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This thesis explores an under-researched field: humanitarian organizations and their
supply chains. Humanitarian organizations respond to the basic needs of populations that
experience a tragic disruption in their lives. Given the challenging contexts they operate
in, this thesis first explores the factors that contribute to their performance. Thereafter, it
identifies the strategies and organizational structures they need to adopt to respond to
the growing challenge of attending to more people with fewer resources. It argues that to
excel in disaster preparedness and response, among other things, humanitarian organizations
need to engage in at least three partnership arrangements – temporary supply networks, a
logistics coordination platform and a series of business and CSO partnerships – and build
and strengthen a number of related capabilities. The invisible resource that once leveraged
increases the opportunity and ability of a humanitarian organization to perform better is
its social capital with parties involved in these partnership arrangements. In terms of lessons
for business, it verifies the relevance and benefits of humanitarian partnership structures
to commercial supply chains in specific scenarios. Apart from holding some lessons for
humanitarian organizations themselves, this thesis contributes to the virtual organizing
literature and provides empirical evidence for the emergence and management of logistics
virtual organizations.
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Chapter 1  Introduction and Overview 
 
According to the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
(IFRC), the number of natural and man-made disasters has increased since the beginning 
of the 21st century. While an average of 470 disasters per year was reported during the 
1991-2000 decade, the number has almost doubled to an average of more than 700 
disasters since 2000 (IFRC, 2004). Over the past decade, weather-related disasters have 
more than doubled outnumbering geophysical disasters - which have remained fairly 
steady - by nine to one (IFRC, 2001 & 2004).  
Natural disasters result in the temporary displacement of approximately five million people 
per year. Among natural disasters, floods affect the highest number of people: an average 
of 140 million per year (IFRC, 2003) while droughts claim the highest number of deaths. 
The effects of civil conflict and war are even more devastating. They result in an average 
of 13 million refugees and up to 20 million Internally Displaced People (IDP) each year. 
Figure 1.1 summarizes the impact of disasters on the world population. 
 
Figure 1.1- Impact of Disasters on World Population 
 1991-2000 
(Avg/year) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 
No. of People Killed 75,250 20,000 39,073 24,500 77,000 
No. of People Affected 211m 256m 170m 680m n.a. 
Source: IFRC, World Disaster Reports, 2001, 2002, 2003 & 2004. 
 
Data shows that the world’s least developed countries are particularly hit by disasters. 
Indeed, 88% of all those affected are in countries of medium human development where 
more than half of natural disasters occur (IFRC, 2001). Two-thirds of those killed, 
however, are from countries of low human development (IFRC, 2001).  
The economic and financial implications of disasters for the international community are 
substantial.  From the economic point of view, in a matter of minutes, natural or man-made 
disasters destroy the very infrastructure of a country, nullifying years of investments and 
development gains. Economic loss continues as long as businesses are interrupted and 
afflicted populations engage in extensive asset liquidation to provide for their daily needs. 
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The price tag of humanitarian aid - estimated at over $18 bn only in 2005 (Riddel, 2007) - 
is typically borne by the international community out of their earmarked development 
assistance budgets. Emergency aid and reconstruction efforts decrease the amount of 
resources available for other development initiatives. Emergency response, recovery and 
reconstruction activities financed out of national budgets of the affected countries divert 
funds from regular development activities. They can also increase a country’s debt profile. 
Climate change is expected to produce environmental effects that will result in an ever-
increasing number of intense natural disasters. The high impact of natural disasters and 
conflicts on the livelihood of so many people, most of whom are particularly vulnerable as 
they are concentrated in the least developed parts of the world, and the implied economic 
loss and financial cost, calls for a closer look.  
Disaster management is primarily the responsibility of the affected government. However, 
large-scale natural and man-made disasters often require the contribution of the 
international community. Humanitarian organizations are the primary governance 
mechanism through which the international community channels emergency funds. This 
thesis aims to provide a first overview on how these organizations can respond to the 
growing challenge of attending to more people with less resources. It aims to bring to the 
forefront and discuss the importance of logistics and supply chain management for the 
humanitarian sector. Hence, it follows an operational view of humanitarian organizations 
without taking into consideration their performance in terms of meeting other needs (e.g. 
psychological including protection against acts of atrocity) of those affected.  
The logistics literature has its origins in military operations. Over the last decades, given 
the growing importance of logistics and supply chain management in commercial 
operations, an extensive literature has emerged to cover the civil sector. More recently, 
research on the logistics and supply chain literature have converged around issues related 
to responsiveness (e.g. Lee, 2002; Fine, 2000 & Fisher, 1997), adaptation (e.g. Lee, 2004), 
resilience (e.g. Rice & Caniato, 2003a; Sheffi, 1990), and collaboration (e.g. Bowersox, 
1990). 
Research on humanitarian supply chains is in its infancy. Lack of any basis in terms of 
conceptual and methodological apparatus on the topic has been the real motivation behind 
this research work. Humanitarian organizations, the relief arm of the international 
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community, address the basic needs of populations that experience a tragic disruption in 
their daily lives. Since society picks up the bill, it is important to learn more about the 
context in which humanitarian organizations operate and how they can best manage their 
supply chains. For example, it is important to know if and how humanitarian operations 
overcome challenges related to responsiveness, adaptation, resilience and collaboration. To 
this end, questions like, ‘What are the main traits of emergency supply chain’, ‘What is the 
context in which humanitarian organizations operate in?’, ‘What strategies can they pursue 
to address such challenges?’ need to be explored. 
This thesis first defines humanitarian supply chains and then grounds research on 
humanitarian relief operations in existing theoretical frameworks. To this end, it has 
identified the network/alliance literature, coordination theory and the resource-base view 
of the firm as relevant. To build the basis for research in this important area, this thesis 
combines these three streams of literature with social capital, the supply chain management 
and the corporate social responsibility literatures. 
The main thrust of this thesis is to develop a framework that helps explain the contribution 
of partnerships to the performance of humanitarian organizations during disaster response.  
As a first step, it explores the importance of a humanitarian organization’s ability to 
manage temporary supply networks in response to each and every emergency. It then 
identifies the ability of an organization to coordinate its response with other humanitarian 
organizations as well as key stakeholders as an effective mitigation measure against 
disaster-specific logistics failure modes.  It argues that select private sector and Civil 
Society Organizations (CSOs) partnerships can enhance an organization’s ability to 
overcome existing resource/capability weaknesses. Finally and most importantly, it 
identifies social capital as the differentiating factor in organizational performance.   
In a second instant, to relate humanitarian supply chain management to commercial 
operations, this research verifies the relevance of the humanitarian logistics partnership 
schemes to commercial supply chains. More specifically, it explores when, to what extent 
and under what conditions strategies pursued by humanitarian organizations in terms of 
organizational structures and practices can be applied to improve the resilience of 
commercial supply chains.  
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This chapter is organized as follows. After defining the main research objective and 
questions, we briefly describe our research design. In section 1.3, we elaborate on the 
relevance and contribution of this research to the supply chain literature. The last section 
provides an overview of the structure and chapters of the thesis.  Given the novelty of the 
research subject, to ensure a common footing to the reader, Appendix A provides a 
snapshot of key humanitarian concepts, organizations and existing structures.  
1.1   Research Objective and Questions 
The goal of this research is to examine the role and contribution of humanitarian 
partnerships to the organizational performance of a humanitarian organization during 
large-scale disasters. Therefore, the object of our study is humanitarian organizations and 
our domain is response to large-scale disasters. The proposed propositions and research 
sub-questions try to explain the relations between our independent variable, i.e., 
partnerships and our dependent variable, i.e., performance by defining relevant mediating 
factors and mechanisms influencing performance. 
For the purpose of this thesis, humanitarian organizations are defined as those non-for-
profit organizations - regardless of their size, geographical or thematic focus - whose 
activities facilitate or include the delivery of aid or assistance in order to save lives and 
alleviate human suffering. This definition includes operational and non-operational 
humanitarian organizations but excludes for-profit organizations and those non-for-profit 
organizations that do not address humanitarian emergencies and operate merely at the 
policy level or have an advocacy role (e.g. fight for the rights and needs of the vulnerable).  
Operational humanitarian organizations are those organizations that manage emergency 
supply chains while non-operational humanitarian organizations provide a service (e.g. in 
the area of logistics) to operational humanitarian organizations.  
Since the focus of this thesis is response during large-scale disasters, the performance of 
humanitarian organizations is measured against short-term, disaster-specific objectives as 
opposed to reconstruction and long-term development objectives related to man-made or 
natural emergencies. 
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Humanitarian organizations are expected to operate in accordance with the principles of 
humanity, neutrality and impartiality (Appendix A). In full respect of these humanitarian 
principles, in this thesis, organizational performance is studied using process and output 
indicators. The process indicators relate to a humanitarian organization’s ability to meet its 
own operational targets for each disaster (internal perspective) and improve its activities 
and create value (innovation & growth perspective). The output indicators are related to 
how well a humanitarian organization meets donor expectation (financial perspective) and 
responds to the needs of the beneficiaries (beneficiary perspective) during each disaster.  
We set the stage for our research project by first defining disaster management and 
organizational performance. We then state the focus of our thesis, which is how 
partnerships can help humanitarian organizations address the challenges of disaster 
response. To gain a better understanding of the impact of partnerships on the performance 
of humanitarian organizations, we develop a conceptual framework. We then derive at a 
number of research questions that are explored and propositions that are tested against our 
empirical evidence. The research objective of this research is as follows: 
 
Research Objective:  
To develop a comprehensive framework that explains the relationship between 
partnerships and the performance of humanitarian organizations during disaster response. 
 
Research Questions: 
To reach this research objective, the following research questions are defined: 
1. What factors contribute to the performance of humanitarian organizations during 
disaster response? 
This research question is explorative. It aims to identify the range of factors that impact the 
performance of humanitarian organizations. 
2. How do humanitarian organizations manage their disaster response activities? 
 
This research question is explorative. It aims to identify the underlying mechanisms, 
resources, structures, and best practices used by humanitarian organizations during disaster 
response and explore how they are developed.  
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1.2    Research Design 
The study of the humanitarian sector is in its initial stages. The aim of this thesis is to 
develop definitions and a framework for future studies on disaster management. To put 
emergency supply chains into context, this study builds on the theoretical frameworks of 
organization sciences, operations management and corporate social responsibility. Based 
on the following branches of literature, a conceptual model is developed. The conceptual 
model serves as a basis for a number of propositions tested and verified with empirical 
data.  
This research is mainly exploratory in nature. Since we try to understand what explains the 
performance of humanitarian organizations during disaster response, this research also 
contains elements of explanatory research. To support our research objective, we start by 
the definition of disaster management and emergency supply chains and describe the 
context in which humanitarian organizations operate. 
1.3   Relevance and Contribution of Research 
The results of this research are relevant to researchers, business and humanitarian 
organizations.  
An understanding of the state of humanitarian supply chains is necessary to identify future 
research on the subject as well as guide humanitarian organizations in their development 
path. This research project can be considered as the first attempt to define, explain and 
explore the operations of the humanitarian sector. As such, it aims to provide the basis for 
future research in this area by providing a rich description of humanitarian operations and 
proposing a framework applicable across organizations explaining organizational 
performance.  
This research contributes to the scientific study of supply chain management in two 
significant ways. First, it establishes humanitarian supply chains as a distinct topic of 
scientific research worthy of study and analysis. Second, by relating commercial supply 
chains to humanitarian supply chains, it shows under which circumstances we can expect 
commercial supply chains to leverage and resort to their portfolio of partnerships to 
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improve their organizational performance. It achieves the latter by applying theories and 
insights gained from different disciplines and empirically grounded in the commercial 
sector to the humanitarian sector.  
This research has also practical relevance for business and the humanitarian sector. Part of 
its social responsibility activities, business is increasingly interested in engaging with non-
profit organizations. This research articulates the steps business needs to take prior and 
during its partnership with a non-profit. It emphasizes best practices and proposes a 
checklist. Second, while humanitarian organizations can learn from business when it 
comes to managing large-scale routine operations, business may be able to learn from the 
experience of humanitarian organizations when it comes to the need to respond to 
unpredictable large-scale events that affect commercial operations. We argue that 
humanitarian organizations manage temporary, global, dynamic and multiple supply chains 
and face a range of logistics failure modes. As more and more commercial supply chains 
operate supply chains with similar traits and meet a similar range of challenges, this 
research helps identify areas of mutual interest and application. 
As far as its practical contribution to the humanitarian sector is concerned, this research 
project provides a different perspective to humanitarian operators. It articulates, brings 
together and analyzes the recent experience of different humanitarian organizations on 
networks, coordination mechanisms and partnerships. In so doing, it helps outline the 
future challenges and opportunities faced by the sector. It also provides an understanding 
of when and why certain supply chain strategies can optimize the response capability of 
humanitarian organizations.  
The results of this research are structured into a framework that explains the performance 
of humanitarian organizations during emergency response. A framework is a useful 
approach in gathering and analyzing insights, arguments and empirical evidence from 
multiple theories and disciplines. It is useful in identifying gaps in our understanding of a 
phenomenon. It is also useful in identifying uncovered areas.  
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1.4   Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of four parts (Figure 1.2). Part I presents the topic of research and the 
research objective and questions. Part II includes three chapters. By referring to the 
humanitarian literature, Chapter 2 derives at our preliminary conceptual framework by 
describing and defining humanitarian emergency supply chains, organizational 
performance and the range of partnership schemes humanitarian organizations engage in. 
To derive at our final conceptual framework, we review relevant literature to identify what 
enhances the disaster management capability of a humanitarian organization. In Chapter 4, 
we develop our research framework to be tested and explored by our empirical research. 
Our empirical research is collated in Part III. In Chapter 5, we present the empirical 
research methodology pursued by this study. Chapters 6, 7, and 8 present and discuss our 
field research conducted at IFRC, United Nations Joint Logistics Center (UNJLC), and 
World Food Programme (WFP). Chapter 9 presents our desk research on the Fritz 
Institute. Chapter 10 analyzes the data and presents our conclusions by relating the results 
to the conceptual model. Part IV concludes our research by highlighting major 
contributions, limitations and suggestions for future research. 
 
Figure 1.2 - Overview of the Thesis 
PART I Introduction 
Chapter 1:   Introduction and Overview 
PART II Development of a Theoretical Framework 
Chapter 2:   Partnerships and Organizational Performance  
Chapter 3:   Literature Review 
 Chapter 4:   Research Framework 
PART III Empirical Research 
Chapter 5:   Empirical Research  
Chapter 6:   IFRC 
Chapter 7:   UNJLC 
Chapter 8:   WFP 
Chapter 9:   Fritz Institute  
Chapter 10: Case Analysis 
PART IV Conclusions 
Chapter 11: Key Findings, Contributions and Future Research 
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Chapter 2  Partnerships and Organizational Performance  
 
Today, one of the biggest challenges and opportunities facing a company is related to its 
supply chain. The source of temporary competitive advantage (Fine, 2000) - the ability to 
deliver a wide range of items and services to customers at the request time and place - is 
believed to lie in the characteristics of the supply chain. Although efficiency remains 
important, firms that manage supply chains that are not responsive to unexpected changes 
or fail to adapt to gradual structural shifts loose market share. Companies that continually 
assess their supply and distribution chains with a view to redesign and adjust them to the 
changing environment tend to lead in their respective industries. Supply chain management 
is equally important to humanitarian organizations as it determines the effectiveness and 
efficiency of their disaster response operations. 
The primary goal of humanitarian organizations is to limit human loss and suffering by 
quickly restoring acceptable living conditions prior or after natural and man-made 
disasters. To respond to the needs of populations in need and at risk, humanitarian 
organizations manage three distinct types of supply chains: development, recovery and 
emergency supply chains. Development supply chains address the needs of the most 
disadvantaged populations on a medium to long-term basis. Examples include assistance to 
semi-permanent refugee camps or school feeding programs for children. Recovery supply 
chains address the post-emergency needs of an afflicted population including 
reconstruction. The focus of this thesis is supply chains and networks set up in response to 
emerging and sudden natural or man-made disasters.   
To master disaster management and ensure the arrival of the right goods at the right place 
at the right time, humanitarian organizations have to excel in disaster preparedness1 and 
disaster response (Chomilier et al., 2003). Samii et al. (Samii et al., 2002b) have identified 
the five pillars of disaster preparedness. These are a stand-by and qualified humanitarian 
personnel; robust knowledge and information management systems; well-established 
disaster response plans and processes; sufficient contingency funding and adequate level of 
                                                 
1
  Disaster preparedness is not to be confused with disaster prevention which includes actions such as 
construction standards against earthquakes that aim to reduce the vulnerability of segments of population 
vis-à-vis certain disasters. 
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inventory and stand-by equipment; and inter-organizational cooperation agreements with 
donors, recipient governments, and suppliers. While preparedness issues are referred to 
throughout this study, the thrust of this thesis is the second component of disaster 
management, namely disaster response mainly from the supply chain perspective. 
The humanitarian literature has highlighted the importance of partnerships in disaster 
response. Although research on partnerships in humanitarian relief is scarce, in a recent 
study, Binder & Witte (Binder & Witte, 2007) study the role of private sector companies in 
humanitarian operations. They conclude that private sector engagement in humanitarian 
operations, although still marginal in terms of number of companies involved and financial 
contributions, has increased. Publicly available data shows that the humanitarian sector has 
attracted in-kind contribution predominately from three sectors: logistics, IT and telecom. 
Although the literature concludes that business partnerships have the potential to improve 
the level of disaster relief services (Globalgivingmatters, 2005; Thomas & Fritz, 2006; 
Binder & Witte, 2007), there has been no attempt to explain the relationship between 
business contribution and the performance of assisted humanitarian organizations.  
Many actors play an active role in the humanitarian supply chain. These include donors, 
suppliers, the military, host government, neighboring country governments, NGOs, other 
humanitarian organizations and logistics service providers (Samii & Van Wassenhove, 
2002b; Kaatrud et al., 2003). A humanitarian organization depends on these actors for the 
mobilization, transport and distribution of relief items.  
Finally, given a simultaneous call on limited logistics resources by all those actors 
involved in disaster response, a humanitarian organization also needs to coordinate its 
relief activities with other humanitarian organizations as well as key stakeholders.  
Until recently, humanitarian organizations were evaluated mainly from the institutional 
perspective – mission to save lives and reduce human suffering – rather than the 
operational one. Today, the increased number and scale of disasters coupled by limited 
access to resources have enhanced the need for more efficient and effective relief 
operations. Against this background, the thinking among the progressive humanitarian 
organizations and donors has evolved. Donors require humanitarian organizations to be 
more results-oriented and their operations more accountable and transparent (Van 
Wassenhove, 2006). As a result, apart from minimizing the social cost of an emergency, 
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humanitarian organizations are starting to embrace a wider set of objectives. These include 
the: i) need to protect development gains, i.e., minimize the long-term and economic cost 
of a disaster, ii) become cost-effective, i.e., minimize the financial cost of their relief 
operations, and iii) operate efficiently, i.e., reduce time of delivery.  
Logistics2 efforts account for 80 per cent of disaster relief (Turnick, 2005). Since logistics 
is central to relief operations (Chomilier et al, 2003) as well as the most expensive part 
(Van Wassenhove, 2006), Beamon & Balcik (Beamon & Balcik, 2008) argue that 
measuring the performance of relief chains is of primary importance. To date there have 
been few attempts to develop performance metrics and measurement systems for 
humanitarian organizations. None of the proposed performance measurement frameworks 
provide a holistic view of the performance of humanitarian organizations during disaster 
response. Performance measurement for emergency chains is not only critical to secure 
donor funding and improve the relief mission (Beamon & Balcik, 2008), but also to 
evaluate the contribution of partnerships to performance. In this respect, the literature has 
identified the need for an effective partnership evaluation framework that can measure the 
impact and outcome of partnerships on humanitarian operations (Binder & Witte, 2007). 
This Chapter aims to achieve three objectives. To identify what partnership schemes 
humanitarian organizations engage in, it will first review and build upon the existing 
literature on humanitarian partnerships and networks. To define performance of 
humanitarian organizations, it will propose a performance measurement framework. 
Finally, by describing the impact of partnerships on organizational performance, it will try 
to identify the concepts that can help us understand the disaster management capabilities of 
humanitarian organizations (Figure 2.1). The concepts will then be further developed 
through a literature review in Chapter 3. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
  Historically, in the humanitarian community, the term logistics has been used to express the functions of 
procurement and transportation as well as the supply and distribution flows. In this thesis the terms of 
logistics and supply chain management are used interchangeably. 
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Figure 2.1 – Preliminary Conceptual Framework 
 
To build an understanding of emergency supply chains and networks this chapter starts 
with a brief description of the main differences and similarities between business and 
humanitarian organizations. Section 2.2 puts disaster response in the context of supply 
chain management. Section 2.3 distinguishes between commercial and humanitarian 
supply chains and outlines the structural traits of emergency supply chains. By applying 
Lee’s (Lee, 2002) “uncertainty framework” to humanitarian supply chains, section 2.4 
identifies the most adequate supply chain sourcing strategy given the demand and supply 
characteristics of relief items and the need to respond to predictable and unpredictable 
disasters. Section 2.5 identifies the range of challenges facing the sector and helps put into 
context the need for different partnership schemes. Section 2.6 defines organizational 
performance in the context of humanitarian organizations by elaborating a humanitarian 
organization balanced scorecard. Section 2.7 puts into relationship different partnership 
schemes and organizational performance. Finally, section 2.8 reviews the humanitarian 
literature with a view to identify the drivers behind humanitarian partnerships. 
2.1  Business versus Humanitarian Organizations 
In Chapter 1 we defined humanitarian organizations as those non-for-profit organizations 
whose activities facilitate or include the delivery of aid or assistance in order to save lives, 
meet basic human needs and alleviate human suffering. As one of the units of analysis of 
this thesis is a humanitarian organization, below we provide an introductory note on its 
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main characteristics. By comparing humanitarian organizations with for-profit 
organizations, we can appreciate how the unique goals, features and constraints of 
operational humanitarian organizations affect their supply chains and performance. 
 
Figure 2.2 – Business versus Operational Humanitarian Organization 
 Business Humanitarian Organization 
Goal Profit maximization by 
satisfying a market need 
Social Profit, respond to a 
humanitarian need 
Ownership Owners Members 
Source of fund/revenue Consumers Donors 
Services/Scope of impact Commercial  
Provision of private 
goods to fulfill private 
interest 
Humanitarian 
Provision of goods and 
services to address social 
interest and need 
Transactions 
coordinated by 
Primarily by Price Primarily by humanitarian 
needs and social and moral 
obligation 
Survival & growth Customer satisfaction, 
profit 
Social acceptance 
Object of Competition Product Donations 
Performance 
expectations 
Financial: shareholder 
value (e.g. dividends) 
through customer 
satisfaction 
Fulfillment of a social contract, 
conformity with expectations 
of the environment 
 
There is a vast body of literature that contrasts and compares for-profit and non-profit 
organizations. Beamon & Balcik (Beamon & Balcik, 2008) compare these two types of 
organization by revenue sources (Moore, 2000), goals (Moore, 2000; Boland & Fowler, 
2000), stakeholders (Speckbacher, 2003) and performance measurement. Drawing on this 
literature, we propose to compare business and humanitarian organizations from eight 
perspectives (Figure 2.2).  
The primary goal of business is to make profit for its owners by selling private goods and 
services to consumers. Business competes on the market through its products and 
transactions are regulated by the price mechanism. A firm’s resource generation capacity 
and performance are directly tied to customer satisfaction as consumers are both users and 
buyers of a firm’s product (Figure 2.3).  
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Figure 2.3 – Buyer and User in Commercial Supply Chains 
 
 
Unlike firms, humanitarian organizations lack any manufacturing or selling function. 
Moreover, unlike commercial operations, the buyer and user of humanitarian services are 
two different entities. The user is the beneficiary while the buyer is the donor (Figure 2.4). 
Transactions are regulated by humanitarian needs and the social and moral obligation of 
the international community. Competition among humanitarian organizations is centered 
around the buyer function, i.e., the fund raising capability and to a lesser extent during the 
procurement stage.  
 
Figure 2.4 – Buyer and User in Humanitarian Supply Chains 
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It is important to highlight the very different role assumed by customers and end-
beneficiaries in the commercial and humanitarian supply chains. In commercial supply 
chains, the customer drives/pulls, is more and more integrated in the supply chain (e.g. 
direct sales model). In humanitarian relief, the end-beneficiary, although highly valued, has 
very little voice in the process. It does not purchase nor pay for the delivered services. 
Humanitarian organizations dominate the supply chain as service providers while donors, 
heavily influenced by political and military agendas, actions and decisions, define the 
scope of the operation through their contribution (Benini, 1999).  
A for-profit’s shareholders determine the vision and strategies of the firm. The vision of a 
humanitarian organization is driven by humanitarian needs and its authority derives from a 
universally shared value: need for solidarity. The survival and growth of non-profit 
organizations in general and humanitarian organizations in particular depend on how well 
they match the expectations of society and their stakeholders. In this respect, financial 
stability is crucial to their survival but financial resources are a constraint rather than a goal 
(Beamon & Balcik, 2008). 
Controlled by their members, humanitarian organizations intervene where the market and 
government mechanisms have failed. Indeed, the international infrastructure of 
humanitarian, development and economic organizations exist to support or, in extreme 
cases, substitute for weak governments in the context of the government-donor relationship 
(Samii, 2006). This international infrastructure performs a dual intermediation role: It 
assists beneficiary countries to maximize the use of donor funds and donors to efficiently 
channel funds to beneficiary countries (Samii, 2006). 
2.2   Disaster Response: A Specific Supply Chain Scenario 
To understand the context in which humanitarian organizations stage their response 
operations, we propose a framework that differentiates between different supply chain 
scenarios. The framework distinguishes between routine and event-related supply chains 
mounted in response to predictable and unpredictable situations (Figure 2.5).  
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Fisher (Fisher, 1997) contends that what determines the level of demand volatility is the 
nature of the product. He provides a definition for functional and innovative products, 
further developed by Lee (Lee, 2002). Functional products are staples that satisfy basic 
needs and have long life cycles. They are products for which customer requirement for 
variety is low, stable and demand is predictable. In contrast, innovative products are those 
products that have short life cycles, come with high variety, have high innovation and 
fashion contents and for which there is limited history of customer demand making their 
demand highly unpredictable.  
 
Figure 2.5 – Supply Chain Management Scenarios 
 
Event 
Large Event Organization 
(Olympic games, music parades, 
conventions, predictable disasters) 
Unpredictable Disasters 
(Fire, hurricane, terrorism, 
earthquake) 
 
Routine 
Functional Products 
(Basic apparel, food) 
Innovative Products 
(Fashion, hi-tech items) 
 Predictable Unpredictable 
 
Fisher argues that functional products with long product life cycle and low levels of variety 
have stable demand. Innovative products with short life cycles, high innovation and 
fashion contents that come in a large variety have unpredictable demand. We advance that 
producers of functional products by responding to a predictable demand manage a series of 
routine operations (lower left quadrant of Figure 2.5). Although producers of innovative 
products do face an unpredictable demand, we argue that they too manage routine supply 
chain models (lower right quadrant of Figure 2.5).  
The third typology of supply chains scenario are those related to large one-off events such 
as sports competitions, conventions and, to a certain extent, emerging disasters. For 
example, some parts of the world are vulnerable to cyclical disasters like the hurricanes in 
Central America and the Caribbean, drought in the Horn of Africa or floods in Bangladesh. 
Advance planning and monitoring of events (e.g. rainfall data in case of drought) allows 
for the elaboration of demand data. As these types of events are either fixed in time and 
space or predictable to a certain extent, they fall within the predictable demand category 
(upper left quadrant of Figure 2.5).  
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The last category consists of supply chains designed in response to unpredictable and 
large-scale one-off events such as sudden disasters. Indeed, most natural and man-made 
disasters (e.g. 2004 tsunami, 2006 Lebanon crisis) remain unpredictable with respect to 
their location, nature, intensity, geographical coverage and timing (upper right quadrant of 
Figure 2.5).  
Companies actively manage their supply chains with a view to reduce the gap between 
demand and supply. To address the front-end uncertainties, they use a set of techniques 
and blend the power of information technology with human input to forecast predictable 
and unpredictable demand. They capture and elaborate sales data, use proxies that can 
serve as guiding indicators, remain close to the market place, postpone final product 
configuration and keep an eye on structural shifts (Ferdows et al., 2004; Fisher et al. 1994; 
Lee, 2004; Magretta, 1998). To best respond to the needs of their customers, they make a 
series of strategic decisions regarding their asset configuration, products, operations and 
supplier network.   
The majority of supply chains managed by business are routine operations that rely on 
supply chain models designed for repetitious actions. On a recurrent basis, private and 
public entities manage a series of supply chains related to calendar- and location-fixed one-
off and repeated events. Consequently, business has to overcome major and unpredictable 
failure modes only on an extraordinary basis. This can partially explain why companies 
have plans against recurrent, low-impact risks while few have plans and are capable to 
respond to high-impact, low-likelihood risks (Rice & Caniato, 2003a). 
In contrast, humanitarian organizations are increasingly tied up in the management of 
large-scale, sudden and complex3 disasters. Those with a global mandate operate in fast 
clockspeed environments and need to respond to do not know when, where, what, how 
much and how many times situations. Consequently, humanitarian organizations need to 
construct and manage a series of non-routine supply chains in response to predictable and 
unpredictable large-scale events repeatedly.   
                                                 
3
  Complex disasters are defined as ‘a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society whether there is 
significant or total breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires 
an international response that extends beyond the mandate or capacity of any single humanitarian agency.’ 
(UNICEF, 2003) 
42
CHAPTER 2 – PARTNERSHIPS AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
 
 
42
2.3  Emergency Supply Chains and Networks 
To produce and sell goods and services to customers, firms manage supply chains and 
networks. Supply chains refer to the order of actors and activities associated to the 
movement of goods from the raw material stage through to the end-customer while supply 
networks refer to the series of relationships maintained over time by a firm to achieve its 
supply chain objectives. Supply Chain Management (SCM) is defined as “a set of 
approaches utilized to efficiently integrate suppliers, manufacturers, warehouses and 
stores, so that merchandise is produced and distributed at the right quantities, to the right 
location and at the right time, in order to minimize system-wide costs while satisfying 
service level requirements” (Simchi-Levi et al., 2000). SCM in commercial activities 
involves a series of actors (Figure 2.6), a forward and backward flow and integration of 
resources – material, information and finance – among supply chain members and the 
following processes: planning, sourcing, making, delivering (transport, storing and 
distribution) and returning through reverse logistics (Figure 2.7).   
 
Figure 2.6 – Main Actors in Commercial Supply Chains 
 
 
Figure 2.7 – Main Activities in Commercial Supply Chains 
 
Emergency supply chain involves the active participation of seven networks of actors. The 
media through coverage of a disaster activates an emergency supply chain and provides 
information. Donors through provision of funds, goods, services and people fuel the 
emergency supply chain. Donors together with suppliers are a source of relief items.  Four 
actors contribute to a humanitarian organization’s logistics assets requirements: donors, 
recipient country(s), neighboring countries and military forces. Implementing partners 
(IPs) who are usually part of the NGO community typically act as distributors (Figure 2.8).  
  Manufacturers Distributors  Retailers Suppliers Consumers 
Sourcing  Making Delivering Planning Returning 
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Finally, beneficiaries as passive actors are at the receiving end of a humanitarian 
organization’s supply chain. 
  
Figure 2.8 – Main Actors in the Humanitarian Organization’s Supply Chain 
 
Humanitarian organizations operate along a consolidated business model (Samii & Van 
Wassenhove, 2006). When disaster strikes, to plan their activities, they engage in an initial 
needs assessment exercise. They determine the level of destruction, number of people 
affected and their initial needs. Then they assess the availability of local resources, 
magnitude of international assistance required, means of delivery, etc. This is with a view 
to prepare an initial appeal indicating how much of what type of goods and services are 
required, when, and where. As more information on the needs of the population becomes 
available, subsequent appeals are prepared.  
After determining needs, humanitarian organizations mobilize cash, people, services, 
information and in-kind donations. As humanitarian organizations do not have a 
manufacturing function, resource mobilization activities are central to their operations. The 
sourced relief items are then transported to the disaster area. Both procured and solicited 
in-kind donations are stored in warehouses before distribution to the population. Ideally, 
there is no need for reverse supply chain management since end-beneficiaries consume 
relief items and non-consumable goods, such as vehicles, are donated to the host country. 
Reverse supply chain management is required only when unsolicited, contaminated, 
expired or residual non-consumables and consumables are disposed of or transferred to 
another disaster (Figure 2.9). Contrary to business, planning does not occur once, that is, at 
the outset of an emergency but is a continuous activity. Response plans are updated, fine-
tuned, and adapted regularly to take into account new environmental conditions and 
changing demand and supply information. Tracking occurs at different stages while 
reporting to donors is typically the step before the closure of the emergency account. 
     Donors Suppliers 
 Logistics 
asset 
providers* 
Media 
IPs: 
Distributors  Beneficiaries 
* Donors, recipient and neighboring country & military forces 
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Figure 2.9 – Main Activities in Emergency Supply Chains 
 
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) manage global and multiple supply chains repeatedly. 
Samii & Van Wassenhove (Samii & Van Wassehove, 2002a) have noted that international 
humanitarian organizations with a global mandate manage global and multiple emergency 
supply chains and networks that are dynamic and temporary by nature (Figure 2.10).  
 
Figure 2.10 – Characteristics of Emergency Supply Chains and Networks 
Global Multiple Dynamic Temporary 
• Global 
operations 
• Global 
donors 
• Global 
suppliers 
• Multiple disasters 
• Multiple supply 
chains and 
logistics systems 
• Multiple origin & 
destination of 
supplies 
• Large no. of 
SKUs 
• Volatile 
demand 
• Changing 
supply 
• Changing 
sourcing, 
staging & 
distribution 
strategies 
• Project-like, 
short-lived 
supply chains 
• Temporary 
collaborations 
• Quick phase-
outs 
 
Similar to MNEs, international humanitarian organizations with global operations manage 
supply chains and networks that span national boundaries. On the supply side, they raise 
and receive monetary and in-kind donations from donors (private and public entities) 
across the globe and procure from a mix of local and international suppliers. On the 
demand side, they assist afflicted populations across geographies. 
At any given time, humanitarian organizations manage a multitude of disaster-specific 
supply chains. In response to a given disaster they mobilize and handle a wide range of 
products. Given the specific characteristics of relief items, they require different 
transportation modes, handling equipment, storage conditions and cannot be dealt with a 
unified logistics system. As a result, humanitarian organizations manage and coordinate as 
many supply chains as those required to move and store a variety of food and Non Food 
items (NFIs) in bulk and small Stock Keeping Units (SKUs). The number and range of 
    Planning  
 
 Returning Disaster 
Resource 
Mobilization 
 
Sourcing Delivering 
 
  Reporting 
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products handled by the humanitarian supply chain increases the complexity of logistics in 
supply and distribution. 
Hoffman (Hoffman, 2005) notes that humanitarian supply chains are the most dynamic 
supply chains in the world. Emergency supply chains are particularly dynamic, volatile as 
information on demand and supply is not available at the outset of a disaster. While 
demand is subject to continuous change, the flow of contributions from various sources 
affects supply. In addition, the origin and destination of humanitarian supplies are multiple. 
They are also in continuous evolution during a given response effort.  In order to ensure 
the mobilization of the right quality and volume of goods and their speedy distribution, 
organizations adopt multiple and dynamic supply sourcing, staging and distribution 
strategies. Changes are driven by the evolution of environmental and supply factors such 
as security, activation of a new transport corridor, availability of a warehouse in a new 
location and identification of a new supplier.  
Emergency supply chains and networks are by definition inherently temporary. With an 
average life span of three to six months, these short-lived supply chains and networks are 
disassembled after the emergency phase. From the supply chain perspective, for each 
disaster, project-like supply chains with a specific set of activity links, actors’ bonds and 
resource ties are constructed and choreographed to cater to the needs of the target 
population like diet, living styles and climatic conditions.  
The unpredictable nature of disasters adds another dimension to the temporary nature of 
humanitarian supply chains in terms of planned against effective duration. In the context of 
limited resources, humanitarian organizations confronted with sudden disasters revisit 
decisions related to the duration and intensity of each operation. In function of their 
resources, some organizations may phase-out their involvement in a disaster earlier than 
planned to address new and more urgent crises. Others may fully adhere to their original 
plans and respond to competing disasters simultaneously.   
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2.4  Supply Chain Sourcing Strategies for Predictable and 
Unpredictable Disasters 
This section uses the uncertainty framework proposed by Lee (Lee, 2002) to identify the 
supply chain sourcing strategies that allow humanitarian organizations to best respond to 
the specific needs of disaster-hit populations during emerging or predictable disasters and 
sudden or unpredictable disasters.  
The supply chain literature argues that undersupply or oversupply are endemic to those 
industries with considerable product proliferation, short selling season, a limited history of 
specific customer demand and where demand is heavily dependent on hard-to-predict 
factors such as weather, fashion trends and the economy. Lee (Lee, 2002) suggests that by 
pursuing the right sourcing strategy, firms can avoid such supply excesses and stock-outs 
reducing disruptions in supply. According to him, a simple but powerful way to reduce the 
risk of undersupply or oversupply is by considering the “uncertainty framework”. The 
framework specifies two key uncertainties faced by a product: demand and supply. 
Fisher (Fisher, 1997) elaborating on the demand side of a product concludes that functional 
and innovative products require different supply chain strategies (Figure 2.11). Firms 
dealing with functional products with predictable demand can concentrate more on process 
efficiencies. For these products, supply chain partners can achieve a nearly perfect match 
between demand and supply through forecast-based management, that is, if they ensure an 
adequate flow of information and level of coordination. For innovative products, demand 
forecasts are not always capable of bridging the gap between demand and supply. Hence, 
the most appropriate strategy is a responsive supply chain where flexibility is built into the 
supply chain network. 
Lee (Lee, 2002) elaborates on the second half of the equation, namely supply. He 
distinguishes between a stable and evolving supply process. The stable supply process is 
one where the manufacturing process is highly automated, the underlying technology is 
mature and the supply base is long established. In contrast, those of evolving supply 
processes, the manufacturing processes and technologies are in development and the 
supplier base limited in size, capacity, experience and level of performance.  
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Figure 2.11 – Characteristics of Functional and Innovative Products 
Functional Innovative 
Low demand uncertainties High demand uncertainties 
More predictable demand Difficult to forecast 
Stable demand Variable demand 
Long product life Short selling season 
Low inventory cost High inventory cost 
Low profit margins High profit margins (utility) 
Low product variety High product variety 
Higher volume per SKU Low volumes per SKU 
Low stock out cost High stock out cost 
Low obsolescence High obsolescence (non transferability) 
Source:  Lee, H. L. (2002), “Aligning Supply Chain Strategies with Product Uncertainties,” California 
Management Review, Vol. 44 No.32, p. 106. 
 
The uncertainty framework reproduced below assists in the identification of the most 
adequate supply chain strategy (Figure 2.12). It combines Fisher’s product definitions and 
the associated level of demand uncertainty with the level of supply uncertainty quantified 
in stable or evolving supply processes. 
 
Figure 2.12 – Sourcing Strategies 
Uncertainty 
framework/ 
Matching Strategies 
Functional products Innovative products 
Stable process Grocery, basic apparel 
(efficient supply chains) 
Fashion apparel, pop music 
(responsive supply chains) 
Evolving process Some food products 
(risk-hedging supply chains) 
Telecom, high-end 
computers 
(agile supply chains) 
Source: Adapted from Lee, H. L. (2002), “Aligning Supply Chain Strategies with Product Uncertainties,” 
California Management Review, Vol. 44 No.3, p. 108 & 114. 
 
Lee (Lee, 2002) sustains that companies providing functional products produced by stable 
processes should opt for efficient supply chains. As such, they should pursue economies of 
scale, optimize capacity and distribution utilization and operate with minimum inventory. 
Companies in this category can establish optimal levels of inventory by turning historical 
sales data into knowledge about their clients’ consumption patterns and generate demand 
projections (Fisher, 1997).  
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Companies providing functional products using evolving processes need to dilute risk 
associated with their supplier base. They should hedge against supply risks by pooling and 
sharing resources such as inventory and sourcing from more than one and alternative 
suppliers.  
The uncertainty framework recommends responsive supply chain strategies for companies 
operating in volatile markets with a stable process. To address the changing, diverse, 
unpredictable and specific requirements of customers, producers of fashion-related 
products can forecast for their capacity levels while using a mixture of techniques (e.g. 
execution against demand, postponement, modular design and products) to respond 
accurately and quickly to front-end uncertainties.  
The framework indicates agile supply chains as the most adequate sourcing strategy for 
companies that depend on evolving processes to produce innovative products (Figure 
2.12). Companies managing agile supply chains are flexible and responsive to volatile, 
short-term changes in demand and hedged against supply shortages or external disruptions 
(Lee, 2002). To establish and manage agile supply chains, companies need to promote 
flow of information among the network partners and develop collaborative relationships 
with suppliers. They should design for postponement, build inventory buffers, have a 
dependable logistics system or partner, draw up contingency plans and develop crisis 
management teams (Lee, 2004). To achieve “accurate response” (Fisher, 1997), they need 
to combine historical data with knowledge residing in-house as well as with supply chain 
members. 
As discussed in section 2.2, in terms of demand, humanitarian organizations need to 
forecast for predictable and unpredictable demand. The requirements of the population 
depend on the nature of the crisis. For example, while disaster victims can still count on 
their communities for support, the same is not true for refugees and Internally Displaced 
People (IDP).   
For large scale disasters, humanitarian organizations mobilize a couple of hundred food 
and NFIs. Relief items are standard, mature, discrete products or assembled kits composed 
of modular products with relatively basic features. The supply base of relief items is 
mainly stable as the manufacturing processes are highly automated and the underlying 
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technologies mature.  The exceptions relate to products with long lead-time and a limited 
supplier base in terms of size and capacity. 
Relief items although consisting mainly of mature products have the demand 
characteristics of functional or innovative products depending on the type of emergency. 
For emerging crises, demand is estimated and an action plan put in place.  Stock-outs can 
be averted and supply constraints overcome. For unpredictable disasters, demand is 
uncertain and variable. Supply in the larger sense is unpredictable as at the outset of a 
disaster the level of collaboration and contribution of the humanitarian response network is 
unknown. The contribution of a humanitarian organization is subject to significant 
variations and depends on the request of the recipient government and the response of the 
local and international community and other humanitarian organizations. Moreover, the 
competing supply chains of humanitarian organizations can result in stock-outs and 
temporary price hikes.   
 
Figure 2.13 – Humanitarian Supply Chain Sourcing Strategies 
Uncertainty framework/ 
Matching Strategies 
Functional products Innovative products 
Stable process Emerging/Predictable Disasters 
(efficient supply chains) 
 
 
Evolving process  Unpredictable disasters 
(agile supply chains) 
 
We argue that for predictable/emerging disasters, to save as many lives as possible, 
humanitarian organizations should aim at process and cost efficiency (Figure 2.13). 
Indeed, high speed and low cost operations increase the outreach of relief operations. In 
unpredictable disasters, humanitarian organizations have to respond to a volatile demand 
and mobilize a high number of SKUs. Given that the price in terms of lives not saved is 
simply too high, we argue that humanitarian supply chains need to be agile, i.e., flexible 
and fast. 
In conclusion, we advance that humanitarian organizations should excel in two supply 
chain sourcing strategies and build capabilities and systems that allow for their parallel, 
simultaneous management.  
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2.5  Humanitarian Partnerships: A Response to Disaster 
Management Challenges  
Operational humanitarian organizations regardless of their size or area of specialization 
(refugees, children, food, etc.) face a number of challenges. This section explores the 
challenges humanitarian organizations face by providing an overview of the context in 
which they operate. This allows us to set the stage for discussing the first component of 
our preliminary conceptual framework: Partnerships.  
The first challenge facing a humanitarian organization immediately after a disaster is how 
to bridge the relief resource and capability gap, which is often significant. To stage a 
response and overcome this gap, humanitarian organizations depend on their supply 
network composed of a number of loose partnerships with a range of actors.  
Response to humanitarian crises is fractioned and organized organizationally along 
mandates and functional lines (Kent, 1987; Borton, 1993). Therefore, when a large scale 
disaster strikes, a large number of humanitarian organizations converge to the disaster site. 
Once in the operating theatre, their supply chains tend to compete over the same range of 
resources at exactly the same arch of time. Given the plurality of humanitarian 
organizations, the sector has long identified the need for effective ways and means to 
ensure inter-agency coordination. The literature has not only recognized the need for inter-
agency coordination but also coordination between humanitarian organizations and other 
stakeholders, all with their own structures and objectives (Long & Wood, 1995).  
There is recognition that disaster preparedness enhances disaster response efficiency and 
effectiveness. However, donors prefer to fund emergency activities and are often reluctant 
to cover core costs necessary to strengthen organizational capacity and capability (Fritz 
Institute, 2005a). Secondly, they tend to evaluate humanitarian organizations on the 
percentage of funds used on direct relief activities. As such, organizations with higher 
overhead costs, e.g., higher investments in support activities such as IT, are often 
considered less efficient (Samii et al., 2002b). In contrast, those with lower overhead costs 
– the most-valued indicator of efficiency – are often rewarded with additional voluntary 
donations. To improve its operations, a humanitarian organization has to overcome the 
prevailing donor mind-set and ensure investment in the area of disaster preparedness.  
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The more inclusive set of objectives has produced a pressing and simultaneous need 
among humanitarian organizations: A rapid professionlization of the sector and in 
particular of the logistics function, long overlooked, given its central role in disaster 
management (Fritz Institute, 2005b). In the logistics area, the challenges facing 
humanitarian organizations are the formal qualification of logistics staff (Oloruntoba & 
Gray, 2006), optimization of their logistics activities and the integration of activities across 
business functions. 
Lack of funding for back-office infrastructure and processes and the need to upgrade the 
logistics function including its information and knowledge management aspect (Van der 
Laan et al., 2007) have attracted the first wave of structured business-humanitarian 
partnerships. Binder & Witte (Binder & Witte, 2007) conclude that the role of business in 
humanitarian relief is becoming more prominent even if it remains a limited phenomenon. 
They identify three ways in which business can engage with a humanitarian organization 
and identify the provision of expertise, new technology and in some cases funding as 
objects of cooperation. Similarly, Thomas & Fritz (Thomas & Fritz, 2006) reviewing the 
private-public relief partnership scene, identify four ways in which a business can share its 
wealth of operational expertise and experience, especially in the area of back-office 
infrastructure and processes, with a humanitarian organization.  
In conclusion, operational humanitarian organizations appear to resort to a portfolio of 
partnerships – temporary supply networks, coordination networks and business-
humanitarian partnerships – to tackle preparedness and response challenges related to their 
operations.   
2.6   Organizational Performance 
To define the second component of our preliminary conceptual framework - organizational 
performance - we open a parenthesis on the topic of performance measurement. By 
drawing on the relevant literature, we first define performance measurement, then review 
the humanitarian literature on the subject and finally apply the predominant performance 
measurement framework to humanitarian organizations.  
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Neely et al. (Neely et al., 1995) define performance measurement as a process of 
quantifying effectiveness and efficiency of action where “effectiveness is the extent to 
which customer requirements are met and efficiency is how economically the firm’s 
resources are utilized to ensure the desired level of customer satisfaction.”  
Kaplan & Norton (Kaplan & Norton, 1992) emphasize the importance of a balanced view 
of organizational performance. They advocate the importance of internal and external, 
financial and non-financial, short and long term perspectives and the relationships between 
different measures on performance evaluation. They advance a framework – the balanced 
scorecard – which focuses on interrelationships between financial and non-financial results 
from four perspectives: financials, customers, internal processes and innovation and 
learning. The four aspects of the balanced scorecard can be related to Fitzgerald et al. 
(Fitzgerald et al., 1991) two basic types of performance measurements: those related to 
results (customers, financial performance) and therefore outputs and those focused on the 
determinants of the results (internal, innovation and learning) and therefore processes.  
The balanced scorecard concept has been the most influential contribution to the study of 
performance measurement (Neely, 2005). The framework has found wide application in 
business and there is growing evidence of its applicability to non-for-profit entities 
(Phillips, 2004).  
As discussed in section 2.1, profitability is key to the survival of private firms while non-
for-profit entities in general and humanitarian organizations in particular have to fulfill a 
particular mission. As such, they can be evaluated along the efficiency and effectiveness 
criteria, where efficiency indicates the extent to which a humanitarian organization 
speedily delivers assistance with the least possible use of resources and effectiveness 
measures the extent of achieved versus intended target. 
Parung & Bititci (Parung & Bititci, 2006) argue that given the increasing importance of 
collaborative networks to firm performance, it is important to measure input (what 
resources participants contribute into a collaborative network), process (distinguish healthy 
networks from unhealthy ones) and output (value gained by different stakeholders). For 
each emergency, an operational humanitarian organization has to orchestrate a response. 
The ability of a humanitarian organization’s logistics function and the strength and ‘health’ 
of its network of partners directly affect the success of a relief effort. It is also important to 
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emphasis that an ever-increasing proportion of a humanitarian organization’s assets consist 
of intangibles, grounded in their human capital.  
 
2.6.1  Literature Review on Humanitarian Performance Indicators 
Beamon & Balcik (Beamon & Balcik, 2008) discuss the challenges for performance 
measurement in the nonprofit sector given the “intangibility of the services offered, 
immeasurability of the missions, unknowable outcomes, and the variety, interest and 
standards of stakeholders.” Despite these challenges, there is a need to measure the 
performance of non-profits in general and humanitarian organizations in particular.  
Scholars note that non-profit organizations tend to measure performance in terms of 
financial and non-financial inputs metrics rather than outputs metrics (Kaplan, 2001 & 
Henderson et al., 2002). Thomas & Fritz (Thomas & Fritz, 2006) observe that the sector 
measures itself in terms of how much food it has distributed or how much funding it has 
raised rather than how many lives it has saved or sufferings it has alleviated. Since such 
input metrics does not necessarily imply higher levels of services nor higher delivery 
capacity (Letts et al., 1999), the sector requires a performance measurement framework 
that can measure how effectively and efficiently it meets its mission.  
Although there is an increasing interest in performance measurement of nonprofit 
organizations, to date there have been only two attempts to measure the supply chain 
performance of relief operations. More specifically, Davidson (Davidson, 2006) develops a 
performance measurement framework for relief logistics by proposing four performance 
metrics. More recently, Beamon & Balcik (Beamon & Balcik, 2008) have applied 
Beamon’s (Beamon, 1999) performance measurement framework consisting of resource 
metrics, output metrics and flexibility metrics to humanitarian supply chains. 
Davidson (Davidson, 2006) argues that disaster response involves trade-offs between 
speed, cost and accuracy of an operation. This is because speed increases the cost of an 
operation and not necessarily accurately meets the requirements of the beneficiaries. To 
make informed decisions regarding these trade-offs, four indicators are proposed: appeal 
coverage, donation to delivery time, financial efficiency and assessment accuracy. The 
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appeal coverage helps measure the extent to which an organization is meeting its appeal in 
terms of both finding donors and delivering items. The donation to delivery time indicator 
helps measure both the average and the consistency of the delivery lead times. The 
financial efficiency indicators compare budgeted versus actual cost of an operation. These 
indicators are to help logisticians make better decisions, measure actual achievements 
against pre-set targets, provide accountability and develop lessons learnt. 
Beamon & Balcik (Beamon & Balcik, 2008) propose three sets of metrics to measure the 
performance of humanitarian organizations during disaster response, namely resource 
metrics, output metric and flexibility metrics. Different cost centers (suppliers, distribution, 
inventory costs) comprise the resource metric. Response time constitutes the output metric. 
Flexibility metrics measures the ability of a humanitarian organization to respond to 
different magnitudes of disaster (volume flexibility), time to respond to disasters (delivery 
flexibility), and ability to provide different types of items (mix flexibility).  
 
2.6.2  The Humanitarian Organization Balanced Scorecard 
According to Beamon (Beamon, 1996) an effective performance measurement system has 
to satisfy at least four conditions; it has to be inclusive, universal, measurable and 
consistent. Inclusiveness implies the measurement of all pertinent aspects. Universality 
allows for comparison under various operating conditions and among organizations in the 
same business. For a performance measurement system to be measurable, the data needs to 
be measurable. Finally, consistency ensures that measures are consistent with 
organizational objectives. The last condition implies that a system should derive from 
strategy. Not confuting the condition of inclusiveness, scholars highlight the importance of 
having a manageable set of metrics and a predominant number of objectives as opposed to 
subjective performance criteria (Neely et al., 1995).   
The primary objective of humanitarian organizations during disaster response is to rapidly 
provide the correct amount and mix of relief items to those in sufferance.  Since internal 
and external, financial and non-financial, short and long term indicators are all relevant to 
how well humanitarian organizations meet their mission, we propose to use the balanced 
scorecard approach as a way to define the performance of a humanitarian organization 
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(Figure 2.14).  It should be noted that the balanced scorecard approach is not pursued with 
a view to build a measurement system. It follows that improvement on determinants of 
result is expected to yield a higher level of performance measured in terms of beneficiary 
satisfaction and financial stability and growth. 
In the remaining part of this section, we define the goals and the related performance 
metrics of a typical humanitarian organization from four perspectives: internal, innovation 
and growth, beneficiary and financial. To derive at an effective framework, we have tried 
to develop a universal, measurable, consistent, inclusive yet manageable set of metrics. 
We start by describing the determinants of result. Competitive pressure and the priorities 
of quality, cost, flexibility, speedy delivery, and reliability force firms to operate 
effectively and efficiently. Priorities are no different in the humanitarian sector. As we saw 
in section 2.4, depending on whether humanitarian organizations are responding to 
predictable or unpredictable disasters, they need to aim at low cost and high speed 
operations or flexible and high speed operations with increasing accuracy. From the 
internal perspective, to respond to as many beneficiaries as possible, humanitarian 
organizations aim to find a balance between cost-effectiveness, timeliness, flexibility, and 
accuracy of their operations. They also seek to ensure accountability, i.e., minimize 
material losses along the supply chain and ensure reporting of their operations at any given 
time.  
To build a learning and innovative organization with a potential to grow and to improve 
upon the internal goals of cost-effectiveness, timeliness, flexibility, accuracy and 
accountability, they endeavor to build and expand their relationships with endowed, 
motivated and committed partners; provide learning opportunities to their staff; introduce 
product and process innovation; and make use of the latest information and communication 
technologies to improve their operations.  
In terms of results, the beneficiary perspective measures how timely a humanitarian 
organization meets the quantitative and qualitative requirements of beneficiaries.  
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Figure 2.14 – Humanitarian Organization Disaster Response Balanced Scorecard 
 
Beneficiary Perspective 
Goals Measures 
Response lead time Hours/days before suffering is alleviated 
Accuracy Coverage: No. of people assisted & 
geographies covered  
Appropriateness: Quantity & mix 
Accessibility: Ease of access & closeness 
 
Internal Perspective  Innovation & Growth Perspective 
Goals Measures  Goals Measures 
Cost-
effectiveness 
Planned vs effective cost of 
operation 
No. of duplications avoided 
No. of sharing dependencies 
resolved 
 Network 
Management 
Net no. of partners  
Net no. of 
contributing 
partners 
Timeliness Emergency-to-relief delivery 
cycle time 
No. of duplications avoided 
No. of sharing and flow 
dependencies resolved 
 Organizational 
Learning 
Investment in/no. 
of staff 
development 
programs 
No. of networking 
opportunities 
Flexibility No. and range of viable alternative 
response plans & options 
No. of sharing dependencies 
resolved 
 Product/process 
innovation & 
redesign 
No. of new 
products & 
business processes 
introduced 
Accuracy Forecast vs effective 
needs/distribution 
No. of dependencies resolved  
Code of conduct 
Product standardization 
 Automated 
supply chain 
management 
Investment in & 
use of IT 
infrastructure 
Accountability Reporting 
Received vs distributed goods 
   
 
Financial Perspective 
Goals Measures 
Survive Pledge-to-donation payment cycle 
Donation-to-donation cycle 
Succeed No. of people assisted/Funds raised 
Prosper Surplus: Financial reserves 
Flexibility: Untied donor contribution 
 
How do beneficiaries 
see the humanitarian 
organization (HO)?  
How do donors 
see the HO? 
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Humanitarian organizations continually run short of their financial needs. Less visible 
disasters typically remain undersubscribed. Regardless of market needs, donor priorities 
can change over time shifting resources from one emergency to another (Samii & Van 
Wassenhove, 2006). To accommodate donor priority, humanitarian organizations need to 
be able to set up flexible operations. To respond to market needs, humanitarian 
organizations need to secure the availability of increasing amounts of untied contingency 
funds (Samii & Van Wassenhove, 2006) as well as diversify and expand their donor base 
(Samii & Van Wassenhove, 2004b). It follows that from the financial perspective, the first 
goal is to achieve a positive net cash flow. Thereafter, it is to achieve the established target 
with the financial resources mobilized. Lastly, it is to establish a growing reserve of untied 
financial resources. A description of each goal and the relative metrics is provided in 
Figure 2.15. 
 
Figure 2.15 – Description of Goals and Metrics 
 
Internal Perspective 
1. Cost-effectiveness refers to a humanitarian organization’s ability to optimize the 
level of inventory and operating costs (supply, transport, distribution and 
information processing costs) along the supply chain. The difference between 
planned versus effective cost, number of sharing dependencies resolved and 
numbers of overlapping efforts avoided are few measures of cost-effectiveness. 
2. Timeliness refers to the ability of a humanitarian organization to reduce the time 
required for the flow of information and resources (people, services & products) 
along its supply chain and between members of its response network. The metrics 
emergency-to-relief delivery cycle time measures the time that elapses between 
the outbreak of an emergency, resource mobilization and assistance. No. of 
duplications avoided and no. of sharing and flow dependencies resolved are 
indications of improvement on timeliness. 
3. Flexibility refers to a humanitarian organization’s ability to respond to 
uncertainty in terms of a changing environment and an unpredictable and volatile 
demand and supply. It is measured by the number and range of viable alternative 
plans and options at the disposal of a humanitarian organization, their timely 
implementation and the no. of sharing dependencies resolved. 
4. Accuracy refers to the ability of an organization to conduct its needs-assessment 
exercise with ever-increasing precision and to meet its quantitative and qualitative 
objectives in terms of goods & services mobilized and delivered. The metric that 
measures the quantitative aspect of accuracy is the difference between forecast & 
effective needs/distribution. The metrics that measure the qualitative dimension of  
58
CHAPTER 2 – PARTNERSHIPS AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
 
 
58
 
accuracy are: number of sharing, fit and flow dependencies resolved; adherence & 
enforcement of the code of conduct regarding donations and extent of goods 
standardization. 
5. Accountability refers to the ability of an organization to account for its 
operations and minimize goods diversion and misappropriation. Two metrics help 
measure this goal: production of timely and comprehensive activity reports and 
the difference between received versus distributed goods and services. 
 
Innovation & Growth Perspective 
1. Network management refers to the efforts undertaken by a humanitarian 
organization to augment and improve the cost-effectiveness, timeliness, flexibility 
and accuracy of partner contributions by i) increasing the opportunity for resource 
mobilization and exchange and ii) maintaining and reinforcing the level of 
commitment to humanitarian causes among well-endowed partners.  Two metrics 
help measure the health of the network: the net number of partners (measures the 
level of opportunity and motivation) and the net number of contributing partners 
(measures the level of effective ability and commitment). 
2. Organizational learning refers to the efforts of an organization to innovate, grow 
and hence improve upon internal goals by attracting, retaining and developing the 
best talents. Metrics that help measure this goal are: investment in and no. of staff 
development programs and number of networking opportunities. 
3. Product/process innovation & redesign refers to the efforts of an organization 
to improve the cost-effectiveness, timeliness, flexibility, accuracy and 
accountability of its operations through product/process innovation and redesign.  
Numbers of product and process improvements introduced measure this goal. 
4. Automated supply chain management refers to the ability of a humanitarian 
organization to coordinate and make accurate, timely, cost-effective, flexible 
decisions across its supply chain as well as fold-in learnt lessons into its future 
operations by adopting tailored IT solutions. Investments in and use of an IT 
infrastructure are metrics that help measure this goal. 
 
Beneficiary Perspective 
1. Response lead time refers to the time required by a humanitarian organization to 
deliver aid and it is measured by the number of hours/days that elapses between a 
disaster and delivery of relief items to beneficiaries.  
2. Accuracy refers to the ability of a humanitarian organization to i) meet the 
quantitative and qualitative requirements of populations in need and ii) meet its 
objectives. Three metrics help measure accuracy: coverage, appropriateness and 
accessibility of assistance. Coverage measures the number of beneficiaries 
effectively assisted and the geographical coverage of the assistance. 
Appropriateness measures assistance in terms of amount and mix of product 
delivered. Accessibility measures ease of access (expenditures of effort and time, 
no. of distribution points) and closeness (distance between beneficiaries and 
distribution centers) to assistance. 
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Financial Perspective 
1. Survive refers to a humanitarian organization’s net cash flow position and it is 
measured by two metrics: the pledge-to-payment and donation-to-donation cycle. 
2. Succeed refers to a humanitarian organization’s level of productivity. The ratio 
that measures this goal is the number of beneficiaries assisted per dollar 
mobilized. 
3. Prosper refers to the ability of a humanitarian organization to build financial 
reserves and increase the amount of untied funds. The two metrics that measure 
prosperity are financial surplus and financial flexibility.  
2.7  Partnerships and Organizational Performance 
In this section, we discuss the relationship between each of the three partnership types 
identified in section 2.5 and the determinants of result - cost-effectiveness, timeliness, 
flexibility, accuracy and accountability – as described in section 2.6. The section is 
structured as follows. In section 2.7.1, we discuss the contribution of temporary supply 
networks to organizational performance. In section 2.7.2, we present the environmental 
context in which humanitarian organizations operate to set the stage for the discussion on 
the contribution of two coordination networks – inter-organizational and extra-
organizational – to organizational performance. Then we discuss under which 
circumstances coordination is expected to be outsourced to a logistics coordination 
platform and highlight the contribution of the platform to organizational performance.  In 
section 2.7.3, we first discuss the impact of business-humanitarian partnerships on 
determinants of result and then present the different partnership possibilities between 
business and humanitarian organizations. 
 
2.7.1  Temporary Supply Networks4 
As mentioned in section 2.3, seven networks of actors (although not necessarily the same 
entities) repeatedly play a significant role in the activation of emergency supply chains, in 
                                                 
4
   With permission from the authors, this section refers and quotes without direct reference from the 
INSEAD IFRC and UNJLC case studies and teaching notes listed in the bibliography. 
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the definition of beneficiary needs and in bridging the resource and capability gap of a 
humanitarian organization. These are the media, recipient country(s), military forces, 
neighboring countries, donors, suppliers and implementing partners. Given the temporary 
and project-like nature of the emergency supply chains, the effective members and 
numbers of the players in each network are defined based on the location (country) and 
nature (natural or man-made) of the disaster. Some of the participants may be involved in a 
multitude of other humanitarian or non-humanitarian supply chains. For each network of 
actors, we shall describe their potential contribution to organizational performance during 
disaster response (Figure 2.16).  
 
Figure 2.16 – Supply Chain Actors and their Contribution to Performance 
Actor Resources/Capabilities Contribution to Performance 
Media Information & coverage Timely & accurate assessment of 
needs 
Timely mobilization & accurate 
distribution of relief items 
Recipient 
Government 
Opens its doors  
Logistics assets 
Administrative support 
Local information 
Timely and accurate mobilization, 
storage and transportation of relief 
items 
Timely access by humanitarian staff 
Lower operating costs 
Enhances flexibility 
Military Forces Information 
Logistics assets 
Military staff 
Accurate storage and timely 
transportation of relief items 
Lower operating costs 
Enhances flexibility 
Neighboring countries Logistics assets 
Administrative support 
 
Accurate storage and timely 
transportation of relief items 
Timely access to logistics assets 
Lower operating costs 
Enhances flexibility 
Donors Funds  
Supplies 
Logistics assets  
Human resources 
Timely and accurate response 
Lower operating costs 
Enhances flexibility 
Suppliers Supplies  Flexible, timely, accurate (volume 
and quality) and cost-effective 
mobilization of relief items 
Implementing 
partners 
Distribution capacity Timely and accurate distribution of 
relief items 
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Media. Information is the most valuable resource throughout a crisis, yet, it is scarce, 
incomplete, dispersed and evolving. In the early phase of a crisis, international, regional 
and national news agencies and operators are among the few sources of real-time 
information for the humanitarian community. This is particularly true for natural disasters. 
Often it is the news on a disaster that activates an emergency supply chain. To a certain 
extent, the level of media coverage shapes and drives the resource mobilization 
achievements of an emergency.  Similarly, since an organization’s fund mobilization 
capability is determined by its reputation and visibility, coverage and acknowledgement by 
the media can enhance its fund mobilization outreach.  
In brief, we argue that the media by providing information on and coverage of a disaster 
has the potential to contribute to two aspects of a humanitarian organization’s 
performance: timeliness and accuracy.  
Recipient Country. To secure the participation of the international community in a 
national relief effort, the recipient country has to welcome “acts of solidarity”. It is only 
after acts of solidarity are welcomed that the international community – governments and 
humanitarian organizations – can contribute and complement the rescue and relief efforts 
of local authorities.  
A humanitarian organization depends on a speedy request for international assistance from 
the recipient government to ensure a timely activation of its emergency supply chain. Use 
of key logistics assets under governmental control, authorizations for the movement of 
goods and people, and access to local information impact its performance. The resources 
made available to a humanitarian organization by a recipient government increase the level 
of operational flexibility. A quick request can help improve the cost profile and timeliness 
of an operation. We contend that a recipient country has the potential to contribute to four 
output metrics of a humanitarian organization’s performance: cost-effectiveness, 
timeliness, flexibility and accuracy of response.  
Military Forces. Military forces can assume three roles during emergencies (Rietjens et 
al., 2007). They can promote a climate of security for civilian populations and 
humanitarian organizations and provide protection for the relief effort. They can provide 
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technical or logistical support to humanitarian organizations. Finally, they can provide 
direct assistance to populations in need. Below, we elaborate on the second role.  
Similar to governments, military forces can have a monopolistic position or control over 
certain resources. The cooperation of national military staff and the use of military 
infrastructure and assets such as airports, warehousing facilities, helicopters, vehicles and 
classified information facilitate response. Similarly, access to internationally available 
military resources help augment response capacity and ensure a speedier delivery of relief 
items to the disaster area and their eventual distribution to the afflicted populations. During 
conflicts, an operational dialogue with combatant forces ensure access to logistics 
resources and guarantee safe and secure land, sea and air operations. Access to such 
resources increases the level of operational flexibility, can improve operating costs and 
level of accuracy with respect to the storage and timely transportation of relief items. In 
conclusion, we argue that military forces have the potential to contribute to four aspects of 
a humanitarian organization’s performance: cost-effectiveness, timeliness, flexibility and 
accuracy of response.  
Neighboring Countries. Humanitarian organizations depend, one way or another, on the 
contribution of neighboring countries in choreographing their response. For strategic 
airlifts, access to the transport infrastructure is critical. For the movement of relief items 
and humanitarian staff, administrative support for speedy issuance of visas at transit points 
and streamlined custom clearance procedures is vital. 
The use of neighboring country physical infrastructure is necessary in at least two 
scenarios. These include emergencies in landlocked countries or prevalently mountainous 
regions that depend on the physical infrastructure of neighboring countries for land or sea 
access. Secondly, emergencies that occur close to a border or those that involve more than 
one country are also dependent on neighboring country infrastructure. 
Therefore, a humanitarian organization needs to obtain authorizations from and gain access 
to the resources of neighboring countries for the movement of humanitarian staff and 
timely, cost-effective and accurate transport and storage of relief items. Access also 
increases the number of operational options available to humanitarian organizations, 
enhancing flexibility. In conclusion, neighboring countries have the potential to contribute 
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to four aspects of a humanitarian organization’s performance: cost-effectiveness, 
timeliness, flexibility and accuracy of response.  
Donors. Although most humanitarian organizations dispose of seed money and relief items 
on stock, these resources need to be significantly scaled up to allow for an appropriate 
response to any large-scale emergency. Donor support from governments and their 
institutions, business and individuals is fundamental in the form of funds, services, people 
and materials in the goods mobilization process (see Appendix A). 
Donors can be one or a combination of financial donors, technical assistance donors and 
donor-suppliers. While the contribution of financial donors is limited to the provision of 
cash, that of technical assistance donors is in-kind in the form of specialized staff and 
services. Donor-suppliers provide goods, services and logistics assets such as vehicles, 
helicopters and boats. Their donations may be disaster-specific or untied annual 
contributions. Donation of specialized logistics resources increases the speed and 
efficiency of relief operations. Use of these resources is particularly valuable when 
commercial markets break down or are non-existent. Donors can also be a source of supply 
chain disruption when they provide unsuitable and unsolicited donations (Chomilier et al., 
2003).  
To ensure a timely, accurate, and cost-effective response, a humanitarian organization 
depends on a network of donors to raise the required amount of cash and right range of 
relief items, logistics assets, and human resources. Well-resourced and untied donations 
augment flexibility of operational decisions. In conclusion, donors have the potential to 
contribute to four aspects of a humanitarian organization’s performance: cost-
effectiveness, timeliness, flexibility and accuracy of response.  
Supplier Network. Given the scale, funding sources and nature of their activities - global, 
temporary, multiple and dynamic - humanitarian organizations carry limited inventory and 
buy-to-order. As a result, they depend on disaster-specific supplier networks to mobilize a 
wide range of standardized and modular products in high volumes. It follows that for each 
disaster, a humanitarian organization aims to construct a supplier network that best 
responds to the delivery criteria of a disaster in terms of timeliness, accuracy and cost-
effectiveness. 
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Humanitarian organizations source relief items from a wide and geographically dispersed 
mix of repeat and first-time local and international suppliers. Humanitarian supply chains 
are short as there is a direct relationship with either the supplier or the donor. They are 
typically narrow as for each disaster one or few suppliers are contracted per product. 
Procurement decisions are taken for each emergency and are based on minimum quality 
requirements, speed of delivery, logistics costs, and customization to local taste. The 
supplier network is the only node of the humanitarian response network which is governed 
by market forces, over which the humanitarian organization exercises discretional power 
and is highly flexible.  
Implementing Partners.  Humanitarian organizations depend on the NGO community, 
commonly referred to as implementing partners, for eventual kit assembly and distribution 
of goods to the beneficiaries, i.e., “last mile delivery”. Implementing partners assume a 
position in the value chain similar to that of retailers in commercial supply chains. NGOs 
with a proven track record in a country and an extensive local network and knowledge are 
preferred as they can ensure timely and widespread territorial coverage in the distribution 
phase. It follows that for each disaster, a humanitarian organization needs to identify and 
outsource the last mile delivery to the ‘best’ implementing partner. A humanitarian 
organization’s last mile delivery strategy impacts the speed and accuracy in which relief 
items are distributed.  
 
2.7.2  Coordination Networks5 
Compared to business, the settings in which humanitarian organizations operate are by 
definition difficult. As mentioned in the opening chapter of this thesis, they often operate 
in the world’s least developed countries, that is, the ones with the poorest infrastructure. 
Humanitarian organizations address large-scale natural or man-made disasters. Such 
disasters destroy or disrupt, among other things, a country’s receiving infrastructure 
leaving behinds thousands dead and more people homeless. Disruptions are even more 
                                                 
5
  With permission from the authors, this section refers and quotes without direct reference from the 
INSEAD IFRC and UNJLC case studies listed in the bibliography. 
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pronounced in those countries with a structurally fragile and fragmented physical and 
institutional infrastructure.  
Given the environment in which humanitarian organizations operate as well as the system-
wide shocks and disruptions they are exposed to, we argue that they are often confronted 
with a continuum of “permanent”, recurrent structural and temporary logistics failure 
modes (Figure 2.17) in the disaster theatre. Indeed, failure modes are endemic and intrinsic 
to emergency relief operations. 
 
Figure 2.17 – Layers of Failure Modes 
 
 
As mentioned above, humanitarian organizations often operate in environments where 
accessibility and a smooth flow of goods and people is constrained by an underdeveloped, 
depilated, fragmented or insufficient infrastructure. The geographical characteristics of a 
country - islands, landlocked, or mountainous countries - can add to the infrastructural 
constraints. Humanitarian organizations often respond to disasters that occur in already 
politically unstable and unsafe countries and areas. Security concerns associated to 
guerrilla activities, existence of landmines and unexploded ordinance across the 
infrastructure and along transport routes can further hamper and constrain relief operations. 
Administrative hurdles related to customs and immigration can affect the smooth influx 
and movement of relief items and humanitarian staff. In terms of transport assets, least 
developed countries typically dispose of a limited pool. As a result, the status of the 
Environment 
System-wide Shocks 
Disruptions 
Structural 
Temporary 
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infrastructure and transport assets may be insufficient or unprepared to handle large 
volumes of commercial, humanitarian and at times military traffic. 
Disasters themselves result in system-wide shocks. For example, during large-scale natural 
or man-made disasters, the supporting physical infrastructure, trade lanes, storage and 
distribution capacity, power and communication lines, and supply networks of the 
concerned area are often seriously destroyed or disabled. 
Humanitarian organizations are also exposed to a range of temporary failure modes. In 
terms of supply, a surge in demand may lead to temporary relief item stock-outs and 
shortage.  In complex disasters involving military operations, a country’s borders or 
airspace may be temporarily closed and overall access limited. Insecurity related to 
hostilities can result in temporary interruption of transport and distribution services. The 
surge in humanitarian and military activity can create shortages in logistics assets such as 
storage facilities and transport modes. Adverse weather conditions and high traffic 
volumes can disrupt transport routes. Due to resource constraints, humanitarian 
organizations may not be able to achieve the required office and distribution network 
coverage. They might lack access to relevant, reliable and timely logistics-related 
information necessary for planning purposes. Since disasters have no regard for existing 
load, relief operations may also suffer from a shortage of logisticians. 
To overcome structural and temporary logistics failure modes, humanitarian organizations 
establish coordination networks with other humanitarian organizations as well as key 
stakeholders (Samii & Van Wassenhove, 2003b). Inter-organizational coordination ensures 
that humanitarian organizations share response plans, information and assets, complement 
each other’s activities, contribute to the establishment of common resources, and do not 
engage in wasteful competition.  As such, inter-organizational coordination is expected to 
contribute to the reduction of operational costs as well as a more accurate, timely and 
flexible response. In terms of extra-organizational coordination, the humanitarian 
community needs to coordinate segments of its supply chain activities with donors, local 
authorities, military forces and service providers.   
To avert the arrival of unsolicited and unsuitable goods and improve the predictability of 
donor contribution, the humanitarian community needs to work closely with the donor 
community. Predictable donor contribution ensures that donations are accurate and timely 
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conferring a higher degree of flexibility. They also ensure that they do not result in 
unnecessary disposal costs or duplications.  
To ensure timely, accurate and cost-effective inflow and outflow of goods, assets and 
people and assets into the disaster theatre, the humanitarian community needs to coordinate 
its activities with both recipient and neighboring countries’ authorities.  Successful 
coordination enhances operational flexibility.  
Humanitarian organizations often operate in military environments. As such, they need to 
coordinate their response activities with “legitimate” or “illegitimate” authorities including 
warlords, occupying, peacekeeping, combatant, national, neighboring countries or regional 
forces such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Humanitarian response in 
militarized environments is complicated. Combatant forces are often in control of common 
assets and transportation infrastructure such as airspace, airfields, and airport warehouses 
and equipment. Coordination with military forces improves response time and increases 
the number of options available to a humanitarian organization, enhancing flexibility. 
Humanitarian organizations contract local service providers and suppliers. Often, bilateral 
negotiations with local logistics service providers (e.g. transport companies) or suppliers 
during an emergency result in price hikes affecting the operational costs of the entire 
humanitarian community. Coordinated negotiations help keep operational costs under 
control and avert temporary stock-outs and delays.  
In conclusion, humanitarian organizations by coordinating their activities with various 
actors can improve upon their internal goals of cost-effectiveness, timeliness, accuracy and 
flexibility (Figure 2.18). 
 
Figure 2.18 – Contribution of Coordination Networks to Performance 
Coordination Contribution to Performance 
Inter-organizational Cost-effectiveness 
Timeliness 
Flexibility 
Accuracy 
Extra-organizational Cost-effectiveness 
Timeliness 
Flexibility 
Accuracy 
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2.7.2.1  Coordination Mechanism 
Humanitarian organizations can either coordinate jointly or outsource the coordination 
function to a logistics coordination platform (non-operational humanitarian facility). Under 
at least two circumstances the coordination function is expected to be outsourced to a 
logistic coordination platform. First, when humanitarian organizations do not have the 
resources and expertise to deal satisfactorily with a wide range of coordination needs in a 
cost-effective and timely manner (Kaatrud et al., 2003). Second, when there is a need to 
eliminate duplication of efforts and ensure a common strategy vis-à-vis key stakeholders 
(Samii & Van Wassenhove, 2003a) 
A logistics coordination facility can assume two functions: an inter-organizational 
coordination function (Figure 2.19) and extra-organizational coordination function (Figure 
2.20). The inter-organizational function will ensure coordination between the activities of 
humanitarian organizations in the UN system, NGO and International Organization 
community. In the second mode, the platform will conduct negotiations on behalf of the 
humanitarian community and act as focal point on common humanitarian issues vis-à-vis 
key stakeholders. In the following paragraphs we elaborate on the impact of a logistics 
coordination platform on organizational performance. 
 
Figure 2.19 – Logistics Coordination Platform: Inter-Organizational Coordination 
Function 
 
 
 
Logistics Coordination 
Platform 
Humanitarian 
Organization (HO) 1 
HO 2 HO 3 
HO 4 HO 5 
HO n 
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Figure 2.20 – Logistics Coordination Platform: Extra-organizational Coordination 
Function
 
 
In its first function, a logistics coordination facility can improve the performance of 
participating humanitarian organizations in several ways. It can manage a consolidated 
information platform. As such, it will collate information as well as invite and facilitate the 
flow and exchange of invaluable information between agency staff. As a result, knowledge 
is produced at a lower cost and more speedily. It can monitor corridor capacities and 
prioritize the movement of goods ensuring accuracy. By supporting the logistics function 
of the humanitarian community through the establishment and staffing of a series of 
antenna offices in the disaster theater, it can confer flexibility and reduce overhead hosts 
and duplications. 
To survive disaster victims need a wide variety of low- and high-value, bulk and small 
Stock Keeping Units (SKUs) food and NFIs relief items. However, most humanitarian 
organizations cater to the specific and complementary requirements of a needy population. 
As a result, relief operations depend on the participation of a range of large and small 
humanitarian organizations. A logistics coordination facility is particularly valuable to 
those humanitarian organizations with small logistics setups and limited logistics 
capability. It allows them to stimulate ‘largeness’. By tapping into information previously 
accessible only to bigger organizations, these organizations can make more accurate and 
faster decisions at no additional cost. Instead of struggling with logistics issues alone, they 
Logistics  
Coordination Platform 
Donors 
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Authorities 
Service 
Providers 
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can rely on the platform’s services. Given their limited negotiating power, by joining the 
platform they can expand their collaborative options and gain access to the resources of 
other organizations improving their flexibility.  
In its second function, a logistics coordination facility can present the logistics asset 
requirements of the humanitarian community in a more comprehensive and accurate way 
to key stakeholders. It can formulate a common position vis-à-vis key stakeholders and 
negotiate on behalf of the humanitarian community. Centralized negotiations with 
concerned local authorities through a focal point speed up the decision making process, 
increase bargaining power and help lower operational costs.  
The sudden outset of a disaster often finds local authorities unprepared on numerous fronts 
including the ensuing intense humanitarian activity. Unfamiliar with the host of 
humanitarian NGOs and organizations mobilized to address a crisis, local and national 
authorities benefit from interaction with one focal point as parallel negotiations are 
avoided. As a humanitarian organization starts to rely on the services of a logistics 
coordination platform, resources otherwise tied in extra-organizational coordination 
activities are released and are applied in alternative activities.  
In conclusion, a logistics coordination platform can help improve the speed, cost, accuracy 
and flexibility of a humanitarian organization’s operations by assuming the inter-
organizational and extra-organizational coordination function.  
 
2.7.3  Business-Humanitarian Partnerships  
As discussed earlier on, humanitarian organizations depend on donors to stage their 
disaster response activities. While, governments and governmental institutions provide the 
lion’s share, the scale and scope of business donations is growing (See Appendix A). 
Business contributions range from ad-hoc donations to donations provided through a 
partnership structure. In section 2.7.1, we touched upon the disruptive impact of 
unsolicited and unsuitable donations on humanitarian supply chains. In this section, we 
first review the literature on business-humanitarian partnerships. Then we propose a 
framework that distinguishes between four different types of business-humanitarian 
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partnership. Finally, we explore the contribution of such partnerships to organizational 
performance.  
To overcome the underinvestment in preparedness capability and to improve upon the 
response function, humanitarian organizations have to go beyond the generic and tied 
resources offered to them by their traditional donors and tap into specialized and additional 
resources. In this regard, select resources within business and CSOs are relevant. Business 
or CSOs can contribute to a humanitarian organization’s relief operation with their 
specialized resources and expertise in a number of ways: sharing of physical logistics 
resources (e.g., airplanes, trucks, warehouses, etc.), donation of company products (e.g. 
food and NFIs), secondment or allocation of personnel, access to organizational capability 
and resources (e.g., tracking and routing systems), etc. (Thomas & Fritz, 2006). 
Humanitarian organizations suffer from limited HR training and development programs, 
few opportunities and limited capability to review existing routines and practices, and a 
prevailing underinvestment in IT infrastructure (Fritz Institute, 2005a). This is because 
they have limited resources to invest in the strengthening of their preparedness and 
response functions.  
In terms of HR resources and development, a corporation or a CSO can contribute to the 
professionalization of the humanitarian sector in general and the logistics function in 
particular by supporting research on disaster management, delivering formal training, 
establishing networking initiatives, etc. Business or CSOs can facilitate the transfer of 
sound and relevant supply chain practices from the commercial sector to the humanitarian 
community.  As far as IT infrastructure is concerned, by leveraging the experience of the 
commercial sector, business or CSO could contribute to the development of a customized 
information support infrastructure for a particular organization or the humanitarian 
community as a whole (Lee & Zbinden, 2003). A tailored system is necessary since 
humanitarian organizations have not been able to adopt off-the-shelf business ERP 
software for technical reasons. The standard software often require the definition of origin-
destination routes. This is a requirement that humanitarian organizations cannot fulfill 
given the dynamics of emergency relief: continuous evolution of disaster sites and goods 
origins. By using IT solutions that generate, store, manage, and transfer information along 
72
CHAPTER 2 – PARTNERSHIPS AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
 
 
72
the supply chain, humanitarian organizations can improve the management of their 
dynamic supply chains and their preparedness capabilities.  
Binder & Witte (Binder & Witte, 2007) study the impact of business partnerships on the 
humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality, and independence. They acknowledge 
that business can extend much needed technical expertise to the assisted humanitarian 
organization and ‘fill gaps in humanitarian action’. They also flag the fact that establishing 
and maintaining strong partnerships are time consuming affairs that require a lot of effort.   
In terms of partnership types, Binder & Witte (Binder & Witte, 2007) argue that business-
humanitarian partnerships can take three forms: single company initiatives, partnerships 
with traditional humanitarian actors or ‘meta-initiatives’. Single company initiatives refer 
to those initiatives launched and implemented by a single corporation often in response to 
a specific disaster. Partnerships refer to those multi-stakeholder initiatives that bring 
together corporations and humanitarian actors. Meta initiatives refer to those initiatives 
that involve companies and other actors to enhance coordination in humanitarian 
operations and share lessons learned.  
Thomas & Fritz (Thomas & Fritz, 2006) contend that business-humanitarian partnerships 
can take four forms. They distinguish, at one end, the philanthropic interest of a business in 
humanitarian operations and at the other end, integrative partnerships that consist in more 
long-term efforts that intend to leverage the core competencies of an organization to 
improve the aid delivery process. Thereafter, they distinguish one-to-one partnerships from 
many-to-many initiatives. They explain the pros and cons involved in the four partnership 
types.  
We argue that humanitarian organizations may find themselves engaged in four types of 
structured partnership arrangements: strategic, cross-cutting, localized and brokered 
(Figure 2.21). Arrangements vary depending on the number of parties involved, strength of 
bond and duration of the partnership with each partnership arrangement having the 
potential to contribute to performance of the partnered humanitarian organization (Figure 
2.22). We equally argue that success of these arrangements depends on the involvement of 
well-endowed, motivated and committed corporate partners.  
Strategic partnerships engage a firm in a detailed partnership with one humanitarian 
organization over a medium to long period of time. Examples of strategic partnership is the 
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on-going TNT-WFP ‘Moving the World’ partnership forged in 2002 for an initial five year 
period which originally encompassed five different initiatives and the IFRC-Fritz Institute 
collaboration on a humanitarian logistics software. These types of partnerships emerge 
when there is an organizational fit between the contributing firm and the assisted 
humanitarian organization (Tomasini & Van Wassenhove, 2004a). The business partner is 
expected to provide its core competencies in terms of expertise and assets (including in IT) 
to the assisted organization both in-between and during disasters. In-between disasters, 
they are meant to contribute to the innovation and growth goals of a humanitarian 
organization. During disasters, by extending their expertise, time and assets, the corporate 
partner can directly impact the cost, timeliness, flexibility and accuracy of relief 
operations.  
 
Figure 2.21 – Partnership Possibilities 
Multiple  
Localized Partnerships 
 
Brokered Partnerships 
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Cross-cutting partnerships are medium to long-term partnerships that directly and 
indirectly address both components of disaster management. An example of cross-cutting 
partnership is the on-going cooperation between humanitarian organizations and Kjaer, the 
Danish company provider of vehicle fleets and services, concerning the management of 
humanitarian organizations’ fleets across geographies. These types of partnerships are 
expected to emerge when a group of humanitarian organizations requires a specific 
resource or capability available with a given firm or CSO. To be effective, they depend on 
intense consultation processes among the parties involved on a particular competence or 
functional area. By upgrading the capability of a range of humanitarian organization in a 
specific function (including IT), these types of partnerships have the potential to directly 
Business/CSO 
Humanitarian Organization 
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contribute to the learning and innovation aspirations of a group of humanitarian 
organizations in a specified area and indirectly to their internal goals.  
 
Figure 2.22 - Impact of Business-Humanitarian Partnerships on 
Organizational Performance 
Contribution to Performance Partnership Type 
Direct Indirect 
Strategic In-between disasters 
• Organizational learning 
• Network management 
• Product & process innovation 
• Automated supply chain 
During Disasters 
• Cost-effectiveness 
• Timeliness 
• Flexibility 
• Accuracy  
 
Cross-Cutting In-between disasters 
• Organizational learning 
• Network Management 
• Product & process innovation 
• Automated supply chain 
During Disasters 
• Cost-effectiveness 
• Timeliness 
• Flexibility 
• Accuracy 
Localized During Disasters 
• Cost-effectiveness 
• Timeliness 
• Flexibility 
• Accuracy 
 
Brokered During Disasters 
• Cost-effectiveness 
• Timeliness 
• Flexibility 
• Accuracy  
In-between disasters 
• Organizational learning 
• Network management 
• Product & process innovation 
• Automated supply chain 
 
 
Localized partnerships refer to those partnerships that involve a stable or dynamic group of 
corporations and one humanitarian organization. The corporations can be repeat or one-
time donors. An example of localized partnerships is the WFP Emergency Network 
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spearheaded by Citigroup and involving some 20 enterprises in the provision of relief 
items to WFP in case of disasters (Giarraputo, 2006). These types of partnerships are built 
upon the concept of pre-positioned goods and standby capacity. Corporations keen to 
respond to disasters channel their voluntary donations to an organization based on the 
latter’s requirements. The humanitarian organization that receives the donations or has a 
standby agreement with a corporation has the responsibility to decide, for each emergency, 
what can be utilized for its operation, what can meet the needs of the afflicted population 
and what remains in the depots or is “uncalled”. Consequently, localized partnerships are 
important disaster preparedness resource that can directly improve the cost, timeliness, 
accuracy and flexibility of an organization’s disaster response. This is because they help 
limit the arrival of unsolicited and excess goods and ensure the timely and accurate arrival 
of required donations. 
Finally, brokered partnerships are necessary when transactions involve a group of 
companies and a range of humanitarian organizations over a sustained period of time. A 
nodal structure or organization is designated as broker to match the demand for goods and 
services of humanitarian organizations with the contribution of individual companies. An 
example of brokered partnerships is the activities of the Fritz Institute, a non for profit 
CSO dedicated to the improvement of logistics in the humanitarian sector. Given the wide 
range of services and goods companies can provide humanitarian organizations, the scope 
of action of this type of partnership is not limited to emergencies but also in-between 
disasters.  
By nature, brokered partnerships emerge when there is a need to coordinate the actions of 
many parties. These types of partnerships i) channel voluntary corporate contributions 
where they are required, ii) mobilize contributions based on identified humanitarian needs 
and gaps, and iii) build standby capacity. In the context of disaster response, they facilitate 
the participation of corporations in humanitarian relief, confer flexibility to a relief 
operation, reduce response time and transaction costs as well as ensure accuracy by 
limiting the dispatch of ad hoc and unsolicited donations. They can also contribute to the 
innovation and growth objectives of a humanitarian organization by creating or facilitating 
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learning opportunities, addressing inefficiencies in existing business processes, and 
strengthening the IT infrastructure and skills. 
In conclusion, business partnerships, apart from improving the speed, cost, accuracy and 
flexibility of relief operations by donating their specialized resources, can contribute to the 
innovation and growth objectives of a humanitarian organization.  
2.8    Drivers Behind Humanitarian Partnerships 
Kovács & Spens (Kovács & Spens, 2007) acknowledge that many actors are involved in 
the humanitarian supply network but they fail to see “clear or stated linkages” between 
them. Scholars while comparing nonprofits with for profit organizations have noted that 
nonprofits raise funds and goods from donors that expect no economic benefits in return 
(Moore, 2000; Henderson et al., 2002; Oster et al., 2004) implying the existence of other 
types of benefits.  
In this section, we review the humanitarian relief literature to identify the motivations and 
drivers behind the participation of different actors, via partnerships and networks, to 
disaster response and disaster preparedness. More specifically, we shall review the inter-
agency and civil-military coordination and business-humanitarian partnership literatures.  
Although the humanitarian sector disposes of a number of coordination mechanisms and 
has a policy making body (See Appendix A), no agency has the authority to take the lead 
and coordinate the actions of others. Moreover, as Stephenson (Stephenson, 2004) 
contends, a strong competition among agencies for resources, competition for media 
attention, high staff turnover, and the different organizational backgrounds, cultures and 
incentives do not create a conducive environment for inter-agency coordination.  
While some researchers have advocated for a ‘coordination by command’ approach, 
Stephenson (Stephenson, 2004) tries to identify what can drive and contribute to inter-
agency coordination. By taking a social network perspective, he identifies trust and shared 
culture as key determinants of inter-agency coordination. He argues that although trust 
may not be a sufficient condition, it can help establish the conditions for effective inter-
agency coordination. In his view, organizations should rise above their egos by giving 
priority to coordinated action. To achieve more effective cooperation, agency leaders 
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should change the organizational culture by promoting a shared sense, trust, and intense 
exchange of information and communication among agency staffs.  
Humanitarian organizations are connected to one another through their mandates and their 
willingness to provide aid effectively (Stephenson, 2004). However, given their operating 
environment and competing missions, their common goal – provision of aid – does not 
ensure coordination. Since trust is considered a key precondition to coordination, 
organizational networks that help develop a robust variety of communication channels are 
believed to foster inter-agency awareness and trust (Stephenson & Schnitzer, 2006). In 
light of above, Stephenson & Schnitzer (Stephenson & Schnitzer, 2006) contend that 
relationships at the inter-organizational, organizational and interpersonal levels play a 
major role.  They suggest that each of them - by contributing to the creation and 
development of trust at the strategic, organizational and individual level - help explain the 
level and extent of inter-agency coordination during disaster response (Figure 2.23). 
 
Figure 2.23 – Factors that Promote Trust at Different Levels 
Strategic  Organizational  Individual 
• Pre-existing network 
paths 
• Strong foundation of 
shared values and 
standards 
• Complementary 
competencies between 
organizations 
• Knowledge of service 
delivery in particular 
sectors, standing capacity 
for carrying out mission 
• Shared service and 
professional standards 
• Past personal and 
professional 
interaction 
• role equivalence 
 
Source:  Adapted from Stephenson & Schnitzer (2006), “Inter-organizational Trust, Boundary Spanning, and 
Humanitarian Relief Coordination,” Non-Profit Management & Leadership, Vol. 17, No.2 
 
Stephenson & Schnitzer (Stephenson & Schnitzer, 2006) argue that humanitarian 
organizations operate within a set of pre-existing relationships and that coordination takes 
place within a relational network. Each emergency brings together independent 
organizations. Since often there is no time to develop relationships during a disaster with 
unknown actors, new actors are often excluded from coordination opportunities.  
They contend that individuals and personal relationships are key. Based on incentives at 
play, personalities, professional capacities, and prior coordination experience, individuals 
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may either foster or curb coordination. Their knowledge and perception of an organization 
and the individuals who work within them and the level of prevailing trust are critical in an 
individual’s coordination decision-making process. For example, they argue that an aid 
worker doubtful about a given organization might coordinate with the organization if he 
believes in the competence and trustworthiness of its counterpart. Likewise, organizational 
or individual complementary competencies improve the chances for coordination. They 
observe that working relationships are self-reinforcing: good cooperation experience 
during one disaster increases the chance for coordination in future operations.  
Finally, Stephenson & Schnitzer (Stephenson & Schnitzer, 2006) observe that 
humanitarian organizations and their staff can set their own rules and standards but cannot 
impose them on others. On the other hand, trust could contribute to the establishment of 
common norms and standards that facilitate inter-agency coordination. They also found 
informal dialogues as well as coordination and sectoral meetings held during disaster 
response extremely useful for the information sharing and networking opportunities they 
provided.  
Similarly, Beauregard (Beauregard, 1998) in his study of civil-military activities during a 
number of disasters identifies six principal factors that hamper coordination and 
cooperation. These include differences in cultures and ideologies, differences in 
organizational structures and chain of command, communication breakdowns due to 
incompatible equipment or absence of communication procedures, refusal by humanitarian 
organizations of military assistance to protect independence and impartiality, and the threat 
or use of force by the military. He concludes by suggesting a range of solutions (training, 
better communication and consultation processes through events that improve mutual 
understanding, liaison teams) to improve the civil-military relationship. 
Similar to inter-agency coordination, coordination between military forces and 
humanitarian organizations is found to be driven primarily by personalities rather than 
well-developed standard operating procedures (Brocades-Zaalberg, 2005). Since efforts are 
person-dependent, they vary within and between different army contingents.  
In a study of coordination between military and humanitarian organization during peace-
keeping operations, Rietjens et al. (Rietjens et al., 2007) take an information processing 
view of coordination. Since effective coordination implies an effective use and exchange 
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of information and there is a need to bridge the gap between information required and 
information available, they apply  Galbraith’s (Galbraith, 1973) four coordination 
mechanisms – slack resources, self-contained tasks, vertical information systems and 
lateral relations – to military-humanitarian relationships. 
Rietjens et al. (Rietjens et al., 2007) conclude that self-contained tasks in combination with 
lateral relations are the main civil-military coordination mechanisms in complex 
emergencies. They suggest that the management of humanitarian operations can be 
improved by adopting an information system based on a variety of sources of information. 
To improve the quality of information and support the dominant coordination mechanism 
of self-contained tasks, they stress the importance of strengthening and structuring of 
lateral relations between humanitarian and military organizations.  
Binder & Witte (Binder & Witte, 2007) identify four reasons for which a business may 
engage in a partnership with a humanitarian organization. The listed motivational drivers 
are positive branding, improved staff motivation, access to business intelligence - learn 
how to operate supply chains in stressed environmental conditions - and a desire to ‘do 
good’. They also identify the networking value of such partnerships and how corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) activities can open new markets for the company.  
What emerges from the literature review is the importance of organizational culture and 
structure, personalities, and personal and organizational trust in inter-agency and military-
humanitarian coordination. Given the contribution of these factors to successful 
coordination, the literature identifies the strengthening of lateral relations through various 
mechanisms – informal dialogues, meetings and consultation processes, liaison teams, etc. 
– as a means to improve and secure coordination. As for business-humanitarian 
partnerships, the humanitarian literature refers us to the CSR literature. 
2.9    Conclusions 
By building on the humanitarian literature, applying an explorative stance and our own 
understanding of the subject, this chapter provides an overview of humanitarian operations, 
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describes the operational context in which humanitarian organizations operate and defines 
the characteristics of their emergency supply chains and networks.  
We set out by identifying the two components of disaster management: disaster 
preparedness and disaster response. In terms of supply chains, we distinguish between 
those responding to development and recovery objectives from the ones set up in response 
to emergencies. We argue that humanitarian organizations manage non-routine supply 
chains in response to predictable and unpredictable disasters. Since the focus of this thesis 
is disaster response, we then proceed to define the main traits of emergency supply chains 
and networks. We also conclude that in response to predictable disasters, humanitarian 
organizations should manage efficient supply chains while in case of unpredictable 
disasters they should manage agile supply chains. 
 
Figure 2.24 – Preliminary Conceptual Framework 
 
 
In this chapter, we develop a preliminary framework to help explain the contribution of 
different partnership schemes to organizational performance (Figure 2.24). After defining 
performance through the development of a humanitarian balanced scorecard, we present 
and discuss three different partnership schemes – temporary supply networks, coordination 
networks, and business-humanitarian partnerships – and their potential impact on 
organizational performance.  
 
Portfolio of 
Partnerships 
Disaster management 
capabilities of  
humanitarian organizations 
• Internal Perspective 
• Innovation & Growth Perspective 
• Beneficiary Perspective 
• Financial Perspective 
 
Organizational 
Performance 
• Temporary Supply Networks 
• Coordination Networks 
• Business-Humanitarian Partnerships 
What concepts define and 
enhance capabilities? 
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To set the stage for the development of our final conceptual framework in Chapter 3, we 
propose to conduct a literature review on a number of theories that may help us understand 
what enhances disaster management capabilities.  
Humanitarian organizations resort to temporary supply chains given their intermediation 
role between donors and those affected by a disaster: beneficiaries. Since they are not 
structured to cope independently with the resource demands imposed on them by 
emergencies, to gain access to a range of key resources, they call upon the resources and 
capabilities of other entities. Reference to network theory allows us to distinguish between 
different network types as well as shed some light on the contribution of networks to 
organizational performance.  
Humanitarian organizations have to overcome structural and temporary logistics 
challenges. To discuss the relevance and consequences of failure modes on emergency 
supply chains, there is a need to integrate that branch of the supply chain management 
literature that explores the challenges of creating secure and resilient supply chains with 
coordination theory. This will allow us to study the interface between actor, process and 
resource interdependencies and supply chain challenges. 
Humanitarian organizations have to address their resource and capability weaknesses and 
inadequacies. To achieve long-lasting competitive advantage, the resource-based view of 
the firm argues that firms need to gain access and build valuable, rare, inimitable and non-
substitutable resources and capabilities (Barney, 1991) and negate resource weaknesses 
and inadequacies (West & Decastro, 2001).  
Scholars have argued that business can have a comparative advantage over individuals, 
governments, and other non-profits in addressing the resource and capability requirements 
of organizations engaged in a social cause (Porter & Kramer, 2002; Hess et al., 2002).   By 
calling upon the resources of business during emergencies, a humanitarian organization 
can increase the speed and reduce the cost of its relief operations. By tapping into these 
additional resources, it can improve its operational flexibility and accuracy. Given the 
potential contribution of business to humanitarian operations and the increasing interest of 
business in humanitarian activities, we will review one form of corporate social 
responsibility from the resource-based view. 
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There is a gap in the humanitarian literature in terms of what drives and ensures the 
participation of different actors to disaster management. Management researchers have 
concluded that social capital embodied in a manager’s relationships and an organization’s 
network affects individual and firm opportunities and performance. Evidence has been 
gathered on the social capital’s effect on the establishment of inter-firm networks (Walker 
et al., 1997; Uzzi, 1997; Chung et al., 2000), ability to help actors coordinate critical task 
interdependencies and to overcome the difficulties of cooperation and collective action; 
and access to resources, information and opportunities (Gabbay, 1997; Uzzi, 1999; 
Granovetter, 1974; Burt, 1992).  Given the relevance of networks, coordination ability and 
resources to humanitarian operations, we argue that to understand what drives and helps 
develop the linkages that result in flows of goods and services between humanitarian 
organizations and other actors, there is a need to review the social capital literature.   
In conclusion, to derive at our conceptual framework in the next chapter, we will conduct a 
literature review of network theory in combination with supply chain management, 
coordination theory in combination with supply chain management, the resource-based 
view of the firm in combination with corporate social responsibility, and social capital 
theory. 
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Chapter 3  Literature Review 
 
 
This Chapter aims to develop a conceptual framework that explains how partnerships 
through the development of disaster management capabilities impact the performance of 
humanitarian organizations during emergency response. Chapter 2 identified four streams 
of literature – network theory, coordination theory, the resource-based view of the firm and 
social capital theory – as relevant to the development of our conceptual framework.  To 
understand the complexity of humanitarian organizations, there is a need to combine the 
above mentioned theories with studies of supply chain management and corporate social 
responsibility. The literature review allows us to define the main disaster management 
capabilities that a humanitarian organization must master. It also allows us to draw some 
conclusions with respect to how these capabilities interact with each other. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 provides an overview of network theory 
and integrates the network approach with supply chain management. To have a framework 
for the study of interdependencies that emerge during disaster response, section 3.2 links 
coordination theory with that branch of the literature that elaborates on secure and resilient 
supply chains.  In that section, we also introduce the concept of virtual organizing. Section 
3.3 reviews the resource based view and discusses the consequences of resource strengths 
and weaknesses on firm performance. The corporate philanthropy literature is also 
reviewed given the relevance of resources and capabilities available only with private 
actors to humanitarian organizations. Given the contribution of social capital to the 
establishment and well-functioning of networks and partnerships, section 3.4 reviews the 
social capital theory. In the closing section of this chapter, we present the findings of the 
literature review and conclude by presenting our conceptual framework.  
3.1   Networks Theory and Supply Chain Management 
There is a vast literature that explains the different aspects of inter-firm interaction and 
cooperation. While there are three forms of inter-firm cooperation - dyad, chain and 
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network, the approaches can be grouped into two major categories: Fundamental theories 
such as network theory and applied theories such as those on supply chain management.  
Snow et al. (Snow et al., 1992) argue in favor of network structures as the most adequate 
organizational type in rapidly changing market environments. The literature indicates 
networks as the most apt organizational structure when an organization is unable or 
unwilling to cope independently with i) the complexity and risks of a rapidly changing 
environment and ii) the skill and resource demands imposed on it in global markets 
(Cravens et al., 1996). 
To compete more effectively in a complex and dynamic global environment, network 
structures allow firms to cope with new threats, seize new opportunities and gain 
flexibility. By focusing on their core competencies and relying on external, specialist 
partners for other business functions, firms share the risks and gain access to new resources 
and skills. It is argued that firms which are part of a network can reduce operational and 
innovation costs, gain access to new markets, and innovate faster.  
The network approach puts emphasis on both direct and indirect relationships and brings to 
the forefront the importance of resources. It starts with the assumption that each actor 
controls a range of resources, performs a series of activities and is connected to others via 
these resources and activities (Figure 3.1). In other words, business units are connected 
through actor bonds, activity links and resource ties (Hakansson & Snehota, 1995). To 
create bonds, link activities and processes, as well as tie or integrate resources, the network 
theory stresses the need for a range of networking activities. Activities consist of partner 
selection, resource integration, information processing, knowledge capturing, social 
coordination, resource and business sharing, decision making, conflict resolution and 
motivation building (Johnsen et al., 2000). 
Snow et al. (Snow et al., 1992) identify and describe three different types of networks: 
stable, dynamic, and internal networks. Internal networks are intra-organizational 
structures that imply collaboration between the different business units of a given 
organization. In the stable network, firms owning different assets required for the 
production of a particular good or service combine their assets. In stable networks, partners 
benefit from stability and continuity as relationships are close and long-term. In dynamic 
networks, complementary members come together on a temporary basis and, similar to the 
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stable network, combine their assets recognizing their interdependence. Members of 
dynamic networks are loosely coupled. They can be changed as well as assembled and 
reassembled without much cost and effort to meet complex and changing competitive 
conditions (Miles & Snow, 1986).  
 
Figure 3.1 – A Model of Network 
 
Source: Hakansson, H. (1987), Industrial Technological Development: A Network 
Approach. Croom Helm, London, UK, p. 17 
 
Miles & Snow (Miles & Snow, 1986) identify the stable and dynamic networks as inter-
organizational forms that allow firms to downsize and focus on their core competencies, 
outsourcing the rest to a network of independent firms. Dynamic network organizations are 
particularly suitable for turbulent environments as they provide for specialization and 
agility in complex situations (Snow et al., 1992; Saabeel et al., 2002).  
Newell & Swan (Newell & Swan, 2000) have identified three major forms of inter-
organizational networks, each characterized by different forms of coordination. Social 
networks are the least formal types of network since they are based primarily on personal 
and interpersonal exchange. On the other extreme are proprietary network, which as 
relatively formal networks where parties are tied together through either financial or 
intellectual property rights. In between, there are the bureaucratic networks. These types of 
networks are governed by formal agreements that specify roles and coordination 
mechanisms.  
Actors 
Activities Resources 
Network 
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The network literature also proposes a framework for the analysis of network development 
(Pihkala et al., 1999). It argues that firms with excellent networking capability and a strong 
resource base in terms of amount and quality are best positioned to take the lead (Figure 
3.2). 
Figure 3.2 – Role of Actors in Network Development 
Strong  
 
 
Best positioned actor 
Resource base 
 
Weak 
 
Worst positioned actor 
 
 Poor Excellent 
 Network capability 
Source: Pihkala et al. (1999), Virtual Organization and the SMEs: a Review and Model 
development”, Entrepreneurship & Regional Development, Vol. 11, p.341 
 
The supply chain management (SCM) literature studies activities that have an impact on 
the speed, reliability and cost performance of the supply chain and on the buyer-supplier 
relationship. Studies on logistics flows and structural aspects of supply networks are 
mainly from the perspective of powerful focal firms that create and manage vertical or 
horizontal networks to their advantage.  
Network theory and supply chain management literature come together when firms i) 
organize their internal functions and activities using a network structure as a governance 
mode, ii) resort to the ‘buy’ option by outsourcing part of their supply chain activities to 
external network partners, or iii) engage in a series of alliances which they call upon on a 
needs-basis. The application of the network approach to supply chain management ensures 
the inclusion of indirect connection along side sequential linkages between actors. It also 
emphasizes the importance of resource ties and integration in the creation and development 
of a supply network (Jahre & Fabbe-Costes, 2005).  
The integration of the SCM and network approach allow us to consider supply chains as a 
complex network consisting of a high number of linear and non-linear, forward and 
backward, spatio-temporal interactions, relationships and interdependencies among 
different entities, processes and resources (Surana et al., 2005). From the network 
perspective, the supply chain is defined as a set of activities by which actors agree to 
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contribute their resources - information, material, money, man power and equipment - 
towards the completion and supply of a common end-product (Jagdev & Thoben, 2001). 
The supply chain literature discusses the relative merits of a broad, loosely coupled supply 
network versus a narrow, integrated one (Figure 3.3). It argues that integrated supply 
networks are a source of adaptation while loosely coupled supply networks are a source of 
adaptability (Weick, 1982). Compared to board network, switching (Easton & Quayle, 
1990; Sabel et al., 1987) is relatively difficult and costly in integrated networks given the 
stable configuration. Contacts and opportunities for an extensive knowledge sharing 
among members are dense in integrated supply networks. However, board networks, not 
restricted to the number of supply chain members, have a wider access to knowledge. The 
high level of activity coordination in integrated supply network leads to more efficient 
processes. Members share a vision and work towards a shared goal. By offering each entity 
good visibility over the other portions of the supply chain through integration of respective 
information systems, in integrated supply networks decision making is improved along 
with the ability to reduce costs and response time.  
 
Figure 3.3 – Relative Merits of Broad versus Narrow Networks 
Broad, loosely coupled supply network Narrow, integrated supply network 
Adaptability Adaptation 
Fluid configuration Stable configuration 
More switching opportunities Rigid and strong 
Wider access to knowledge Dense flow of information 
Hedge against uncertainty Improved decision making 
Cost competitive Shared destiny 
High flexibility Greater visibility 
Agile  Efficient  
 
The literature argues that for those organizations that manage temporary chains - engage in 
time-bound and specific set of activity links, actors bonds and resource ties - a broad 
network is more indicated. It is equally argued that significant dynamism in the 
environment necessitates a constant adaptability of the supply network. Altering the 
boundaries of the network by including or excluding particular entities and by adding or 
eliminating connections among entities becomes a necessity to face rapidly changing 
environment.  
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Supply chain literature discusses the contribution of logistics alliances in lowering the 
level capital investments in logistical assets. Given the cost of setting up and maintaining a 
logistics function, firms have various options. These include provision of the function in-
house, use of own specialized logistics subsidiaries, out-sourcing to third party logistics 
providers (3PLPs) and outsourcing on as-needed basis. In terms of logistics alliances, three 
typologies have been identified: those between customized logistics service providers and 
producer of goods (vertical), between two service providers (horizontal) and between two 
clients (horizontal) (Bowersox, 1990).   
Logistics alliances have the potential to lower distribution and storage operating costs 
improve distribution coverage, provide access to superior facilities, equipment and 
locations, as well as improve the speed and quality of customer service. Through a higher 
and coordinated use of the alliance’s fixed assets, firms can reduce their respective 
operating costs and achieve better results. Joint investment in specialized logistics assets 
allows firms to reduce their financial contribution and share the risk with the other parties. 
Through partnerships with other channel participants that possess or have access to unique 
or specialized resources not available within a firm (Bowersox & Daugherty, 1995), 
partner firms can achieve flexibility and meet the changing requirements of their 
customers. 
Scholars have also elaborated on the disadvantages of outsourcing logistics to third parties. 
Disadvantages include loss of control (Bradi & Tracey, 1991; Bowman, 1995; Byrne, P. 
M., 1993; Cooke, 1994; Lynch et al., 1994; Richardson, 1993), loss of information, and the 
inability of the providers to fully meet the company’s expectations and needs. 
3.2   Coordination Theory and Supply Chain Failure Modes 
This section is organized as follows. Section 3.2.1 provides an overview of coordination 
theory. Section 3.2.1.1 discusses different coordination structures with a particular 
emphasize on virtual organizing. The next two sub-sections discuss the building blocks 
and drawbacks of virtual organizing. Finally section 3.2.2 links the discussion on 
dependencies with that branch of the supply chain literature that elaborates on secure and 
resilient supply chains.  
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3.2.1  Coordination Theory 
While network theory studies when and how actors are connected to each other via 
activities and resources, organizational theorists have recognized that interdependencies 
between different activities and actors need to be managed (March & Simon, 1958). 
Coordination theory provides a framework for the study of such interdependencies. By 
focusing on the use of common resources that create the dependency, Malone & Crowston 
(Malone & Crowston, 1994) define coordination as ‘managing dependencies among 
activities’. Managing dependencies between activities, however, implies that activities are 
performed by actors. To overcome coordination problems, actors need to resort to specific 
or alternative coordination mechanisms. 
Coordination theory argues that two types of objects give rise to dependencies: tasks which 
include goals and activities and resources used or created by tasks (Crowston, 1997).  
Crowston (Crowston, 1997) lists the various steps required to identify and manage 
dependencies and eliminate duplication efforts. Malone together with other scholars 
(Malone & Crowston, 1994; Crowston, 1997; Malone et al. 1999) characterize different 
kinds of dependencies and propose a variety of alternative coordination processes that can 
help manage them (Figure 3.5). 
Malone et al. (Malone et al., 1999) elaborate on three types of interdependencies: flow, 
sharing and fit (Figure 3.4). All three dependencies arise because resources are related to 
multiple activities. Respectively, they argue that fit dependencies arise when multiple 
activities collectively produce one resource. Flow dependencies occur whenever one 
activity produces a resource that is required in the next activity. Sharing dependencies arise 
when a number of activities require the same limited resource (money, storage space, etc.). 
To manage shared-resource constraints a resource allocation process is needed. It is argued 
that this type of dependency can be managed by a variety of task assignment mechanisms, 
such as managerial decision-making, prior assignment according to task type, pricing 
mechanism or technological coordination mechanisms. Other possible coordination 
processes that help manage share-resource constraints include priority order, market-like 
bidding, and first come first serve. It is worth noting that shared resource constraints can 
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result in conflicting situations as actors performing interdependent activities may have 
conflicting goals and interests.  
 
Figure 3.4 – Forms of Interdependencies 
 
Source:  Malone et al. (1999), “Tools for Inventing Organizations: Toward a Handbook of Organizational 
Processes”, Management Science, Vol. 45, Issue 3 
 
Flow dependency can be viewed as a combination of three constraints: prerequisite, 
accessibility, and usability constraints.  Prerequisite constraint is when a producer activity 
has to be completed before the consumer activity can begin. Managing this dependency 
involves a notification process - to indicate that the consumer activity can begin - as well 
as sequencing and tracking processes. Accessibility constraint is when one activity requires 
the output of another activity. In case of physical goods, the output has to be physically 
transported. As for information, the information has to be communicated. In the case of 
services, the service has to be provided. Usability constraint is when what is produced has 
to be usable by the activity that requires it. One common way of managing this 
dependency is by standardization. Managing these three dependencies amounts to having 
the right thing, in the right place, and at the right time (Malone et al., 1999).  
The third type of dependency is when to complete a task, product or an overall goal, a 
number of activities needs to occur at the same time. Managing the fit dependency requires 
the management of simultaneity constraints that implies satisfying both the accessibility 
(items produced must be made available for use) and usability (item produced should be 
usable) constraints. 
 
 
 
 
Fit Sharing 
Task Resource 
Flow 
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Figure 3.5 – Typology of Dependencies and Coordination Mechanisms 
Dependency/Duplication Coordination Steps Examples of Coordination 
Mechanisms 
DEPENDENCY 
Sharing 
Shareable resources 
Reusable resources 
 
Non-reusable resources 
• No conflict 
1. Notice conflict 
2. Schedule use of the resource 
• Pick one task to do 
Task assignment, First-come-first 
serve, priority order, budgets, 
managerial decision, market like 
bidding 
Flow (Producer- customer relationship) 
Prerequisite (right time) 
Accessibility (right place) 
 
Usability (right thing) 
 
 
Conflicting 
 
1. Order tasks 
2. Manage transfer of 
resources 
3. Ensure usability of output 
 
 
• Reorder task to avoid 
conflict 
• Add another task to repair 
conflict 
• Make to order (pull vs. push) 
• Place orders using economic 
order quantity, JIT or 
detained advance planning 
• Notification, sequencing or 
tracking 
• Ship by various transportation 
modes or make at point of use 
• Use standards or ask 
individual users 
Fit 
Simultaneity constraints 
 
 
 
Conflicting 
1. Manage transfer of 
resources 
2. Ensure usability of output 
 
• Reorder task to avoid 
conflict 
• Add another task/resource 
to repair conflict 
• Scheduling 
• Synchronization 
DUPLICATIONS 
 
 
 
 
  Same characteristics 
 
  Overlapping 
 
  Conflicting 
Identify duplications 
Manage duplications 
1. Decide 
2. Communicate 
 
 
 
 
 
Task merging 
 
Negotiate a mutually agreeable 
result 
Decide which task to do 
• Managerial decision-making 
• Consensus 
 
Source: Adaptation from Crowston, 1997; Malone & Crowston, 1994; & Malone et al., 1999 
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Malone & Crowston (Malone & Crowston, 1994) identify two generic processes required 
for group coordination: decision making and communication. Many coordination processes 
call for decisions that affect the activities of more actors. For instance, in sharing resources 
actors must decide on its allocation. Group decisions can be made by command, voting or 
consensus. Many coordination processes require the communication of useable 
information. In this case, the establishment of a common language, or a standard of 
communication becomes crucial.   
To determine the cost of coordination and choice between different coordination 
structures, the coordination theory takes into account two factors: decision making patterns 
and their related communication requirements (Malone, 1987).  Malone (Malone, 1987) 
decomposes the cost of coordination structure in three categories: production costs (the 
average delay to process a task), coordinating costs (the number of messages necessary to 
assign a task) and vulnerability costs (whether the organization functions if one actor does 
not perform the assigned tasks).  
Coordination theory draws our attention to the contribution of IT to the cost of 
coordination (Malone & Crowston, 1994). Since coordination mechanisms are primarily 
information processing activities, it is argued that coordination cost depends on the 
technology available and deployed. Progress in IT changes the relative cost of coordination 
mechanisms making new processes viable and at times even desirable (Crowston, 1997). 
IT makes it easier to gather information about available resources and to match resources 
with a particular task. Database and communication systems enable multiple workers to 
share, access and make changes to information resources. Widespread use of technology 
can help reduce both duplication efforts and coordination costs (Malone & Crowston, 
1994). A generalized decrease in coordination costs changes the viability of different 
coordination structures. For example, decreased coordination costs can favor a higher use 
of markets, closer coordination across firm boundaries, the emergence of flexible 
organizations, decentralized networks and a shift toward smaller firms (Malone et al., 
1987). 
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3.2.1.1  Coordination Structure: Virtual Organizing 
Malone (Malone, 1987) proposes four alternative coordination structures: product 
hierarchy (separate divisions for different product lines), functional hierarchy (separate 
divisions for different functions), decentralized market (buyers and suppliers are in contact 
with each other), and centralized market (a broker is in contact with buyers and suppliers). 
Malone then evaluates the efficiency and flexibility profile and the relative cost of each of 
the structures.  
In the centralized market structure, decision making is centralized with a broker. 
Compared to the decentralized market structure, this structure reduces substantially the 
number of connections and messages exchanged and results in low coordination costs. It 
has low production costs as each broker coordinates all the tasks and maintains a 
communication link between actors party to an exchange. Compared to the other 
coordination structures, the centralized market structure has the highest vulnerability costs, 
as an eventual failure of the broker disrupts the entire system while the failure of individual 
actors delays the implementation of tasks.   
 
Figure 3.6 – Coordination Structures: Relationship between Network & Coordination 
Theories 
Network Theory Coordination Theory 
Internal Networks Product Hierarchy 
Internal Networks Functional Hierarchy 
Stable & Dynamic Networks Decentralized Market 
Virtual Organizing Centralized Market 
 
Miles & Snow (Miles & Snow, 1986) advance that to cope with new environmental 
conditions, firms undertake experimental actions that lead to new organizational forms. As 
such, each new form addresses the needs of a specific competitive environment. Below we 
discuss a new organizational form – virtual organizing – that ensures a centralized market 
structure as defined by Malone while combining select aspects of the stable, dynamic and 
internal networks as described by Miles & Snow. Figure 3.6 puts into relationship 
coordination structures as defined by the coordination and network theories while Figure 
3.7 summarized the main characteristics of virtual organizing. 
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The concept of virtual organization was born out of outsourcing strategies of large firms. 
To respond to a rapidly changing environment, vertically integrated large firms 
disintegrated and started to focus on their core competencies outsourcing the rest to 
suppliers. The terms virtual supply chain or virtual enterprise were coined to describe the 
large focal firm’s effort in coordinating the activities and resources of geographically 
dispersed suppliers required for the production and distribution of a particular product or 
service.  
Figure 3.7 – Major Features of Virtual Organization 
• Structural Components: Virtual Web &Virtual Corporation staffed with virtual teams 
• Managerial figures: Architect, caretaker, lead operator 
• Cultures: Virtual web, virtual corporation, firm 
• Focus of virtual corporations: Temporary, project oriented  
• Members:  
o Geographically dispersed 
o With complementary or different competencies 
o Retain their independence and continue with their core competencies 
• No change in ownership of resources 
• Authority: Non-hierarchical  
• Participation unrestricted by industry, size and geographical location 
• Horizontal and vertical integration of the value chain 
o shortage in resources, integration of resources  
o share risks and costs, cooperation along the value chain 
• Enablers: Trust & IT  
• Informal or formal formation 
• Within the scope of collaboration, members share vision and goals 
• Vision and goals reshaped according to needs  
• Collaborative and dynamic network: Members changed according to needs 
o Low barriers to the entry and exit 
o No post-membership financial obligation  
• Flat Organization 
• Decentralized management: Fast decision making and decision execution 
• Lack of physicality  
 
In the literature, the concept of virtual corporation has been mainly applied in the context 
of small and medium scale enterprises (SME) networks. To compete globally and to 
stimulate largeness, scholars have verified that on a temporary basis, SMEs pool their 
specialized resources and capabilities residing within the network to deliver a product.  
Virtual teams have emerged mainly when and where there has been a need to temporarily 
harness, tap into the creativity and talent of geographically dispersed individuals to deliver 
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a service or product. Contrary to virtual supply chains where the relationship between 
suppliers and the focal firm are of a hierarchical nature, relationships within a virtual 
corporation and team are non-hierarchical.  
Mowshowitz (Mowshowitz, 1986 & 1994) laid out a theory of virtual organizing based on 
the notions of simplification, switching and combinatorial freedom.  He asserts that 
companies achieve optimal efficiency and effectiveness if they can switch from one 
resource to the next without being limited by temporal, geographic or political boundaries. 
Byrne (Byrne, J. A., 1993) is the scholar who has delivered the most comprehensive 
definition of virtual corporation. Accordingly, a virtual corporation is: 
 
“A temporary network of independent companies - suppliers, 
customers, and even rivals - linked by information technology to share 
skills, costs, and access to one another's markets. This corporate model 
is fluid and flexible - a group of collaborators that quickly unite to 
exploit a specific opportunity. Once the opportunity is met, the venture 
will, more often than not, disband. In the concept's purest form, each 
company that links up with others to create a virtual corporation 
contributes only what it regards as its core competencies. Technology 
plays a central role in the development of the virtual corporation. 
Teams of people in different companies work together, concurrently 
rather than sequentially, via computer networks in real time.”  
 
Virtual corporations are created in response to a market opportunity and dissembled upon 
its achievement.  They are value-adding partnerships that ensure a better and higher use of 
the members’ resources; provide access to new abilities, markets and information at lower 
cost; and reduce time to market (Bremer et al., 2000). Members benefit from the collective 
expertise as well as tangible and tacit knowledge residing within the virtual web members 
as opposed to expertise and knowledge available within one member (Venkatraman & 
Henderson, 1998). 
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Virtual corporations often give the impression that a large resource base, organization is 
behind the activities, whereas in reality, perhaps just a group of people networking from 
different locations contribute to this illusion (Klein, 1994; Fischer, 1995; Jägers et al., 
1998; Wicher, 1996). In other words, virtual corporations stimulate largeness and are often 
indistinguishable from larger organizations to an outsider (Goldman et al., 1995; Scholz, 
1994; 1996). This feature of the virtual corporation is particularly attractive for SMEs. 
SMEs typically have limited resources. Participation to virtual organizations enables them 
to expand their collaborative options, exploit opportunities previously inaccessible to them, 
gain access to a wide range of resources and compete with larger companies (Kasper-
Fuehrer & Ashkanasy, 2003; Franke, 1999) without losing their independence.  
Goldman et al. (Goldman et al., 1995) realize the drawbacks of the dynamically configured 
virtual corporations mainly in terms of trust building. As such, they introduce the concept 
of the virtual web. The virtual web is an open-ended pool of relatively stable, pre-qualified, 
and independent partners loosely bound by a cooperation framework. The cooperation 
framework sets the mission and vision of the virtual web as well as the general rules of 
participation. The web is a virtual collection of resources, capabilities, and core 
competencies that facilitates the speedy configuration of a virtual corporation (Franke, 
1999).  The virtual web allows members to entertain and build relationships with each 
other before becoming party to any virtual corporation (Franke, 1999). Similarly, Franke 
(Franke, 1999) argues that for the initiation and operation of virtual corporations, two 
functions have to be carried out: initiation and preparation of the virtual web and 
maintaining and improving the virtual web collaboration.  
Pires et al. (Pires et al., 2001) further elaborate the concept of the virtual web. They specify 
that the need for partnerships between competing firms as well as those between supply 
chain firms arise only when firms require, on a recurrent basis, to assemble resources to 
exploit in the speediest manner well-defined market opportunities. In other words, they 
argue that it is the repeated need and not issues related to trust that make the virtual web a 
permanent feature of virtual organizing and a necessity for the deriving virtual 
corporations.  
The virtual corporation is composed of virtual teams that operate across space, time and 
organizational boundaries. Each team member has its own area of specialization and 
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contributes to the objectives of the project with his/her specific skills. As milestones are 
accomplished or modified, members adapt their contribution in order to move with the 
team towards a common goal.  
Virtual organizing results in three different levels of interrelated organizational cultures. 
These are company culture, the culture of each virtual corporation and that of the virtual 
web (Franke, 1999). Indeed, a virtual corporation is a new organizational structure that has 
its own and unique identity and internal configuration.  
Snow et al. (Snow et al., 1992) in their article “Managing 21st Century Network 
Organizations” identify and define three managerial roles necessary for the creation and 
management of network organizations. These are the architect, caretaker and lead operator. 
In their view, networks require the conceptual inputs of an architect, the negotiating and 
nurturing skills of the caretaker and the organizational skills of a lead operator.   
 
Figure 3.8 – Management Figures of Virtual Organizing 
 
 
 
 
 
The managerial network roles identified by Snow et al. (Snow et al., 1992) are applicable 
to the different components of the virtual organization (Figure 3.8). Bearing in mind that 
the role and function of the three managerial figures may at times overlap and be even 
occupied by the same person, the architect is the originator of the virtual organization 
concept. The caretaker is the person or group of people who administer and nurture the 
virtual web including its IT functions, define its agenda, establish business processes and 
standards and provide forums for contact between virtual web members. They are 
responsible for the establishment of a solid base from which virtual corporations can be 
configured.  They initiate the virtual corporation and mobilize the required resources from 
the virtual web members. If a required capability is lacking or unavailable, the caretaker 
considers the engagement of external players.  Lead operators are the managers of each 
Virtual Organization 
 
 
Architect 
Virtual Web 
 
 
Caretaker 
Virtual Corporation 
 
 
Lead Operators 
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virtual corporation. They operationalize and disassemble the formed virtual corporation(s). 
Responsible for the structure’s performance, they manage the tension between continuity 
and closure as well as take and communicate the required operational decisions. 
Given the low relational investment required to become and remain a member of the 
virtual web, entry and exit decision are relatively easy and cheap. Nonetheless, adherence 
to the virtual web is a strategic decision as it is an open-ended, long-term commitment to 
contribute to virtual corporations as per an agreed cooperation framework. In contrast, the 
decision to establish and contribute to a virtual corporation is an operational one.  
The virtual organization literature also foresees the transfer of virtual corporation 
activities, temporary in nature, to the core business of some actors. At this stage, the 
concerned actors need to decide on how to manage the identified activities over a longer 
period. Possibilities include the setting up of more binding ties with partners involved in 
the implementation and delivery of the activities or internalization (Shi & Gregory, 2005). 
In conclusion, virtual organizations combine selected aspects of the three network types 
(Franke, 1999). They have the strength of a stable network as they offer member 
companies a stable framework for cooperation and continuity of relationships. They 
provide the close and trustworthy cooperative culture of an internal network. Lastly, they 
offer the agility and competitiveness of a dynamic network.  
 
3.2.1.2   The Virtual Organization’s Building Blocks 
The literature proposes a combination of commitment, strong leadership, top management 
support, agreement on vision and key processes, trust, interdependence, limited conflict 
and organizational compatibility as antecedents to inter-firm strategic alliances (Achrol et 
al., 1990; Mentzer, 1999; Mentzer et al., 2000). Franke (Franke, 1999) identifies eight key 
drivers - pre-qualification criteria, trust and culture, direction, finance and legal aspects, 
marketing, supply chain design, business processes and ICT - behind the successful 
transition of firms from a stable network to a virtual web. This section aims to describe the 
most relevant drivers of virtual organization identified by the literature.  
In networks, trust and reputation substitute for control mechanisms of rules and contracts 
available in hierarchies and markets (Ariss et al., 2002, Kasper-Fuehrer & Ashkanasy, 
2003; Jägers et al., 1998). Virtual organizations consist of voluntary rather than legally 
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binding collaboration arrangements. There is broad consensus that trust is one of the most 
important factors for the initiation, development, and continuation of virtual webs and 
virtual corporations as it enhances the willingness of partners to cooperate (Clases et al., 
2003). Trust facilitates information sharing between members. It enables virtual 
corporations to cope with time pressures in complex and uncertain situations and helps 
them retain their operational agility. As more and more virtual corporations are formed and 
experience and reputation grows, trust is reinforced among members. 
Trust along with the interaction of three inter-related organizational cultures – company, 
virtual corporation and virtual web, play a significant role in the successful transition of 
companies from a stable to virtual organization. Although members come together if and 
only when they share a common goal, clear and well defined direction of the virtual web 
helps focus the scope of cooperation.  
Dyer & Singh (Dyer & Singh, 1998) argue that the potential for relational rents hinges on 
the compatibility of the decision-making processes, organizational systems and cultures of 
network partners.  Strategic and organizational complementarities are said to be critical for 
realizing the potential benefits of a partnership arrangement that combines complementary 
resources.  
Compatibility between the hard and soft resources of the partners ensures that networks in 
general and virtual corporation in particular can act effectively as a single organization 
dedicated to one particular project (Goldman & Nagel, 1993). It is argued that in order to 
unite quickly, the partnering companies have to be compatible, committed and ready to 
respond to the unexpected requirements. Firm pre-qualification criteria aims to determine 
the level of firm logistics systems and philosophy compatibility. So as to avoid free riders, 
it also ensures that each member possesses a core competency or specialized resources.  
Reference business processes, that is, a set of standards to be continuously reviewed are 
important for the formation of virtual webs and corporations and facilitate the integration 
of new web members into the virtual web (Franke, 1999). Similarly, a supply chain design 
that builds on the members’ logistics philosophies and logistics management systems 
ensures the production of a competitive output as fast as possible.  
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The pre-requisites to trust are shared and transparent goals as well as the assurance of 
relationship integrity in terms of fair access to and distribution of benefits. In this respect, 
the finance and legal aspects of cooperation in terms of risks, costs and profits have to be 
spelt out, fair and acceptable to all parties.  
The virtual organization literature highlights the fact that while the outcome of the virtual 
corporation is visible in the form of a product or service, its structure and organizational 
boundaries is often blurred. More specifically, the structure and boundaries can remain 
unclear to the customer (Kasper-Fuehrer & Ashkanasy, 2003; Cooper & Muench, 2000), 
the participating organizations and at times even to the virtual corporation team members. 
This is true to the point that the success of the virtual corporation is often measured by its 
ability to appear and operate in the market as a single organization making it difficult for 
an outsider to distinguish between the different participating firms (Aken, 1998; Goldman 
& Nagel 1993; Pires et al., 2001; Kasper-Fuehrer & Ashkanasy, 2003; Rahman & 
Bhattachryya, 2002). Hence a strategy for marketing of the network helps compensate for 
lack of physicality and as Forslund et al. (Forslund et al., 1998) suggest a logo can help the 
identification and bonding process. 
As the relevant literature points out, recent developments in IT have blurred organizational 
boundaries, increased the speed of formal and informal communication and enabled the 
connection of firms and teams regardless of their number, location or distance. They have 
made the instantaneous and seamless sharing and exchange of large volumes of 
information across time, space and teams possible (Mertens & Faisst, 1996). The 
convergence of ICTs has allowed for the substitution of traditional ways of working in co-
located, hierarchical and stable environments with more dynamic organizational structures 
and virtually organized workforce.   
ICT has enhanced the effectiveness and efficiency of cooperation and has facilitated the 
emergence of decentralized organization structures. It has decreased transaction costs 
associated to cooperation, coordination and switching, increasing the economic incentives 
of dynamic collaboration arrangements. It has created new opportunities for learning, 
reinforcing both cognitive and affective trust among the partners (Scott, 2000). As far as 
the logistics function is concerned, IT has helped create transparent logistics structures, 
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facilitated the emergence of strategic alliances and realization of time-based strategies 
important for time-sensitive industries (Bowersox & Daugherty, 1995).  
Virtual organizations use ICT to virtually and dynamically establish a complex network of 
relationships necessary for the sourcing, creation and deployment of complementary or 
additional resources and capabilities (Venkatraman & Henderson, 1998). Without it, 
virtual organizations could not operate, react and communicate as swiftly and effectively 
as they do now. Members of a virtual organization come together via an electronic network 
flexibly and cheaply. To align activities and create knowledge, virtual corporations 
communicate, transfer and exchange large amount of information quickly, accurately, 
easily, cheaply and over great distances.  As such use and compatibility between ICT 
systems ensures an effective cooperation.  
Scholars have stressed the importance of agile workforces (van Oyen et al., 2001) in 
turbulent environments and networks. Networks require a workforce that can direct, 
manage, and discipline its activities based on new information and feedback. The network 
literature provides us with a description of the skills and traits of an agile workforce: 
intelligence, competencies, collaboration, culture and information system (IS) (Breu et al., 
2002).  An intelligent workforce quickly reads and interprets external change and adjusts 
objectives accordingly. A competent one continually acquires and upgrades its skills inline 
with the requirements of the business. An agile workforce collaborates effectively across 
projects, functions, teams and organizational boundaries. In terms of culture, it has the 
social resource, mindset that is conducive to empowerment and decentralized decision-
making. An agile workforce is an IT literate one that can use and quickly adapt to new 
systems.  
 
3.2.1.3  Drawbacks to Virtual Organizing 
Scholars have identified a number of drawbacks to virtual organizing. For example, the 
transition from organization to virtual corporation raises the question of how staff and 
management overcome the problems arising from geographical distances and a flat 
organization.  
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As already mentioned, virtual organizing creates three inter-related cultures. The loose 
structure blurs organizational boundaries and empowers employees rendering their 
management, in terms of guiding them towards the final goal, difficult. In this respect, 
scholars (Hughes et al., 2001; Cooper & Muench, 2000) highlight the importance of 
monitoring and control in empowered virtual teams as a means to avoid goal displacement. 
More specifically, for the contribution of the virtual team to remain relevant to the overall 
objective, Hughes et al. (Hughes et al., 2001) highlight the importance of backward and 
forward “awareness”. “Awareness” is defined as the knowledge of what has been 
accomplished prior to the work being handed on to the team and what happens after the 
team accomplished its task.  Similarly, Cooper & Muench (Cooper & Muench, 2000) 
stress the importance of coordination and communication between virtual teams in flat 
flexible organizational structure as a means to avoid inconsistency between the actions of 
dispersed members.  
Hughes et al. (Hughes et al., 2001) argue that secondments to a geographically distant 
virtual corporation may create group loyalties. In the worst-case scenario, when 
communication between the different components of the virtual organization is poor, it 
may result in the development of a “them and us” and “buck passing” attitude. Similarly, 
Bosch-Sijtsema (Bosch-Sijtsema, 2002) argues that staff seconded to virtual corporations 
has several professional responsibilities which may result in prioritization, loyalty and 
motivation problems. To counter these types of problems, Cooper & Muench (Cooper & 
Muench, 2000) stress the importance of fixing responsibilities and establishing reporting 
lines. Apart from ensuring accountability, clear reporting lines and responsibilities anchor 
and help the identification process of the virtual team members to the new set up.  
Virtual teams can also suffer from the feeling of isolation caused by the lack of day-to-day 
physical interaction with colleagues (Cascio, 2000). To counter the feeling of isolation, 
which can affect the productivity and quality of work, lead operators should encourage and 
seek regular opportunities for face-to-face encounters. 
Cascio (Cascio, 2000) identifies the cost disadvantages of the virtual workplace as a 
drawback to the concept of virtual organizing. He argues that dispersed workplaces 
increase setup and maintenance costs as administrative and technical support is extended to 
numerous and possibly distant setups resulting in loss of cost efficiencies.  
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Upon & McAfee (Upton & McAfee, 1996) focus on the IT challenges facing virtual 
organizing. They draw our attention to the fact that the design, administration and 
subsequent technological updating of an IT infrastructure is not a negligible responsibility 
and task. In addition, the caretaker, whose core competency is typically not in the area of 
IT, often carries out this function. For these reasons, they argue that virtual organizing may 
not emerge in all those contexts where needed but in environments where a large, 
dominant partner can provide for the required impetus and the funding (Upton & McAfee, 
1996). 
Cooper & Muench (Cooper & Muench, 2000) identify the issue of proprietary information, 
if not adequately addressed and protected, as a potential drawback to a company’s 
continued participation in virtual organizations. 
Finally, scholars warn firms that an increased reliance on virtual organization for critical 
services can lead to dependence and a gradual loss of control over key resources and 
competencies as well as strategic decisions (Cooper & Muench, 2000).  
In conclusion, by flagging lack of authority and control over the virtual web members and 
their resources as well as compatibility between cooperating members as the main 
drawbacks, the literature emphasizes how the very advantages of virtual organizing – flat 
organizations, temporary and dispersed units – are at the source of the concept’s 
drawbacks.  
Miles & Snow (Miles & Snow, 1992) identified the inherent causes of failure in the stable, 
internal and dynamic network types. They also discussed the dangers of misapplication and 
deviation from each form’s operating logic.  
As far as the inherent causes of failure are concerned, in stable networks these are related 
to the quasi-insulated, protected nature of the customer-supplier relationship. It is argued 
that internal networks are subject to failure if they are driven by internal motives rather 
than pure business rationale. Dynamic networks are expected to achieve their potential as 
long as there is a sufficiently large number of readily deployable, competent and relevant 
firms operating at each point of the value chain to choose from. 
Virtual organizing is not immune from the above mentioned causes of failure. Given the 
relatively stable nature of the virtual web, if complacent, the deriving virtual corporations 
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can become disconnected from the effective needs of their constituencies. As such, they 
can fail to provide value adding services or realize a market opportunity. To ensure that 
virtual corporations are activated only when clearly needed, it is important that the 
caretaker resists undue pressure exercised by virtual web members. As any dynamic 
network that depends on the voluntary contribution of its members, virtual corporations 
may run the risk of quality variation across deployments as needed expertise might not 
always be available.  
 
3.2.2  Supply Chain Failure Modes 
Humanitarian organizations need to manage a range of dependencies and duplication of 
efforts that emerge between their supply chains during emergencies. To understand the 
sources of such dependencies, we review the branch of the supply chain management 
literature that deals with secure and resilient supply chains. 
The integration of the SCM and coordination theory allows us to study the interface 
between interdependencies between different entities and their supply chains.  Supply 
chain failure modes caused by the structural shortcomings of a country or region, sudden 
shocks and disruptions have important supply chain and coordination implications.  They 
can create, increase or exasperate actor, process or resource dependencies. Structural 
supply chain failure modes directly linked to the specificity of a country affect all players. 
Similarly, shocks produce system-wide affects and, while temporary in nature, can result in 
structural deterioration of the environment. Firms are also subject to a wide range of 
industry or firm-specific disruptions that affect their operations and need to be dealt within 
the network (Figure 3.9).  
Figure 3.9 – Examples of Sources of Supply Chain Challenges 
System-Wide Industry or firm-specific 
Environment Shocks Disruptions 
Geographical features 
Logistics 
infrastructure 
Business Environment 
Large scale disasters 
Political Instability 
Accidents 
Labor disputes 
Supplier bankruptcy 
Industry consolidation 
Information System breakdown 
Procurement failures 
Capacity issues 
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Causes of supply chain shock and disruptions are numerous and the literature on the 
subject is rich. Instead of providing an overview on the topic, we take the pragmatic 
approach proposed by Rice & Caniato (Rice & Caniato, 2003a) by presenting the impact of 
disruptions on the supply chain - the failure modes - rather than the risks themselves. 
 
Figure 3.10 – Types of Failure Modes and Dependencies 
Failure mode Description Dependency 
Supply Delay or unavailability of materials 
from suppliers  
Flow, fit 
Transportation Delay or unavailability of transportation 
infrastructure or various modes 
Flow, Sharing 
Facilities Delay or unavailability of plantations, 
plants, warehouses, office buildings 
Flow, sharing 
Communication Delay or unavailability of the 
information and communication 
infrastructure and systems 
Flow 
Human Resources 
(HR) 
Delay, loss or unavailability of HR to 
continue operations 
Flow, sharing 
Source:  Adapted from Rice Jr., J. B. & F. Caniato (2003a), “Supply Chain Response to Terrorism: Creating 
Resilient and Secure Supply Chains”, Supply Chain Response to Terrorism Project, Interim Report of 
Progress and Learning, MIT Center for Transportation and Logistics. 
 
As per Figure 3.10, Rice & Caniato (Rice & Caniato, 2003a) identify and define the five 
failure modes that affect a supply chain. We argue that these failure modes which are 
related to shocks and disruptions in supply, transportation infrastructure, communication 
networks as well as those related to loss of human resources and unavailability of facilities 
can increase the frequency and level of sharing, flow and fit dependencies.   
The secure and resilient supply chain literature provides an overview of the type of 
measures firms apply to mitigate the affect of failure modes on their operations (Figure 
3.11). These measures allow firms to manage/overcome interdependencies that emerge in 
case of supply chain shocks and disruptions in an effective way. In general, the most 
reactive firms have contingency plans in place, can call upon redundant capacity and adapt 
to new scenarios leveraging the flexibility built into their operations. 
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Figure 3.11 – Mitigation Measures against Supply Chain Shocks and Disruptions 
Mitigation Measures Failure Mode 
Commercial Operations 
Supply Contingency planning 
Redundant capacity 
• Inventory, suppliers, production capacity 
Flexible operations 
• Supplier substitutability 
• Design changes 
• Direct sales model 
Facilities Contingency planning 
• Recovery centers 
Redundant capacity 
• Redundant or standby production facilities  
Flexible operations 
• Global, dispersed operations 
Transportation Flexible operations 
• Transportation mode substitutability (air, road, rail, sea) 
• Vehicle mode substitutability (airplane, train, boat, truck, 
car, motorcycle, etc.) 
• Logistics provider exchangeability 
• Change in destination, receiving port 
Communication Contingency planning 
• Business continuity plans 
HR Flexible operations 
• Temporary staff 
  
For example, flexible supply chains allow companies to respond to new scenarios by 
rapidly adjusting the speed, destinations and volumes of their supply chain and reallocating 
existing infrastructure and capabilities to new purposes and use (Prater et al., 2001). 
Flexibility is a cost-efficient choice as there is no idle capacity. However, it does force 
companies to prioritize needs and choose between competing activities.  By maintaining 
redundant capacity, firms can equally protect their supply chains from failure modes. 
However, unused capacity and capabilities imply higher fixed costs. Given the different 
cost and service characteristics of flexibility and redundancy, firms can combine or choose 
between the two options on a case-to-case basis. 
As the supply chain literature focused on secure and resilient supply chains describes, to be 
able to react to shocks and unexpected disruptions and restore normal supply network 
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operations, a company can actively engage in business continuity/contingency planning. 
Contingency planning allows companies to act upon the five failure modes.  
To hedge against facility modes firms envisage the establishment of recovery centers, 
management of global and geographically dispersed operations, and relationships with 
redundant, standby production facilities. Opening up of pre-arranged, dedicated emergency 
control centers, recovery sites upon detection of a disruption allows companies to conduct 
the “service”, back-office component of their business and overcome human resource, 
facilities and communication. By envisaging the movement of production to other parts of 
the world and having secondary suppliers for all critical components, companies can 
address failure modes deriving from facility and supply. 
To counter transportation failure modes, companies draw plans that envisage the use of 
different transportation routes, modes and vehicle types as well as back-up logistics service 
provider(s). To counter potential breakdown in their communication and IT systems, they 
formulate business continuity plans that incorporate the availability of alternative locations 
and adequate back-up systems. Finally, to overcome the unavailability of human resources, 
they call upon temporary staff. 
3.3  Resource Based View and Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
In this section, we draw upon the resource based view of the firm to understand the 
importance of resource and capabilities in organizational performance. In section 3.3.1, we 
review the resource based approach with a view to identify the need for resource and 
capability enhancement. In Chapter 2 we identified the importance of business processes, 
human resource and IT to organizational innovation and growth. Hence, section 3.3.1.1 
scans the resource based approach literature on the subject.  To understand the supply side 
of resource and capability enhancement and provide and explanation of when and why 
business can and is interested to contribute to the operations of humanitarian organizations, 
section 3.3.2 links the resource based view to the corporate philanthropy literature. It also 
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reviews the benefits and risks of business-humanitarian partnerships as well as what drives 
business to engage in partnerships with humanitarian organizations.  
 
3.3.1  Demand for Resource and Capability Enhancement 
Wernerfelt, the proponent of the resource based view (RBV), argues that since products 
and resources are the two sides of the firm, a firm can be analyzed from either perspective. 
The starting point of the RBV of the firm is a firm’s resource position in terms of its 
strengths and weaknesses. Under the RBV, resources are the basis of firm success or 
failure. The RBV defines resources and capabilities as the stock of tangible and intangible 
assets controlled by a firm (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991). Intangible assets can be both 
tradable (patents, brands, etc.) or non-tradable. Trust, image, culture, and skills are among 
the non-tradable and ‘invisible’ (Conner, 1991) intangible assets of a firm.  
The RBV literature makes a clear distinction between resources and capabilities. It 
considers resources as the source of a firm’s capabilities and capabilities as the main 
source of competitive advantage. Firm resources can be categorized in five major 
categories: financial, physical, human, technological, and reputation. Firm capabilities 
consist of a series of complex interacting routines that express the capacity of a firm to 
deploy and combine resources under its control to perform a task or activity. They are 
information based, tangible or intangible processes that are firm specific. They are 
developed over time through complex interactions among the firm’s resources particularly 
its human capital.  
The RBV assumes that all firms are idiosyncratic and that their strategic resources are 
heterogeneous (Barney, 1991). The thesis of the RBV is that while common resources 
ensure a firm’s survival, certain resources lead to higher rents and are the fundamental 
drivers of performance and competitive advantage. Resources and capabilities that confer 
such competitive advantage are those that are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable, and not 
substitutable (Barney, 1991). Path dependency, causally ambiguity (Lippman & Rumelt, 
1982) and social complexity make resources imperfectly imitable (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). 
When resources are not perfectly mobile, inimitable and difficult to identify and 
understand, heterogeneity is long lasting and competitive advantage is sustained.  
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The RB approach is concerned with the most effective deployment of core resources and 
capabilities and with the continuous development of existing and new resources. 
Replacement investment, commitment to upgrade and resource augmentation – that is 
filling ‘resource gaps’ (Stevenson, 1976) - are viewed as necessary actions to meet the 
challenges of the future. Grant (Grant, 1991) argues that those firms that develop and 
exploit their internal resources and capabilities are more prepared to confront external 
opportunities and threats. Dierickx & Cool (Dierickx & Cool, 1989) argue that the stock of 
resources a firm possesses influences the pace of resource accumulation. It follows that the 
study of a firm’s resource portfolio can provide indications of its growth opportunities and 
point to its strategic options.  
Scholars have also identified the limit to the RBV. The extent to which a firm’s strategic 
advantage is based on casually ambiguous resources, it is not possible to know, with 
certainty, which resources are the cause of that strategic advantage (Barney, 2001) limiting 
the opportunity for its transferability and replication across a firm’s business units (Grant, 
1991).  
The RBV while concentrating on the positive side, that is, unique benefits of core 
resources and distinctive competencies, refers to resources weaknesses (Wernerfelt, 1984) 
and competitive disadvantage (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Barney, 1991). Scholars have 
discussed the constraining effects of particular resource positions for the performance and 
growth potential of the firm. For example, the resource-based view prescribes building 
core resource as well as capability stocks as a means to achieve competitive advantage 
(Barney 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989). This is with a view to avoid that firms develop 
particular resource strengths, but neglect the development of effective capabilities required 
for organizing and coordinating such resources.   
West & Decastro (West & Decastro, 2001) have argued that the inability to leverage and 
extend a particular set of resources or the possession of the wrong set of resources could 
offset existing advantage or place a firm at a competitive disadvantage. Black & Boal 
(Black & Boal, 1994) note the possible effect of resources on one another. They argue that 
resources can either compensate, enhance or suppress/destroy each other.  As resource 
weaknesses and inadequacies interfere with rent generation, they have to be addressed. 
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Hence the ability to identify, organize, and coordinate resource strengths is as important as 
the ability to identify and coordinate efforts to mitigate or eliminate resource weaknesses 
(West & Decastro, 2001).  
 West & Decastro (West & Decastro, 2001) identify two characteristics of resource 
weaknesses and inadequacies. They argue that weaknesses and inadequacies that 
undermine a firm’s performance capability must be both valuable and rare. Only those 
weaknesses and inadequacies that cause significant loss of competitive advantage, or place 
a firm at a competitive disadvantage are valuable.  
The weakness/inadequacy perspective elaborates on the source and solution of resource 
weaknesses and inadequacies. It argues that resource weaknesses may result from 
deliberate action or from omission. Firms are often confronted with different investment 
alternatives. Decision to invest in one area may prevent a firm to build core competencies 
in another. Past firm-specific investments, bounded rationality and developed routines 
limits a firm's investment choice set (West & Decastro, 2001).  
The RBV argues that competitive advantage accrues from stocks of resources and resource 
stocks cannot be increased instantaneously (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). Similarly, the 
weakness/inadequacy perspective argues that resource weaknesses develop over time and 
can be effectively dismantled only over a period of time. Similar to resource strength, 
resource weakness and inadequacy often grows in an invisible fashion. Both the sources of 
and solutions to resource weaknesses and distinctive inadequacies are often complex, 
ambiguous, and difficult to identify. West & Decastro (West & Decastro, 2001) conclude 
that because they are rare and common solutions do not exist or in any case are not 
transferable from one firm to another, the solutions to counteract weaknesses are not 
obvious and require time to be fully developed. Since resource weaknesses and 
inadequacies like resources strengths are evolutionary within organizations, firms need to 
continuously invest in activities that offset or destroy them. 
West & Decastro (West & Decastro, 2001) argue that it is not only important to invest in 
existing and new resources strengths but also in i) the reduction of stocks of resource and 
capability weaknesses and ii) those resource and capability strengths that help neutralize 
the effect of weaknesses. Investments to reduce weaknesses serve to ensure a position of 
net resource strength. 
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Figure 3.12 – Relationship between Resource Based Approach and Business/CSO 
Partnerships 
Business/CSO  Humanitarian Organization 
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To address pervasive weaknesses and inadequacies, a humanitarian organization would 
need to invest in certain capabilities or resources.  However, in so doing it may need to 
access specialized resources and capabilities available only with private actors. As 
illustrated in Figure 3.12, when a business or civil society organization (CSO) has a 
strength in a specific resource or capability that if transferred or made available could help 
bridge a humanitarian organization’s weakness, then a partnership between the two could 
be desirable.   
 
3.3.1.1 Contribution of Business Processes, Human Resources and IT to 
Organizational Performance 
The resource based view suggests that, among other things, three organizational resources 
and capabilities can boost the performance of humanitarian organizations. These are HR 
and HR practices, business processes, and IT infrastructure. Investments in these areas 
ensure that each organization optimizes the use of its specialized resources and bridges 
eventual resource gaps improving its performance (Figure 3.13). In the following 
paragraphs we briefly scan the resource based approach literature on the subject. 
Business Processes. Business processes are routines or activities that a firm develops to 
implement its tasks and reach its objectives (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Porter, 1991). 
Examples of business processes include the processes of purchasing, production, 
delivering, and after sales service (Porter, 1985). Ray et al. (Ray et al., 2004) propose the 
effectiveness of business processes as a dependent variable in the resource based research. 
Since resources cannot be a source of competitive advantage by themselves, they argue 
that business processes are the way a firm’s resources and capabilities are exploited. As 
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such, they can be a source of competitive advantage. They argue that the overall 
performance of a firm depends, among other things, on the net effect of its business 
processes. The net effect is considered since each business process can increase or 
decrease a firm’s overall performance depending on whether the firm excels, does an 
average or poor job in it.  
Ray et al. (Ray et al., 2004) argue that while the ability of a firm to pursue certain 
activities, routines or business processes may be constrained by its resources and 
capabilities, efficiently and effectively organized business processes help a firm realize the 
full competitive potential of its resources and capabilities improving performance. 
Moreover, they argue that a firm’s routines by themselves can be an important determinant 
of a firm’s resources and capabilities given the fact that they tend to be inimitable. 
 
Figure 3.13 – Performance and Three Organizational Resources and Capabilities 
 
Organizational 
Resource/Capability 
Dependent Variable 
1. Business Processes Net effect of business processes 
2. Human resources 
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Human Resources. In line with the resource based view of the firm, Wright et al. (Wright 
et al., 1994) examine how a firm’s human resources can be a source of sustainable 
advantage. They argue that a firm’s pool of human resources is a source of sustained 
competitive advantage since it is a valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable 
resource. In the same vein, Barney & Wright (Barney & Wright, 1998) argue that 
sustainable competitive advantage does not come from individuals but from teams.  
Scholars have identified HR skills as the source of competitive advantage. Meyers et al. 
(Meyers et al., 2004) found that while job experience and education level represent 
minimum or threshold level requirements, an employee skill set is the differentiating factor 
in employee performance. Human capital theory (Flamholtz & Lacey, 1981) distinguishes 
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between general skills and firm specific skills. While general skills help achieve 
competitive parity, greater potential derives from investments in firm-specific skills 
(Barney & Wright 1998). However valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable, HR 
can create value only if the firm is organized, has the right HR systems and practices in 
place to exploit it.  
Likewise, Wright et al. (Wright et al., 1994) argue that HR practices used to attract, utilize 
and retain employees are not themselves sources of sustained competitive advantage but 
that they can be leveraged to provide a source of competitive advantage. For instance, HR 
practices can ensure that employees with rare talents are selected and that employees are 
trained so as to have a unique set of skills.  
Empirical studies have consistently shown that more effective HR management leads to 
superior firm performance (Becker & Huselid, 1998). HR management practices are 
considered instrumental in releasing the potential of a firm’s pool of human resources 
maximizing its effectiveness. Since HR practices and systems can facilitate or inhibit the 
development and utilization of organizational capabilities, managers are invited to pursue 
effective human resource management practices. Failure to invest in HR systems can result 
in a competitive disadvantage.  
The need for HR management is more pronounced in changing competitive environments. 
In these cases, companies may need a workforce with a different skill set than the one they 
currently possess. To meet new needs firms can hire new staff. But they also need to 
continuously develop existing staff through training and other staff development initiatives 
(Becker & Huselid, 1999). In terms of staff development, Saa-Perez & Garcia-Falcon (De 
Saa-Perez & Garcia-Falcon, 2002) argue that HR practices and policies such as training 
programs and socialization systems by enhancing employee skills and motivation can help 
improve a firm’s organizational performance. Given the importance of teams in firm 
performance, activities that aim to develop and nurture the relationships among 
organizational members are also deemed important (Barney & Wright, 1998). 
Meyers et al. (Meyers et al., 2004) identify four skill types as important for the 
performance of logistics managers: social skills, decision making skills, problem solving 
skills and time management skills. Social skills consist of the interpersonal skills of a 
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logistics manager necessary to build consensus and provide leadership. Decision-making 
skills reflect the ability of a manager to make decisions in an efficient manner. Problem 
solving skills involve the ability to manage time and set priorities. Time management skills 
consist of the ability to set agendas in order to meet goals and accomplish tasks.  
Information Technology. Several studies have examined the relationship between 
investments in IT and firm productivity. The evaluation of individual IT investments has 
been difficult given the ‘delayed benefits, unintended uses, business changes, and hidden 
support costs’ (Ross et al.. 1996). Nevertheless findings have shown that nor information 
systems or information technology by themselves contribute directly to sustained firm 
performance. There is strong evidence that IT exerts its influence on firm performance 
indirectly, through complementary relationships and interaction with other firm resources 
and processes. In this respect, Benjamin & Levinson (Benjamin & Levinson, 1993) 
conclude that performance depends on how IT is integrated with organizational, technical 
and business resources. Powell & Dent-Micallef (Powell & Dent-Micallef, 1997) conclude 
that only human resources combined with IT contribute to improved performance.  
It is commonly accepted that for information dependent firms, effective IT resources 
constitute a competitive necessity (Ross et al. 1996). Ray et al. (Ray et al., 2001) 
distinguish between IT’s two performance effects: absolute and relative. They argue that 
IT can improve the efficiency and effectiveness of processes in an absolute sense. That is 
the cost and/or quality of processes can be higher with the deployment of IT compared to 
when IT is not deployed. Accordingly, firms should invest in generic technologies as they 
have an absolute performance effect. However, to improve the relative performance of 
processes, there is a need to invest in inimitable IT capability.  
Ross et al. (Ross et al., 1996) develop a framework to study the relationship between IT 
and firm performance. They argue that a particular IT application does not provide a firm 
with a specific advantage. It is the capability of deploying IT to business opportunities and 
in support of specific activities and processes that is important. More specifically, IT is 
expected to enhance competitiveness when there is an effective IT capability, IT-related 
costs are controlled, and when business objectives are expected to be influenced by IT 
systems. Ross et al. (Ross et al., 1996) decompose IT capability in three IT assets: highly 
competent IT staff, a reusable technology base, and a strong relationship between IT staff 
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and the firm’s business units. In light of above, they argue that a firm should continuously 
assess the status of its human, technology and relationship IT assets in order to address 
eventual weaknesses and leverage strengths.  
Rai et al. (Rai et al., 2006) develop the theoretical linkages between IT infrastructure 
integration, supply chain process integration and firm performance. They suggest that 
integrated IT infrastructures, which facilitate the integration of resource (information, 
physical and financial) flows between a firm and its supply chain partners, enable firms to 
develop their supply chain integration capability. They argue that this capability results in 
significant and sustained firm performance gains in terms of operational excellence and 
revenue growth. As such a firm should engage in the development of its IT infrastructure 
to enable resource flows, coordination of activities and resource optimization. 
 
3.3.2  Supply of Resource and Capability Enhancement 
The corporate philanthropy literature discusses the benefits and risks of business-non-
profit partnerships to non-profit organizations. To understand how and why business can 
contribute to the resource and capability enhancement needs of humanitarian organizations 
and the risks involved, we review the corporate social responsibility literature.   
 
3.3.2.1  Business’ Contribution to Non-Profit Organizations 
The corporate philanthropy literature argues that non-profits that enter into partnerships 
with companies that are strategic in their philanthropy, that is, have the intention to add 
value to the cause they are supporting, can derive substantial benefits. Porter & Kramer 
(Porter & Kramer, 1999) identify four ways through which foundations can create value 
through their giving initiatives. These consist of selecting the best non-profit, signaling 
other donors, improving the effectiveness of the grantee, and advancing the state of 
knowledge and practice.  
These four ways of creating value are equally applicable to corporate philanthropy. 
Accordingly, business partners can create social impact and value for society by selecting 
the most effective non-profit, signaling other donors, improving the performance of the 
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non-profit and advancing the state of knowledge and practice (Porter & Kramer, 1999). 
The four ways in which business partners contribute to the operations of non-profit 
organizations are mutually reinforcing and their benefits cumulative (Porter & Kramer, 
1999). A brief description of the four forms follows. 
Selecting the Best Non-profit. Stable, experienced, and sizable non-profit organizations 
with low overhead costs, a good image and reputation, strong brand recognition/name 
equity, a compelling or urgent mission, influential network, and a charismatic or well-
known leader are particularly attractive partners for business (Andreasen, 1996; Simon, 
1995). More specifically, for corporate giving to achieve a high impact, partnering with a 
non-profit that has low overhead costs and effective operations can lead to more value 
created per dollar expended (Porter & Kramer, 2002). Consequently, CSIs create value if 
they are allocated to recipients that have the organizational capacity to absorb the in-kind 
and monetary assistance and the ability to deliver and achieve a greater social impact.  
Signal other Donors. A reputable, relatively large corporation with a sizable network and 
well-oiled communication/PR machinery, by publicizing its partnership with a non-profit 
and sustaining the relationship over time can raise the profile of the non-profit organization 
among traditional and non-traditional donors. By signaling to other donors, the business 
partner can help channel and attract additional funding and in-kind contributions from the 
corporate world to the non-profit. From their end, non-profits after identifying their 
requirements should be able to use their partner’s network as well as the results of the 
partnership to market their organization with corporations that make a good fit.  
Different companies bring different competencies to a given cause. By tapping into 
specialized expertise, the non-profit can benefit from a series of corporate partnerships. 
Should a partnership be effective in signaling other donors and in raising the public's 
awareness of the activities and needs of the non-profit, an increase in cash donations can 
be expected.  
In conclusion, Porter & Kramer (Porter & Kramer, 1999) assert that by selecting the best 
grantee and signaling to others, the corporation adds value in terms of more effective 
allocation of overall philanthropic giving.   
Improving the Effectiveness of the Grantee. Compared to individual donors, 
corporations have the scale, the time horizon, and the management skills to tackle 
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structural social issues and create benefits for society more effectively (Porter & Kramer, 
2002). By providing or facilitating access to specialized and complementary expertise and 
assets, business partners help non-profits upgrade their skills, address their weaknesses and 
improve their performance. As a result, value is created for society and the social impact 
per dollar donated is increased.  
Advancing the State of Knowledge and Practice. Business partners can also create value 
by facilitating the transfer of knowledge as well as advancing the state of knowledge and 
practice in the social sector. By applying their expertise, know-how, capabilities, resources 
and network, they can change the working culture of non-profits. They can help in two 
major ways: develop solutions to organizational as well as social problems.   
Through the interaction of these four forms, business partners either create value that goes 
beyond the mere purchasing power of their grants or achieve a social benefit with fewer 
dollars (Porter & Kramer, 1999). As Porter & Kramer (Porter & Kramer, 2002) 
summarize, by selecting the right grantee, the business partner assures a better return on its 
contribution. By signaling other potential donors it ensures a higher return on multiple 
contributions. By improving the effectiveness of the non-profit, it increases the return on 
the organization's total budget. 
Scholars (Porter & Kramer, 2002; Hess et al., 2002; Simon, 1995) equally agree that since 
corporate philanthropy is driven by clear goals, it is critical for achievements, objectives 
and performance to be monitored and evaluated to ensure the effective use of resources.  
 
3.3.2.2  Drivers of Business-Non-Profit Partnerships 
Porter & Kramer (Porter & Kramer, 2002) argue that when companies move away from 
scattered and unfocused support to social initiatives that improve the competitive context 
of a firm, they achieve value both for the company and society. First, they argue that social 
and economic objectives are not necessarily conflicting and distinct. In other terms, social 
support does not come at the expense of economic results, but that they are interlinked. 
Secondly, they highlight that the contribution corporations can make to a cause may be 
higher than what individual donors can achieve. In other words, they argue that where the 
company does not add value nor derives benefit, the cause, as advocated by the Chicago 
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economist, Milton Friedman, should be pursued by individual donors (Porter & Kramer, 
2002). 
Hess et al. (Hess et al., 2002) build the business case for corporate philanthropy. They 
coined programs that are part of the corporate strategy, grounded in the firm’s core 
competencies, go beyond cash donation and imply the use of firm resources, capabilities 
and relationships as Corporate Social Initiatives (CSIs). CSIs are expected to be long 
enough to achieve their objectives. They are usually conceived, initiated and guided by the 
partners’ top management. Well resourced and closely linked to the core values of the 
private sector partner, they depend on employee participation for implementation. What 
sets them apart from other traditional philanthropic initiatives is that their results are 
systematically evaluated, assessed, and compiled in company annual reports. 
Hess et al. (Hess et al., 2002) recognize that successful CSIs are those that are based on the 
corporation's values and culture articulated in the firm’s mission statement, which the 
firm’s employees have signed up to. Well-designed CSIs can help companies overcome the 
"rhetoric-reality gap" between the mission statement and the day-to-day operations of the 
firm (Waddock & Smith, 2000). They can achieve both internal benefits in terms of a 
motivated workforce as well as external ones, such as enhanced brand recognition.  
Nesting CSIs firmly in corporate values also demonstrates long-term commitment, which 
improves the credibility of the initiative with stakeholders. 
Hess et al. (Hess et al., 2002) identify three categories of drivers behind CSIs. These are 
expected gains and improvements in terms of a firm’s competitive advantage, the “moral 
marketplace” and its comparative advantage. This section expands on each of the identified 
drivers. 
Competitive Advantage. Competitiveness depends on how productively a company uses 
labor, capital, and natural resources to produce goods and services (Porter & Kramer, 
2002). In the era of knowledge workers, the availability of skilled and motivated 
employees has been identified as the key differentiator and source of competitiveness 
(Drucker, 1989 & 2002; Pfeffer, 1994).  
Corporate philanthropy can become an important part of corporate strategy as it 
contributes to building a firm’s competitive advantage. Indeed, more and more firms 
engage in CSIs with a view to build new, hard to imitate, and less-tangible sources of 
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competitive advantage such as a motivated and productive workforce, reputation assets and 
brand recognition (Hess et al., 2002). 
In terms of corporate image and reputation building, Hess et al. (Hess et al., 2002) argue 
that a well-designed CSI is more convincing than cash contribution for two reasons. Firstly 
because beneficiaries and assisted non-profits value donation of specialized, costly, and 
scarce products and services -  including time and talent of expert employees - more than 
its equivalent in cash. Secondly, direct engagement signals a real commitment to a cause 
and as such is far more appreciated by a firm’s stakeholders (Simon, 1995).  
Moral Marketplace. Given the influence exercised by and the massive resources at the 
disposal of the private sector, there is growing expectation for it to assume global 
responsibility and deliver societal value (Heap, 2000; Smith, 2003). More specifically, 
public opinion no longer views environmental and social concerns as the sole 
responsibility of governments, but also part of the business community’s responsibility 
(Mathews, 1997); this also in the face of government failure. 
In order to respond to shifts in common beliefs, expectations and preferences in the capital, 
consumer and labor markets, firms need to be socially responsible. As the literature 
emphasizes, the consumer, labor and capital markets are becoming more and more 
selective in their choices. For example, consumers increasingly recognize companies for 
the causes they support as much as the products they produce (Simon, 1995). As such they 
reward brands that are more than a “product” and may exercise pressure by boycotting 
products that, by way of example, use child labor or are harmful to the environment. 
Secondly, employees are more attracted to companies that are socially responsible and 
have a strong value system. Finally, investors are more inclined to invest in businesses 
with good corporate reputations and practices (Hess et al., 2002; Smith, 2003).  
As Andreason (Andreason, 1996) argues, in highly competitive industries where price and 
quality are not key differentiators, a company can try to distinguish itself on the moral 
marketplace. It can build a competitive advantage by supporting a cause and having sound 
business practices. In other cases, companies may be obliged to launch CSR/CSI programs 
as a reactive response to similar initiatives undertaken by their competitors.  
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Comparative Advantage. Similar to Porter & Kramer (Porter & Kramer, 2002), Hess et 
al. (Hess et al., 2002) argue that a firm can have a comparative advantage over individuals, 
governments, other non-profit or for-profit entities in addressing a social cause. For 
example, firms that have developed unique competencies, apart from enjoying competitive 
advantage over other firms in the marketplace, have comparative advantage over 
governments and individuals addressing certain problems (Dunfee & Hess, 2000). In an 
extreme scenario, a firm may be the only or one of the few providers of a particular 
product or service required by a cause. By contributing with their unique assets and 
expertise, corporations provide an in-kind assistance that may be out of the financial or 
technical reach of certain non-profit organizations. Consequently, the participation and 
contribution of business in social causes is complementary to the role and responsibilities 
of governments and traditional donors. 
 
3.3.2.3    Risks of Business-Non-profit Partnerships 
The previous paragraphs focused on the how business-non-profit partnerships can improve 
the performance of non-profit organizations and why business is interested to engage in 
such schemes. To provide a more holistic view, it is important to highlight the main risks 
associated with these types of partnerships. 
Andreasen (Andreasen, 1996) identifies a set of risks facing non-profits partnering with 
business. He argues that since the implementation of an alliance requires a lot of time and 
effort, failure results in substantial wastage of resources for both parties. He also 
emphasizes that only those non-profits that have the required absorptive capacity can 
benefit from the proposed assistance. He alerts non-profit managers of the negative effect 
that corporate cash and in-kind donations may have on the organization’s traditional 
donors. Traditional donors may reduce their donations should they believe that the non-
profit no longer requires their assistance or if they disapprove of the nature of the non-
profit's relationship with business.  
A corporation that enters into an alliance with a non-profit organization may impose 
restrictions such as exclusivity rights that may limit its organizational flexibility. A 
corporation with a deteriorating reputation may constitute a concrete risk to the image and 
operations of a non-profit. In addition, the corporate partner may damage the non-profit's 
121
LEVERAGING PARTNERSHIPS: LESSONS FROM HUMANITARIAN 
ORGANIZATIONS 
 
 
121
image and strategy through its actions (e.g. misuse of the non-profit logo, uncoordinated or 
unethical marketing initiatives). He argues that while a failed alliance is damaging, the 
perils of success can be equally harmful should the non-profit lack the structure, processes 
and systems to manage the ensuing success and growth. Another potential consequence of 
a successful partnership is the excessive reliance of the non-profit organization on its 
corporate partner.  
The literature has identified a series of risks facing the corporate partner in a CSI. The 
shortage of credible and promising non-profits willing and able to benefit from the support 
of a corporate partner (Elkington & Fennell, 1998) is identified as one of the main 
drawbacks. The second category of risk is related to the perception among the corporate 
stakeholders regarding the firm’s real motivation (Porter & Kramer, 2002). In other words, 
by engaging in an initiative that is viewed by the public as self-serving or driven by PR, 
image building or tax purposes, instead of creating a “halo effect”, may harm the company. 
As it is the case for the non-profit, a failed partnership results in wasted resources. A non-
profit suffering from a deteriorating reputation can be equally damaging to a corporation. 
Finally, divergence in working cultures, especially at the outset of the partnership and until 
it is duly addressed, can undermine the achievement of established deliverables (Samii et 
al., 2002a). 
3.4 Social Capital Theory 
The social capital theory elaborates how networking relationships and ties confer value to 
actors. It argues that networking relationships and ties enable actors to access resources 
embedded within their network. The term social capital is defined as ‘the sum of the actual 
and potential resources embedded within, available through and derived from the network 
of relationships possessed by an individual or social unit’ (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). 
Therefore, it includes both the network and the assets that may be mobilized through it 
(Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998).  
The role of social capital and social networks as a resource have been studied from the 
individual (Burt, 1992) and group level (Coleman, 1988) perspective. In the individual-
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level type, benefits accrue to the individual while in the group-level, social capital has the 
attributes of ‘collective good’ insofar that its use by the participants is non-rivalrous but 
excludable (Coleman, 1988).   
Within the two above-mentioned levels, two types of relations have been identified: 
internal and external. Internal ties fostered within communities result in ‘bonding’ forms of 
social capital whereas external relations result in ‘bridging’ forms of social capital 
(Putman, 2000).  
The bonding view focuses on those features of social capital structure that give the 
collectivity cohesiveness hence facilitating the pursuit of common goals. Network closure 
(Coleman, 1988) based on the bonding view stresses the role of cohesive ties in building 
social norms and trust, both of which facilitate coordination and cooperation (Putman, 
1995). One of the benefits of network closure is the intense flow of information between 
network participants. 
The bridging view sees social capital as an inherent resource of the social network as it ties 
individuals or groups (focal actor) to other actors. The structural hole theory (Burt 1992) 
based on the bridging view claims that benefits of social capital result from the relational 
opportunities among disconnected groups. In the structural hole theory, the unconnected 
are connected increasing the diversity of information and flow of new ideas whereas 
cohesive ties are seen as a source of rigidity and potential risk.  
The internal and external views are not mutually exclusive. As far as the firm is concerned, 
the amount of social capital available and hence its performance is influenced both by its 
external linkages to other firms and by the fabric of its internal linkages. Since both 
individual and group-level, internal and external social capital are relevant in competitive 
and cooperative environments (Johanson, 2001), organizations have different incentives to 
invest in them.  
Social capital has been equated to other forms of capital (Coleman, 1988). Adler and 
Kwon (2002) further elaborate on the main characteristics of this intangible resource. First, 
they argue that social capital developed through internal and external relational 
investments is an asset that can provide future flow of returns. Second, social capital is 
‘appropriable’ (Coleman, 1988) as certain ties can be used for other purposes. It is equally 
‘convertible’ (Bourdieu, 1985) because network positions can be converted to economic or 
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other gains. Moreover, it is costly to develop, reverse or convert.  Social capital can 
substitute or complement other resources and provide access to capabilities and resources 
that may otherwise be unavailable. To remain effective and grow, it needs maintenance. 
Unlike other forms of capital, social capital typically increases rather than decrease with 
use. Since it is located within the structure of relationships, it takes mutual commitment to 
build it but defection by one party to destroy. Finally, unlike other assets, investments in 
social capital cannot be quantified but its benefits can be measured.  
 
Figure 3.14 – The Dimensions of Social Capital 
Structural dimension Cognitive dimension Relational dimension 
Network ties Shared codes and language Trust 
Network configuration Shared narratives Norms 
Appropriable organizations  Obligations & Expectations 
  Identification 
 
Social capital has three dimensions: structural, relational and cognitive (Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998) (Figure 3.14). The structural dimension refers to the ability to make 
connections with others. Accordingly, it has three facets: network ties, network 
contribution and appropriable organizations. Network ties refer to the core proposition of 
social capital theory in terms of ties providing access to resources. Network configuration, 
that is, the overall pattern of connections in terms of density, connectivity, and hierarchy 
indicates the level of contact and ease in accessibility to resources residing in the network. 
Appropriable organization refers to the possibility of using social capital developed in one 
context in other settings.  
The relational or normative dimension refers to the fact that trust, obligations and 
expectations, norms and a common identity emerges through a history of interaction.  For 
Zaheer et al. (Zaheer et al., 1998), trust is the expectation that an actor is reliable, 
predictable, will act fairly. They identify four basic types of trust: those based on personal 
ties, those built on contextual cues, those developed on the basis of perceived competence 
and those that result from contractual obligations. Trust is expected to encourage people to 
interact and cooperate as well as help cooperating partners to deal with complexity and 
uncertainty (Luhmann, 1979).   
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Norms are an expression of consensus reached among network partners. Obligations and 
expectations between parties are expected to facilitate access to resources and determine 
the level of motivation. Identification – the process whereby individuals see themselves as 
one with another person or group of people – is expected to increase the chances for 
exchange as the parties involved are motivated and recognize the value of cooperation.  
The cognitive dimension refers to the development of a shared context, a common 
language to ensure there is a common interest or understanding of issues facing the 
organization. A shared language is expected to facilitate access to people and their 
resources, while shared narratives are expected to facilitate the exchange of experience 
enabling the introduction of improved practices.  
Nahapiet & Ghoshal (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998) argue that the development of social 
capital is a function of time, interaction, interdependence and closure. Time captures the 
importance of a stable and continuous relationship in the development of social capital. 
Social capital is reinforced and further developed in contexts where actors depend on each 
other.  Interaction helps increase the level of social capital.  Finally closure in social 
relationships is proven to be conducive to the development of relational and cognitive 
social capital. 
Similarly, scholars (Moran & Ghoshal, 1996; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998) argue that four 
conditions must be met for social capital to be activated and exchange and combination of 
resources to take place: opportunity, value expectancy, motivation and ability. Social ties 
increase the opportunity for exchange, interaction and cooperation within the network. 
Parties must expect deployment of social capital to create value. Parties have to be 
motivated to help each other. Finally, they need to have the requisite ability either in terms 
of resources and capabilities or combination capability or else they cannot be a source or 
beneficial recipient of social capital.   
At group-level, internal ties create the opportunity to act together. As the source of social 
capital lies in the structure and content of the actor’s social relations, the frequency, 
intensity, and multiplicity of ties and their configuration – direct or indirect – provide an 
indication of the quality of such opportunity and the strength of the social capital. The 
content of social ties are mainly centered around commonly shared norms and beliefs. 
Closure of the network structure strengthens social capital as it encourages cohesiveness 
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(Coleman, 1998) while sparse networks provider greater social capital benefits and more 
cost-effective resources (Burt, 1992).  
Actors are motivated either because of a shared destiny, by obligations created in the 
process of social exchange, conditions enforced upon them by the broader community 
(Portes, 1998; Blau, 1964) or by norms of generalized reciprocity (Putman, 1993). The 
share of resources effectively mobilized depends on the motivation of the ‘donor’ while the 
total amount depends on the opportunity created by the network of contacts.  
The relevant literature has identified three direct benefits of social capital: information; 
influence, control and power; and solidarity (Adler & Kwon, 2002). Social capital 
facilitates access to broader sources of information and improves information’s quality, 
relevance and timeliness (Adler & Kwon, 2002). Power accrues to firms or individuals 
who bridge disconnected groups (Burt, 1992). Finally strong social norms and beliefs 
encourage compliance with rules and customs and reduce the need for formal controls. The 
ultimate value of social capital depends on the match between network configuration and 
type of tasks on hand. Norms and beliefs, apart from being sources of social capital, 
influence the value of a given stock of social capital (Adler & Kwon, 2002). 
There is growing consensus on the contingency view of the role of social capital on 
organizational performance. The positive or negative influence of social capital depends, 
among other things, on the fit between each social network and organizational activities, 
the costs involved (Hansen et al., 2001; Harrington, 2001), and the ability of the network 
to promote trust and adherence to common values as opposed to opportunistic behavior.  
Indeed, social capital has risks that can even outweigh its benefits (Portes, 1998; Adler & 
Kwon, 2002). The cost and time of building and maintaining social capital may be too high 
compared to its benefits. Over-investment may lead to over-commitment. Power benefits 
may be traded-off against information benefits. Overembeddedness can restrict access to 
ideas outside the network (Burt, 1992). It can also pave the way to exclusionary effects, 
inertia or result in reinforced domination. Firms may be oppressed by feelings of 
obligation and friendship.  Wasted effort or missed opportunities for collaboration could be 
the other risks.  
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Scholars argue that as long as market and hierarchies give rise to social relations they too 
contribute, albeit indirectly, to the formation of social capital. It is argued that in arms-
length transactions where products and services are exchanged for money or bartered and 
formal hierarchies where authority regulates transactions are neutral to social capital. In 
contrast, relational contracting and intra-organizational relationships based on trust and 
culture are supported by social capital.  
In conclusion, the source of social capital lies in the structure and content of the actor’s 
social relations and its effects flow from the information, influence and solidarity it makes 
available to the actor (Adler & Kwon, 2002). To be able to extract value from social 
capital, similar to other resources, this too needs to developed, nurtured and maintained. 
Once social capital is created, the focus shifts to its growth as higher levels of social capital 
by fostering stronger network ties facilitates access to resources available within the 
network for network participants. 
3.5  Conclusions 
The aim of this thesis is to ground research on disaster response in existing theoretical 
frameworks. In Chapter 2, we presented and discussed our preliminary conceptual 
framework. We identified three partnership schemes – temporary supply networks, 
coordination networks and business-humanitarian partnerships – as independent variables 
that can help explain the organizational performance of humanitarian organizations during 
disaster response. To explain what can drive the contribution of diverse actors to disaster 
relief and to a particular humanitarian organization, we identified social networks as 
relevant. Against this background, in this chapter we reviewed the network, coordination, 
resource based view and social capital theories. This allows us to establish supply network 
management, coordination, access to disaster preparedness resources and capabilities and 
social capital as key disaster management capabilities.  
The above-mentioned theories study the governance structure and/or performance of firms 
considering one or a combination of the following factors: resources, activities and actors.  
Network theory is based on the assumption that different business units or firms are 
connected to each other through actor bonds, activity links and resource ties (Hakansson & 
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Snehota, 1995). Coordination theory studies the interdependencies between actors, 
activities and resources that may arise within markets, hierarchies, or networks. To 
determine the performance of a firm, the resource based view focuses on the stock and 
traits of a firm’s resources and capabilities.  By arguing that networking relationships and 
ties enable actors to access resources embedded within their network, the social capital 
theory explains how through different types of network relationships and ties, this 
intangible resource confers value to a firm. In the following paragraphs we highlight what 
we found relevant in the literature review for our study of humanitarian organizations and 
disaster response. 
Firms resort to network structures when the governance mechanisms of market and 
hierarchy are not satisfactory. The literature indicates networks as the most apt 
organizational structure when an organization is unable or unwilling to cope independently 
with i) the complexity and risks of a rapidly changing environment and ii) the skill and 
resource demands imposed on it in global markets (Cravens et al., 1996). Humanitarian 
organizations operate in rapidly changing environments where pressure on their skills and 
donated resources is high. Therefore it is not surprising that to stage their response they 
resort to supply networks to gain access to their networks’ resources and capabilities 
rendering supply network management a core disaster management capability. 
The increasing number of unpredictable and competing large-scale disasters in less 
developed countries of the world and the insufficient resources at the disposal of each 
humanitarian organization for a swift and accurate response make coordination for 
humanitarian organizations a recurrent and dominating concern. To overcome failure 
modes and manage dependencies prior and during an emergency, a humanitarian 
organization needs to coordinate its activities with other humanitarian organizations and 
key stakeholders. As time is of essence during emergency response, a humanitarian 
organization also needs to avoid parallel efforts, duplications along the supply chain by 
merging its activities with other like-mind organizations. Coordination theory helps us 
identify and categorize different kinds of dependencies emerging during disaster response 
within a humanitarian organization, along the emergency supply chain as well as with 
other humanitarian organizations. Figure 3.15 provides an overview of the type of 
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logistical challenges met by a humanitarian organization and the need for extra and inter-
organizational coordination.  It also allows us to establish coordination ability as an 
important disaster management capability.  
The resource based view argues that firms possess resources and capabilities a subset of 
which enables them to achieve competitive advantage and another subset which may 
contribute to the destruction of value (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984; West & Decastro, 
2001). Hence, it is not only important to build on unique organizational strengths, but also 
to disassemble or neutralize those organizational weaknesses that might compromise 
strength (West & Decastro, 2001). In addition, a firm must develop capabilities to acquire, 
integrate, reconfigure and release resources embedded in its network of relationships to 
achieve sustained competitive performance. Since it is not possible to adjust significantly 
the aggregate amount of stock in the short run, the resource based view stresses the 
importance of investment flows to ensure an adequate addition of stock.  
The situation is no different among humanitarian organizations. Similar to business, these 
types of organizations must build and nurture strengths and neutralize and negate 
weaknesses. By enhancing their resources and capabilities, humanitarian organizations 
improve upon their disaster preparedness capabilities. Increased level of disaster 
preparedness strengthens the effectiveness of temporary supply networks and coordination 
efforts.  
More specifically, the resource based view suggests that HR, IT and business processes are 
resources and capabilities that can improve the performance of a firm. Staff motivation and 
socialization are key to any productivity improvement (Grant, 1991). Scholars in the 
supply chain literature have emphasized the importance of people in achieving supply 
chain objectives (van Hoek et al., 2002). Since logistics is a human centric process and 
central to the performance of humanitarian organizations, the development of logisticians 
and the logistics function is expected to provide the greatest potential in terms of 
differentiating an organization from its past performance and competitors. Trained, 
motivated, well-connected and networked team of logisticians with developed social skills 
improves the ability of a humanitarian organization to stage effective and efficient relief 
operations by managing temporary supply networks and coordinating activities within their 
organizations as well as across organizations and key stakeholders. 
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Figure 3.15 – Recurrent and Common Failure Modes: Dependencies & Duplications 
Failure 
Modes/Context 
Logistical Challenge Need for Inter & Extra 
Organizational 
Coordination 
Dependency 
Duplication 
Supply Failure Modes 
Emergency Relief item stock-outs and 
excesses 
Relief item ‘value’ 
Inter: Need for overview of 
community pipeline 
Duplication 
Sharing, Fit, 
Flow 
Emergency Address “orphan” issues such 
as supply of fuels 
Inter: Transportation 
problems 
Duplication 
Emergency Arrival of unsolicited goods Extra: Limit arrival of & 
manage unsolicited goods 
Flow – ensure 
usability 
Transport Failure Modes 
Developing 
countries 
Poor and/or fragmented 
physical infrastructure 
Extra: Problems of 
accessibility  
Sharing 
Developing 
countries 
Lack of sufficient transport 
assets 
Extra & Inter: Delays & 
cost increase 
Sharing/Dup 
Landlocked 
countries 
Dependence on bordering 
countries’ infrastructure 
Extra: Delays Duplication 
Emergency Adverse weather conditions: 
Disabled infrastructure 
Extra & Inter: Problems of 
accessibility 
Sharing 
Emergency Blocked goods at transit 
points  
Extra: Overcome 
administrative hurdles 
Duplication 
Natural Disasters Disabled or destroyed 
infrastructure  
Extra & Inter: Problems of 
accessibility  
Sharing 
Conflicts Insecurity Extra: Interruption of 
transport & distribution 
services  
Sharing 
Conflicts & 
political context 
Temporary closure of 
infrastructure/transit points 
Extra: Delays & cost 
increase  
Fit 
Duplication 
Facility Failure Modes 
Emergency Limited storage facilities Inter: Problems of storage Sharing 
Duplication 
Emergency Lack of distribution channels Extra & Inter: Limited 
distribution capability 
Sharing/Dup 
Emergency Limited office network Inter: Ensure geographical 
coverage  
Sharing 
Conflicts Unavailable storage facilities Extra & Inter: Problems of 
storage 
Fit/Duplication 
Communication Failure Modes 
Emergency Dispersed information Inter: Need for vast range 
of information 
Duplication 
HR Failure Modes 
Competing 
emergencies 
Lack of sufficient number of 
logisticians 
Inter: Need to augment 
logistics capability 
Duplication 
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Humanitarian organizations operate in rapidly changing environment. For each disaster 
they depend on a variable and often inadequate resource set. Since business processes 
determine the way resources and capabilities are exploited, efficiently and effectively 
organized business processes assume a particular importance. Given that it is difficult to 
change the amount or range of resources mobilized in response to a disaster, the redesign 
of some of the business processes can help increase the efficiency and effectiveness of 
available resources and capabilities. Sound operational and logistics-specific business 
processes can help ensure a cost-effective, timely, accurate, flexible and accountable relief 
operation. They also improve the ability of an organization to stage temporary supply 
networks and coordinate across its supply chain activities. 
Although the literature argues that possession of IT resources does not result in enhanced 
performance, organizations operating in highly complex environments must deploy 
efficient and effective information systems to manage information and knowledge (Wade 
& Hulland, 2004). Humanitarian organizations operate in complex environments and need 
to access and elaborate external information, manage their supply chains, coordinate their 
responses, and make decisions in time sensitive environments. An IT infrastructure 
provides humanitarian organizations with an adequate technical platform for the effective 
and efficient management of their operations in general and logistics function in particular. 
A robust and flexible information infrastructure coupled with strong IT technical skills are 
useful in the management of resource flows internally and with external partners 
improving orchestration and coordination ability. An information infrastructure helps 
humanitarian organizations manage knowledge, learn from past experience and improve 
their decision making process. An adequate IT infrastructure can reduce duplication of 
efforts by streamlining existing business processes, lower operational and coordination 
costs, reduce delays in the goods mobilization and distribution process, enable quicker and 
more accurate decisions and facilitate the monitoring of accountability objectives and 
reporting requirements.  
In conclusion, similar to business, efforts aimed at enhancing the resource and capability 
profile of a humanitarian organization improves performance. Investments in the logistics 
function of a humanitarian organization will improve coordination and supply network 
management. 
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To overcome the underinvestment in preparedness capability and to improve upon the 
response function, humanitarian organizations need to go beyond the generic and tied 
resources offered to them by their traditional donors. They need to tap into specialized and 
additional resources. The corporate responsibility literature sheds some light on how 
private actors can contribute to a humanitarian organization’s resource and capability 
enhancement requirements. It is argued that a for-profit organization that has a 
comparative advantage in an area valued by and relevant to the mandate of a humanitarian 
organization can address its organizational gaps and weaknesses. For example, by calling 
upon the resources of business during emergencies, a humanitarian organization can 
increase the speed and reduce the cost of its supply networks. By tapping into these 
additional resources, it can improve its operational flexibility and accuracy.  CSOs and 
business can also contribute to the innovation and growth objectives of a humanitarian 
organization. They can help humanitarian organizations develop the right set of HR skills, 
improve their business processes, and establish an IT infrastructure.  
The literature has identified the benefits and risks of corporate social initiatives which 
equally apply to business-humanitarian partnerships (Figure 3.16). The motivations that in 
the first place encourage the two parties to consider a partnership determine the list of 
expected benefits. In terms of risks, the humanitarian organization is expected to face a 
larger number and more serious set of risks. This is because while a CSI is just a side 
program for the corporate partner who continues with its core activity (production/delivery 
of goods and services), it is a program which intervenes in the core activity of a 
humanitarian organization. Hence, the identified risks carry a heavier weight for the 
humanitarian organization.  
Firms resort to the governance mechanisms of markets, hierarchy and networks. While 
price regulates markets and authority regulates hierarchies, social capital theory indicates 
social capital as one of the main currencies for network transactions.  Since network 
transactions account for the majority of exchanges during a relief operation, understanding 
the impact of social capital on performance becomes importance. 
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Figure 3.16 – Potential Benefits & Risks of Business-Humanitarian Partnerships 
 
Main benefits for humanitarian organization Main benefits for corporate partner 
• Access to specialized, additional, 
complementary resources and capabilities 
• Advance status of knowledge and practice  
• Signal new donors 
Moral Market Place 
• Improve employee motivation and 
productivity (attraction, retention) 
• Fulfill the CSR expectation of the 
market 
Competitive Advantage: 
• Increase in reputational assets 
• Enhance brand recognition 
Main risks faced by humanitarian 
organizations 
Main risks faced by corporate 
partner 
• Divergence in working  cultures 
• Absorptive capacity 
• Reduced donations from traditional donors 
• Loss of organizational flexibility 
• Structural dependency 
• Tainted partners, Anti-ethical activities  
• Overwhelming success 
• Failure: wasted resources 
• Shortage of credible & promising 
non-profits 
• Accused of partnering exclusively 
for self-serving reasons, PR, image 
building or tax purposes 
• Failure: wasted resources 
• Deteriorating reputation  
• Divergence in working cultures 
 
From the network theory perspective, actor ties influence the structural, cognitive and 
relational dimension of social capital. More specifically, they provide an opportunity for 
the creation, maintenance and reinforcement of individual and group-level bonding and 
bridging social capital. Coordination – managing dependencies between tasks and 
activities implemented by actors – provides a fertile ground for the development and 
growth of social capital given the level and period of interaction, interdependency and 
closure. Similarly, lack of coordination that leads to misunderstanding and conflict can 
contribute to the destruction of social capital.  Partnerships between business and non-
profit organizations can help build as well as destroy bridging and bonding social capital 
given their impact on the development of different dimensions of social capital. Therefore, 
relationship management becomes the most important disaster management capability of a 
humanitarian organization and its staff. 
The literature highlights the potential contribution of HR systems and practices in terms of 
creating intra, inter and extra-organizational networking opportunities. Such opportunities 
can lead to the creation of individual and group-level bonding and bridging social capital. 
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Likewise, HR practices that aim to develop the social skills of individuals and groups 
further enhance the effective use of existing social capital. Implementation of an integrated 
IT infrastructure along the supply chain can create new opportunities for the development 
of social capital between individuals and groups. Finally, we argue that business processes 
factor in, leverage the prevailing level of, and contribute to the creation of social capital 
between various individuals or groups. 
Social capital theory advances that the amount of resources mobilized from network ties is 
heavily reliant on the social mechanisms of reciprocity, socialization and motivation 
(Adler & Kwon, 2002). In terms of the actual level of resources mobilized, social theory 
advances that it depends on the ability, motivation and opportunity of the donating party 
(Adler & Kwon, 2002). Typically, however, the donor is expected to receive its return 
from the collectivity as a whole in the form of status, honor, or approval rather than from 
the direct recipient (Portes, 1998). Motivation also plays a key role in ensuring 
coordination. Coordination theory highlights the relevance of motivation, incentives, and 
emotions in coordination related to human (Malone & Crowston, 1994). 
The general public expects donors – governments and their institutions, foundations, 
corporations, etc. - to respond to disasters. In line with the social capital theory, we argue 
that the level of resources mobilized by a humanitarian organization from its network of 
donors depends heavily on at least three factors. These are donor obligations emerging 
from public expectations and pressure, level of socialization with the donor community, 
and donor motivation By engaging in effective relationship management - roping in and 
intensely socializing with socially-obligated but also motivated, able and well-endowed 
partners over long periods of time - humanitarian organizations increase their opportunity 
for the development of bridging social capital and an improved performance. 
The literature review has allowed us to understand which disaster management capabilities 
improve organizational performance and how different partnership and network schemes 
can contribute to their enhancement (Figure 3.17). It has equally allowed us to reach a 
number of conclusions regarding the connection between social capital developed through 
sound relationship management, supply network management, coordination and 
opportunity for resource and capability enhancement. 
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Figure 3.17 – Conceptual Framework 
 
The view of organizational performance presented is a socially-driven one. We see disaster 
response deeply embedded in networks and in the structure of network relations. Thus we 
suggest that differences between humanitarian organizations, including difference in 
performance, may represent differences in their ability to create and exploit social capital, 
that is, their ability to manage relationships.  
In conclusion, given the prevalence of networks in humanitarian operations, inter-
organizational and extra-organizational interdependencies during disaster response, and 
need to address resource/capability weaknesses, humanitarian organizations appear in need 
of increasing amounts of social capital in order to coordinate and gain access to the 
required resources and capabilities. Based on the conceptual framework presented above, 
in the next chapter we shall present our research framework with a view to define a 
number of research questions and advance a number of propositions to be tested by our 
empirical evidence.  
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Chapter 4  Research Framework 
 
In this Chapter we present our research framework composed of a number of propositions 
and research questions to be validated by our empirical research. This research framework 
is derived from our conceptual framework, our understanding of humanitarian operations 
and the themes that emerged in the literature review. To set the stage for our framework, 
we first review the findings of Chapters 2 and 3.  
In Chapter 2 we established two concepts: the relationship between three partnership and 
network arrangements and organizational performance and the need for operational 
humanitarian organizations to have strong disaster management capabilities in order to 
ensure the arrival of the right relief items at the right time and place. In terms of disaster 
response capabilities, in Chapter 3 we established coordination as a subset of supply 
network management ability. The opportunity to enhance resource and capability was 
found to be an important factor in disaster preparedness. We also determined that increased 
levels of disaster preparedness improve coordination and supply network management. 
Then we established relationship management as an important disaster management 
capability and social capital as central to our framework. As indicated by the social capital 
theory, we expect more ties and repeated relationships to reinforce and increase the level of 
a humanitarian organization’s social capital.  
As illustrated in Chapter 2, when disaster strikes, a humanitarian organization conducts a 
needs-assessment exercise with a view to determine the discrepancy between resources and 
capabilities already in its possession and those required to adequately meet the 
requirements of the affected people. To bridge the resource/capability gap, which is often 
significant, it needs to gain access to and internalize resources/capabilities available within 
or outside its network. This is usually achieved without owning or investing in all the 
required capital nor committing to long-term employment. As mentioned in section 2.7.1, 
the supplier network is the only node of the supply network regulated by price and over 
which a humanitarian organizations can exercise power. Therefore, it is important to 
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explore what supplier network configuration best meets the requirements of disaster 
response.  
Coordination theory helps us categorize the different dependencies emerging during 
disaster response. It also allows us to establish a relationship between dependencies 
resolved and duplications avoided and performance. However, there is still a need to 
explore which coordination governance structure best meets the unique challenges of 
disaster response, how humanitarian organizations execute coordination and what 
coordination mechanisms they use.  
The resource based view considers the ability to coordinate an organizational resource that 
impacts productivity and therefore the performance of an organization. Business-
humanitarian partnerships have the potential to operate as effective coordination 
mechanisms. In structured partnerships, the corporate partner has the means to match the 
specific needs of the assisted organization. If well-managed, these types of partnerships 
ensure that services, goods and assets provided meet the prerequisite, accessibility, 
usability and simultaneity constraints criteria (flow and fit dependency) of the assisted 
humanitarian organization as defined by the coordination theory. As such, their 
contribution improves the performance of the assisted organization as the right thing is 
provided to the right place at the right time.  
In Chapter 2, we identify four business-humanitarian partnership possibilities. In Chapter 3 
by drawing on the CSR literature, we list the expected benefits and risks associated to 
business-humanitarian partnerships both for the corporate partner and the humanitarian 
organization. However, each of the four suggested partnership schemes has a different 
characteristic. Therefore, there is a need to explore their relative risk-to-benefit profile, 
verify whether all humanitarian organizations can benefit from them, and identify best 
practices in business-humanitarian partnerships. 
The core proposition of social capital theory is that networks of relationships constitute a 
valuable resource. Our construct is centered on the concept of social capital. We argue that, 
at any given time, the invisible resource that once leveraged increases the opportunity and 
ability of a humanitarian organization to perform better is its social capital. The stock of 
social capital of a humanitarian organization derives from its portfolio of partnerships, with 
each relationship contributing to its development and reinforcement. In this respect, there 
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is a need to explore whether some actor relationships contribute more than others to the 
development of social capital and if so which ones. Moreover, since both bonding and 
bridging social capital are relevant to our conceptual model, there is a need to explore their 
contribution to disaster response and disaster preparedness. 
This Chapter is structured as follows. In section 4.1 we develop a proposition related to the 
structure of the supplier network. In section 4.2 we elaborate on the optimal governance 
structure for the logistics coordination platform. By drawing upon the network and virtual 
organizing literature, we argue that virtual organizing is the only organizational structure 
that can meet the unique challenges of coordination during emergency relief. We then 
formulate two research questions that help us explore how humanitarian organizations 
implement such a structure and what are the risks and opportunities facing humanitarian 
virtual organizations and how they are managed.  In section 4.3 we advance a proposition 
related to two opposite partnership schemes: strategic and brokered partnerships. To 
expand on the proposition, we develop two research questions to help us explore what type 
of humanitarian organization can engage in strategic partnerships and what are the best 
practices for business-humanitarian partnerships.  In section 4.4 we advance propositions 
and research questions which allow us to explore the relationship between social capital, 
different network actors and performance.  
4.1 Supplier Network 
For each disaster, to respond effectively and efficiently to the needs of the afflicted 
populations an operational humanitarian organization has to construct a supply network 
that includes suppliers of relief items. Relief items consist of a couple of hundred food and 
NFIs such as medicine, shelter, fuel, sanitation, and telecom unit.  The bulk of relief items 
consist of commodities: standardized and mature products. For these types of products, the 
supplier base is wide and geographically dispersed and the level of product substitutability 
is relatively high. Therefore competitive offerings and stock outs at one supplier can result 
in purchases from alternative sources. 
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As discussed in section 2.3, operational humanitarian organizations manage a multitude of 
temporary, spatially-dispersed and highly dynamic emergency supply chains in time-
sensitive environments. The effort, investment and time to establish a fully integrated 
supply chain - which is expected to be substantial and run into years - is always longer than 
an emergency period. This makes it an inefficient and irrelevant supply chain configuration 
strategy. In contrast, a broad, loosely coupled supplier network is a valid supply chain 
configuration regardless of the nature of the disaster: predictable or unpredictable.   
Compared to a fully integrated supply chain, a broad supply network driven by product 
availability (rather than relationships) is more resilient to system-wide shocks and 
disruptions.  A network of multiple and geographically dispersed suppliers renders the 
supply chain more resilient to supply and transport failure modes for at a number of 
reasons. For example, supply networks can be easily (re)configured with interchangeable 
and complementary members to counter unavailable or disabled suppliers. The multi-
commodity emergency supply chain can be quickly scaled up, configured and interlocked 
with members that possess redundant capacities and excel in preparedness and flexibility. 
The number of nodes and interchangeable components is higher in a network than an 
integrated supply chain enabling humanitarian organizations to shift sourcing from one 
country or site to another whenever confronted with supply and transport failure modes. 
Given the commoditized nature of relief items, the temporary and dynamic nature of 
emergency supply chains and the time-sensitiveness of emergency relief, we argue that 
only a broad supplier network can ensure a speedy, accurate, flexible, and cost-effective 
response. It follows: 
P1:  Only a broad supplier network can ensure a speedy, accurate, flexible and 
cost-effective disaster response. 
4.2 Coordination  
In Chapter 2 we highlighted the fact that humanitarian are confronted with a continuum of 
“permanent”, recurrent structural and temporary logistics failure modes.  In Chapter 3 by 
drawing on the secure and resilient supply chain literature, we discussed how business 
counters failure modes. Similar to business, operational humanitarian organizations plan 
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for and implement a series of agency-specific mitigation measures. At the organizational 
level, to mitigate disruptions to their supply operations, these humanitarian organizations 
prepare contingency plans as well as build redundant capacity and flexibility into their 
operations.  
However, there are a range of logistical challenges commonly encountered by 
humanitarian organizations that call for inter and extra-organizational coordination. As 
seen in section 3.5 of Chapter 3, coordination theory helps us identify and categorize the 
different kinds of inter and extra-organizational dependencies and duplications emerging 
during disaster response. However, it is also important to understand how humanitarian 
organizations overcome dependencies and avoid duplications emerging prior or during 
disaster response. 
Q1:  How do humanitarian organizations manage dependencies and 
duplications emerging prior or during disaster response? 
 
In Chapter 2 we argued that humanitarian organizations can either coordinate jointly or 
outsource the coordination function to a non-operational humanitarian organization, that is, 
a logistics coordination platform. We then discussed the circumstances in which the 
coordination function is expected to be outsourced. In Chapter 3 we reviewed the main 
characteristics of virtual organizing. We concluded that virtual corporations are flat, 
temporary, quickly deployable and reconfigurable entities that are operationalized through 
trust among members and extensive use of ICT. They are activated when there is a need to 
leverage the complementary and different resource, time and place competencies of their 
members in order to overcome resource shortages and share costs. The unpredictable 
nature of the majority of disasters calls for quick deployment and constant reconfiguration 
of staff and resources at the disaster site. Hence, we argue that a virtually organized 
logistics coordination platform is the only structure that can ensure quick deployment and 
constant reconfiguration. 
The main resource of the humanitarian sector is people and knowledge is their asset. 
Logisticians involved in disaster logistics are exposed to and gain experience and 
knowledge about the logistics specificities of developing countries. A logistics 
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coordination platform with the characteristics of a virtual organization can leverage the 
wealth of human expertise and knowledge resources residing within the virtual web. This 
is achieved thanks to the contribution of spatially and temporally dispersed virtual 
members. As a result, members benefit from the collective expertise as well as tangible 
and tacit knowledge residing with the virtual web members.  
Emergencies are subject not only to the dynamics of knowledge but also time pressure 
during both the planning and response phases. Planning relies on access to large volumes 
of information, especially up-to-date logistics-related information. Throughout a crisis, 
information is distributed unequally between humanitarian organizations. As each 
humanitarian organization occupies a specific node in the information chain, access to 
sources of information varies significantly between organizations. More importantly, no 
single agency has the resources to cover the continuous evolution and flow of a vast 
category of logistics-related information across geographies and actors (Kaatrud et al., 
2003). We argue that only a virtually organized humanitarian coordination platform can 
adequately perform the information brokerage and depository function. It can provide data 
analysis, facilitate knowledge building, help overcome knowledge asymmetries and ensure 
access to knowledge assets that are tacit, not available on the market and costly or difficult 
to imitate. This is possible because it can i) man the structure with the HR resources of the 
virtual web and ii) leverage the information available within its spatially and temporally 
dispersed offices and virtual members. Access to knowledge and information for the entire 
humanitarian community and beyond can then be ensured through an accessible website.  
Humanitarian operators handle and have to make sense of considerable volumes of 
disorganized and time sensitive data. Since most actions are time-sensitive, accurate and 
timely response also depends on the ability to take fast decisions. Decisions within virtual 
corporations - flat and decentralized structures - are made at the unit level without referrals 
to higher levels. By eliminating the need for hierarchical approvals, decisions are made at a 
faster rate. Hence, only a virtually organized humanitarian logistics coordination platform 
thanks to the use of ICT and its flat structure can facilitate the flow of information in real-
time throughout the entire network quickening the pace of decisions at the intra, inter and 
extra-organizational level.  
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As described in Chapter 2, to survive disaster victims need a wide variety of low- and 
high-value, bulk and small Stock Keeping Units (SKUs) food and NFIs relief items. 
However, most humanitarian organizations cater to the specific and complementary 
requirements of a needy population. As a result, relief operations depend on the 
participation of a range of large and small humanitarian organizations. We argue that 
through a virtually organized logistics coordination platform, humanitarian organizations 
with small logistics setups and limited logistics capability can stimulate largeness. By 
tapping into information previously accessible only to bigger organizations, they can make 
better and faster decisions at no additional cost. Instead of struggling with logistics issues 
alone, they can rely on the platform’s services. Given their limited negotiating power, by 
joining the platform they can expand their collaborative options and gain access to the 
resources of other organizations. In essence, only a virtually organized logistics 
coordination platform allows them to be integrated in the global response effort and 
operate more effectively and efficiently in time-sensitive emergencies and dynamic 
environments. 
In conclusion, during disaster response, to coordinate response in the best interest of the 
assisted populations, humanitarian organizations regardless of their size need to gain 
access and internalize resources available within or outside their network. To resolve 
dependencies, avoid duplication and create synergies, they need to i) ensure quick 
deployment, ii) operate a reconfigurable structure, iii) gain access to resources (e.g. staff, 
information and knowledge, etc.) residing within the community, and iv) be in a position 
to make quick decisions. It follows that: 
P2:  Only virtually organized logistics coordination platform will lead to good 
services. 
 
In order to fully appreciate the implications of the above-mentioned proposition, there is a 
need to understand how humanitarian organizations operationalize a logistics coordination 
platform. The virtual organizing literature has identified two structural elements of virtual 
organizing: virtual web (Goldman et al., 1995; Pires et al., 2001) and virtual corporation 
(Byrne, J. A., 1993). It has also identified a number of building blocks for the successful 
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operationalization of a virtual organization and the risks and market opportunities facing 
virtual organizations. There is a need to explore whether the same structural elements, 
building blocks, and risks and opportunities identified by the literature are relevant to 
virtually organized humanitarian logistics coordination platform. We propose to explore 
the above with the following two questions: 
Q2:  How do humanitarian organizations operationalize and ensure the 
success of a virtually organized logistics coordination platform?  
Q3: What are the risks and opportunities facing humanitarian virtual 
organizations and how they are managed?  
4.3 Business-Humanitarian Partnerships 
Chapter 3 allowed us to determine the benefits and risks of business-humanitarian 
partnerships. In Chapter 2, we identified four business-humanitarian partnership 
possibilities. In this section we argue that each partnership possibility may have a specific 
benefit-to-risk profile. To explore the eventual differences, there is a need to compare the 
different partnership schemes. We propose to compare the schemes that are at the two 
extremes in terms of number of parties involved, intensity and duration of collaboration 
namely strategic with brokered partnerships (Figure 4.1). This allows us to formulate a 
proposition and two research questions which are visually represented in Figure 4.2. 
At the organizational level, partnership between a corporation and a humanitarian 
organization may be a first of its kind. Given the differences in modus operandi of non-
profit and for-profit organizations, in the short run, differences in cultures and language 
can become a source of frustration for both parties resulting in implementation delays. This 
is particularly relevant to strategic partnerships since they aim to address the effectiveness 
of an organization also in terms of working practices. If not worked out, these types of 
divergences can prevent the parties from proceeding with their partnership intentions.  
Given the fact that strategic partnerships aim to improve the effectiveness of an 
organization over a certain period of time, the receiving humanitarian organization should 
have the absorptive capacity in terms of human resources and organizational structure to 
truly benefit from it.  
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In financial terms, strategic partnerships given their duration and financial contribution can 
lower the level of donations by traditional donors if these donors view the continuous 
contribution of the corporate partner as a substitute to their own funding. An eventual 
replacement of traditional funding with business funding may jeopardize the survival of an 
organization and increase its dependency on its business partner.  
 
Figure 4.1 – Risks and Benefits of Strategic and Brokered Partnerships 
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Because of their duration and the intensity of the relationship, on the operational level 
strategic partnerships may reduce organizational flexibility and create structural 
dependency. This occurs if the corporate partner becomes a substitute for pre-existing 
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commercial or non-commercial ties and relationships or when it becomes time consuming 
and costly for a humanitarian organization to call upon past suppliers or quickly rebuild 
such relationships in case of need. The replacement of the corporate partner with other 
suppliers reduces the number of sourcing options available to the humanitarian 
organization.  Likewise, the activities conducted by the corporate partner may lead to the 
decision to shelve plans that had as objective the development of such resources and 
capabilities within the humanitarian organization impacting its innovation and growth 
prospects.  Finally, proactive business partners may even overtake an organization’s 
function weakening its ability to be self-sufficient and to take independent decisions.   
The risk of entering into a partnership with a ‘tainted’ partner engaged in anti-ethical 
activities is expected to be low for strategic partnerships. This is because these types of 
partnerships have a gestation period (time that elapses between partner search, negotiation, 
until formalization of cooperation) during which the humanitarian organization can screen 
and examine the reputation and activities of the corporate partner. However, given the 
duration of these types of partnership, the risk of finding oneself engaged with a partner 
with deteriorating reputation is high. 
The overwhelming success of a strategic partnership can have a number of implications. 
First, the parties may decide to extend their relationship which has financial and HR 
implications. Success can act as a show case attracting new corporate partners to the 
humanitarian organization. Success can also encourage replication which implies shifting 
of effort and investment from one partner to another or distribution of energy and time 
among many parties. In all cases, the probability of the other risks mentioned above is 
enhanced. As far as failure is concerned, it is a permanent risk facing both parties. 
In terms of benefits, since strategic partnerships can be categorized as Corporate Social 
Initiatives (CSIs), they are expected to improve the effectiveness of the receiving 
humanitarian organizations, advance the status of knowledge and practice and signal other 
donors. As for the corporate partner, they are expected to address the expectation of the 
moral market place and be a source of competitive advantage. 
In terms of risks, since a corporate partner that engages in a strategic partnership has clear 
CSR objectives, it needs to partner with a promising humanitarian organization. Therefore 
shortage of credible and promising organization could become a draw back. There is 
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always the risk that a corporate partner is accused of engaging with a humanitarian 
organization for self-serving purposes. However, this risk diminishes over time in case of 
strategic partnership given the long-term commitment.  In contrast, given the duration of a 
strategic partnership, the probability that the reputation of the assisted humanitarian 
organization deteriorates increases.  
Compared to strategic partnerships, benefits resulting from brokered partnerships for both 
the humanitarian and corporate partner are expected to be more modest. Assistance offered 
and received through brokered partnerships can suffer from lack of focus should the 
intermediary organization embrace an all-inclusive mission in terms of wanting to assist 
humanitarian organizations in a wide range of areas.  The parties can also lack control over 
results and outcomes because while the intermediary organization can facilitate interaction 
among the parties, it cannot set the learning, implementation, adoption or partnership 
agendas. In other words, the parties involved have no obligation to implement or provide 
the suggested improvement, adopt or provide a technical solution, and maintain or enter 
into a relationship recommended by the intermediary organization. The benefits in terms of 
signaling other donors is expected to be limited because involvement with corporate 
partners brokered by an intermediary organization are more likely to signal other 
corporations to join hands with the intermediary organization rather than the assisted 
organization. As far as the corporate partner is concerned, given the ad hoc nature of 
assistance provided, the partnership is unlikely to produce the same benefits or result in the 
same risks of a full-fledged company initiative. 
In conclusion, compared to strategic partnerships, risks resulting from brokered 
partnerships for both the humanitarian and corporate partner are expected to be limited. 
This is because of the ad hoc and fragmented nature of assistance delivered through these 
types of partnerships. The only risk which is may be higher is the possibility of engaging 
with a ‘tainted’ partner given the short time to vet each potential donor but given the 
duration of the assistance, the impact on reputations would also be low. 
It follows that: 
P3: For the parties involved, the risks and benefits of strategic partnerships 
are higher than those of brokered partnerships.  
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Should the risk-benefit profile of strategic and brokered partnership schemes be different, 
the other obvious question that comes to mind is whether all or only a specific range of 
humanitarian organizations can engage and hence benefit from each scheme. Given the 
expected benefits for the assisted organization of strategic partnerships, it is interesting to 
explore whether humanitarian organizations need to have certain characteristics to be able 
to attract and implement a strategic partnership or not.  
Q4: What type of humanitarian organizations can engage in strategic 
partnerships? 
  
To ensure a successful business-humanitarian partnership, the corporate partner and the 
humanitarian organization may be able to mitigate some of the risks. Therefore, it is 
important to explore what measures can be taken during the design, launch and 
implementation phases of the partnership to ensure the highest net benefit. 
Q5: What are the best practices that can avert predictable risks and increase 
benefits of business-humanitarian partnerships? 
 
Figure 4.2 – Research Framework: Business-Humanitarian Partnerships Subsection 
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theory argues that the creation and development of social capital, among other things, 
depends on a range of relations and ties. Resource based view research emphasizes the 
importance of network ties in facilitating access to resources and considers social capital as 
a source of competitive advantage. Viewed as a valuable intangible organizational 
resource, social capital is considered inimitable as its creation is path dependent and its 
development socially complex.  
As we saw in Chapter 3, the literature argues in favor of a balanced creation and use of 
bonding and bridging social capital. A combination of bonding and bridging social capital 
is believed to confer a firm with the right level of flexibility and facilitate access to new 
ideas, limiting the risk of over-commitment to specific relationships (Adler & Kwon, 
2002). The circle of social capital is also believed to be a reinforcing one. Social capital 
increases the ability of an organization to make connections and develop relations. 
Connections reduce the time and investment to access resources. Multiple bonding and 
bridging connections increase the stock of social capital augmenting opportunities for 
access to a wide range of resource. Social capital is also ‘appropriable’, developed in a 
context, it can be used in another (Coleman, 1988) and ‘convertible’ from social capital 
into other kinds of capital (Bourdieu, 1985). 
In line with the social capital literature, we argue that the underlying mechanism, the 
currency generated by the portfolio of networks and partnerships created and sustained by 
a humanitarian organization is social capital. More specifically, we argue that humanitarian 
organizations leverage bridging social capital at the individual and group-level to 
coordinate with key stakeholders as well as mobilize and gain access to resources and 
capabilities available within their partnership portfolio. They leverage bonding social 
capital with other humanitarian organizations to ensure inter-organizational coordination. 
As argued in Chapter 2, by creating and reinforcing their stock of social capital – 
relationship management – humanitarian organizations are expected to improve their 
supply network management ability and increase their opportunity for resource/capability 
enhancement. As discussed in Chapter 3, the development of social capital is a function of 
time, interaction, interdependence and closure (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). With 
particular focus on disaster response, in section 4.5.1, we use the above definition to 
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identify the source of social capital. In section 4.5.2, we discuss the potential contribution 
of bonding and bridging social capital to the performance of a humanitarian organization. 
 
4.4.1  Network Actors and Social Capital 
A humanitarian organization maintains a wide range of relationships with its response 
network partners. It can be engaged in different types of partnerships with business or 
CSOs. It can also be a member of the humanitarian virtual web and benefit from the 
services of the logistics coordination platform.  
To distinguish between different network ties and their contribution to the development of 
social capital, we categorize each relationship along Nahapiet & Ghoshal’s four criteria: 
time, interaction, interdependence and closure. Figure 4.3 categorizes relationships along 
the first two criteria: interaction (strength of bond) and time (duration of relationship), 
while Figure 4.4 categorizes them along the last two criteria: interdependence and closure. 
Given the low intensity and short duration of interaction with one-time suppliers, ad hoc 
donors, local media and business partners, members of localized and brokered 
partnerships, relationships, dictated by context, are expected to be short. Interaction with 
recipient governments, disaster-specific implementing partners, and national or combatant 
military forces will be typically very intense but limited to the duration of the relief effort. 
Existing relationship with major international news agencies and those created with 
brokering institutions are expected to be over a long period and activated on a needs basis. 
In stark contrast with the other forces, long-standing donors are the life-line of emergency 
supply chains. Given their importance, humanitarian organizations are expected to build 
intense and long-term relationships with them. Similarly, given the importance and 
multitude of dependencies that arise during disaster response between various 
humanitarian organizations and a shared mandate, each organization has a history of 
intense interaction with a range of well-established humanitarian organizations. 
Relationships with experienced implementing partners with global presence are expected 
to be long and intense. Similarly, relationship with repeat suppliers, although regulated by 
the mechanism of price, are long in nature and will be intense during the good ordering and 
delivery process. 
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Figure 4.3 – Level of Interaction and Duration of Relationship with Network Actors/ 
Different Humanitarian Partnership Schemes 
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As far as partnership schemes are concerned, in strategic and cross-cutting partnerships, 
the level of interaction is high and the duration of the collaboration is long. Similarly, 
organizations that decide to contribute and/or benefit from a logistics coordination 
platform engage in an intense and long-term relationship with the structures and staff of 
the platform. 
As depicted in Figure 4.4, we do not expect a humanitarian organization to achieve low 
closure with any of its partners when there is high interdependence. The level of 
interdependence and closure between a humanitarian organization and its one-time donors, 
suppliers, media, and those entities party to brokered and localized partnerships is expected 
to be low. To respond in a cost-effective, timely, flexible, and accurate fashion to a 
disaster, a humanitarian organization has to achieve closure with its long-standing donors, 
other humanitarian organizations, repeat suppliers, implementing partners, recipient 
governments, military forces, strategic and cross-cutting partners and the logistics 
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coordination platform. The objective of an effective and efficient response increases the 
level of interdependence between a humanitarian organization and its long-standing 
donors, other humanitarian organizations, repeat suppliers, implementing partners, 
recipient government(s), strategic partner and logistics coordination platform.  
 
Figure 4.4 – Level of Interdependence and Closure with Network actors/Different 
Humanitarian Partnership Schemes  
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Social capital is expected to develop where there is a high level of interaction, long-term 
relationships, interdependence and closure between two parties. We can conclude that a 
humanitarian organization is expected to build social capital primarily with those network 
partners that appear in the top-right quadrants of Figures 4.3 and 4.4 namely, long-standing 
donors, other humanitarian organizations, implementing partners, repeat suppliers, 
strategic partners and logistics coordination platform. It follows that: 
P4: Only intense partnerships, that is, partnerships with long-standing, 
interactive, interdependent and closely-knitted partners or structures, will 
increase a humanitarian organization’s stock of social capital.  
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4.4.2  Contribution of Social Capital to Organizational Performance 
In this section we distinguish between the contribution of bonding and bridging social 
capital to disaster management.  
Bonding social capital among humanitarian organizations has the potential to improve 
organizational performance. More specifically, we argue that it is a necessary condition for 
inter-organizational coordination in large-scale operations.  Bonding social capital 
increases an organization’s ability to manage dependencies and avoid duplications 
emerging from a range of logistics failure modes. We also argue that bonding social capital 
developed during the planning phase can be leveraged during the response process and 
vice-versa. It follows that: 
P5: Bonding social capital is a necessary condition for inter-organizational 
coordination during disasters. 
 
We equally argue that bridging social capital is a necessary condition for humanitarian 
organizations to tap into specialized resources and capabilities reducing their resource and 
knowledge holes during disaster response. For example, social capital developed with 
members of the supply network can increase the volume of in-kind, industry-specific and 
cash donations at the disposal of a humanitarian organization both during and in-between 
disasters. Bridging capital built in-between and during disaster response also contributes to 
successful coordination between operational and non-operational humanitarian 
organizations and other stakeholders. 
Similarly, access to specialized resources and capabilities enhances the resource/capability 
profile of a humanitarian organization and improves its ability to manage its supply 
network during disaster response.  Bridging social capital developed in-between disasters 
(e.g. during resource/capability enhancement efforts) is ‘convertible’ and ‘appropriable’ 
during the disaster response phase and vice-versa by both operational and non-operational 
humanitarian organizations. It follows that:  
P6: Bridging social capital is a necessary condition for successful disaster 
response. 
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Since we argue that relationship management is a key disaster management capability, it 
becomes important to explore how social capital is developed. By differentiating between 
bonding and bridging social capital, the next research questions aim to explore how 
organizations create opportunities for its creation and reinforcement. Finally, we explore 
the contribution of bridging social capital to resource/capability enhancement of 
operational humanitarian organizations.  
Q6: How is bonding social capital developed among humanitarian 
organizations? 
Q7: How is bridging social capital developed between humanitarian 
organizations and other key stakeholders? 
Q8: What is the contribution of bridging social capital to resource/capability 
enhancement of operational humanitarian organizations? 
4.5   Summary  
In Chapter 3 we developed our conceptual framework which is based on the integration of 
network, coordination, resource-based view, social capital and corporate social 
responsibility theories. In this chapter we developed our research framework which 
consists of a number of research questions and propositions summarized in Figure 4.5 and 
illustrated in Figure 4.6. We propose to test our propositions and explore our research 
questions after presenting our empirical study in Chapter 10. 
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Figure 4.5 – Research Questions and Propositions 
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Figure 4.6 – Research Framework 
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Chapter 5   Empirical Research  
 
In Part II of this thesis, we developed our conceptual and research framework.  In this 
chapter we present the methodology and general approach to the empirical inquiry. This 
research is primarily explorative and explanatory in nature. The accomplishment of the 
research objective includes the elements of description and explanation. The aim of the 
empirical research is to validate the constructs and arguments of the conceptual framework 
developed in Part II and to draw some lessons for humanitarian organizations as well as 
business. 
This chapter is organized as follows. In section 5.1, we present our research philosophy. In 
section 5.2, we discuss the empirical research methodology explaining why we have 
chosen a combination of single and multiple case study approach and our case site 
selection rationale. Section 5.3 concentrates on the research design by describing the 
applied research methods and validity of the research.  
5.1  Research Philosophy 
In this section, we discuss three research perspectives - positivist, interpretive and critical - 
with a view to identify the one(s) that best meets the requirements of our research. 
Positivist research is “based on the view that the world exhibits objective cause-effect 
relationships that can be discovered, at least partially, by structured observations” 
(Walsham, 1993). This approach allows for the logically related hypotheses derived from 
theory to be empirically tested (Lee, 1991).   
Interpretive perspective assumes that our knowledge of the reality derives from “social 
constructions such as language, consciousness, shared meanings, documents, tools and 
other artifacts” (Klein & Myers, 1999). This is in contrast with the positivist approach as 
no objective reality is discovered to be then replicable by others. Through the interpretive 
approach, the researcher gains an intimate understanding of a specific setting and situation 
through close connection with diverse actors.  
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The critical perspective allows the researcher to identify the restrictive and alienating 
conditions of a status quo. The objective of this research philosophy is to critique a 
phenomenon in order to identify alternatives that can result in change and improvements. 
Given the scope of our research, we focus on the positivist and interpretive views. 
Positivism lacks connection to empirical reality but generates generalizable concepts. 
Interpretivism, based on individual subjectivity and understanding of specific contexts, 
may fall short of the possibility for generalizations and a conceptual framework.  Lee (Lee, 
1991) suggests that the two perspectives can be combined and be mutually supportive to 
address the specific requirements of organizational research.  He proposes three levels of 
understanding - subjective, interpretive and positivist – and a series of feedback loops to 
ensure and reinforce its quality. The process allows for a proposition based on positivist 
research to be confirmed or disconfirmed through empirical testing. 
The aim of our study is to gain an understanding about humanitarian operations during 
disaster response by focusing on the contribution of a portfolio of partnerships to disaster 
management capabilities and its impact on performance.  To explore the impact of such 
partnerships on organizational performance and to draw some lessons for these 
organizations as well as business, we need to enhance our generalizable understanding of 
the context, drivers, structure and elements of disaster management. 
Research in disaster management lacks a comprehensive framework that explains the 
relationship between actors and the impact of partnerships on disaster management. An 
interpretive understanding of how, why and when humanitarian organizations seek 
partnerships can provide useful insights into the contribution of partnerships to disaster 
management and the impact of context.    
In this thesis, we adopt Lee’s approach. The interpretivist approach is used in our empirical 
research. Findings of each case are interpreted in their own context. We use the positivist 
research philosophy to validate our constructs.  
5.2  Empirical Research Methodology 
This thesis adopts the qualitative approach for empirical research, more specifically, the 
case study method. We choose the qualitative method given the exploratory and 
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explanatory nature of our main research questions.  Qualitative methods are recommended 
for the investigation of complex phenomena as they allow for an open conceptual approach 
and detailed descriptions (Marshall & Rossman, 1995). 
The humanitarian sector is composed of many actors and stakeholders. For each disaster, 
to mobilize a wide range of food and NFIs, each humanitarian organization constructs and 
choreographs a series of emergency-specific supply chains. In addition, it enters into a 
number of coordination and collaboration schemes and leverages relationships with its 
network of partners. The response capability and performance of each humanitarian 
organization depends on its capability, those of its long-term and ad-hoc partners and the 
partnership schemes. The number of variables and their relationships exceed the 
capabilities of quantitative research. Moreover, most of the relationships evolve and need 
to be considered in a dynamic setting. Lack of prior research in this field is a further 
deterrent to quantitative research. As argued below, the case study approach provides a 
number of clear advantages for the current study.  
 
Figure 5.1 – Main Research Questions 
1. What factors contribute to the performance of humanitarian organizations during 
disaster response? 
 
2. How do humanitarian organizations manage their disaster response activities? 
 
Yin (Yin, 2003) identifies three criteria for the selection of a research strategy. These are 
type of research questions, control over behavioral events, and focus on contemporary 
versus historical events.   We have pursued the case study research strategy for the 
following reasons. As suggested by Yin, the nature of research questions already provides 
an indication of the most adequate research approach (Figure 5.1). Our main research 
questions include ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions and our sub-questions are also ‘what’ and 
‘how’ questions which are all exploratory in nature. For these types of questions, Yin 
proposes the case study, experiment or historical approach.  
Secondly, Yin suggests that the extent of control a researcher has over actual behavioral 
events help determines the research strategy. While it is possible to study the behavior, 
decision-making processes and operations of humanitarian organizations in real-life, that 
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is, in an empirical setting, it is almost impossible to replicate them through an experiment, 
a controlled environment. Any experiment would fail to capture the complexity and 
dynamism present in disaster management. Moreover, it is possible to conduct field 
research and case studies at a number of humanitarian organizations.  
Finally, as Yin mentions, the case study methodology is an appropriate strategy to study 
contemporary events. Partnerships in the humanitarian sector are a recent phenomenon.  
The existence of an operational setting as opposed to historic studies implies that the 
researcher can deploy the case study approach.  
 
5.2.1   Case Study Design 
In this thesis, we follow a combination of single and multiple case approaches. Our choice 
has been dictated by circumstances and time factors.  
Yin (Yin, 2003) argues that the multiple case study approach increases the external validity 
of research since it allows for replication and replication procedures lead to the 
development of a well-founded theory. Multiple case study design is in line with the 
positivist philosophy of multiple experiments. If carefully selected, multiple case studies 
allow for literal (prediction of similar results) and theoretical replication (different results 
for predictable reasons). 
The necessary condition propositions are tested in single cases. The analysis of different 
organizations and disasters helps us distinguish between different disaster management 
capabilities, mechanisms, structures and practices in real life settings. We have used own 
observations, interviews, documents and historic data to validate our propositions hence 
enabling prediction on the subject.  
 
5.2.2    Selection Criteria 
For the selection of the cases, we pursued the purposeful sampling strategy. We selected 
organizations that could provide information on and share their experience about disaster 
management. Since we wanted to determine the relationship between partnerships and 
organizational performance during disaster response, we studied the response of the 
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organizations to specific disasters. The selected organizations and disasters are 
representative of the phenomenon under study, capture the heterogeneity in the 
humanitarian sector, allow for the testing of the research framework and facilitate 
comparisons (Maxwell, 1996). The size and profile of the organizations interviewed fit 
with the time, budget and accessibility constraints of the research project. The Fritz 
Institute, INSEAD and the World Food Programme (WFP) facilitated access to the sites.   
The case selection process responded to a set of criteria. First, to capture eventual 
differences the sample includes UN and non-UN humanitarian organizations as well as 
operational and non-operational humanitarian organizations. Operational humanitarian 
organizations are those organizations that manage emergency supply chains while non-
operational humanitarian organizations provide a service (e.g. in the area of logistics) to 
operational humanitarian organizations. Second, to ensure the relevance of our findings in 
different contexts, the range of disasters include natural and man-made, predictable and 
unpredictable large-scale disasters.  Third, at least one disaster was studied for each 
operational and non-operational humanitarian organization so as to identify the critical 
factors that ensure success during disaster response. Fourth, in selecting the sites, 
prevalence was given to the importance of the logistics function within the organization 
rather than the organizational structure. Fifth, the selected cases show different types of 
partnerships. Finally, the perspective of other key stakeholders such as donors, business 
and CSO has been included.  
Our empirical research focused on two operational humanitarian organizations, IFRC and 
WFP, and their disaster management operations and one non-operational facility, the 
UNJLC, and its coordination activities. The selected humanitarian organizations are 
amongst the largest and most representative as they address the needs of different segments 
of disaster-hit populations. To have a better understanding of their operations, interviews 
were also conducted with other humanitarian organizations, the donor community, the 
logistics company TNT. Desk research was conducted on the CSO focused on 
humanitarian issues, the Fritz Institute. 
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5.2.3  Data Collection 
There are two distinct strategies to case study analysis and theoretical framework 
adjustment. The first one is the use of a single case study protocol for all cases and analysis 
of findings at the end. The second one is the adjustment of the theoretical framework after 
completion of each study. We followed the first strategy. Empirical data was collected and 
interviews were conducted in a sequential basis. After their completion, we reflected the 
findings on the conceptual framework. 
The focus of each study was defined at the very outset. In preparation for the fieldwork, 
the author reviewed and consulted publicly available material such as annual reports, 
technical papers and websites. The preparatory work led to the formulation of a case study 
protocol. The protocol included the type of people and departments to be interviewed, an 
overview of initial conceptual framework and a questionnaire.  
Yin (Yin, 2003) stresses the principles of multiple sources of evidence, need for a case 
study database and establishment of chain of evidence. For each case study, we used a mix 
of sources – document, publication, archival records, interviews, and direct observations – 
to gather relevant data and support statements. Semi-structured, in-depth interviews were 
the main source of data collection. The multiple secondary sources reinforced the data 
collection process.  
The interview protocol was used during the interview sessions with IFRC, UNJLC and 
WFP case studies. Interviews were conducted by a team that included the author. The data 
collection and analysis process was driven by the need for completeness, accuracy, 
significance and consideration of alternative perspectives. The author took detailed notes 
during each interview. Notes included collection of raw data and initial sense-making. All 
interviews were recorded and some were transcribed. Throughout the data collection 
period, the author benefited from ad hoc observations. In one occasion, the author attended 
an inter-agency meeting. Data from these sources improved the understanding of the 
dynamic contextual framework. 
Preliminary analysis of data occurred at the end of each interview session. To have an 
overview of the phenomenon under study, diagrams were sketched to map out 
relationships. The diagrams helped in exploring explanations and arguments for the 
observed phenomenon. Leads from the data analysis and fieldwork and the researcher’s 
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interpretation of the information obtained were promptly investigated through a series of 
follow-up questions and phone interviews. Upon examination of new material, reports 
were updated to include the latest insights. Business case studies were written after each 
site visit. To generate generalizable insights, we took the positivist angle and moved 
beyond a specific case situation by looking at the outcome of multiple case studies.   The 
multiple case approach helped us in the identification of patterns in terms of strategies, 
challenges, opportunities, and decisions as well as the advancement of propositions.   
In terms of data management, we created a digital folders archiving system for each case 
study. A chain of evidence was established by documenting data sources in the case study 
reports and analysis. 
Figure 5.2 provides an overview of the research project in terms of timeframe as well as 
number and type of people interviews. As one can note, in the course of data collection, 
over 50 people were interviewed, most of which held managerial positions or were 
logistics officers (Appendix C). 
 
Figure 5.2 – Scope of Research Project 
Organization Year of Study No. of people 
interviewed 
Functions Interviewed 
IFRC 2002: Interviews & 
document review 
2007-2008: Desk research 
7 • IFRC Logistics & 
Operations staff 
UNJLC 2002-2005: Interviews & 
document review 
26 • UNJLC staff 
• Donors 
• Other Humanitarian 
Organizations 
• External organizations 
WFP 2002-2004: Interviews and 
document review 
19 • WFP logistics & 
management staff 
• TNT Moving the 
World Programme 
staff 
Fritz Institute 2007-2008: Desk research n.a. n.a. 
 
For the IFRC two sets of interviews were held. One set focused on the disaster response 
function of the IFRC (Gujarat earthquake and Hurricane Mitch) while the emphasis of the 
second one was on preparedness activities.  
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As far as the UNJLC is concerned, four sets of site interviews were conducted over a three-
year period. Three set of interviews concentrated on the UNJLC coordination activities 
during disasters (Gujarat earthquake, Mozambique floods, Afghanistan and Iraq crises) 
while one focused on the institutionalization process of the facility (in-between disasters). 
It is worth mentioning that the data collection process for the UNJLC case studies was 
enhanced as key informants were repeatedly interviewed by the same research team over 
the three year period. As a result, a sound and effective working relationship emerged 
between the informant organizations and the interviewers as the former became acquainted 
with the case development process and the adopted research approach.  
For WFP, a set of interviews at WFP headquarters and another set at TNT headquarters 
were held. Interviews at WFP headquarters focused on the disaster response of the 
organization during the Zaire crisis and its partnership with TNT.  
The Fritz Institute case is entirely based on desk research. This was not a deliberate choice 
but dictated by circumstances. When we started our research project in 2002, the Fritz 
Institute had just been established. With few activities in place and little indication of how 
it was going to develop, it did not present itself as a rich case study. However, by 2007 it 
had a track record. Given the advanced stage of our research, it is only for the benefit of 
time that we decided upon a desk research.  
 
Figure 5.3 – Overview of Research 
Organization Disasters Partnership Partnership 
Arrangement 
Chapter 
IFRC  
 
Gujarat earthquake 
Hurricane Mitch 
IFRC-Fritz 
Institute 
Supply Network 
Strategic partnership 
6 
UNJLC Gujarat earthquake 
Mozambique 
floods 
Afghanistan, Iraq 
Inter- and extra-
organizational 
coordination 
Logistics coordination 
platform 
7 
WFP  
 
Zaire crisis 
 
WFP-TNT Supply Network 
Strategic partnership 
8 
Fritz 
Institute 
n.a. Fritz Institute-
Humanitarian 
Organizations 
Brokered partnership 9 
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Figure 5.3 contains an overview of our research and the corresponding chapters. The 
sequence in presentation reflects the order in which we conducted our interviews and 
carried out our desk research.  
5.3  Research Design 
Yin (Yin, 2003) defined research design as consisting of five components: the study 
question, the unit of analysis, propositions, the logic of linking data to propositions, and 
the criteria for interpreting findings. The research question has already been presented 
above. In the next sub-sections we discuss the remaining four components. 
 
5.3.1    Unit of Analysis 
The phenomenon under research is performance of humanitarian organizations during 
disasters. Hence, we have two distinct units of analysis: organizations and disasters. Data 
is related to different disasters depending on whether the proposition aims to test activities 
by an operational organization or/and a non-operational organization. More specifically, 
three disasters - Gujarat earthquake, Hurricane Mitch and Zaire Crisis - relate to two 
operational organizations: IFRC and WFP. Four disasters - Gujarat earthquake, 
Mozambique floods and Afghanistan and Iraq crises - relate to the UNJLC, the non-
operational organization. 
The objects of research in the case study analysis are individual operational and non-
operational humanitarian organizations and disasters and the domain is large scale 
disasters. Information is collected from and about each organization. Our data on disaster 
response is embedded in our research on each operational humanitarian organization while 
that on coordination, a subset of disaster response activities, is embedded in our research 
on the non-operational humanitarian coordination facility.  
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5.3.2    Propositions and Research Questions 
To respond to our main research questions, we formulated a series of questions and 
propositions. The logic that guided us in the proposition formulation process was based on 
the need to identify the structures, actors and resources that explain performance during 
disaster response. The logic that guided us in the question formulation process was based 
on the need to understand how humanitarian organizations develop resources and 
operationalize and manage their operations.    
5.3.3    Linking Data to Propositions 
The validity of suggested links between data and propositions determines the quality of the 
empirical research and adherence to the stated research objective. In Figures 5.4 and 5.5, 
we illustrate the link between our data and the proposed propositions and research 
questions.  
Figure 5.4 – Linking Data to Propositions 
Propositions Unit of 
Analysis 
Data 
P1:  Only a broad supplier network can ensure a 
speedy, accurate, flexible and cost-effective 
disaster response. 
Disasters Gujarat, Zaire, 
Hurricane 
Mitch  
P2:  Only virtually organized logistics coordination 
platform will lead to good service. 
Disasters Gujarat, Iraq, 
Mozambique, 
Afghanistan, I 
P3: For the parties involved, the risks and benefits 
of strategic partnerships are higher than those 
of brokered partnerships.  
Organizations IFRC, WFP, 
Fritz Institute 
P4: Only intense partnerships, that is, partnerships 
with long-standing, interactive, interdependent 
and closely-knitted partners or structures, will 
increase a humanitarian organization’s stock of 
social capital.  
 
Organizations IFRC, WFP & 
UNJLC 
P5: Bonding social capital is a necessary condition 
for inter-organizational coordination during 
disasters. 
Disasters Gujarat, Iraq, 
Mozambique 
& Afghanistan 
P6: Bridging social capital is a necessary condition 
for successful disaster response. 
Disasters Gujarat, Zaire 
Afghanistan, 
Hurricane 
Mitch, Iraq, 
Mozambique  
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Figure 5.5 – Linking Data to Research Questions  
Research Questions Unit of 
Analysis 
Data 
Q1:  How do humanitarian organizations manage 
dependencies and duplications emerging prior 
or during disaster response? 
Organizations IFRC, WFP & 
UNJLC 
Q2:  How do humanitarian organizations 
operationalize and ensure the success of a 
virtually organized logistics coordination 
platform?  
Organizations UNJLC 
Q3: What are the risks & opportunities facing 
humanitarian virtual organizations and how are 
they managed?  
Organizations UNJLC 
Q4: What type of humanitarian organizations can 
engage in strategic partnerships? 
 
Organizations WFP, IFRC & 
UNJLC 
Q5: What are the best practices that can help avert 
predictable risks and increase benefits of 
business-humanitarian partnerships? 
Organizations WFP  
 
Q6: How is bonding social capital developed 
among humanitarian organizations? 
Organizations UNJLC, WFP, 
Fritz Institute 
Q7: How is bridging social capital developed 
between humanitarian organizations and other 
key stakeholders? 
Organizations IFRC, 
UNJLC, WFP, 
Fritz Institute 
Q8: What is the contribution of bridging social 
capital to resource/capability enhancement of 
operational humanitarian organizations? 
Organizations WFP & IFRC 
 
Since P1 relates to supply chain management, we have selected disaster data related to the 
disaster response activities of our two operational humanitarian organizations: IFRC & 
WFP. Since P2 and P5 relate to the coordination activities, we have selected disaster data 
related to UNJLC’s coordination activities. For the test of P6, we have selected disaster 
data related to both our operational and non-operational humanitarian organizations. 
5.3.4   Research Methodology for Necessary Condition 
The propositions formulated in this thesis test the relation between partnerships and the 
mediating factors, the mediating factors and organizational performance, between 
mediating factors, partnership types and organizational performance as well as what types 
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of organizations can engage in what types of partnership arrangements.  Since the research 
questions are ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions and all propositions propose the presence or 
absence of a phenomenon under certain conditions, the case study approach is identified as 
the preferred strategy (Johnston et al., 1999; Dul & Hak, 2008). As for the propositions, 
five out of six express a necessary condition. This implies that in every instance in the 
defined domain, the proposition has to hold true and that just one instance is enough for 
the proposition to be rejected. Necessary condition statements are particularly useful to 
managers as they identify the critical factors that ensure success (Dul et al., 2008).  
Different types of hypothesis require different strategies for testing (Dul et al., 2008). As a 
result, to test necessary condition propositions, we use the case study strategy and follow 
the seven methodological steps suggested by Dul et al. (Dul et al., 2008) which are: 
formulate the theoretical statement that will be tested, select an appropriate (single) case, 
specify the hypothesis for that (single) case, measure the relevant variable(s), test the 
hypothesis, formulate the test result and formulate the consequences of the test result for 
the theory. Below we expand on how we intend to apply the seven steps to our research. 
We have clearly formulated the range of propositions to be tested (Figure 5.4). The listed 
propositions consist of discrete dichotomous necessary conditions (as opposed to 
continuous ones). There are three ways in which we can select our cases: i) a case in which 
B is present and that the hypothesis predicts that A is present; ii) a case in which A is 
absent and that the hypothesis predicts that B is absent; finally, iii) any case where the 
hypothesis predicts that the combination “A absent/B present” does not occur. We have 
chosen the any case approach. Since we have two units of analysis – disasters and 
organizations, for propositions 1, 2, 5 and 6 the cases consists of disasters, while for the 
remaining two propositions, the cases consist of organizations.  For each case (disaster or 
organization), we specify a hypothesis. Thereafter we present scores for the relevant 
variables for each proposition for each case. Before discussing the implication of results, 
we present and formulate the test results. 
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5.4  Summary  
In this thesis we adopt a combination of interpretive and positivist research. As disaster 
management is a complex field, we adopt an interpretive approach. A positivist approach is 
selected for the joint case study analysis to validate the conceptual framework and the 
deriving propositions.   
We argue that the case study methodology is particularly valuable for this under-
researched field as it helps provide an in-depth, contemporary, in context and verifiable 
description of the humanitarian logistics function and challenges. We adopt a case study 
design to examine the impact of partnerships on disaster management. Although 
humanitarian organizations have existed for over a century, studies on their operations are 
in their infancy. Partnerships within the humanitarian community in themselves are a 
relatively new phenomenon. Since humanitarian partnerships are a contemporary 
phenomenon that show their potential in real-life contexts and can hardly be replicated in 
experiments, the case study design is deemed as an appropriate research methodology.  To 
replicate our logic, we adopt a multiple case study design. Our sampling strategy ensures 
the selection of different types of partnerships, organizations and disasters. This helps us in 
enriching our framework with evidence and experience from different situations.  
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Chapter 6   IFRC  
 
 
In this chapter, we present and discuss the results of research at the International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) conducted in 2002 
supplemented by desk research as far as the IFRC-Fritz Institute collaboration is 
concerned. After an introductory note on the history, structure, tools and processes, and 
strategic directions of IFRC, section 6.2 describes IFRC’s response to two disasters: The 
Gujarat earthquake and Hurricane Mitch. Section 6.3 describes the IFRC partnership with 
the Fritz Institute, which was centered on the development of a supply chain management 
software. Finally, section 6.4 discusses our findings.  
6.1  IFRC6  
History. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) is 
one of the world's oldest humanitarian organizations. Founded in 1919, it comprises of a 
network of 185 National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (NSs) - almost one in 
every country in the world, a Secretariat in Geneva and a network of regional and country 
offices, delegations and a series of warehouses and logistics centers at the regional level. 
The NSs act as auxiliaries to the public authorities of their own countries in the 
humanitarian field.  Together, they assist some 233 million beneficiaries each year. The 
Federation together with the NSs and the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) make up the International Red Cross Movement, one of the largest humanitarian 
setups. 
The IFRC is the choreographer of the Red Cross disaster management effort. It coordinates 
and mobilizes relief assistance for international natural and man-made emergencies 
                                                 
6
  With permission from the authors Sections 6.1 & 6.2 are a reproduction of the following INSEAD case 
studies: Samii, R et al. “International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC): 
Choreographer of Disaster Management: The Gujarat Earthquake”, INSEAD case study 06/2002-5032 and 
“IFRC: Preparing for Tomorrow’s Disasters”, INSEAD case study 06/2002-5039. 
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assisting an average of 30 million people annually while the ICRC provides assistance in 
conflict environments.  
For the purpose of this discussion, we define recipient NSs as the NSs where the disaster 
occurs. Twenty to 25 out of the 185 NSs can be considered as donating NSs. The donating 
NSs typically include the American, Austrian, Belgian, British, Danish, French, Finnish, 
German, Japanese, Italian, Norwegian, Dutch, Spanish, Swiss and Swedish NSs. For each 
major disaster, donating NSs channel substantial funds, goods and personnel through 
IFRC.  
Structure. In 2001, the IFRC was restructured (Figure 6.1). The major novelties in the 
new organizational structure were the creation of a Knowledge Sharing division and a 
Disaster Management and Coordination division. The latter has two distinct departments - 
the Emergency Response Preparedness and Logistics and Resource Mobilization 
departments, and three Operations Managers responsible for coordinating emergencies on 
global scale. 
In the new structure, the Logistics and Resource Mobilization department is composed of 
the Field Logistics Unit (FLU) and Resource Mobilization Unit (RMU) (Figure 6.2). In 
2002, the department was manned by six permanent staff and a fluctuating number of 
temporary staff on loan from NSs. 
The head of the Logistics and Resource Mobilization department of IFRC had joined IFRC 
after a long career with Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). With the reorganization of the 
Federation in 2001, he ensured that logistics was upgraded from a unit to a department (the 
hierarchical structure of IFRC is as follows: unit, service, department and division) and 
was provided with more resources to perform its function. 
The head of RM had been with the Red Cross Movement for over 22 years: 9 years with 
the Danish NS and 13 at the Federation. She was in charge of the procurement of a couple 
of hundred items – from food, shelter, medicine to telecom units - for an average value of 
150 million CHF per year, that is, 50% of the value of IFRC appeals. Her unit was 
responsible for the planning, coordination and reporting of goods mobilized through the 
NSs. Over the years, she had established a personal and worldwide network of contacts 
with major NSs and key suppliers (minimum three suppliers per item). In recent years, her 
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unit had introduced applications developed in-house using standard software tools 
(spreadsheets and dbases) to manage the unit’s activities. 
The head of FLU with a background in vehicle management was in charge of overall fleet 
management, deployment of logistics delegates, logistics Emergency Response Unit 
(ERU), reception and storage of goods on site, and onward transport to the final point of 
relief distribution of IFRC. 
Tools & Mechanisms. In an effort to improve its disaster management capability, IFRC 
over the years had developed three main tools to respond to emergencies: DREF, FACT 
and ERUs.  
The oldest mechanism in place was the Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) which 
provided seed money to initiate relief activity before the launch of a disaster specific 
international appeal.  
The Field Assessment and Coordination Team (FACT) was deployed for large disasters. 
Its mandate was to carry out rapid field assessment immediately after a disaster, ensure 
coordination with dozens of actors, make quick decisions, and activate an appropriate 
relief operation. FACT members were on standby and deployable within 12-24 hours for 
up to six weeks anywhere in the world. They were experienced Red Cross/Red Crescent 
disaster managers, hence generalists, trained in specific areas such as relief, logistics, 
health, nutrition, public health and epidemiology, water and sanitation, finance, and 
administration. To build and maintain such a core pool of about 200 experts from which to 
draw, IFRC organized training sessions. The training sessions aimed at imparting a 
consistent methodology, building team spirit, and a common pool of expertise. The 
Disaster Management and Coordination Division was the authority that decided on the 
composition of the team of six to seven members to be deployed in any given disaster. 
Prior to the FACT each donating and host country NS sent its own assessment team with 
obvious cost and coordination implications.  
The Emergency Response Units (ERUs) are specialized and self-contained units equipped 
with latest technology, facilities and people. They address logistics, health, 
telecommunication and water and sanitation issues and had been introduced more recently. 
The Logistics and Resource Mobilization department played a central role in the FACT 
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exercise through the participation of a logistics expert, and the ERU deployment through a 
Logistics ERU. 
In terms of mechanisms the IFRC resorted to appeals, code of conduct and frame 
agreements. For each disaster, to raise resources the IFRC issues information bulletins and 
a series of appeals. The information bulletin put on alert status all those NSs sponsors of 
ERUs.  The appeals are a marketing, planning and coordination tool. They help to motivate 
action from NSs, they allow NSs to approach their respective governments, and they are a 
transparent coordinating mechanism with other humanitarian organizations. 
IFRC has a code of conduct to regulate private sector donations. By setting standards that 
included ethical and operational issues, the Federation has the right to refuse certain 
donations. Apart from its own policies, it adheres to guidelines provided by a recipient 
country. For example, when it comes to drug donations, it adheres to the regulations of the 
World Health Organization (WHO) and that of the recipient country’s Ministry of Health. 
In general, to limit the arrival of unsolicited goods on the disaster site especially from its 
ad hoc donors, it seizes every opportunity to voice its preference for cash donations and 
issues lists of recommended and restricted items. Finally, its commodity tracking system 
serves to limit and pin down the arrival of unsolicited goods into the pipeline. 
By 2002, IFRC had established frame agreements with suppliers for five key items. These 
agreements specify the good’s price, quality and delivery requirements, and oblige 
suppliers to stock (at their own premises) a certain level of inventory. These agreements 
have drastically simplified IFRC’s task as well as that of its NSs network.  
Processes. Based on a preliminary assessment and the subsequent field assessment carried 
out by FACT, the RMU prepares a relief mobilization table (RMT). The RMT, which is a 
list of items with respective amounts, is circulated among NSs via email and then is 
followed up by targeted phone calls. The NSs ready and willing to procure and ship to 
destination items mentioned on the RMT confirm their pledges to the RMU. The pledge 
becomes effective once the RMU assigns a commodity tracking number to it. The 
commodity tracking system ensures an overview over the movement of goods (from 
procurement, transport, warehousing to distribution) and helps avoid and pin down the 
arrival of unsolicited goods. The NSs then informs the RMU on the shipping details (e.g. 
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arrival date and hour of the consignment). As needs keep changing and pledges keep 
arriving, the RMT is updated. 
In close coordination with the ERU unit, IFRC’s Logistics department deploys the various 
ERUs. The Logistics ERU ideally goes into action before the arrival of the goods at final 
destination. Based on the mobilization table and local infrastructure conditions, it estimates 
the need, size, and number of required facilities (tents) as well as an adequate site for their 
erection. Before clearing the goods through customs, it obtains special agreement (tax 
exemption for the imported goods) and arranges for the transportation (trucks, fuel, drivers, 
insurance etc.) of the goods to the warehouses.  
 
Figure 6.3 – IFRC Good Mobilization and First Shipment Process Flow 
 
 
Source:  Samii, R. et al., “IFRC: Choreographer of Disaster Management: The Gujarat Earthquake”, 
INSEAD case study 06/2002-5032. 
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proceed with the settlement of their supplier invoices. The Logistics ERU is then entrusted 
with the storage, stock control, and security of the goods. The FLU receives a copy of the 
daily stock movement and dispatch list. Upon receipt of a release note from relief 
delegates, the Logistics ERU arranges for the forwarding of goods to the point of final 
relief distribution. The logistics systems in place by 2002, although new, were still 
rudimentary with no interface among them, thus resulting in multiple data entry. Figure 6.3 
illustrates IFRC’s good mobilization process while Figure 6.4 its goods distribution and 
replenishment process. 
 
Figure 6.4 – Goods Distribution Flow and Replenishment Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Adapted from Samii, R. et al., “IFRC: Choreographer of Disaster Management: The Gujarat 
Earthquake”, INSEAD case study 06/2002-5032. 
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Besides assessment reports prepared by FACT delegates to guide field operations, other 
reports are generated to satisfy the accountability and administrative requirements of the 
Federation. In theory, debriefing sessions are held with delegates after completion of their 
field missions. However, this is not always feasible. While there is awareness of the 
reinforcement role of an effective knowledge management system in building experience, 
by 2002 no system was in place to capture the experience, knowledge and information 
shared in reports and during debriefing meetings for future reference. Similar to other 
humanitarian organizations, IFRC reinvented the wheel and was poor in lessons learnt. 
To prevent the arrival of unsolicited relief items, IFRC made sure it involved the donor 
NSs in the needs assessment phase for example by involving the staff of select NSs in the 
FACT missions. Although IFRC’s ultimate “customers” were the disaster stricken 
populations, as the saying among the IFRC staff went, “A happy donor today is a good 
donor tomorrow”. What made a donor happy was IFRC’s efficiency, transparency and 
effectiveness and the donor’s visibility and accountability with the public at large. In this 
context, the role of the press in covering a disaster became crucial. The fundraising 
capabilities of the NSs depend to a large extent on the press coverage and reviews they 
manage to obtain in the immediate aftermath of a disaster.  
To ensure access to and faster distribution of more goods purchased at competitive prices 
especially for predictable disaster, depending on the willingness of its NS network, IFRC 
was ready to conduct a number of activities. It would consult concerned NSs to obtain their 
agreement on the content of basic relief kits (shelter, sanitation, and kitchen sets). It would 
sign pre-agreements/MoUs based either on a disaster response plan or individual/specific 
kits. It could then identify and assess the capability of potential suppliers. This would lead 
to the preparation of a mock relief action plan with a corresponding budget. With this 
information packaged, it could approach the donor NSs. Once it obtained the agreement of 
donor NSs, it could pre-contract the kits to the identified suppliers at predetermined and 
advantageous prices. With this paperwork behind it, during the disaster it could focus 
exclusively on its relief effort.  
Network. To deliver better assistance to disaster stricken populations, IFRC works 
through the NSs and collaborates with international bodies, non-governmental and inter-
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governmental organizations. Among the intergovernmental organizations, the European 
Union, through ECHO (European Community Humanitarian Office), the organization that 
typically supports agencies that are on the ground within 72 hours from a disaster, is 
IFRC’s largest single donor. IFRC collaborates with relevant United Nations (UN) 
agencies such as the UN office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Health Organization (WHO), 
the World Food Programme (WFP), and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in the field 
and participates in the establishment of humanitarian standards and procedures. IFRC 
competes for the same resources as other humanitarian NGOs. 
Strategic Directions. IFRC’s strategy consisted of the creation of tools and resources and 
their utilization at the global level. Depending on the size of the disaster, it envisaged 
different levels of intervention: NSs were to cope with small disasters, medium-sized 
disasters were to be dealt with at the regional level, and for big disasters. IFRC would call 
upon its own global network of people and resources. As such, IFRC planned to build 
preparedness and response capabilities at regional and NS level. To effectively manage 
disasters, IFRC’s preparedness activities were to be built on five pillars: human resources, 
knowledge management, operations and process management, financial resources, and the 
community. 
In terms of human resources, it intended to run a number of standard training programs and 
provide on the job training at the local, regional and international level. In terms of 
knowledge management, efforts were underway to create a Disaster Management 
Information System (DMIS) with the objective of ensuring that the existing knowledge 
within the IFRC network of NSs was captured, codified and accessible to staff at large. 
One of the features of DMIS was identification and creation of links with relevant 
websites7 that held key information regarding the geography, climate, population, food 
habits, living conditions and customs, infrastructure, duty customs and regulations of a 
country and its regions. The other effort was to carry out risk assessments and get prepared 
                                                 
7
   During disaster response, to get a good overview, IFRC uses information available on the UNJLC website 
for its mapping and planning activities at the central level. This is because it simply does not have the 
logistics resources to collect and update operational parameters such as cost and availability of fuel, trucks, 
warehouses, etc.   
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for predictable disasters. As far as operational and process management was concerned, it 
intended to strengthen its existing tools and mechanisms and further engage stakeholders 
in needs-assessment and contingency planning exercises.  
IFRC had failed to increase the size of DREF, as it had had no impact in changing the 
donor mind-set. It had learnt, however, to work around this mind-set that looked for the 
victims - hence the visual evidence of a disaster – before committing itself to the provision 
of resources, preferably through goods rather than cash. IFRC’s fund mobilization 
capability through appeals was influenced by its performance in past disasters. Once it 
proved it could deliver and be there on the ground, it received a more favorable response to 
the next appeals.  
It also intended to forge strategic alliances with significant “non-Red Cross” organizations 
to capitalize on these organizations’ country presence and infrastructure, areas of technical 
expertise, as well as human, knowledge and experience capital. With a strategic alliance in 
place, under specified conditions, there would be no need to coordinate and negotiate 
respective contributions and roles in a disaster as a framework would be already in place. 
The media was considered another potential partner. During the Cuba disaster, CNN 
acknowledged IFRC when it utilized its satellite to broadcast live. Since ECHO has a 
policy of providing funding to agencies that are on the disaster site within 72 hours, IFRC 
received funding from them. The international and national press are also considered as a 
valuable source of information. They travel on the territory, collect first-hand information 
on the disaster, and would share it with humanitarian organizations. 
6.2  Disasters 
In this section, we shall describe the response of IFRC to two disasters: the Gujarat 
Earthquake and Hurricane Mitch. 
 
6.2.1   Gujarat Earthquake 
At around 08:50 local time on Friday 26th January 2001, a series of earthquakes peaking at 
a massive 7.9 on the Richter scale hit Gujarat. The epicenter of the most destructive quake 
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in independent India was 20km from the city of Bhuj, one of the least accessible parts of 
the country. The quake had damaged the state’s commercial capital Ahmedabad, less than 
100km away from the epicenter.  
That morning the information at the disposal of the IFRC from the stricken region was 
sketchy and anecdotal. Communication with the area was extremely difficult.  One of the 
first pieces of information that reached IFRC was that the receiving infrastructure of the 
local military airport of Bhuj had been disrupted (tower and air control equipment were 
destroyed and airstrip required repair) and numerous airport staff were killed or wounded. 
Later, it became clear that entire sections of Gujarat’s fragile network had completely 
collapsed. The fragmented water pipeline system was seriously damaged leaving entire 
areas without running water. Power and telecommunication lines were also severely 
affected.  
Given the short response window for natural disasters, within the first 24 hours, IFRC took 
a number of actions. The accumulated experience of Federation staff was leveraged to 
estimate the size and gravity of the disaster. The Federation immediately engaged in a 
dialogue with its network of donor National Societies (NSs). Given the political tensions 
with Pakistan, it was not obvious that the Indian Government and the local military forces 
would welcome international assistance and hence open their airspace to accommodate the 
arrival of commercial/aid aircrafts. The Indian Red Cross entered into negotiations with 
government officials to secure the participation of the international community in the relief 
effort. It took almost three days before the Indian government publicly welcomed “acts of 
solidarity.” 
To activate the relief supply chain, IFRC put together an information bulletin shared with 
all NSs. It quickly consulted a number of websites and satellite information to gather 
information on the region and build an estimate of the size of the affected population. In 
the meantime, its delegation in Delhi made the necessary arrangements to reach Gujarat. 
By the afternoon of the same day, a preliminary appeal for CHF 2 million to assist 50,000 
beneficiaries was issued, and CHF 200,000 released from the DREF. Over the next days, it 
prepared a relief operation plan for a 100-120 day period and launched its full appeal of 
CHF 25.5 million. 
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Within 48 hours, the first FACT members arrived in Bhuj. Approx. 36 hours from the 
disaster, the IFRC Delhi team and the Indian Red Cross were at the disaster zone followed 
by the first batch of relief supplies from existing stock. By then, the Logistics and 
Resource Mobilization department of IFRC had issued its first local procurement order for 
shelter and blankets.  
By Monday, three days after the disaster, IFRC had commitments to the tune of four 
million CHF, fifteen donating NSs were ready to intervene, international suppliers were 
mobilized, the Logistics ERU team was on site, and the first batch of relief items were 
ready to be distributed. 
A number of things had worked really well. IFRC was the first humanitarian organization 
to arrive on the disaster site. This gave it a lead role among the humanitarian agencies and 
determined our resources and reach. 
During the Bangladeshi earthquake some ten years ago, substantial amount of time and 
energy was spent on the management and disposal of unwanted goods as 95% of goods 
received were unsolicited. The newly institutionalized tracking system had limited the 
arrival of unsolicited goods. It had allowed the team to see, at any given time, who was 
sending what, with what means, where and when keeping the amount of unsolicited goods 
as low as 5%. 
The deployment of the ERUs, six in total, had worked well. Within days of the earthquake, 
three health-related ERUs, a specialized water and sanitation unit, a telecom unit and a 
logistics ERU had been deployed. Although the Logistics ERU had entered into action 
before the arrival of the bulk of goods at the Bhuj military airport, an earlier deployment 
would have facilitated operations. The Federation’s standardization efforts, frame 
agreements, code of conduct, and a mix of local and international sourcing had helped 
expedite the mobilization of relief items.  
Contrary to “creeping” crises such as drought/famine or health emergencies (e.g. HIV) that 
remain under-financed and require downscaling, earthquakes and floods readily attracted 
donor and public attention and money. Therefore, as expected, donor response to the 
Gujarat earthquake was good. More money was raised than what was actually requested: 
the full appeal was 25.5 million CHF while 100 million CHF was raised. 
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However, not everything had worked according to plan. Instead of assessing the disaster, 
the FACT team was drawn into operational activities from the minute it arrived in Gujarat. 
They were at the Bhuj military airport receiving the first relief items and the ERUs. They 
were the decision-makers behind the establishment of the compound that ended up hosting 
the 135 relief operators. In the first day or two after the arrival of the supplies, they even 
acted as relief delegates, distributing goods to the needy.  
Since the FACT team went quickly into doing instead of assessing, the Federation did not 
have a full picture of the disaster zone. In fact, for a few days they were in the dark. Road 
conditions and lack of transportation did not facilitate things. In fact, it was almost a week 
before the team was able to communicate any reliable information on the extent of the 
disaster. Similar to other disasters, the media and its operators became an important source 
of information for everyone. 
Given the absence of relief delegates on site, during the first two days, against all 
procedures, supplies were distributed without any tracking. Then goods started piling up in 
the warehouses. It took two to three weeks for relief delegates to organize their operations 
and pull the supplies out of the warehouses.  
Requirements in terms of relief times kept on changing. The initial information received by 
the Federation from the field was that the Indian government did not want any tents. Three 
days later, it received a request for 10,000 units. Soon afterwards, the government’s 
request shot up to 60,000 units - only to settle on the figure of 35,000. There were a 
number of reasons for the fluctuating figures. Most of the houses in the region were made 
of mud. With plastic sheets, damages especially those to the roofs could be temporarily 
fixed. Social networks were strong and people, who had lost their houses, were taken in by 
relatives and friends. Finally, people preferred the above-mentioned options to living in 
tents and hence refused them. In this particular case, IFRC was faced with a constraint, that 
of availability. Given the shelf life of tents (two years) and the lead-time required for their 
production, no supplier had the requested amount of 35,000 tents in stock. At the same 
time, demand for this product had increased overnight as a host of humanitarian 
organizations simultaneously approached the same global suppliers.  
Finally, IFRC at the end of the emergency was confronted with excessive stocks in Bhuj, 
which it had to deal with. It had mobilized 160 tons of high protein biscuits (BP5), 
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however, since the government and the local communities responded efficiently to the food 
requirements of the people, it ended up using only 25 tons of the stock. Therefore, at the 
end of the emergency period, it had to obtain the agreement of both the donor and the 
Indian NS to store the remaining stock in India. 
In 30 days, IFRC had organized the arrival of 45 charter planes carrying basic shelter 
material - 255,000 blankets, 34,000 tents, and 120,000 plastic sheets – and other items 
such as kitchen sets and jerry cans. The military staff at Bhuj airport had fully supported 
this operation. Despite the fact that they were mourning deceased colleagues, they 
continued to work under difficult and dangerous conditions to cater to charter planes flown 
in by different humanitarian organizations from all over the world. During the first 100 
days of operation, IFRC had assisted 300,000 people through the active participation of 35 
partners. The price tag of this operation, borne by the international community, was 35 
million CHF while another 35-40 million CHF was devoted to the recovery and 
rehabilitation phase. 
The Gujarat earthquake was a benchmark for IFRC as it was the first disaster where all the 
tools, mechanisms and practices developed to manage emergencies had come together. To 
improve response time, IFRC recognized the need to work on its appeal and 
standardization process, relationships with NSs, each tool at its disposal, and its overall 
readiness to respond to disasters.  
 
6.2.2  Hurricane Mitch 
Between 22 October and 1 November 1998, Hurricane Mitch, a 180-mph Category 5 
storm, the worst to hit the Gulf of Mexico in 200 years, swept through nine Central 
American countries devastating the economies of Honduras, Nicaragua and Guatemala. 
The hurricane, dumping as much as six feet of rain, washed out roads, destroyed some 400 
bridges in the region, changed the course of rivers and left a three feet layer of mud on 
flooded airport airfields. 10,000 people were estimated dead while some two million were 
left homeless. In January 1999, Carlos Flores, president of Honduras stated, “We lost in 72 
hours what had taken us more than 50 years to build, bit by bit.” 
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IFRC was under fire. The donor NSs and the NSs of Central America were dissatisfied 
with the way it had handled the Hurricane Mitch disaster. Nothing had gone right. It took 
weeks before IFRC took a lead in coordinating the relief contributions of the donating 
NSs. IFRC’s technical staff and relief delegates arrived late in the region. ERU were 
deployed at the eleventh hour. Basic supplies such as food, water and shelter took weeks to 
mobilize and distribute to the population. Twenty-two separate assessment reports were 
carried out by various NSs and donors. IFRC had failed to play a coordinating role in 
managing the disaster. It was not prepared to respond to the crisis as not enough technical 
expertise was readily deployable and no supplies were pre-positioned. This, while bilateral 
assistance, in particular from the US and Mexican governments as well as the American 
and Spanish NSs, had visibly delivered. IFRC knew that if it did not develop a system to 
guarantee transparent and quick responses to disasters, donors would reinforce their own 
capabilities and provide assistance on a bilateral basis. 
Although the Federation was engrossed in a reorganization exercise, a group of 
experienced staff was appointed to ensure that IFRC was never again caught unprepared. 
Their work resulted in the creation of a Pan-American Disaster Response Unit (PADRU) - 
a pilot initiative to be eventually replicated in other regions of the world.  
PADRU’s central responsibility was to respond to disasters in the region by providing 
technical expertise and creating capacity in disaster preparedness and response. To 
effectively manage disasters, PADRU was to initiate work on the five preparedness pillars: 
human resources, knowledge management, operations and process management, financial 
resources, and the community. 
On the operations and process management side, the initiative’s aim was to ensure access 
to and faster distribution of more goods purchased at competitive prices. For example, 
before a predictable disaster strikes (e.g. hurricane), there are a number of things IFRC 
could do. First, it could sit around a table with the concerned NSs to obtain their agreement 
on the content of basic relief kits (shelter, sanitation, and kitchen sets). Bearing in mind 
that there is no need for the perfect kit, but a kit that provides clean water, basic and 
balanced diets and shelter for those initial days after a disaster, it could sign pre-
agreements/MoUs based either on a disaster response plan or individual/specific kits. The 
next step would consist of the identification and capability assessment of potential 
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suppliers. This would lead to the preparation of a mock relief action plan with a 
corresponding budget. With this information packaged, it would approach the donor NSs. 
Once it obtained their agreement, it would pre-contract the kits to the identified suppliers at 
predetermined and advantageous prices. With this paperwork behind it, in the midst of a 
disaster it could focus on its relief efforts instead of negotiating and deciding the content of 
kits with NSs and analyzing competitive bids from various suppliers.   
This strategy required a paradigm shift for the NSs. As NSs are independent organizations, 
not necessarily they follow IFRC’s advice. IFRC had the delicate task of convincing NSs, 
independent organizations auxiliary to their governments, to make commitments by 
signing off on pre-determined agreements. In other words, disaster preparedness was 
required in Geneva but also at IFRC’s regional and national offices across the continents. 
The culture of preparedness was to be spread to the NSs with different capacity and 
capabilities. Through PADRU, IFRC also aimed to go beyond itself and its members by 
including other humanitarian organizations, active in relief operations, in the preparedness 
process.  
6.3    IFRC-Fritz Institute Partnership 
During the January 2001 World Economic Forum, Lynn Fritz, the former chairman and 
CEO of the logistics company Fritz Companies met the secretary general, the head of 
disaster management and head of logistics of IFRC (Kopczak & Johnson, 2004). Over the 
next eight months, Fritz and a selected team discussed whether and how a logistics 
information system could improve the operations of IFRC. The Fritz team did not limit the 
needs-assessment exercise to IFRC. After a round of visits to major humanitarian 
organizations, they discovered a generalized under-investment in IT infrastructure, 
processes, and tools among major humanitarian organizations. More specifically, they 
found out that humanitarian organizations use inadequate technology systems, that is, 
manual and time-consuming processes, to manage their disaster response operations.  
In 2002, Fritz founded the Fritz Institute a non-profit civil society organization (CSO) that 
aims to assist humanitarian organizations in the delivery of humanitarian aid. When it 
came to the development of a tailor-made logistics software that can address the unique 
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supply chain requirements of humanitarian organizations, the Fritz team decided to partner 
with IFRC. From the Institute’s perspective, IFRC represented a typical humanitarian 
organization. In addition, IFRC, given its federated structure, could allow for best practices 
and tools such as a logistics software to be propagated among its NSs. 
The design phase of the Humanitarian Logistics Software (HLS) was officially launched in 
May 2002. To develop the software, for over a year, a handpicked team of in-house and 
third-party logistics and software experts worked shoulder-to-shoulder with IFRC staff. 
However, the process was not problem-free as there were two schools of thought within 
the IFRC. One group was in favor of an ERP system to be implemented by one of the top 
five ERP vendors and the other for a custom-made software (Kopczak & Johnson, 2004). 
The projected cost of the ERP system was $ 12 million. The head of the logistics 
department at IFRC lobbied for a “best of breed” solution – SAP for HR, CODA for 
finance and a specific system for logistics based on the fact no ERP system could cater to 
IFRC logistics requirements (Kopczak & Johnson, 2004).     
Following a thorough review of IFRC’s logistics needs, the Fritz Institute customized a 
web-based, state-of-the-art proprietary logistics software enabling the secretariat and its 
network of NSs to harness the potential of technology during its emergency relief 
operations. HLS provides more control and visibility over relief items by tracking 
donations from mobilization up to the receipt at the disaster site. For the development of 
the HLS:  
“The Fritz Institute has used the latest technologies and partnered with 
logisticians to build a flexible, tailored origin to destination tracking 
system, especially designed for the dynamic relief context. It is based on 
commercial best practices and adapted to humanitarian requirements 
through extensive research with many leading relied organizations. 
Currently implemented at the IFRC, the HLS is being made available free 
of charge to other humanitarian relief organizations. Its modularity allows 
it to be used as a framework tool which can incorporate current systems 
that underlie the relief supply chain and fill the functional gaps that may 
exist.”                                                   
     – Fritz Institute Website 
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After a user acceptance testing phase, the software was officially turned-on in September 
2003 (Kopczak & Johnson, 2004), that is, 18 months after the official launch of the design 
phase. Built from ground-up, the software designed as a headquartered based system (Fritz 
Institute Annual Report, 2005), standardizes and automates the relief mobilization process 
and provides an interface between the different activities and steps of the IFRC logistics 
chain from the launch of an emergency appeal through procurement, donations, 
warehousing and distribution.   The HLS was funded by the Fritz Institute and was fully 
implemented in 2004. It is currently used by the IFRC to coordinate its disaster response 
activities across geographies. At the end of 2006, the software was rolled out in IFRC’s 
regional logistics units in Dubai, Panama and Kula Lumpur (Fritz Institute Annual Report, 
2006). 
The software has reportedly impacted IFRC’s operations. IFRC has stated that HLS has 
helped to improve its response time by 30% (Fritz Institute website). Compared to 2004, 
IFRC has decreased its supply chain set up times from 18 to just 3 days and decreased the 
cost of delivery of aid per family from $ 800 to $ 142 (Fritz Institute, September 2007 
press release).  
In September 2004, Fritz Institute was named a Tech Laureate by The Technology 
Museum of Innovation (San Jose, CA) for having developed the HLS.  This award given 
annually to 25 social entrepreneurs who successfully leverage technology to benefit 
mankind gave visibility both to the Fritz Institute and IFRC.  
6.4  Discussion 
IFRC is an operational humanitarian organization. As such, in this section, we discuss its 
sourcing strategies and practices, its supply chain configuration, disaster supply network, 
how the Federation operationalizes it, and key features of its partnership with the Fritz 
Institute. 
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6.4.1   IFRC Sourcing Strategies and Practices 
For predictable and emerging disasters, to save as many lives as possible, IFRC aims at 
process and cost efficiency as high speed and lower cost operations increase the outreach 
of its relief operations. To reduce costs and enhance responsiveness, IFRC prepares 
contingency plans and to the extent possible, resorts to pre-positioning options. It defines 
the content of its disaster response plan and pre-contracts relief kits to select suppliers at 
pre-determined and advantageous prices. To achieve the above, it establishes a dialogue 
with the recipient country and collects information on the eventual level of government 
contribution. Its network of NSs assesses the availability and suitability of local supplies. It 
leverages the advantages of different sourcing opportunities to achieve speed and cost 
targets. It pre-contracts key, high volume, low cost items to cost competitive suppliers with 
fast delivery capabilities. By tailoring its supply chains to the nature of demand, it tries to 
build on the best sourcing/supplier capabilities on offer.  
For unpredictable disasters, IFRC faces an uncertain and variable demand. Uncertainty 
also prevails on the supply side, as the response of the local and international community 
to the disaster is unknown. In these cases, to save as many lives as possible, IFRC aims at 
a flexible and fast supply chain.  In so doing, it bases its procurement decisions on 
minimum quality requirements and speed of delivery as opposed to cost minimization and 
optimization. It typically sources from the most ‘reliable’ suppliers to ensure a timely 
supply of quality products in the desired quantities. To meet the needs of end-beneficiaries, 
it tries to promptly adjust its supply chain configuration as well as its speed, destinations 
and volumes to a shifting supply and a changing demand. Rarely does IFRC resort to 
postponement techniques given the basic needs of the assisted population. Customization 
occurs mainly in the assembly of the food kits taking into consideration dietary and 
climatic aspects. 
For example during the Gujarat earthquake, IFRC had to revise its contribution in terms of 
product mix, volume and delivery requirements several times. For instance, in terms of 
shelter, it had to change its original plan – creation of temporary communities through tent 
camps - to accommodate local customs and government requests that emphasized the need 
for temporary repair solutions (plastic sheets to cover destroyed and damaged house roofs).   
In terms of supply, uncertain of local community response, it mobilized a large tonnage of 
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high-protein biscuits. However, given the generous response of the local community and 
authorities, it had to mount a reverse supply chain to deal with excess supply.   
Humanitarian organizations can also experience stock-out problems for products that have 
a long lead-time and a limited supplier base. For example, during the Gujarat earthquake, 
to provide shelter to the homeless for a couple of days IFRC seem to require 60,000 tents. 
However, the short response period combined with a temporary surge in demand on the 
part of a host of humanitarian organizations combined with the relatively long production 
lead-time, created supply problems.  
In conclusion, IFRC aims at excelling in two supply chain strategies. To this end, it is 
working towards building capabilities and systems that allow for their parallel, 
simultaneous management alone and in partnership with its disaster response network. 
 
6.4.2   IFRC Supply Chain Configuration 
In response to any major crisis, IFRC mobilizes a couple of hundred food and NFIs such as 
medicine, shelter, fuel, sanitation and telecom units. Given the short response window for 
natural and unpredictable disasters, IFRC has to mobilize relief times within the shortest 
delay. Its emergency supply chain is composed of a large number of direct relationships 
with suppliers and donors. It is temporary as for each disaster a supply chain is constructed 
and dismantled soon after the emergency phase is over (typically within three months from 
the day of the disaster). It is also multiple as at any given time IFRC manages as many 
supply chains as the number of large-scale on-going disasters in the world. For instance, 
during the Gujarat earthquake, among other disasters, IFRC was involved in the 
earthquake in El Salvador, a drought in Tajikistan, the aftermath of floods in Bolivia and 
the Orissa cyclone in India.   
IFRC relies on its NS network as well as first-time and repeat suppliers to stage its 
response.  Its supplier base includes a mix of single source and alternative international, 
regional and local suppliers. IFRC requires its global suppliers to stock at their own 
premises a certain level of inventory. This condition ensures the rapid mobilization of the 
192
CHAPTER 6 - IFRC  
 
 
192
right amount of goods at any given time. Participating NSs also source from these global 
suppliers. For widely available commodities, IFRC resorts to spot purchases.  
Given the characteristics of IFRC’s relief items and the high level of product 
substitutability, it can source from a wide supplier base. Local sourcing reduces transport 
time and cost and items are more likely to be acceptable and compatible to local cultures, 
tastes, climates and lifestyles (accuracy). When competitive local procurement is not 
possible because of supply failure modes (e.g. disabled suppliers, lack of supplier 
capability or capacity), it sources from the most reliable and trusted foreign supplier.  
More specifically, the IFRC adopts a “staggered buying process”.  It uses international 
suppliers as a source of both “reactive” and “non-reactive” capacity. Regional and local 
suppliers typically cover the outstanding balance for “reactive” capacity. Suppliers with 
redundant and flexible production capacity are selected as a means to respond to a surge in 
demand for a given relief item. Local suppliers are used to reduce shipping times and 
ensure local content and features in the product. Its wide and geographically dispersed 
donor and supplier network as well as supplier interchangeability, substitutability provides 
it with the required operational flexibility. In conclusion, to be fast, flexible, accurate and 
cost effective, IFRC manages a broad supply network rather than a fully integrated supply 
chain. 
 
6.4.3   IFRC: Goods Mobilization and Distribution 
To perform its role as a disaster response choreographer, IFRC outsources significant 
portions of its goods procurement and delivery process to the disaster area to the 
participating (receiving and donating) NSs and its repeat suppliers. For local knowledge 
and resources, it leverages the assets and office network of the recipient NS. We argue that 
transparency, standardization, encapsulation and trust are the enablers of the IFRC goods 
mobilization and distribution effort (Figure 6.5).  
To ensure the mobilization and distribution of the right goods at the right time, IFRC 
maintains a transparent relationship with its network of participating NSs. IFRC shares 
information on needs, in continuous evolution, with its donating NSs through the 
formulation and updating of situation reports, appeals and a disaster-specific RMT. The 
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RMT contains the list and amount of items required, pledged and received. Together with 
the commodity tracking system, it deters the dispatch of unsolicited goods and highlights 
goods in shortage or excess. IFRC also acts as a supervisory agent for the donating NSs 
vis-à-vis suppliers as it advises them of the arrival of each consignment in the field 
speeding up the settlement of supplier invoices. In the spirit of “a happy donor today is a 
good donor tomorrow”, at the end of each operation, it performs an accountability function 
by issuing a detailed account of goods received and distributed to beneficiaries. Similarly, 
the flow of information between recipient NSs regarding the goods distribution process 
helps maintain a transparent relationship with IFRC. 
 
Figure 6.5 – IFRC-NS Partnership 
 
 
To facilitate the goods mobilization process, IFRC has a standard item list and 
standardized relief kits and framework agreements with a number of global suppliers for 
key relief items that it shares with its NS network. The standards take into consideration 
regional requirements and type of emergency. Process standardization (e.g. delivery to 
final destination), goods standardization (e.g. quality and product specification), and 
framework agreements with suppliers for key items speed up the sourcing process by the 
donating NSs and expedite relief operations. Together with code of conduct for private 
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sector donations, they help contain the arrival of unsuitable goods. Distribution practices 
and standards also regulate the relationship between IFRC and recipient NSs. 
To facilitate the delivery process, IFRC’s NSs network and its repeat suppliers operates 
along the encapsulation concept, notably, the execution of a number of tasks and adherence 
to agreed operating procedures upon commitment. Aware of the quality standards and 
packaging specification of each item on the RMT and in accordance to the notified 
shipping instruction, the donating NS manages entire segments of the supply chain from 
procurement to transportation to the port of delivery. NSs procure items in accordance to 
IFRC’s product specification requirements. For key items, they call upon suppliers with 
whom the IFRC has concluded framework agreements. As a result, no further exchange of 
communication between IFRC and a donating NS is required once the NS commits to the 
supply of an item. The concept of encapsulation is also valid for when IFRC sources relief 
items directly from suppliers as regardless of the origin of the goods, IFRC expects the 
contracted suppliers to deliver supplies to the disaster zone. 
The IFRC-NS network is a stable network where trust, result of repeated and continuous 
relationship, prevails and is nurtured. Indeed, trust is the glue that keeps IFRC and its 
network of independent NSs together. Once a NS pledges to supply an item, IFRC is off 
the case until the arrival of the goods to the port of destination. Trust also prevails between 
IFRC and its repeat suppliers. 
  
6.4.4   IFRC-Fritz Institute Partnership 
In this section, we shall concentrate on the IFRC-Fritz Institute partnership which although 
limited to one area – IT – is classified as a strategic partnership (Figure 6.6).  
There was an organizational fit between the flagship initiative of the Fritz Institute – a 
humanitarian logistics software – and the IT needs of IFRC. The Fritz Institute provided 
resources towards the development of a software which would i) standardize and help 
better manage IFRC’s supply chain activities during disasters and ii) help it capitalize on 
the lessons learnt after each disasters. The Fritz Institute initiative bridged the prevailing IT 
infrastructure gap between IFRC and its NS network.  
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Figure 6.6 – Fritz Institute 
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The development of the HLS encountered some difficulties at the beginning since there 
were two camps at the IFRC: one in favor of an ERP system and another in favor of a 
lighter, customized software. The opinion of IFRC’s head of logistics and the high cost of 
an ERP system implementation compared to the offer of the Fritz Institute to fully cover 
the development cost of a logistics software weighed significantly on IFRC’s final 
decision.  
IFRC was ready to engage in a software development partnership since it had planned and 
budgeted for the development of a software to meet its administrative and operational 
requirements. The relevant staff were committed to work closely with the software 
developers to ensure that their needs were adequately featured in the different functions 
and outputs of the software. However, the logistics team of IFRC was thinly staffed and 
there was competition between time to be devoted to disaster response activities and 
dialogue with software developers.  
IFRC, one of the largest humanitarian organizations, was one of the few partners with 
whom the Fritz Institute could forge a partnership with. Its sheer size and global operations 
ensured visibility for the Fritz Institute initiative. In addition, the structure of the Red Cross 
Movement with its federated network of National Societies is unique. This provided the 
Fritz Institute with a multiplier effect opportunity that only few other humanitarian 
organizations (e.g. MSF) could offer.  
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However, failure (or lack of interest over time) in the development of the software would 
have delayed availability of a logistics software by few years and would have resulted in 
waste of time, effort and reputation by both the Fritz Institute and IFRC staff.  
The HLS is reported to have impacted the cost and timeliness of IFRC relief operations as 
well as facilitated and supported the Federation’s reporting function. Its database function 
has the potential to improve the accuracy and flexibility of IFRC relief operations in the 
future. In addition, the HLS makes performance measurement possible.  
 
Figure 6.7 – Risks and benefits of the IFRC-Fritz Institute Partnership 
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As summarized in Figure 6.7, the IFRC-Fritz Institute partnership improved the 
effectiveness of IFRC operations, has the potential to advance the status of practice and to 
a lesser extent has signaled other donors in terms of worthiness of partnering with the 
Federation in particular and humanitarian organizations in general. By basing its decision 
more on the track record of the founder of the Fritz Institute, the owner and manager of a 
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successful logistics company, rather than the Institute itself, IFRC took a calculated risk 
when it decided to partner with the Fritz Institute. Since the partnership was limited to the 
software and IFRC was planning to upgrade it anyway, the partnership did not result in 
capacity limitations or reduced donations from traditional donors.  
There has been no direct mention of working cultures constituting a bottleneck. In this 
regard, it is worth mentioning that Fritz Institute outsourced the development of the 
software to a company and monitored its development. The development time was 18 
months. This could have probably been shorter had there been prior experience in 
developing a software for the non-profit sector. Having said that, the interest of the Fritz 
Institute was aligned with that of IFRC in terms of adhering to the development schedule. 
However, since IFRC, like other humanitarian organizations, does not have a culture of 
measuring logistical performance, the real potential of the software has remained 
unutilized (Davidson, 2006). Davidson foresees the need for an organizational culture 
change, which involves top management to people across departments, before a 
humanitarian organization like IFRC starts measuring and comparing its performance for 
each disaster. 
The software does result in structural dependency on the Institute’s User Support Services 
and has locked the Federation in terms of IT choices. This results in loss of organizational 
flexibility as it is not reasonable to foresee the development of another software anytime in 
the future. Success of the software paves the way for its dissemination to IFRC’s NSs: a 
cost and effort possibly to be borne by the Federation itself. Failure to maintain the system, 
ensure the required User Support Services for its continuation and develop future versions 
is a concrete risk facing IFRC going forward. On the hand, success has shifted the attention 
of Fritz Institute to the marketing of the software to other organizations (Chapter 9).  
The Fritz Institute is a non-profit organization that is involved in a noble cause: assistance 
to humanitarian organizations. Consequently, its efforts are not viewed with suspicion. Its 
activities are not aimed at improving the bottom line but increasing funding for the 
Institute and recognition for its founder, Lynn Fritz.  
The Fritz Institute has accumulated substantial benefits from this initiative. It increased its 
competitive advantage as it has been recognized through the 2004 Tech Museums Awards 
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as an institution that has successfully leveraged technology to benefit mankind. Given the 
Institute’s objective – creation of a logistics software for the humanitarian sector – IFRC 
was possibly the best candidate to partner with given its structure and operations. By 
developing the software with a large humanitarian organization with international, regional 
and local presence involved in the delivery of wide range of relief items in the four corners 
of the world, it paved the way for its divulgation among all types of humanitarian 
organizations; an extra-benefit. As a non-profit organization dedicated to the strengthening 
of the humanitarian sector, it did not run the risks typically faced by the corporate world. 
However, the deteriorating reputation of its partner and failure were risks that persisted 
until the finalization of the product. 
6.5    Summary 
This chapter provides background information on IFRC and describes how the Federation 
manages its emergency supply chain during natural disasters. The description confirms the 
global, temporary, dynamic and multiple nature of IFRC’s emergency supply chains.  
In Chapter 2 we argue that for predictable and emerging disasters, humanitarian 
organizations should aim at process and cost efficiency while for unpredictable disasters, 
humanitarian organizations should set up and manage fast and flexible supply chains. As 
discussed in section 6.4.1, to rise to the challenge of timely delivery of relief goods to end-
beneficiaries, IFRC differentiates between unpredictable and emerging natural disasters. 
To respond to predictable crises, it engages in timely contingency planning efforts with its 
NS, supplier network and recipient governments. To respond to the increasing number of 
unpredictable disasters, it tries to mount and run fast and flexible supply chains.   
In terms of supply chain configuration, given the temporary and dynamic nature of 
emergencies and the level of product substitutability, broad supply networks render IFRC’s 
emergency relief supply chains more resilient to disruptions. Section 6.4.4 illustrates how 
trust, standardization, encapsulation and transparency simplify an otherwise complex range 
of relationships between IFRC and its NS network. In section 6.4.5, we discussed the 
IFRC-Fritz Institute strategic collaboration on the humanitarian logistics software 
recognizing its benefits to both parties and noting the averted implementation risks.  
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Chapter 7  UNJLC  
 
 
This chapter presents research on the United Nations Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC), the 
logistics coordination platform of humanitarian organizations. Over a period of three years 
(Figure 7.1), we conducted separate research on the UNJLC. The research focused on three 
deployments in response to natural and man-made disasters, the genesis of the facility and 
the institutionalization process.  
 
Figure 7.1 – UNJLC Research 
Research Year of Study 
The Genesis of UNJLC 2002 
The Afghan Crisis (Part I & II) 2003 
The Institutionalization Process 2004 
The Iraq Crisis 2005 
 
This Chapter is organized as follows. We start the discussion with an overview of the 
facility. In section 7.2, we review the operations of UNJLC in response to the 
Mozambique, Afghanistan and Iraq crises. In section 7.3, we review the institutionalization 
process of the facility. Section 7.4 is dedicated to our findings where we examine the 
organizational structure and specific design features of the UNJLC.  We elaborate on the 
strategic and operational building blocks necessary for its establishment and success. 
Finally, we review the risks and opportunities facing the UNJLC. 
7.1  History8 
Coordination is not a new concept to the humanitarian community. Since the mid 1990s, 
the humanitarian community has recognized the need for a coordination mechanism in 
multi-sectoral humanitarian emergencies. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA) functions as a coordination platform for all emergencies. As described in 
                                                 
8
  With permission of the authors, sections 7.1, 7.2 & 7.3 reproduce the INSEAD UNJLC case studies listed 
in the bibliography. 
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Appendix A, it houses four inter-agency coordination mechanisms: the Consolidated 
Appeal Process (CAP), the Military and Civil Defense Unit (MCDA), the UN Disaster 
Assessment Coordination team (UNDAC) and the Humanitarian Information Centre 
(HIC).  
The complexity of more recent humanitarian crises has led to the unbundling of logistics 
from generic coordination. To address common logistical impediments, the Inter-Agency 
Standing Committee (IASC) has the option to activate a specialized, temporary, distinct 
and impartial facility: the UNJLC. The UNJLC is a coordination facility that complements 
and coordinates the logistics capabilities of cooperating humanitarian agencies during 
large-scale emergencies. The facility is configured to support two response models: inter-
agency logistics coordination only or coordination plus asset management. The purpose 
and utility of the UNJLC is two-fold: coordination among and augmentation of logistics 
capabilities of humanitarian organizations as well as coordination between the 
humanitarian community and key stakeholders. 
Figure 7.2 provides an overview of the origin, applications and modus operandi of the 
UNJLC. The UNJLC was a spontaneous response to an overwhelming humanitarian crisis 
arising from the 1996 outbreak of civil war in Zaire. During that crisis WFP and UNHCR 
had managed to overcome some of the logistical bottlenecks by mobilizing transport 
means required to move cargo, refugees and personnel. On the contrary, UNICEF, WHO 
and the NGOs relied on few, decrepit and dangerous roads and competed for the few 
transport assets.  
WFP and UNHCR pooled and offered their excess air assets in terms of cargo and 
passenger capacity first to each other. Bearing in mind humanitarian needs, the offer of 
excess capacity was extended to other agencies. They established a structure that was soon 
manned by representatives of the main UN Agencies and NGOs. With a view to optimize 
the use of limited and expensive resources, the structure began to coordinate the logistics 
planning and operations of the humanitarian community. It processed information on and 
started to manage the common logistics resources and operations of WFP, UNHCR and 
UNICEF. 
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Figure 7.2 – UNJLC in Brief 
 
What is the UNJLC? 
The concept of a UN Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC) was born out of the humanitarian 
response to the 1996 Easter Zaire crisis, which demanded intensified coordination and 
pooling of logistics assets among UNHRC, WFP and UNICEF. The concept was applied 
to subsequent UNJLC interventions in Somalia, the Balkans, East Timor, Mozambique, 
Bhuj, Afghanistan, Angola, Iraq, Sudan and tsunami hit countries. In March 2002, the 
UNJLC was institutionalized as a UN humanitarian response mechanism, under the aegis 
of WFP, by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group (IASC-WG). 
The UNJLC’s mission is to complement and coordinate the logistics capabilities and 
cooperating humanitarian agencies during large-scale emergencies. The UNJLC is not a 
new agency but a facility which is activated when intensified field-base inter-agency 
logistics coordination is required. Once mobilized, the UNJLC seeks the widest possible 
participation among humanitarian logistics actors and facilitates the interface with non-
humanitarian entities such as the military.  
 
What is the Logistics Support Function of the UNJLC? 
The UNJLC aims to collectively identify and eliminate logistics bottlenecks of common 
interest to the humanitarian community to avoid wasteful competition among agencies. 
Related to this, the UNJLC plans, prioritizes and de-conflicts relief movements when 
available infrastructure capacity is limited. Through this process the UNJLC advises on the 
most efficient transport modes and performs movement control functions. The UNJLC also 
frames logistics-related policy issues affecting humanitarian logistics operations. 
 
What Kind of Information is Provided by the UNJLC? 
The UNJLC acts as a platform for gathering, collating, analyzing and disseminating 
information required by agencies to optimize logistics planning and management. This 
involves two basic information categories: Pipeline/Commodity Tracking, including 
agency stock positions; and Logistics Support Information, such as humanitarian logistics 
installations and assets, status of corridors and border crossings, customs and infrastructure 
assessment. The UNJLC has GIS (Geographical Information System) and mapping 
capabilities. A variety of dissemination mechanisms are employed, including inter-agency 
meetings, bulletins and CD-ROMs. A generic website (www.unjlc.org) is maintained, 
housing general reference information and deployment-specific materials. 
 
When is a UNJLC Demobilized? 
UNJLCs are envisaged as a temporary bolster during the response phase of an emergency. 
As such, no UNJLC is activated without a clearly defined exit strategy. Prior to 
demobilization, the UNJLC ensures appropriate inter-agency logistics coordination 
mechanisms are in place. Similarly, the UNJLC aims to improve agency and government 
logistics management capabilities through selective logistics capacity building activities. 
 
Source:  UNJLC Website, “UNJLC Flyer”. 
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Figure 7.3 – The UNJLC Key Activities and Events, 2000-2004 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Activity/Event 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
- IASC endorsement  of UNJLC               
- IASC institutionalization               
- Establishment of Core Unit               
- Activation Protocol               
- Fields Operations Manual               
- Training sessions               
- INSEAD UNJLC case studies               
- Visit to donor capitals               
- Inter-agency quarterly meetings               
- Development of common services               
UNJLC Deployments 
- Mozambique Floods                
- Bhuj Earthquake               
- D. R. Congo               
- Afghanistan               
- Côte d’Ivoire               
- Iraq                
- Liberia               
- Sudan               
- Haiti               
Contingency Planning 
- Afghan winterization               
- Iraq crisis               
- Southern Sudan Peace Process               
Independent Reviews 
- Afghanistan operation               
- Iraq operation               
- Liberia operation               
- Core Unit               
- Comprehensive Review               
 
The term UNJLC was coined at the outset of the crisis and has never been revised to 
capture the evolution of the concept. The “Joint” referred to the pooling of air assets and 
the “Centre” to the single location at the Entebbe airport.   
The development of the UNJLC concept went through a relatively lengthy process and a 
non-linear sequence of events (Figure 7.3).  It was deployed in numerous9 large-scale 
                                                 
9
  Somalia Floods (1998), Balkan crisis (1999), East Timor (1999), Mozambique floods (2000 & 2001), Bhuj 
earthquake (2001), and Afghanistan (2001).  
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humanitarian emergencies - from natural disasters to complex emergencies that involve 
refugees, Internally Displaced People (IDP), peacekeeping operations, and combatant 
forces - before it was endorsed and institutionalized as a permanent facility of the UN’s 
emergency response structure by the IASC. The mastermind of the concept, David 
Kaatrud, was the head of the facility from 2000 to 2004. Adrian van der Knaap, member of 
UNJLC deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq and a WFP staff, took over the leadership 
role from Kaatrud. 
The UNJLC provides a range of value-adding services. With a view to optimize the level 
of humanitarian inventory, for emerging disasters, the UNJLC takes the lead in 
contingency planning. It flags and anticipates logistics problems and takes an active role in 
their resolution. To resolve common and major logistics bottlenecks and avoid wasteful 
competition it de-bottlenecks and de-conflicts use of logistics assets among agencies and 
between agencies and relevant stakeholders. It solves logistics bottlenecks such as opening 
of transport corridors and border crossing points. It de-conflicts the use of common 
logistics assets such as air space and airfields with military forces. As a focal point on 
humanitarian issues, the UNJLC liaises, coordinates, and negotiates with relevant 
stakeholders. For example, to speed up the movement of humanitarian operators and 
goods, it negotiates the opening of humanitarian corridors. It negotiates landing and 
navigation fees on behalf of the humanitarian community with relevant authorities and 
obtains a series of authorizations and facilitation measures. The UNJLC also plans and 
prioritizes the movement of critical food, NFIs and people (refugees, returnees, 
humanitarian and media operators, etc.). By combining and providing access to 
complementary and indivisible physical and human resources and capabilities, the UNJLC 
helps the community optimize the use of assets. In the event of a mismatch between the 
transport capacity and cargo, the UNJLC ensures access to excess transport capacity.  
As access to adequate and timely information is of great importance for both operating and 
political humanitarian organizations and donors, the UNJLC facilitates and supports the 
exchange and flow of logistics-related information between agencies via its website. As 
agencies typically budget only enough to meet their essential operational logistics 
requirements, to re-enforce and augment the overall logistics capability and capacity of the 
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system, the UNJLC performs analytical functions.  To improve the overall quality of 
logistics planning and operations, the UNJLC conducts infrastructure surveys and sectoral 
technical assessments on issues such as fuels, customs, and transportation. Big and small 
humanitarian organizations part of the UN, international organization or NGO community 
contribute and benefit from the UNJLC in line with their means. Since the UNJLC aims to 
augment operational humanitarian agencies’ logistics capacities, it is particularly careful 
not to undermine agency efforts, including their visibility.   
While the UNJLC is configured to take on an asset management role, emphasis is on 
coordination. An asset management role is assumed as a last resort, and in the event, it is 
tasked by National Emergency Management Authorities (NEMA) such as during the 
UNJLC operation for the 2000 Mozambique floods. 
7.2   Disasters 
In this section, we shall describe the activation and demobilization process as well as the 
activities of the UNJLC to two natural disasters and two man-made disasters namely, the 
2000 Mozambique floods, Gujarat Earthquake, Afghanistan crisis and Iraq crisis. 
 
7.2.1   The 2000 Mozambique Floods 
Cyclone Connie hit the southeast coast of Mozambique on 4 February 2000, severely 
affecting three of the country’s provinces. The rapid rise in the water level resulted in 
widespread flooding of the major river basins. The cyclone continued inland causing 
substantial damage to four other neighboring southern African countries.  The opening of 
dams upstream (especially in Zimbabwe and Zambia) worsened the situation. The capital’s 
water and electricity supplies were the first to be severely affected. In a matter of hours, 
road and rail links to the bordering countries of South Africa and Swaziland were cut, 
railway services between Maputo and Zimbabwe were impeded, airfields were under 
water, property and thousands of acres of land was destroyed, water purification plants, 
boreholes, wells were damaged and 100,000 people were homeless or stranded on 
“islands” of rooftops and trees.   
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On the government’s invitation, OCHA’s UNDAC10 team reached the disaster area on 
12 February, a week after the first cyclone had hit Mozambique. The team assisted the 
government in preparing a consolidated appeal to mobilise funds from the donor 
community. Among other things, it set up the Cell for Logistics Coordination, hosted by 
the National Institute for Disaster Management (Instituto Nacional de Gestao de 
Calamidades, INGC), with the mandate to coordinate assessment and relief activities.  
The severe floods were aggravated by a second cyclone, Eline that struck the eastern coast 
of Mozambique on 21 February and moved inland producing heavy rains and strong winds 
for three consecutive days. By the end of February, the worst and most extensive floods 
the country had known for 150 years had affected over 900,000 people, forcing 300,000 
people to abandon their homes, washing away 1,600km of roads, and destroying cultivated 
land and numerous bridges connecting the provinces.11 The threat of water-borne diseases, 
such as cholera and malaria increased daily from the pools of stagnant water and 
unsanitary conditions. 
By early March, intermittent rainfall continued to affect parts of the country. In addition, a 
new cyclone, Gloria, was hovering in the Indian Ocean. Up until the end of March, the 
heavy rains continued to inhibit the distribution of relief items by road, as repaired roads 
were intermittently put out of use. The country’s main highway was opened to traffic on 
26 March providing better access to the flood affected areas. The first trucks with supplies 
from Beira to the Gaza province were dispatched on 29 March. By the end of the month, 
an estimated 1.2 million people had been affected by the floods. Of those, 463,000 
internally displaced people had received assistance from humanitarian organisations and 
were sheltered and fed in over 120 accommodation and feeding centres set up throughout 
the affected areas. 
On 5 April the last and relatively confined cyclone, Hudah, hit the Mozambique coast with 
limited displacement of people and loss of crops. By June, the official and revised figures 
of the disaster indicated that 5 million people had been affected by the flooding, with 
                                                 
10
  UNDAC deployed for “sudden onset of natural disaster”, prepared a consolidated appeal on behalf of the 
Mozambique government and UN humanitarian organizations for donor funding.  
11
  Source: Mozambique & Zimbabwe: Flood Rehabilitation, Appeal no. 4/2000, Situation Report no. 2, 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent, 23 February 2000. 
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544,000 of these being displaced.12 At the peak of operations out of Beira and Maputo, a 
total of 57 aircraft of several types belonging to different operators were involved in 
humanitarian relief activities.  
The quick succession of four devastating cyclones had created formidable logistics 
challenges for the humanitarian community. With airstrips, roads, and bridges under water, 
rescuing the victims and delivering basic relief items such as food, shelter, and medicine 
were extremely difficult. 
At the time of the disaster, the government of Mozambique only had two helicopters at its 
disposal, and one of these was grounded for repairs. Within days of the government’s first 
appeal for international assistance, the South African National Defence Force had provided 
a fleet of 10 aircraft. On 11 February the first South African military rescue helicopters 
arrived at the disaster site. Between 11 and 19 February, they choreographed the first wave 
of rescue operations. As the situation stabilized, donors started to scale down their 
operations. The OCHA's UNDAC mission left the country on 24 February after 
completing the first consolidated appeal. When the second wave of floods hit Mozambique 
between 26 and 27 February, no single organization was prepared for its abruptness and 
magnitude. On 29 February the UNDAC team returned to the country to prepare the 
second appeal.  
Rescue operations resumed and reached their peak right after the second cyclone. 
Thousands of people, clinging to life in trees or on rooftops had to be rescued and given 
relief. After the second cyclone hit, professional planning was required to obtain optimal 
utilisation of the 50 plus aircraft provided by 15 operators13 to support the victims. As the 
magnitude of the emergency was revealed and air activities evolved from straightforward 
rescue to transporting food and non-food items including shelter, medicine and water, the 
complexity of the logistics operations was compounded. On the initiative of UNDAC, the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs requested that the Cell for Logistics Coordination be converted 
into a UN Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC) on 3 March 2000. The UNJLC hosted in the 
INGC building, reported to the Mozambique government and as such became an 
                                                 
12
  Source: UN Coordination in Mozambique Following the Devastating Floods, June 2000. 
13
  Among which were government aircraft and helicopters from Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Malawi, 
Portugal, South Africa, Spain and the US. 
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instrument of the government’s rescue and relief operations. While DFID temporarily 
appointed one of its officers to activate the UNJLC, WFP, the mastermind behind the 
concept back in 1996, was designated as the lead coordinating agency for logistics support 
and communications. WFP designated an ex-pilot and several-time OCHA consultant as 
head of the centre.  
Without office equipment or communication lines, the UNJLC started planning and 
coordinating airlift operations on 8 March. After a few days, the US military provided the 
UNJLC with furniture, maps and office equipment. The UNJLC had the required 
legitimacy to direct air operations given its national status and presence in the INGC 
building. In spite of repeated promises, the office lacked basic services such as telephone 
landlines, fax and email connections throughout its two-month operation. This prevented it 
from communicating effectively with civil aviation authorities and the humanitarian 
agencies. UNJLC relied on the WFP Mozambique office in Maputo for administrative 
support and logistics systems. The latter provided it with mobile phones and transportation.  
The Centre was slowly manned. WFP assigned an experienced loadmaster to organise the 
loading of the cargo. To accomplish its mission, the UNJLC approached the military forces 
and had four foreign military staff seconded to it.  
At the onset of the emergency, there was little understanding of the concept and mandate 
of the UNJLC among the humanitarian community and military actors. The concept gained 
credibility through the daily updates at the coordination meetings chaired by the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs which were attended by humanitarian organisations and the media. 
These meetings became a forum to reiterate that the UNJLC was not a WFP satellite, but 
an impartial set-up to support the humanitarian community with the commonly available 
logistics assets. But it still failed to ensure the participation of other humanitarian 
organizations through secondment of their experienced staff. 
In this operation, the UNJLC coordinated only ‘regional’ airlifts (movement of goods from 
the region into the disaster areas) and not ‘strategic’ ones (movement of supplies from 
other continents into eastern and southern Africa). To ensure the smooth influx and 
movement of relief items, it dealt with a series of administrative issues. With the support 
of OCHA, INGC and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, it sought and obtained facilitation 
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measures from the local authorities such as exemption from landing and navigation fees, 
immigration procedures, customs clearance, etc.   
The way the air operations were managed seemed to favour the most dynamic and better-
organized humanitarian agencies. Initially this created some misunderstandings among less 
prepared, smaller organizations as typically the “stronger” were the ones that managed to 
conform to the mission schedule by getting their items on the tarmac at the correct 
shipping time (Figure 7.4).  
 
Figure 7.4 – Air Management: Prioritization, Tasking and Scheduling 
The UNJLC introduced a mission request form that had to be completed by humanitarian 
organizations before 1pm on the day before execution. The schedule was discussed with 
the operators (mostly military) during a daily meeting at 4pm when the requests were 
matched with the available assets and tasks appointed to the respective operators and 
aircraft types. Subsequently, humanitarian organizations were informed by mobile phone 
and the schedule was finalized by 6pm. This scheduling cycle allowed a maximum of 
flexibility and took into account newly injected priorities and the backlog from the 
previous day. On the other hand, users only received flight confirmation after the 4pm 
meetings. To maximize the use of assets avoiding waste and delays, organizations were 
informed that a request implied readiness to execute the following day. In the event of late 
arrival at the airport, users would lose priority and the UNJLC had the prerogative to 
reassign the space to readily available cargo at the airport. 
 
In prioritizing the cargo and destinations, the UNJLC based itself on the overall 
humanitarian need-driven guidelines emanating from the different coordination meetings 
held with INGC, the UN Country Resident Representative, OCHA, and the UN Agencies. 
 
On the operational side, things went very smoothly. The South African Air Force had 
assumed the role of planning and assigning air missions before the activation of the 
UNJLC. Upon its activation, the UNJLC, apart from few minor incidents at the airfield 
level, was accepted by the military as the body in charge of prioritizing, tasking, and 
scheduling air assets. Its task, although never formalized, was to plan and schedule the use 
of air assets leaving the actual coordination of the execution largely to the South African 
Air Force.  The international military personnel agreed to be coordinated by civilians and 
the UNJLC to an unprecedented extent. The UNJLC carefully prepared compulsory daily 
briefings with all pilots. As a result, almost 10,000 hours, or the equivalent of 15,000 to 
20,000 flights were organized without accident.  
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Airlifts are essential to ensure quick response, but they are also the most expensive means 
of transport hence calling for proper management. With the argument that humanitarian 
support flights had priority, UNJLC systematically refused and resisted the pressure to 
dedicate helicopters for VIP and other visitors’ use. On the other hand, to keep the floods 
on the world’s television screens and support the fund raising efforts, the UNJLC 
coordinated and secured necessary seats for journalists. Up to then, there had been few 
emergencies that had received as much media attention as the second flooding in the 
Limpopo Valley. The international television teams already in the country were able to 
record and broadcast dramatic pictures of the second cyclone and, as such, generated 
considerable donor support.  
In addition to air management, the UNJLC performed a stock tracking function. This was a 
difficult task given the poor reporting procedures. UNJLC limited itself to the registration 
of food items, which constituted 75-80% of all transported cargo. Without an effective 
authority that could manage the movement control (receiving, storing and distribution) of 
unsolicited food and non-food items provided by private and public donors, the UNJLC 
undertook the task. To augment the reach of the operations (rescue and relief distribution), 
a number of NGOs and governments (the Netherlands and the UK) stepped up their 
support by providing 230 boats. Although not designated as the coordinating body for the 
use of other assets except air, the UNJLC was asked, on an ad hoc basis, to trace the 
distribution and ensure the correct utilization of these boats coming into the country.   
Although donors continued to fund air operations until mid May 2000, from April with 
fewer air assets available, helicopter operations were centralized at main pick-up points, 
now accessible by road from Maputo, closer to the crisis areas. This resulted in better use 
of resources and hence a better cargo-flying hour ratio. To reduce costs, small boats were 
put into use to ferry supplies. As road access improved, expensive airlifts were replaced by 
trucking. By the second week of April with improved weather conditions, displaced people 
started to return to their homes leaving the accommodation centers. In early May, road 
routes into affected areas started drying up ready for rehabilitation or another round of 
repairs. As the emergency relief effort moved into a rehabilitation phase, road access 
212
CHAPTER 7 - UNJLC  
 
 
212
improved and funding for the UNJLC dried up, the decision to close down the UNJLC was 
taken by the government. 
The combined humanitarian air operation of the disaster was among the largest ever: a 
total of 10,000 flight hours, transporting almost 30,400 passengers and 11,623 metric 
tonnes (MT) of food and non-food items. These results were possible thanks to the 
UNJLC. 
On the request of the government, the UNJLC concept was successfully deployed again in 
the Mozambique 2001 floods. Similar to the 2000 floods, the UNJLC dealt with air asset 
management and logistics coordination.  
 
7.2.2   Gujarat Earthquake 
While the humanitarian community in Mozambique praised the UNJLC operations, the 
next UNJLC deployment during the Bhuj earthquake, India, was not successful. Initially 
WFP management was convinced that the Indian Army was capable of managing the 
response including any logistics coordination issues. As a result, the decision to deploy the 
UNJLC concept was taken only after the arrival of a WFP Emergency Response Team on 
the ground. In addition, the UNJLC was activated without sufficient Inter-Agency and 
governmental consultation. Few people among the UN Agencies, NGOs or local 
authorities were aware of the UNJLC concept. UNJLC arrived at the disaster site two 
weeks after the earthquake without knowing what type of assistance was required. 
Moreover, upon arrival it had no office, communications or information management 
facilities and was severely limited in terms of the services it could provide.  
In the meantime the IFRC had set up a coordination structure and had established a 
relationship with different authorities. In this disaster the Indian government was 
particularly keen to manage the rescue and relief operations itself. This is a common 
scenario for natural disasters since sovereign governments are there to manage their own 
disasters. The Indian government actually outsourced logistics to a capable national NGO 
and as a result viewed the UN involvement in logistics as redundant. As the UNJLC was 
deployed too late to meet its objective, it left the disaster scene less than four weeks after 
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its arrival with two major lessons learnt: timely activation process and sufficient means 
once activated were crucial. 
 
7.2.3   Afghanistan Crisis 
For the Afghan crisis, the UNJLC was originally deployed for a six-month period. At the 
end of the period, it was extended for another year. Section 7.2.3.1 covers the first period 
while section 7.2.3.2 the second and final one. 
 
7.2.3.1    Phase I: First Six Months 
Activation, Structure and Mandate 
Prior to the attack of Coalition forces, seven million Afghans depended on international 
aid. Given the region and the complexity of the situation, the post-conflict relief effort was 
expected to be large. It was also expected to be hindered by significant logistical 
bottlenecks, given the limited infrastructure in the region. As such, the relief effort would 
require intensified logistics coordination.  
A fortnight after the September 11 events and in view of the emerging Afghan crisis after a 
consultation process among humanitarian organizations, the UNJLC was deployed to 
coordinate the UN’s humanitarian effort to the Afghan crisis. Without flyaway kits, tools 
and trained staff, the UNJLC set out to do the job.  
The UNJLC operations started out of WFP headquarters in Rome. As all international staff 
had been evacuated from Afghanistan because of the hostilities in early October 2001, a 
UNJLC was established in Islamabad, Pakistan. The UNJLC in Rome coordinated 
strategic14 logistics planning issues, while the UNJLC in Islamabad concentrated on the 
regional15 logistics issues. Given the long-term presence of UN Agencies in the region 
over the years, it was decided that the UNJLC would be in charge of logistics coordination 
and not actual management of logistics assets, such as warehousing, trucks or aircraft.  
                                                 
14
  Movement of supplies from world-donors into the crisis region or humanitarian warehouses. 
15
  Movement of goods from the crisis region into Afghan region. 
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The Islamabad office had to be expanded very quickly since it had to deal with more issues 
than simple airlifts. However, it took one month to staff it. The problem was that the 
UNJLC is not an organization and consequently it did not have its own budget and 
administration. In addition, when the operations began, the UNJLC was not even 
recognized as a formal humanitarian response mechanism. This recognition came only 
towards the end of March 2002. To jump-start operations, the UNJLC relied on WFP’s 
administrative support and fundraising mechanisms. To secure office space in Islamabad, 
it piggybacked on the facilities of the Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC) set up by 
OCHA. Lack of harmonized and emergency administrative procedures among the involved 
UN Agencies was another source of delay.  
To man the office, the UNJLC leveraged WFP’s stand-by arrangements with seven 
partners including the Swiss Government, Canadem, and DFID for possible secondments. 
This created some confusion among the humanitarian organizations as they believed that 
the UNJLC was a WFP facility. UNJLC had to reinforce the message that the facility was 
not a WFP initiative and that it depended on the goodwill of all humanitarian UN Agencies 
as well as NGOs for UNJLC staffing. 
Although the participating UN Agencies recognized the complexity of the emergency and 
the need for a coordinating platform, most UN organizations in Afghanistan were not 
aware of the UNJLC concept and had to be convinced of its utility. Logisticians across 
organizations understood the power of the concept but field staff with no incentive to 
cooperate were far from enthusiastic. 
Compared to the previous UNJLC deployments in which agencies were asked to volunteer 
staff time to the facility, in the Afghanistan crisis, the UNJLC established dedicated funds 
to cover the costs of full-time secondments. As they are limitations to the volunteering 
approach, to be a convincing Inter-Agency facility UNJLC needed to attract qualified 
logisticians from the different agencies. However the initiative was doomed as long as it 
results in the detrimental reduction of an agency’s logistics capabilities and capacity. For 
the first time during the Afghan crisis the facility actually financed secondments, hence 
augmenting the overall humanitarian logistics capability. At the height of operations, the 
UNJLC offices had attracted 30 seconded staff from WFP, UNICEF, WHO, UNHCR, 
IOM and OCHA. This was the best achievement of the facility till then.  
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As it had no cargo of its own to move, the UNJLC established a neutral, regular forum to 
discuss logistics issues, task scarce resources, and set priorities. It was only after the 
UNJLC had proved its capability to formulate logistics procedures and provide logistics 
information, support, and expertise that it gained the respect and credibility of field 
operators as a useful, honest and neutral broker. Despite the slow ramp-up, it introduced 
robust systems to support the coordination activities and operations of humanitarian 
organizations. It quickly proved to be in a position to fill in the gaps, and to facilitate, as 
well as enhance and increase humanitarian outreach.  
Coordination of strategic and regional airlifts was the primary mandate of the UNJLC. It 
compiled an inventory of available assets (military aircraft and planes chartered by UN 
Agencies or provided by donors), capacity and agency requirements. Taking into account 
humanitarian priorities, it assigned assets to agencies or advised on pooling of assets for 
long-range strategic and regional airlifts within the Afghan theatre. The purpose of the 
UNJLC was not to interfere with an organization’s well-established chartering 
arrangements. While respecting an individual agency’s logistics systems, it sought to 
coordinate efforts for greater synergies and efficiency. It was common practice for 
agencies to charter airplanes separately without coordinating with each other. The UNJLC 
aimed to ensure that excess aircraft capacity was efficiently used. For example, an agency 
could not justify chartering an entire aircraft for a small load. UNJLC’s objective was to 
match eventual overcapacity with outstanding transport requests. To perform satisfactorily, 
it required timely and accurate information, and inputs from each agency in terms of their 
assets, requirements and activities. As a result, it became the repository of information 
regarding agency strategic airlifts into the region. 
UNJLC Islamabad managed a number of satellite UNJLCs set up in the region. The 
UNJLC offices served as logistics information collection nodes as well as coordinating 
bodies for local, joint logistics activities. The day-to-day task of these satellite offices was 
to identify bottlenecks affecting the humanitarian effort as a whole and to assist the 
collective response to the impediments. By the end of November, UNJLC offices were 
operating out of Italy (Rome), Pakistan (Islamabad, Quetta and Peshawar), the US (Tampa, 
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the Coalition headquarters), Iran (Mashad), Tajikistan (Dushanbe), Uzbekistan (Tashkent 
and Termez) as well as Afghanistan.  
In the remaining part of this section, we will illustrate the range of services provided by 
UNJLC and the context in which they were delivered. 
Corridor Logistics and Operational Bottlenecks 
International staff were evacuated from Afghanistan soon after the events of September 11. 
It was not before 14 November, after the fall of Mazar-e-Sherif, the first city attacked by 
the US-led Coalition, that UN personnel returned to Afghanistan on day trips. Staff 
evacuation, coupled with the geographical constraints of a landlocked country like 
Afghanistan, made humanitarian cargo dependent on the bordering countries’ transport 
corridors. The initial set of logistical bottlenecks facing the humanitarian community was 
thus related to these overland corridors and border crossing points into Afghanistan. The 
main operational constraint was security as there were daily bombing raids by the US-led 
Coalition and continued hostilities between the different factions of the Northern Alliance 
and the Taliban. 
A lot of food was trucked into the country by WFP before the beginning of the hostilities. 
Throughout the bombing campaign, to reach both Northern Alliance and Taliban-
controlled cities, WFP trucked in relief items using locally-hired trucks. As a result WFP 
had a good knowledge of existing routes as well as the logistics situation and constraints in 
the region. Its network of local staff and transport operators provided an excellent source 
of up-to-date information, which assisted the UNJLC in identifying principal bottlenecks 
and analyzing available logistics capacity. Apart from analyzing corridor capacities and 
concentrating on border crossing points, the UNJLC ensured that agencies would not build 
up too much stock on any one corridor. At one instant, agencies were unknowingly 
purchasing tarpaulin and tents in Pakistan. UNJLC was able to encourage them to put more 
stocks in Iran. 
Access to the country was interrupted several times due to the closure of the southern 
corridor through Quetta, Pakistan, making the two main northern corridors of 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan crucial. The Turkmenabad corridor in Turkmenistan, which 
had been so important during the last decade’s droughts and war, consisted of a desert 
road. Just 30km before Afghanistan, the tarmac ended and this road became dirt, making 
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this vital corridor also the most expensive way to truck relief into the country, in light of its 
vulnerability to weather conditions. With the first rainfalls it became unviable. The second 
corridor was the Termez corridor in Uzbekistan. This represented a viable alternative to the 
Turkmenabad corridor as it had a river port, rail connections and a bridge over the river. In 
addition, the roads on both sides of the border (connected by the Amu Darhya bridge) were 
asphalted and in good condition. However, after Mazar-e-Sherif and Hairaton were 
captured by the Taliban in 1998, this corridor was closed down by the Uzbek government.  
Without clear signals from the Uzbek government about when it would open the river 
border, humanitarian organizations worked on their contingency plans for eventual 
northern access via Termez. UNHCR and UNICEF stockpiled food and non-food items in 
their existing warehouses and increased local staff in Termez and Tashkent, while WHO 
and UNFPA prepared for small interventions.  
Initially UNJLC only had one office in Uzbekistan. The Tashkent office had a lobbying, 
representation and project management function. Almost overnight the Uzbek authorities 
found themselves in the midst of intense military activity and were flooded by 
humanitarian organizations, cargo and journalists. A UNJLC in Termez was needed to 
provide an interface between local authorities and humanitarian effort on logistics-related 
issues at key border crossing points. 
In late October, the Uzbek President gave assurances that his country would fully support 
the humanitarian aid effort for Afghanistan and that the UN could make full use of the 
airport and river port facilities in Termez to store aid cargo and transfer goods into 
northern Afghanistan. The UNJLC negotiated an agreement with the Uzbek Border and 
Port Authorities about transporting humanitarian cargo by barge to Afghanistan. It was 
agreed that only humanitarian cargo clearly marked as such and authorized by the UNJLC 
was to travel on the barges. In addition, UN staff had to receive the cargo on the Afghan 
side and had to be responsible for its transportation and distribution to the beneficiaries.  
After the fall of Mazar-e-Sherif on 9 November, the Termez river crossing was opened by 
barge. On 14 November the first UN cargo carrying UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP relief 
items and international staff crossed the Amu Darhya River. UNJLC, in agreement with 
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the UN Agencies, established and executed a system for the prioritizing and scheduling 
barge cargo. 
After restoring barge transportation, the UNJLC concentrated its efforts on the bridge 
crossing. It was important to increase the overall capacity of the Termez crossing point, 
especially after the fall of Mazar-e-Sherif. The Uzbek and Afghan authorities officially 
opened the ‘Friendship Bridge’ between the two countries on 9 December 2001. Two days 
later, international staff moved back into Afghanistan and set up base in Mazar-e-Sherif. 
Rail traffic transporting relief goods resumed soon after. In collaboration with OCHA, an 
agreement was prepared with the Uzbek government stipulating the modalities of 
humanitarian cargo in transit to Afghanistan and the responsibilities of both signatories: 
the Uzbek government and the UN. To facilitate the flow of relief items, the UNJLC 
finalized clearance procedures with the Uzbek customs authority for shipments transiting 
Termez. 
The Uzbek authorities did not know the Oxfams and CAREs of this world. Once the bridge 
opened, UNJLC helped screen and certify NGOs. It ensured that well-known NGOs got 
the same treatment and benefits as UN Agencies. As a result, UNJLC became the 
government’s focal point for the transportation of humanitarian cargo into Afghanistan. At 
the end of the day everyone was happy with UNJLC intervention. Journalists based in 
Termez had their story. The Uzbek government was seen as cooperating with the UN. The 
NGOs managed to get their cargo into the country and across into Afghanistan. The UN 
was pleased with its coordination efforts and results. 
Once surface transport resumed between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, load capacity 
became higher than humanitarian requirements. The logistics bottleneck had disappeared 
and with it the need for intensified coordination. After the establishment of an efficient 
local Inter-Agency logistics coordination structure, the UNJLC had completed its mission 
in Termez and the satellite office was closed. 
De-conflicting with the Military 
Contrary to natural disaster-related emergencies, it was vital in the Afghan crisis that the 
humanitarian community have no visible contact and would not be confused with the 
combatant military force, the US-led Coalition. While the UN had a policy for dealing with 
military forces in the event of natural disasters, at the time of the Afghanistan emergency, 
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it was still elaborating a specific policy for complex conflict environments. UNJLC 
contributed to the process by working closely with the concerned UN offices. It assisted in 
the development of workable policies during the response phase for logistics-related 
activities. On 20 November, UN headquarters approved the guidelines on the use of 
Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA)16 for humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan and 
conferred the coordination and ‘deconflicting’ role to the UNJLC.17 One of the main 
challenges for humanitarian operations in a military environment is to ‘deconflict’ the 
activities of the humanitarians and military, who are both trying to make use of limited 
infrastructure, such as airfields, warehouses and transport corridors. 
In December 2001, the ISAF, a UN Security Council-mandated multinational 
peacekeeping force, was deployed in Kabul with a mission to establish a secure base for 
the Afghan transitional government. As a result, the UNJLC’s coordinating role between 
the humanitarian community and the military forces operating in the country (e.g. the 
Coalition and CJCMOTF) expanded to include this peacekeeping force. As a result, the 
UNJLC became the focal point for two very different, distinct military entities: the 
Coalition and the ISAF. Coordination with the Coalition force, the combatant force in 
control of common services, assets and transportation infrastructure such as airports, 
offloading cargo equipment and airport warehouses in Afghanistan, was an operational 
necessity given the need to deconflict asset use. The relationship with the ISAF, a 
peacekeeping mission relegated only to Kabul and its districts, was different from the 
Coalition given the fact that they were a UN force. 
As a result of the hostilities, the Afghan airspace was closed to humanitarian air operations 
and was under the de facto control of the Coalition. In December 2001, through intense 
negotiations with the Coalition forces, the UNJLC opened up the Afghanistan airspace for 
                                                 
16
   The UN has two separate sets of policies to guide its cooperation with the military, that is, the use of 
Military and Civil Defense Assets (MCDAs) for strategic and in-theatre airlift, Air Traffic Control, aircraft 
handling equipment, etc. The first set of policies regulates the use of MCDAs in conflict situations. These 
policies aim to protect the humanitarian “space”. The second set of policies regulates the use of MCDAs 
during natural disasters as the use of national and international military assets in natural disasters is 
necessary, far less controversial and often welcomed. As for peacekeeping environments, the UN Security 
Council is the authority that mandates a multinational peacekeeping force. As such, procedures are in place 
to regulate the interface with humanitarian operations. 
17
  The use of MCDA was envisaged for strategic airlift, in-theatre airlift, Air Traffic Control (ATC), tunnel, 
road, bridge, and airfield repair, road monitoring, aircraft handling equipment, and snow removal equipment 
and operations. 
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humanitarian air operations and assisted in the coordination of air cargo movements. Soon 
after, it addressed the problem of limited landing spots for humanitarian cargo with the 
Coalition at the Kabul airport. To establish an understanding and facilitate dialogue 
between the Coalition and humanitarian agencies, it organized a special briefing session 
for the Coalition civil affairs personnel to explain how humanitarian organizations operate 
and are organized. The UNJLC satellite offices carried out liaison duties on logistics issues 
with the Coalition’s civil affairs offices in the provinces, the Coalition Humanitarian 
Liaison Centers (CHLC). With a view to bridging the gap between the humanitarian 
community and the Coalition on operational issues, the UNJLC maintained a liaison 
presence with the Coalition in Tampa, Florida. 
To ensure distinction between military and humanitarian action as well as for security 
purposes, UNJLC agreed that aircraft carrying humanitarian cargo should be painted 
white. The food airdrop campaign carried out by US Air Force in ‘visible’ regions of 
Afghanistan was not coordinated with humanitarian organizations. Through its liaison 
officer in Tampa, the UNJLC managed to phase out the initiative, making the case that 
humanitarian aid was moving in sufficient quantities.   
Upon receipt of a strategic airlift request into the region from Europe, UNJLC would 
inform and coordinate with the Coalition headquarters in Tampa. Concerned with the 
establishment of safe and efficient operations within Afghanistan, especially during the 
bombing campaign, the UNJLC deconflicted humanitarian flights into Afghanistan with 
the Coalition. To avoid both accidents and misunderstandings between military and 
humanitarian use, it prepared standard operating procedures for airport staff. Information 
on airfield conditions and air safety issues received from Coalition sources was duly 
shared with the humanitarian agencies.  
Following the fall of Kabul in mid November, requests for regional and strategic air 
transport increased exponentially. Between November 2001 and June 2002, the UNJLC 
flew 1,609 metric tonnes (MT) of humanitarian cargo (953 MT of non-food items, 464 MT 
of food items and 192 MT of medical items) into the region for a total of no less than 17 
different agencies and organizations. Military airlifts were also arranged to transport 
communications equipment and vehicles from the WFP-managed UN Humanitarian 
Response Depot in Brindisi, Italy into Dubai, UAE.  
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In coordination with the UNJLC representative in Tampa, UNJLC Rome engaged in the 
difficult and sensitive process of declassifying certain information and data that was useful 
and relevant to humanitarian logistics planners. The unclassified information helped the 
UNJLC and other agencies carry out a range of humanitarian logistics planning activities. 
As early as January 2002, the Coalition and the ISAF were involved in rehabilitating the 
civil infrastructure (repairing roads, runways, bridges, schools, clinics, electricity and 
water systems, etc). As these activities needed to be coordinated with UN Agencies, the 
UNJLC set up procedures and structures to facilitate military-UN-NGO dialogue and 
discussions. 
The UNJLC was concerned with air security even after the end of the hostilities. It was 
informed that Mazar-e-Sherif was going to become an uncontrolled airfield with no 
qualified air traffic control (ATC) staff and virtually no ground handling capability as of 
1 April 2002. The US Air Force unit providing ATC and other services at the Mazar-e-
Sherif airfield had decided to withdraw, taking all its equipment with it. To ensure the 
provision of basic equipment and expertise to allow for the continuation of air operations 
at Mazar-e-Sherif, it approached the ICAO. It was agreed that two US Air Force ATC 
personnel would remain at Mazar-e-Sherif on a temporary basis to assist with the transition 
to host nation responsibility. Still, no air traffic controllers remained behind. Moreover as a 
result of the US withdrawal, the airfield ended up with limited ground handling capability. 
Only cargo that could be unloaded manually could be airlifted into Mazar-e-Sherif. After 
further representations and provision of detailed information by UNJLC Tampa, Canada 
provided a mobile military ATC unit as temporary assistance to the Afghan civil aviation 
authorities. 
Regional Logistics Bottlenecks 
As soon as it was safe to do so and after the fall of each major city, humanitarian 
organizations moved further inland and set up shop. The first UNJLC office in Afghanistan 
was in Mazar-e-Sherif. After the unexpected fall of the capital, UNJLC Kabul was 
established followed by UNJLC Hirat. Thanks to its field presence UNJLC immediately 
started to post basic logistics information, such as local airfield, trucking and warehouse 
capacity on its website, in an effort to help logistics personnel in each agency better plan 
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their operations. On 27 March the last UNJLC office in Afghanistan, UNJLC Kandahar, 
was established. This satellite office assisted the humanitarian organizations and interim 
government and was a go-between for the CHLCs and UN Agencies in transport, logistics 
and rehabilitation-related activities.   
By February 2002 the trucking situation in Hirat had deteriorated. The city’s truck 
companies were unionized and their representative body had a monopoly position in the 
market. To secure access to truck capacity humanitarian agencies had bid up the price of 
transport. A cartel had been formed and prices for the transportation of cargo, which had 
more than tripled over the last six months, had sharply raised operational costs of 
humanitarian organizations. With the help of a transport expert seconded by DFID, the 
UNJLC engaged in a technical study on the Afghan transport sector with particular focus 
on the trucking industry and key inputs, such as fuel. Based on the data resulting from this 
study, UNJLC Hirat arranged a meeting between representatives of different agencies and 
the director of the Department of Transport to discuss the rationalization and reduction of 
transport prices. According to official data, more trucks were available on the Hirat market 
than needed, making increased prices unjustifiable. To resolve the issue, the UNJLC 
presented a transport price proposal intended for use by all agencies. The proposal 
envisaged a price grid similar to what was, at that time, employed in Mazar-e-Sherif and 
the northern region. UNJLC managed to break the cartel and put an end to tariff hikes by 
threatening to bring in a UN trucking fleet and publishing transport rates on its website. 
The transporters agreed to review their rates downwards, aligning them to the pre-conflict 
2001 rates. The intervention saved the humanitarian community millions of dollars. 
The warehouse situation in some Afghan cities was a recurring concern as demand often 
exceeded available storage capacity. For example in April 2002, although most of the 
stored items in Hirat were to be distributed, the UNJLC signaled the need for additional 
storage tents, forewarning agencies planning to stock items in the city of the lack of 
storage capacity. To address this type of bottleneck, the UNJLC undertook a series of 
activities. It often brokered exchange agreements between agencies in need of and those 
with storage facilities. It coordinated sharing of storage space. It also liaised with the 
Coalition and government authorities to speed up the transfer of warehouses to those 
humanitarian organizations in need and committed to their rehabilitation.  
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To coordinate the movement of critical non-food items throughout the region, the UNJLC 
set up a cargo planning and prioritization system. This processed agency cargo requests 
and prepared load plans for the WFP's fleet of regional aircraft. Between November 2001 
and June 2002, the UNJLC tasked and coordinated flights into the Afghan region on behalf 
of 28 entities. A total of 2,772 MT of humanitarian cargo - 2,343 MT non-food items, 143 
MT of food items, and 285 MT of medical items - was transported. 
The UNJLC also provided key logistics support to UNICEF’s Back-To-School Campaign 
delivering and distributing stationary items and books. It met extensively with UNICEF's 
logistics planning team to plan the operation. The campaign heavily relied upon UNJLC 
for the arrangement of airlifts and in-country warehousing. 
As humanitarian agencies re-entered and penetrated Afghanistan, the country’s fragile 
infrastructure of primary and secondary roads emerged as the chief bottleneck. As soon as 
the security situation improved, with a potentially positive impact on food and non-food 
items distribution, humanitarian effort was faced with the arrival of the first snowfalls and 
the deterioration of road conditions. In early February, for example, avalanches on the road 
between Mazar-e-Sherif and Kabul temporarily blocked the corridor between Kabul and 
the northern part of the country. The UNJLC continually posted information on road 
accessibility and snow clearing activities on its website.  
In early March 2002 the UNJLC called a meeting between the representatives of the major 
UN Agencies. The purpose of that meeting was to develop a strategy to implement needed 
road rehabilitation projects without further delay. Road conditions had further deteriorated 
as a result of heavy military, humanitarian and commercial traffic coupled with heavy rains 
and snowfalls. It was agreed that UNJLC would embark on infrastructure survey projects, 
and the findings of these would enable the humanitarian community to approach donors 
for the most urgent repair interventions.  
Between March and April 2002 the UNJLC completed the infrastructure assessment on 
Afghan road conditions and traffic capacity. This survey helped identify, quantify and 
priorities repairs necessary to ensure sustainable traffic of humanitarian cargo. UNJLC 
Hirat, Mazar-e-Sherif and Kabul compiled the logistics inputs of humanitarian agencies 
and created a road repair database. UNJLC Mazar-e-Sherif set up a database to match 
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major infrastructure asset improvement projects in the northern region with donor funding. 
UNJLC Hirat finalized the database by indicating the stage of the projects (planned, 
ongoing and completed) and arranged for its distribution to the involved UN Agencies and 
NGOs. Subsequently the UNJLC organized meetings with donors and military forces 
interested in rehabilitation works (hospitals, schools, roads, etc.) and facilitated interaction 
between agencies and donors. 
Infrastructure and administrative bottlenecks were not the only impediments to 
humanitarian relief efforts. For example, trucking out of Pakistan (Peshawar and Quetta) 
stopped several times due to insecurity and the reluctance of drivers to travel into 
Afghanistan. Security concerns were not only related to military and warlord activities but 
also to the existence of landmines and unexploded ordinance. UNJLC was involved in the 
de-mining operations in the western Region by facilitating the airlift of explosives and 
essential de-mining equipment to Hirat. 
Aware of the UNHCR’s plans to facilitate the spontaneous return of refugees from Iran 
and Pakistan as well as internally displaced people to their places of origin, UNJLC 
recommended and prioritized the rehabilitation of infrastructure facilities that called for 
immediate and rapid interventions. Given the security issues and road blockades, the 
UNJLC was also involved in organizing protected truck convoys for refugee movement.   
On 25 March 2002, just before the end of the UNJLC’s first mandate, a powerful 
earthquake, measuring 6.0 on the Richter scale, hit the northern district of Nahrin in the 
Baghlan Province. UNJLC Mazar-e-Sherif was immediately requested to coordinate 
logistics activities of the Coalition, local authorities, UN Agencies and NGOs. Relief 
operations which started immediately were significantly hampered by mined roads. The 
UNJLC was involved in the response to the second earthquake that hit Nahrin District a 
fortnight later. With an epicentre 150km north of Kabul and a magnitude of 5.8 on the 
Richter scale, the earthquake completely destroyed previously damaged villages and 
infrastructure. 
Information Brokerage Platform 
Throughout the Afghan crisis requests for information and data analysis by the 
humanitarian logistics planners was enormous. One of the UNJLC’s raison d’être was to 
convey appropriate information to support humanitarian logistics planners. As early as 
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October 2001, the UNJLC had developed a website (www.unjlc.org) dedicated to the 
Afghan crisis. It contained information on strategic and regional airlift schedules, 
operational procedures, and capacities as well as indicative costs of air charters, road and 
rail transport from Europe to the region. With time, the website became more and more 
comprehensive. The systematic feedback received from the visitors to the site was one of 
the main elements influencing its development and content. As a consolidated information 
platform, the site ended up forewarning and forearming the humanitarian community with 
invaluable information scattered amongst various agencies as well as UNJLC’s primary 
sources. To ensure wider usage, the website information was conveyed to users without 
connectivity through CD ROMs. 
The UNJLC website provided information on bottlenecks for humanitarian activities. For 
instance, in December, prompted by shortages experienced in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan it 
started to cover information on trucking fuel. The mass purchase of fuel by military 
authorities had restricted its availability to the point that refueling was almost impossible 
in Dushanbe. The UNJLC website included a section dedicated to current and expected 
trucking fuel prices and supply, depot capability, status of pump stations, and any agency 
activity.  
The UNJLC worked on Afghanistan airspace issues of common concern. With the 
withdrawal of the Taliban and the rehabilitation and clearance of the airfields from mines, 
the number of regional airlift destinations within Afghanistan increased.  It posted 
information on the status and usability of these airfields by humanitarian aircraft. It also 
provided information on UNHAS passenger and commercial airline schedules. 
The UNJLC website provided the contact details of the logistics personnel of the various 
agencies and contained information regarding the status of agency as well as donor 
activity. Over time, it became a reliable source of updated information on the Afghan 
economy, exchange rate, fuel prices, size, price and availability of trucks in the region, 
transport rates, price of daily labor, and cargo information (duties, clearing prices, and 
procedures in various neighboring countries). It included corridor infrastructure (airfield, 
road, port, rail, barge, bridge bottlenecks, conditions, and capacity and status) and in-
country information (regional stock position of food and selected non-food items). 
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Regarding warehousing, it compiled and posted a list of warehouse and storage facilities 
(capacity, need for repair) including planned ones per location.  
In partnership with the US government, the UNJLC website carried extensive weather 
forecasts, status reports as well as information on the impact of adverse weather on 
humanitarian activity. In the UNJLC weekly bulletin, agencies were advised on the impact 
of heavy rain, snow, avalanches and drought on the viability of roads, bridges and rivers. 
For example, when in early December 2001, the water level of the Nizhni Pyanj River at 
the Tajikistan border dropped, restricting the use of barges with 90cm draft, the UNJLC 
bulletin raised the issue and recommended the use of barges with a maximum draft of 
50cm. Eventually to improve the river crossing, the German government provided funds 
for the purchase of small self-propelled barges with minimum draft that were capable of 
carrying two trucks. They also funded port facilities upgrades and ferry repair. 
The UNJLC went beyond the simple provision of information. It was often a member of 
assessment teams such as the one dealing with the fuel storage facilities in Hairaton, 
Afghanistan. It supported agency activity by identifying needs and helping to prepare 
funding proposals for donor consideration. Its nodal position allowed it to flag and 
anticipate problems. It often went a step further by proposing solutions or getting directly 
involved in resolving them. It entered into negotiations with local customs, rail and port 
authorities to tackle issues related to customs clearance procedures, visa requirements, and 
transit of humanitarian cargo and personnel from the bordering countries of Pakistan, Iran, 
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan into Afghanistan. The UNJLC was often 
involved in drafting and brokering tariff and fee agreements with port and railway 
authorities as well as transport companies.  
End of Phase I 
In March 2002, UNJLC decided to demobilize its regional satellite offices in Central Asia 
and to reinforce its presence in Afghanistan. The UNJLC concept had just been 
institutionalized by the IASC. The UNJLC free services had been equally appreciated by 
UN Agencies and NGOs, small and large. In addition, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator 
had just requested UNJLC to stay another year to continue addressing the humanitarian 
situation through another winter.  
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The humanitarian community considered the Afghanistan experience a true success as well 
as a quantum leap in logistics information management and coordination. The website in 
particular, started almost haphazardly, had grown organically in the field, unraveling its 
full potential.  
 
7.2.3.2   Phase II: Next 18 months 
By the end of its six-month mandate UNJLC had accomplished its goals. It had supported 
humanitarian logistics planners in their efforts throughout the 2001/2002 Afghan winter 
and addressed cross-border and in-theatre logistics bottlenecks. However, four months 
after the fall of the Taliban regime, the scale of the humanitarian crisis remained 
significant and the need for another year of operations was clear. The UNJLC, which had 
never been deployed for longer than six-months, was asked on an extraordinary basis to 
continue its operations for one more year. The much reduced team (from 27 to 12 staff) 
prepared for the challenges of the forthcoming Afghan winter in what would later be 
known as “Phase II” of the UNJLC Afghanistan operation.  
Continuation of Services 
During the second phase, the UNJLC continued to assist the humanitarian community in 
responding to the Afghanistan emergency.18 Given the importance of regional transit 
points for the flow of goods into Afghanistan, the UNJLC continued to monitor and gauge 
capacity of key logistics nodes in neighboring countries. After the 2001/2002 winter, the 
bottlenecks had shifted. Emphasis was less on the border corridors and much more on the 
internal infrastructure such as secondary roads, mountain passes, interior airfields, etc. and 
UNJLC followed suit.  
To meet continued demand for information by the humanitarian community, the UNJLC 
maintained an updated website on a range of issues including road conditions, assessment 
and repair initiatives, fuel, security, Coalition and ISAF activity, air services, weather 
                                                 
18
  In late March 2002, to assist the Afghan interim government, the UN Security Council established and 
funded the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA) for one year. The UNJLC 
became part of one of UNAMA’s two pillars: the one dealing with humanitarian reconstruction and 
rehabilitation.  
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conditions, and warehousing. It continued to lead infrastructure projects and initiatives and 
remained engaged in situation assessments providing recommendations. UN agencies 
continued to receive logistics services such as cargo handling at various airfields and 
transportation arrangements within the country. For example, UNJLC assisted FAO in the 
transportation arrangements for their forthcoming seed distribution (1,100 MT) program in 
the Western Area.  However, although it never stopped tackling administrative and 
operational hurdles on behalf of the humanitarian community, the distinctive feature of our 
Phase II operation was its increasing involvement in the country’s most strategic 
initiatives. UNJLC got involved in three activities: winterization and two nation building 
initiatives: the Loya Jirga and currency exchange. 
Winterization Activities 
The merciless Afghan winter and the level of complexity of the on-going humanitarian 
relief effort were the reasons for the one-year extension of the UNJLC. Typically, from 
November onwards large parts of the country were cut off from the outside world. To 
avoid a return to full-scale air operations and ensure maximum use of surface 
transportation before the winter season, as early as June 2002 UNJLC focused the attention 
of the humanitarian community on the upcoming winter through a winterization strategy 
workshop.  The aim was to instill a more organized approach than that taken in the winter 
of 2001/2002 after the end of the war for which agencies had had little time to prepare.  
At the Kabul winterization workshop held in mid-July 2002, a common operational 
strategy for the 2002/2003 winter was discussed. The workshop, attended by over 25 
participants from the major UN agencies (WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO, UNAMA etc), 
donors (USAID) and NGOs, helped identify priority needs and key interventions to be 
carried out by the main humanitarian actors. During the two-day workshop UNJLC 
identified those external and internal corridors and routes vital for the humanitarian effort, 
discussed their future use and potential bottlenecks/blockages. It was a difficult exercise as 
almost nobody from the previous winter was still in the country and in many cases there 
had been no overlap between people moving out and coming in. What was worst was the 
fact that since the 2001/2002 winter intervention had been an emergency, there was almost 
no reporting or transfer of experience at the organizational level. With little institutional 
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memory to capitalize on, the participants relied on personal experience to outline their 
strategy. 
To ensure adequate delivery of aid during the winter season, a three-pronged strategy was 
developed involving pre-positioning of aid, ensuring corridor accessibility and developing 
contingency airlift capacity. Pre-positioning of aid – strategic placement of food or non-
food items (NFIs) accessible to recipients for distribution throughout the winter months - 
was the most cost-effective option. This strategy was to be carried out in conjunction with 
minor road interventions to ensure access to pre-positioning sites before the onset of 
winter. For pre-positioning to be effective it was necessary to identify adequate storage 
facilities for the relief items in critical locations. Where pre-positioning was not viable due 
to population movement, road accessibility for aid convoys was to be ensured through 
interventions on critical routes before and during the winter season. Due to inherently high 
costs, airlift operations were to be used only as a life-saving measure in exceptional 
circumstances. In the interest of cost containment a combined strategy encompassing 
elements of the first two strategies was adopted. 
By early October, the UNAMA-led Winterization Operational Task Force composed of 
representatives of the UN agencies and government officials had prepared a National 
Action Plan for the winter. The combined effects of winter - physical isolation, lack of 
access to basic social services, high food insecurity, shelter needs and poverty - were 
expected to affect large segments of the population. As such, the overarching concerns of 
the winter preparedness program addressed by the Plan were: food security, population 
movements, urban preparedness, accessibility and the nomad population.  
The stock planning exercise of the humanitarian agencies had to take into account the 
needs and constraints of the various regions. Pre-positioning was selected for all regions 
except the Central Highlands where data on the projected number and location of 
beneficiaries was unreliable. In addition, physical constraints were also factored in. For 
example, the road network in the North-East of the country was not only complex but also 
extremely difficult to clear and ‘unstable’. The risk of avalanches and snow slides are high 
as most routes run adjacent to mountains. The main issue in Kabul and provinces was 
shelter given the return of over one million returnees. In the Central Highlands people 
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lacked access to basic supplies during the harsh winter months. It was estimated that in 
total about 2.6 million people would be “at risk” due to food and shelter deficits. They fell 
into three broad categories: those in the rural areas cut off due to snow or other seasonal 
physical obstacles (approx. 1.3 million people) and in need of food; returnees and 
internally displaced without means or moving into vulnerable areas (over 270,000 people); 
and specific urban groups who lived outdoors or in dilapidated public buildings (700,000 
people) or with inadequate shelter and in need of food (360,000 people). 
Alongside the humanitarian agencies, UNJLC was involved in the overall planning, pre-
positioning of goods, preparation of winter stocks inventory, and status reports on road 
projects and road conditions. It also fulfilled its information brokerage function by posting 
all winterization information on the UNJLC website.  
To raise awareness of logistics-related winterization issues among the donor community a 
donor conference, attended by more than a dozen organizations, was organized in Kabul in 
early August. To realize the option of pre-positioned food and NFIs UNJLC had to ensure 
timely donor support in terms of funding and provision of commodities. This and similar 
efforts helped in securing donor commitment. However, it still took a long time before the 
first installments for some of the planned activities were received. 
The UNJLC winterization initiative enjoyed the full support of government authorities, 
notably the Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) to which 
President Karzai appointed Minister Haneef Atmar who was to report to him directly on 
the planning and progress of the campaign.  At the provincial level, the UNJLC took the 
time to meet with the local authorities to explain the latest winterization and road 
rehabilitation efforts underway across the country. 
Both the US-led Coalition and the Multinational Force, ISAF, participated in the 
development of collaborative winterization plans with the UN agencies and government 
authorities. They provided practical assistance to complement the UN and government-
planned activities. For example, The Coalition provided weather forecasts and satellite 
imaging of critical areas while the ISAF assisted the UNJLC efforts by providing handling 
services for humanitarian cargo. 
The access component of the winterization action plan included three important elements: 
rehabilitation of key roads, rehabilitation of key airstrips, and road and airstrip snow 
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clearance. To ensure the viability of roads, the UNJLC organized inter-agency missions to 
critical areas to review and confirm road conditions, identify locations for base camps and 
workshops, confirm snow clearing plans, and identify any shortfalls of current plans. 
UNJLC Kabul co-chaired the weekly Road Task Force meetings focused primarily on 
winter road access. The UNJLC satellite offices identified high priority interventions (e.g. 
priority snow clearing stretches) that were of key significance for economic and 
humanitarian reasons.  The satellite offices also acted as focal points for the receipt of 
snow clearing and main base camp operations proposals. To support operations, UNJLC 
Hirat translated Russian military maps of those routes requiring snow clearance while 
UNJLC Kabul developed a detailed Operations Guide for snow clearing activities as well 
as base camp management. At times UNJLC assisted in the purchase of relevant 
equipment (e.g. snow removal) and spare parts, including selection, inspection and 
monitoring activities.  
As early as September 2002 the UNJLC identified airstrips within the Western Area that 
would require snow clearance during the winter period. As for road clearance, it 
catalogued mechanical assets and identified machinery to be utilized for major passes. In 
respect of mechanical operators, it identified their availability within the private and public 
sector and identified gaps to be addressed through training.  A key element was the use of 
a range of humanitarian actors to implement the intervention program. This included 
engaging a significant number of NGOs. In the event of an NGO proposal remaining 
unfunded, the UNJLC together with UNOPS and MRRD collaborated on the snow 
clearance activities.  
UNJLC was forced to review its snow clearance methodology that implied wide usage of 
snow removal equipment as a result of delayed donor funding and inflated NGO proposals. 
In mid-November it was decided to proceed with a community-based cash-for-work 
program involving labor-based contracts (3,000 laborers) and minimal equipment.  Snow 
clearing equipment was to be used only in those areas where passes were not suitable for 
manual labor.  The new methodology expedited the contracting and procurement process. 
Low skilled laborers were provided with basic outfits. Its impact on the local communities 
was two-fold: it provided an infusion of cash to rural areas and maintained access. The 
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program gave the local population that bit of hope necessary to make them stay in their 
villages instead of migrating to the cities. Moreover, by remaining in their villages they 
could properly prepare for the next agricultural season. 
The shift to labor-intensive snow clearing resulted in the immediate participation of local 
authorities (MRRD), hence facilitating the hand-over of subsequent winter preparedness 
activities.  The program resulted in a simple sustainable system easily replicable by the 
authorities in subsequent years. All snow clearance items were to become property of the 
MRRD and contracting local manual labor at two dollars a day was a system that the 
Ministry could replicate after the departure of humanitarian organizations. The UNJLC 
assisted in the formalization of the system using the data from interested NGOs’ and the 
snow clearing teams’ reporting system. A database on the volume of traffic, centimeters of 
snowfall and labor required to be maintained and used in subsequent years was created. 
Thanks to the preparatory work, the operation of the humanitarian community was 
effective and efficient as long lead times and reliance on fragile corridors and mountain 
passes prone to blockage with the first winter snows were systematically avoided. Forward 
planning enabled the humanitarian community to provide assistance to some 3.4 million 
beneficiaries, well beyond the estimated 2.6 million vulnerable people at risk. 
Nation Building Activities 
During the second phase of operations, the UNJLC shifted significantly from its core 
activities. In addition to supporting capacity-building efforts and coordinating the 
country’s road rehabilitation projects it was drawn into two major non-humanitarian 
projects which contributed to nation-building in Afghanistan. UNJLC exposed itself to a 
serious mission creep. Government and institutions had ‘disappeared’ and there was an 
acute need to fill the logistics vacuum. By responding to these gaps, in certain aspects 
UNJLC began to suffer from its success since after a while everything became a logistics 
problem.  
However, UNJLC made deliberate and conscious decisions. Before engaging in any new 
activity it assessed the potential benefits and risks of political and economic failure for 
humanitarian logistics operations.  Concerning activities related to nation-building it was 
felt that a successfully elected and empowered government could lead to a peaceful and 
secure environment for humanitarian operations. Furthermore, the speedy introduction of a 
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new currency was viewed as providing the requisite stable financial environment for cost-
efficient humanitarian logistics operations. Consequently, UNJLC decided to provide 
substantial support to the country’s transition process (Including the disarmament process 
started in July with the collection and storage of weapons by local factions in Mazar-e-
Sherif. and UNAMA’s essential nation-building efforts. 
The Loya Jirga Process. On 5 December 2001 an agreement was reached in Bonn, 
Germany between the US, the UN and the Afghan tribal factions on the political future of 
the nation. The interim government that came into effect on 22 December 2001 had the 
responsibility, within the next six months, to establish an Emergency Loya Jirga, or Grand 
Tribal Council (Figure 7.5). This emergency council, composed of representatives of the 
diverse Afghan ethnic groups, had a mandate to prepare the country for a Constitutional 
Loya Jirga within two years. The UN agencies, under the auspices and leadership of 
UNAMA, were to assist the government in the process.  
 
Figure 7.5 – The Loya Jirga Process 
 
The first step to convening the Emergency Loya Jirga was the selection of some 1,050 
representatives from the country’s 381 districts. The process began with the first series of 
local meetings around the country during which elders and respected members of the 
community selected those who would represent them at the regional level in the next series 
of meetings.  Each district selected at least one member and additional members from the 
larger districts were chosen according to population estimates. A further 450 non-elected 
delegates from a variety of backgrounds were appointed by the Commission responsible 
for the coordination of the Loya Jirga process. 160 seats, i.e., 11% of total seats, were 
allotted to women. In the second step, each of the district councils elected those who 
would participate in the Loya Jirga using a secret ballot. The third and final phase 
consisted of the appointment of the country’s head of state, the key cabinet ministers of the 
transitional government, and members of the Supreme Court by the 1,500 delegates chosen 
by the districts and the Commission. The new government hence elected would serve until 
parliamentary elections in 2004.  
As the Loya Jirga approached and logistics bottlenecks began to emerge, the UNJLC was 
asked by donors to assist. The UNJLC supported the three steps of the Loya Jirga process 
culminating in the main gathering in Kabul in June 2002.  It provided both air and general 
logistics assistance through UNJLC Kabul, it seconded three technical staff to the Loya 
Jirga Aviation Support Operations Centre (ASOC) managed by UNOPS and planned the 
234
CHAPTER 7 - UNJLC  
 
 
234
delivery of hardware such as tents and furniture to the regional election centers. During the 
second phase initiated in mid-May, it loaded and dispatched 500 tents, donated by 
UNICEF, from Kabul to the major towns around Afghanistan.  In addition the UNJLC was 
involved in the selection and security of the election and gathering sites. In Hirat, it helped 
UNAMA in the organization of the election centers (infrastructure and election observers).  
The second round of elections in the regions’ districts involved on-site logistics support 
(e.g. at the Olympic Stadium complex of Mazar-e-Sherif) and the movement of over 3,000 
delegates and successful candidates. One of UNJLC’s main contributions to the process 
was the ferrying of VIPs, key personnel and candidates around the country and to the 
capital Kabul,” confirmed Toyota. It seconded three technical staff to the ASOC to assist 
UNAMA in the planning and movement of observers and Loya Jirga staff/cargo at 
regional and district levels using the six helicopters and four aircraft chartered by 
UNAMA. Upon completion of Step 2 of the elections, 1,153 Loya Jirga candidates were 
flown into Kabul from all over the country for the six-day Loya Jirga Grand Council of 11 
June 2002. In just two days, a total of 55 missions were organized moving candidates from 
Jalalabad, Kandahar, Mazar-e-Sherif, Puli Alam, Bamyan, Hirat, Ghazni and Kunduz to 
Kabul. To enable the movement of candidates from the airport to the Loya Jirga site, 
UNJLC Kabul facilitated the hiring of transportation for UNAMA.  
From the logistics perspective, the last step of the Loya Jirga process began on 18 June 
with the announcement of President Hamid Karzai’s full cabinet. Once the elections were 
over UNJLC did everything again in reverse. Between 19 and 20 June, the UNJLC 
organized the return of the 1,500 delegates from Kabul to the provinces, demobilized the 
main Loya Jirga as well as the area offices and ensured the recovery of equipment. In 
preparation for this last stage it reviewed the inventory of equipment distributed and 
defined procedures for the collection procedure. In addition, as per ISAF 
recommendations, it ensured the donation of the Loya Jirga furniture to schools. 
Currency Exchange Exercise. Over the last 30 years the old afghani had lost 99.9% of its 
value. About 60% of the notes circulating in 2002 had been printed in the past six years. 
Some warlords had illicitly printed notes as a mean to finance their operations while others 
had created their own currency. In early 2002, two planeloads of new notes, equal to one 
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thousand old notes were delivered to the Central Afghanistan Bank to replace the multiple 
(3+) currencies in circulation.  
In September 2002 President Karzai announced the introduction of a new Afghan 
currency. The new currency aimed to break away from dollarization and ensure and 
encourage the usage of local currency in domestic transactions. As stated by President 
Karzai, the symbolic and economic value of the redenomination were of great importance 
to the country’s national and political unity.  However, the changeover to the new currency 
had to be implemented within a two month period. 
The government faced a multitude of challenges and operational constraints in the 
currency exchange exercise (Figure 7.6). First and foremost it had to persuade the Afghan 
population to trade 1,000 afghanis for a 1 unit note of an untested, new currency. The 
redenomination exercise involved high collection and distribution costs (approximately 
US$5-6 million). Notes had to be transported by air and road across the country including 
remote, insecure and high altitude areas during autumn and winter when access was made 
difficult by rain and snow. This represented a huge logistical challenge for the authorities 
given the country’s war-shattered infrastructure and limited transportation means.19 The 
verification and destruction of the old money, a necessity to avoid its re-circulation, 
constituted another source of concern.   
The UNJLC was heavily involved in the planning and execution of the currency exchange 
process. It assisted the Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB) with the receipt of related cargo 
(currency and equipment) at various airports. It also seconded UNJLC staff to the Central 
Bank and supplied a Logistics Coordinator to the Currency Exchange Task Force. In Hirat, 
by late October, more than hundred billion old afghanis were destroyed and replaced by 
the new currency. By the end of that month at least one Exchange Point (EP) was 
established in each province. By mid-December the currency exchange operation entered 
its final stage: the new afghan currency was made available from 47 designated EPs and 
500 exchange windows served by a minimum of 12 persons. The EPs were equipped with 
a safe storage area (vault facility), note counting machines, invalidation equipment, tellers, 
                                                 
19
  The Central Bank disposed only of two trucks, frequently out of use. 
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and banknote handling equipment. The operation was completed on schedule on 2 January 
2003 when the old bank notes ceased to be legal tender. 
 
Figure 7.6 – Currency Conversion Program: 7/10/2002 – 2/01/2003:  Facts & Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Samii, R. & L. N. Van Wassenhove 
(2003c), “Logistics Moving the Seeds of a 
Brighter Future (UNJLC’s Second Year in 
Afghanistan)”, INSEAD case study 09/2003-
5135. 
 
 
Although the actual verification task was carried out by some 180 UN/NGOs observer 
volunteers, the UNJLC ended up doing the bulk of the work. It was involved in the whole 
chain from receipt and air transport of the new currency, the deployment of the equipment 
and the initiation of the EPs, air transport of the observers/inspectors, to recording and 
Human, Financial and Operational Resources 
• US$ 26 m budget (US$ 9m in donations) 
• 2,500 Afghan bank personnel involved 
• 500 Afghan security personnel involved 
• 25 international experts involved 
• 180 UN/NGO observers involved 
• 7 DAB Area Coordination Centres 
• 47 Exchange Windows 
• 200 Money traders  
• Assistance provided by UN/UNAMA, World 
Bank, International Monetary Fund, 
Denmark, Germany, Sweden, UK and US 
Implementation 
• 800 million new banknotes (1 new afghani 
corresponded to 1000 old aghanis) of 
different denominations printed by 
companies in Germany and Sweden with 
similar security features as the Euro and 
shipped to Kabul 
• 4,000 MT of old bank notes collected, 
destroyed equal to 18 trillion old afghanis 
(approx. US$ 450m), 98% of circulating 
afghanis 
• 16 billion new afghanis issued (approx. US$ 
750m) 
• Public information and awareness campaign 
Timeframe 
• Three months of active planning and 
preparation 
• 2.5 months of implementation 
• 1.5 months for termination/closure 
Exchange rate (January 2003) 
• 1US$=47 afghanis 
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destruction of the notes. Over and over again it picked up responsibilities that did not ‘fit’ 
neatly into any box. 
Infrastructure Rehabilitation 
The rehabilitation of the road infrastructure provided the necessary growth conditions for 
the agricultural economy and thereby contributed to improving local food security. 
UNJLC’s work on the assessment of the country’s road network to identify priority 
rehabilitation projects began as early as March 2002 and continued through the summer in 
preparation for winter.  To ensure continuity in relief operations, the UNJLC kept a 
vigilant eye on priority routes, vigorously pursued the implementation of key interventions 
and helped coordinate the road rehabilitation process.  At a subsequent stage it coordinated 
the survey and execution of most secondary road works. It also helped set up and chaired 
some of the regional Road Task Forces composed of donors, government authorities 
(MPW, MRRD, Military), and the UN.  
By July 2002, many local and international NGOs had filed their road reconstruction 
proposals with the UNJLC offices. To meet donor requirements, the UNJLC assisted some 
NGOs with the restructuring of their project proposals and performed the critical 
prioritization function. The UNJLC then actively lobbied the donor community to fund 
repair work on critical routes. Its efforts and solicited advice aimed to avoid duplication of 
funding on the same road sectors and to ensure the coverage of important stretches before 
the winter.  
To facilitate the effective implementation of priority road rehabilitation projects, the 
UNJLC entered into a partnership with UNOPS, for example, collaborating to create and 
distribute CD-Roms of the UNOPS ‘Technical Manual for the Rehabilitation of Feeder 
Roads Using Labor-Based Methods’ in English and Dari amongst the humanitarian 
community. 
Capacity Building 
To maximize the sustainability of its interventions, the UNJLC integrated and trained local 
government personnel in its activities. In addition to weaving capacity building aspects 
into its daily operations, the UNJLC conducted and facilitated a number of training 
sessions. From mid-November to mid-December 2002, a series of six three-day River 
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Engineering workshops were conducted for some 150 local engineers from government 
and NGOs in the capital and three other cities. Following the success of these sessions, the 
UNJLC facilitated similar courses in provincial capitals by the workshops’ trained and 
certified engineers to their peers. Under the auspices of the UNJLC, SHA developed the 
River Engineering Manual which was then translated into Dari and Pushtun. 
In response to an increasing number of car accidents and to reinforce safe driving habits, 
the UNJLC coordinated a series of training sessions in Hirat and Kabul for UN drivers. 
This inter-agency effort included security and first-aid components as well as general 
training on driving rules, 4X4 handling, road trip procedures, essential mechanics and 
maintenance.  
The UNJLC also participated in training sessions organized for humanitarian operators on 
issues such as warehousing management and customs procedures. It delivered the module 
on international passenger/vehicle/cargo crossing procedures in the Termez-Hairaton 
Border Crossing Training courses organized by other UN agencies and emphasized the 
importance of better paper workflow on delivery schedules 
The UNJLC Phase Out 
The decision to close down the UNJLC on 31 March 2003 was reaffirmed to the Afghan 
authorities in November 2002. The UNJLC was due to close down at the end of the second 
winter, hence much later than originally envisaged. The proposed date was viewed as 
much too early by the authorities who lobbied actively for its extension. UNJLC primarily 
a response facility was mindful of not remaining activated much beyond the emergency 
phase. 
To ensure continuity in the implementation of residual UNJLC activities, responsibilities 
had to be transferred to a suitable national or international entity. By March 2003 its 
counterpart ministries did not yet have the appropriate structure or staff in place to handle 
the activities. It had been hard for them to identify and attract qualified people to cover key 
positions. To avoid leaving a hole behind it, many activities were transferred to UNAMA 
until final handover could be eventually effected to relevant government entities.  
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7.2.4  Iraq Crisis 
By late 2002, while the political arm of the UN was working to prevent war, the 
humanitarian community was assessing the likely humanitarian consequences of the 
conflict, possible logistics bottlenecks, and its response plan. A draft UN report entitled 
Likely Humanitarian Scenarios, dated 10 December 2002 on the potential effect of a war 
against Iraq and its aftermath estimated, amongst other things, that as many as 500,000 
Iraqis could require medical treatment as a result of fighting and problems in the aftermath 
of war; that crude oil production could be halted; that a million refugees or internally 
displaced persons could be created, and that some three million Iraqis could face hunger. 
In preparation for the Iraq emergency, a UNJLC planning officer traveled to countries 
potentially involved and affected by the crisis to sensitize and brief UN agency country 
teams on the UNJLC.  
At the time the best indicator of the possible consequences of the conflict was Iraq’s 1990-
1991 invasion of Kuwait. That conflict had resulted in the torching of 700 of the emirate’s 
oil wells by retreating Iraqi forces and the sabotage of the country’s refineries and power 
stations. It took nine months to entirely extinguish the oilfield conflagration with the help 
of seawater from the Arabian Gulf; more significantly, it took several years to rehabilitate 
the refineries to a stage where they could respond to Kuwait’s own domestic needs. 
It was therefore reasonable to assume that, in the event of Coalition forces prevailing over 
the Iraqi military, the regime would be prepared to sabotage its own oil infrastructure – 
partly as a defensive measure against Coalition military operations and partly to 
complicate the post-war task of the victors. Compared to Kuwait, Iraq’s oilfield 
infrastructure extended over a much larger area and was concentrated at opposite ends of 
the country. It was also isolated from the vast supplies of water needed to fight oilfield 
fires, opening the way to more effective and wide-spread sabotage. To respond to this 
threat, much of the Coalition’s military planning focused on securing the oilfields and 
responding quickly to oilfield fires.  
Even in a less extreme scenario, it was well known that Iraq’s refineries – as with most of 
its infrastructure – had suffered greatly from years of sanctions, lack of investment and 
spare parts, even before 1990. Indeed, two of its three major refineries were old and 
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dilapidated; the third more modern refinery, north of Baghdad, had suffered from lack of 
spare parts and proper maintenance. While the UN’s Oil-For-Food Program20 had helped 
alleviate the situation, the persisting technical problems were expected to be compounded 
by the effects of the conflict. 
It was logical for the humanitarian planners to assume that indigenous Iraqi fuel would not 
be available for their operations or to the population. Furthermore, reliance on Coalition 
forces for fuel supplies was doubtful, even undesirable, if only to maintain humanitarian 
distance from the combatants. It was clear that the humanitarian community had to arrange 
its own fuel from outside Iraq if it were to sustain the logistics of its post-conflict 
operations inside Iraq.  
With conflict between the US-led Coalition and Iraq looming in early 2003, the UNJLC 
started to prepare for the emergency. While it conducted its normal activities, for the first 
time it activated a specialized team within its Iraq operation to address the serious logistics 
problem of fuels. Fuels had historically been an ‘orphan’ issue: it affected everyone but no 
one was directly responsible for it. Individual actors could always make their own 
arrangements but a combined approach, cutting across all agencies, ensured economies of 
scale, consistency of supply, and logistical flexibility. Therefore, UNJLC started planning 
for any interruption in Iraq’s domestic supply chain – from the production of crude oil, 
transportation by pipeline to refineries and the operations of the refineries themselves, to 
storage capacity and local distribution – that could jeopardize the UN’s operations in Iraq. 
One of the first tasks facing the UNJLC was the engagement of the fuel team members. 
UNJLC made a conscious decision to recruit experts from the industry. Thereafter, it was 
to leverage the UN Oil-For-Food Program. UNJLC expected delivery schedules under the 
Oil-For-Food Program to be disrupted by the conflict. Given the importance of items 
purchased under this program for Iraq’s post-conflict recovery, it wanted to avert the risk 
of delayed delivery of vital items available and already paid for by Iraqi oil exports 
                                                 
20
  In the context of economic sanctions, the Oil-For-Food Programme was the program administered by the 
UN’s Office of the Iraq Programme (OIP) under which Iraqi oil exports revenues were used to purchase 
foodstuffs and medicines for the population, as well as spare parts and services to help maintain the 
country’s oil sector, water and sanitation infrastructure, and electricity network. 
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Through a staff co-located in the New York-based UN Office of the Iraq Program (OIP)21 
which was responsible for the administration of the Oil-For-Food Program it aimed to 
ensure timely delivery.  
The Fuel Team’s initial task was to formalize the concept of joint fuel supplies with the 
agencies. In order to achieve economies of scale and negotiating power in purchasing, 
transport, storage and distribution, it was important to highlight the merits of common 
sourcing. UNJLC had to convey this message to the agencies, get their support, and then 
identify an implementing partner. The requirements of the humanitarian community also 
had to be established. To do that, UNJLC sat down with each agency to determine what 
type of and how many vehicles they planned to use, and for how long. Then it was 
important to establish the type of fuels required to power office, accommodation and 
communications generators. After establishing where and when they needed each fuel type 
and in what quantities, it had to identify potential sources of fuel. This interaction had an 
unexpected benefit: agencies realized the importance of fuels to their operations and were 
alerted to the possibility of not being able to call on indigenous fuel supplies. 
It soon became clear that Iraq’s main oil-producing neighbors, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, 
could not be assumed to meet the country’s supply requirements. Export of refined 
products is generally established through long-term contracts; the vast needs of the 
Coalition had already put unprecedented pressure on these supplies. Kuwait, the closest 
source, still recovering from a 2000 refinery accident, was importing fuels for its own use. 
Jordan, another neighboring country, depended on crude oil feedstock supplies from Iraq 
for the running of its refineries. Other nearby sources of supply – Syria, Turkey, Bahrain, 
and the UAE – each had their own drawbacks.  Eventually, under the initial scenario of the 
UN importing its own fuel for humanitarian operations, given UNJLC’s non-status as an 
agency, it was envisaged that the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) would be the 
fuel purchasing and supply agent for the community. 
                                                 
21
  OIP was responsible for many aspects of the UN’s engagement with Iraq, including compensation and 
reparations for those affected by Iraq’s 1990-91 invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The Oil-for-Food 
Programme (referred to in Iraq as the “Memorandum of Understanding”) was a major part of OIP’s 
activities. 
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Within days of conflict erupting in March 2003, it became clear that the much-feared 
oilfield conflagration would not occur. Less than 10 wellheads in the south were set alight, 
but they were quickly extinguished by Kuwaiti oil firefighters and international 
contractors. The crude production, which had been interrupted during the conflict, resumed 
together with the refineries, with the exclusion of several gas plants. 
When the humanitarian community returned to Iraq in early May, it did not find a dearth of 
fuel but a surplus, particularly of diesel as the Iraqi regime had stockpiled vast quantities in 
anticipation of an extended conflict. The first impression was that while UNJLC had 
helped agencies consider fuels as a vital part of their logistical requirements, the need to 
implement the contingency planning was less pressing. At that time few could fully 
appreciate the critical contribution that the Oil-For-Food contracts22 on restoring Iraq’s oil 
refining capacity and its fuel distribution ability in the post-conflict period. 
One of the first things UNJLC noticed visiting downstream installations in the south was 
that the technology utilized in the refining process was obsolete, a generation or more 
behind that of the industry. Productivity was low also because of the impact of sanctions 
on maintenance.  In many ways, it was a miracle that some of the plants were still 
operational. 
The supply of LPG, the main fuel used for cooking, was most indicative of the 
shortcomings of the industry. Limited storage capacity in terms of the special pressurized 
tanks required to hold large quantities had prevented significant stockpiling. Sanctions, 
lack of maintenance, and substantial looting in the immediate aftermath of the conflict had 
put the South Gas Plant, the country’s largest source of LPG production, out of action.  
Restoring Iraqi Oil Production Capacity 
To restore Iraqi oil production to pre-war levels, the US Army Corps of Engineers 
deployed Task Force Restore Iraqi Oil (RIO). Given their limited direct expertise in the oil 
and fuels domain, they engaged major international oilfield contractors. UNJLC’s informal 
collaboration with RIO in terms of exchange of information and data analysis started early 
on and it was to assist it in better achieving respective mandates.  
                                                 
22
  Items included huge back-up generators for refineries; consulting services for refinery rehabilitation; LPG 
bottles for domestic use, whereby an increased number of gas bottles in circulation would be able to replace 
the old or damaged stock and increase the efficiency of distribution; and additives for increasing the octane 
rating of the leaded gasoline used in Iraq. Oil-For-Food contracts destined for the oil sector, numbering in 
excess of 1,000, constituted perhaps the largest part of the program in financial terms. 
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Inspection of facilities at the Basra refinery had highlighted the dire need for specific 
equipment, supplies and spare parts. With little knowledge of the contracts already 
concluded under the Oil-For-Food Program, RIO was considering their purchase. This is 
where UNJLC could add value. Working closely with the Iraqi Ministry of Oil and the 
UNJLC satellite office in New York, UNJLC scoured lists of Oil-For-Food contracts23 for 
items that could be of use to the refineries. Then it prioritized needs and worked towards 
expediting their delivery into Iraq. 
By mid-May, six shipments ready to move into Iraq had been identified. This was a crucial 
test for UNJLC. The successful delivery of these items legitimized the facility within the 
UN as a structure capable of expediting other contracts in the pipeline.  
The first shipment arrived in Jordan in June. With the assistance of UNJLC field offices in 
Amman and Baghdad, military escorts were arranged to ensure the safe delivery of the 
products to Baghdad’s Daura refinery. Upon consignment of the supply, UNJLC realized 
its job was far from completed. With the disruption to the national power grid, the refinery 
remained underperforming. UNJLC New York was once again instrumental in spotting a 
large generator, held by UNDP in Jordan under another Oil-For-Food contract, and 
facilitating its delivery to Daura. Only then, the refinery was able to produce much-needed 
fuels, relieving the humanitarian situation and reducing the need for expensive fuel 
imports. 
RIO was quick to recognize the value of the link between UNJLC’s ability in locating 
items in the Oil-For-Food contracts and industry needs. To further expedite the process and 
help prioritize needs, RIO offered its support and assistance to the UN Humanitarian 
Coordinator.  
                                                 
23
  The administration of the Oil-For-Food Programme in the aftermath of the conflict was quite complex. 
Before the conflict, the contracts were generally dealt with by the respective Iraqi ministries as part of the 
Iraq government. After the conflict, there was no Iraqi government, and, in effect, no counterparties for the 
suppliers to deal with. As such, various UN agencies ‘adopted’ contracts in their areas of responsibility, 
dealt with the suppliers to move the subjects of the contracts into Iraq in the delayed circumstances, and 
ensured that the suppliers were paid. For example, the World Health Organization ‘adopted’ contracts in the 
health sector; the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), already active with power projects in 
the north of Iraq, took responsibility for contracts affecting the power generation and distribution sector, and 
so on. In the case of the oil sector, there was no obvious UN agency with a clear responsibility in that area. 
Contracts in this sector and several other similarly affected areas became known as ‘orphan’ contracts, as no 
agency had ‘adopted’ them. Oil sector contracts accounted for a very substantial part of outstanding 
contracts. 
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The relationship between RIO and UNJLC was that of an odd couple. On the one hand 
there was RIO, the huge and well-financed arm of the Coalition with personnel the length 
and breadth of Iraq, the support of some of the world’s biggest and best oilfield 
contractors, access to vast amounts of information, and almost complete control over the 
Iraqi oil industry, tasked with restoring crude output of one of the world’s largest oil 
producers to pre-war levels. On the other hand, there was UNJLC, a small, specialist unit 
of the United Nations with a handful of analytical staff trying to make sense and act upon 
information on hand. 
Early Warning 
It was during a meeting in the last week of May 2003 with a RIO senior civilian on the 
details of the Oil-For-Food Program that UNJLC raised the issue of the availability of 
kerosene for heating. In the 50°C heat of summer, no one had given much thought to the 
issue of winterization as summer kerosene consumption being one-ninth of that of the 
winter had not created any pressure on supply.  Alerted to the problem, RIO enjoyed a lead 
time that allowed it to build stockpiles from domestic sources as well as arrange for its 
import in vast quantities. 
UNJLC drew his conclusions after studying the crude oil production and refinery figures 
provided by RIO. LPG supplies would be insufficient for the population. Only imports 
could meet humanitarian needs for cooking fuel, and RIO was the only possible 
implementing organization.  
UNJLC advice was also prompt in the case of diesel supplies. Looking at RIO reports in 
late June and early July, UNJLC noticed no mention of diesel among the refinery 
production data. While the populace was drawing diesel from the pre-war stockpiles it was 
unclear whether production matched consumption, or whether diesel production would 
recover before the depletion of the stockpiles. RIO was alerted and the issue was raised 
with Iraq’s State Oil Marketing Organization in Baghdad. Shortly after, RIO started 
tracking the availability of diesel. By doing so, it became clear that local supply could not 
match demand. With no choice but to import, necessary arrangements were put in place.  
Building and Leveraging Relationships 
Upon entry into Iraq in May 2003, UNJLC had established satellite offices in Baghdad, 
Basra, Hilla and later Erbil. This field presence eased the collection of information from 
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various sources and facilitated interaction with relevant Iraqi institutions including the 
Ministry of Oil in Baghdad, its major operating companies and the Southern Oil Company. 
Relationships with the local authorities in Basra were seldom easy. There were occasions 
during UNJLC’s weekly refinery meeting with relevant parties where the Director General 
of the Southern Oil Company would publicly criticize the UN for not doing enough to help 
the Iraqi people. The perception that the UN had unlimited resources and could solve all 
the problems shrouded efforts, including the implementation of Oil-For-Food contracts. 
During informal evening meetings UNJLC would try to iron out the differences and get a 
better insight of the ever-dynamic situation. The UNJLC – a flexible and small setup – was 
in the position to do that. 
An Iraqi staff member on the UNJLC team was another asset. By knowing the culture and 
his way around the city and the industry, he would go with his colleagues and speak to the 
relevant parties in their own language, in their own way, and achieve results beyond the 
reach of a non-Iraqi. 
With an increase in economic activity and the deterioration of the security situation, long 
queues started to appear at petrol stations all over the country. Some agencies had arranged 
to refuel at special pumps reserved for government vehicles. Concerns for security rose 
when one UN vehicle was shot at on a petrol station forecourt, presumably by a 
disgruntled member of the public who assumed that it was queue-jumping. Frustrated and 
infuriated members of the public, anxious about jobs and security and agitated in the 
summer heat, became an additional source of security concerns. The Iraqi UNJLC staff 
member thanks to his relationship with the Ministry and its operating entities was able to 
arrange a discreet solution: refuel for UN vehicles at Ministry fuel stations, behind walls or 
near the refinery. In another occasion, UNJLC was instrumental in securing an 
independent fuel supply for UN premises, ensuring continuity in the UN’s operations in 
the Basra region.  
The team’s earlier work on fuel contingency plans for UN agencies proved valuable not at 
the point of initial entry into Iraq as expected, but later. Limited domestic supplies, 
unforeseen surges in public demand, and a deteriorating security situation had 
demonstrated the importance of independent fuel supplies for the UN. 
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Information 
Once again, UNJLC was an unparalleled source of logistics-related information for an 
audience that encompassed the humanitarian community, donors, and the population. One 
of its outputs was a weekly bulletin on the country’s fuel situation. As its output was 
accessible to the public, it had to be cautious not to divulge information that could be 
utilized by saboteurs. 
As it was inappropriate to repeat the Ministry’s or RIO’s information verbatim, UNJLC 
established its own unique and eclectic range of information resources for its fuel bulletins. 
These included observations on the streets of Baghdad, Basra and Erbil. At the micro level 
it spoke to Iraqi housewives lining up for LPG cylinders, gauged how long people waited 
to refuel their cars, and tracked black market prices. At the macro level it tracked national 
production and imports, all to verify how supply matched, or was expected to meet, 
demand. It added value by providing analysis, not just information. 
The analytical work of the Fuel Team helped to reinforce the assumption that kerosene 
production in the summer would be insufficient to build the necessary stockpiles and that 
imports would be necessary for the winter. It also demonstrated that LPG supply would be 
a major issue, as later proved by the Basra riots in August 2003. By analyzing the 
information on hand, UNJLC also concluded that there was probably a lot more smuggling 
of oil products out of Iraq than had generally been assumed and was able to confirm this 
with on-the-ground visits to smuggling ports in the south. 
Perhaps the importance of information in mobilizing solutions was demonstrated most 
clearly when the New York Times, Washington Post and several influential British 
newspapers picked up on issues raised in UNJLC fuel bulletins at a time when the US 
Congress was considering an appropriations bill for Iraq.  
The fuel bulletins filled an information vacuum at a time when good information was 
scarce, and people listened. With the freedom to act, think and be flexible, UNJLC was 
able to add enormous value. UNJLC did not have the resources to do things itself, but it 
was able to provide good advice to people who could make a difference as the bulletins 
ended up on the desks of key senior figures, including the Coalition Provisional 
Authority’s (CPA) Administrator Paul Bremer. 
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Bremer found the information provided by the UNJLC bulletins credible and written from 
a different perspective than that of his own organization. Several members of the UNJLC 
team were invited to his office to explain how the information was collated and analyzed 
and to provide additional insight. During its meeting UNJLC explained that much of the 
analysis was based on information produced by the Coalition, but summarized and 
combined with other sources. It also seized the opportunity to highlight the humanitarian 
perspective of fuels to the most senior Coalition authorities. In late August 2003, the 
UNJLC was invited to represent the humanitarian community at a fuels and power 
conference convened by the Coalition at the headquarters of the US Central Command in 
Tampa, Florida, attended by senior Iraqi officials and key figures in the reconstruction 
effort. On that occasion, among other things, UNJLC had the opportunity to verify how its 
fuel bulletins had influenced key decision makers. 
Following the bombing of UN headquarters at the Canal Hotel in Baghdad on 19 August 
2003, UNJLC was obliged to withdraw from Iraq along with much of the rest of the 
humanitarian community.  It continued its fuels reporting until November, but without 
staff on the ground this became increasingly difficult. Phase I of UNJLC’s operations in 
Iraq ended formally in February 2004. 
Experience gained in Iraq in the fuels area found immediate application in new crises such 
as Liberia and Sudan. In preparation for these crises, a strategic, cross-cutting approach to 
analysis was taken, embracing the needs of the entire humanitarian community as opposed 
to individual actors. Given the importance of fuels supply for all parties, it demanded an 
institutionalized approach. To institutionalize the fuels function within the UNJLC, there 
was a need for strategic relationships with OPEC member states, major international oil 
companies, specialist commercial fuel organizations, and donors.  
7.3  The Institutionalization Process 
In this section, we review and describe the institutionalization process, the modus operandi 
and the typical services of the UNJLC. 
The UNJLC concept evolved and is still evolving thanks to the contribution of its architect, 
caretaker and lead operators. The contribution of the UNJLC architect, David Kaatrud, 
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Chief of Logistics at WFP from 2000 to 2004 and the Director, Coordination and Response 
Division at OCHA since September 2006, was fundamental in the successful development 
of the concept.  
At the inception of the concept back in 1996, Kaatrud, operating out of Uganda, was the 
Regional Director of WFP for the Great Lakes region. Far from having a well-developed 
vision of the concept, he discovered the potentials of the concept through its application in 
a range of subsequent emergencies. During those ad hoc activations, he identified niche 
areas where the UNJLC concept could be successfully applied and proposed new 
combinations of resources. After being promoted to the Head of Logistics of WFP in 2000, 
Kaatrud started to work on the consolidation of the concept out of WFP’s headquarters in 
Rome. As ideas crystallized, he strengthened the organizational structure of the UNJLC, 
better defined its mandate and the division of roles between the different managerial 
functions. His perseverance, charisma and strong leadership were instrumental in the 
institutionalization of the concept by IASC.  
Contrary to the other inter-agency coordination mechanisms that are housed in OCHA, 
given the UNJLC’s operational nature, in March 2001, the IASC endorsed the concept 
under the aegis of WFP. Donors believe that the UNJLC should always be hosted by an 
operational UN agency. Given WFP’s leadership in logistics, they found it natural for 
WFP to host the UNJLC and for the UNJLC to build on WFP know-how and resources.  In 
March 2002, after the successful deployment of the UNJLC in the Afghan crisis, the 
facility was recognized by IASC as a permanent part of the UN’s humanitarian response 
structure under WFP custodianship. In October of that year, the UNJLC Core Unit was 
established at WFP headquarters in Rome, Italy, and by November, IASC endorsed the 
UNJLC Activation Protocol.  
In its custodian role, WFP is responsible for mobilizing the requisite resources for each 
UNJLC deployment through dedicated projects raised through the OCHA-led 
Consolidated Appeal Process. The Core Unit, hosted by WFP, calls upon its support 
services (administrative, financial, communications, IT, etc.) and leverages its standby 
agreements and partnerships with other organizations. While WFP is more a contributor 
than a beneficiary of the UNJLC’s services, it still benefits directly from the UNJLC’s 
‘collective bargaining’ operations such as those with relevant authorities and service 
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providers and activities that aimed at improving the overall operational environment (road 
repairs, snow removal, warehouse space, etc.). There is also a significant indirect benefit to 
WFP, as long as the UNJLC provided services to smaller agencies that in the past relied on 
WFP support and advice. As summarized in Figure 7.7, the Core Unit provides a number 
of services. It ensures continuity in-between emergencies, examines emerging crises, 
designs UNJLC interventions, deploys UNJLCs, and markets and builds an understanding 
about the UNJLC concept with key stakeholders and external actors. The Core Unit takes 
the lead in inter-agency contingency planning, acts as a crisis barometer, and builds the 
human and system infrastructure required for quick deployments. 
 
Figure 7.7 – The Services & Activities of the UNJLC Core Unit  
Activities Description/Examples 
Conceptual Arm • Coordinate inter-agency contingency planning  
• Monitor, crisis barometer 
• Establish norms, standards and procedures  
• Build logistics capability  
• Create operational and information support systems 
• Provide forum for discussing general logistics issues 
• Develop a communication strategy and mount an 
information campaign 
• Lead global logistics coordination initiatives 
Operational Arm • Ready to react to emergencies 
• Design and prepare UNJLC deployments 
• Train logisticians 
Source:  INSEAD case study: Samii, R. & L. N. Van Wassenhove, “UNJLC: An Operational and Conceptual 
Inter-Agency Logistics Platform” (05/2004-5213). 
 
Agencies and donors had different perceptions of the WFP-UNJLC custodian-customer 
relationship. While some considered the UNJLC the baby of WFP, others sensed the 
tensions between the two, viewing it more as its step-child. The fact that the WFP Chief of 
Logistics was also the Head of UNJLC eased tension. Agencies and donors concurred that 
he had managed the agency relationships in a very tactful manner by keeping WFP ashore 
and not entering in competition with any agency. The UNJLC had maintained its 
autonomy and neutrality without privileging any agency in its operations. While a rotating 
custodianship of the UNJLC among the agencies was a desired evolution by some, there 
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was recognition that no agency was ready to run with the concept, at least in the 
foreseeable future.  
The Activation and Demobilization Process 
Up until the endorsement of the Activation Protocol by IASC in late 2002, UNJLCs were 
set up in an ad hoc fashion. The Protocol envisages a rapid inter-agency consultative 
process orchestrated by OCHA. Today, this core group, accessible at short notice, decides 
on the activation of the UNJLC within 24 to 48 hours from the disaster. The purpose of the 
consultation is to take into account the complexity of the emergency; determine the need 
for, duration and scale of a UNJLC; as well as its entry and exit strategies. The 
consultation team assesses the scale of existing humanitarian operations in the affected 
area, the number of agencies and actors potentially involved in the response (military, 
combatant and peacekeeping forces, etc.), and UNJLC’s eventual deployment 
requirements in terms of assets, financial and human resources. It then evaluates the 
existence of major logistics failure modes and eventual need for Military and Civil 
Defense Assets (MCDAs) before deciding on the activation of the UNJLC. Based on these 
discussions, the UNJLC makes its own recommendation on the need for a UNJLC. A full-
blown UNJLC is not always required. For example, where there are good local capabilities 
and perhaps only one bottleneck, the UNJLC could take on an advisory role. When the 
emergency involved the intervention of two main agencies, coordination could be 
internalized. When the issue is largely uni-sectoral, e.g., food, one lead agency could 
assume the coordination role. To better manage expectations, however, the UNJLC 
intended to articulate the pre-conditions for a UNJLC. Once the decision to activate the 
UNJLC is made, the IASC delegates the coordination of humanitarian logistics to the 
structure. From that point onwards, the UNJLC becomes responsible for the optimal use of 
scarce logistics resources as well as the provision of flexible and innovative logistics 
solutions.  
Agencies concurred with the activation approach pursued by the UNJLC. The UNJLC is to 
intervene and preserve its strength where it could make a difference, i.e., in big acute 
emergencies, where there are real logistics challenges. Donors supported selective 
deployments and the provision of a wide range of options from advisory services to 
surgical interventions (e.g., Haiti) to full-blown deployments.   
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The UNJLC distinguishes between natural and complex disasters. Given the short response 
time for natural disasters, to meet agency expectations it has to be prepared to react swiftly 
with credibility and at an appropriate scale, or extend its support otherwise. Depending on 
the scale of a natural disaster, to ensure professional logistics assessment and support to 
the humanitarian community, it envisages the attachment of logistician(s) to OCHA’s 
UNDAC.  
Agencies expect the UNJLC to be involved in the preparedness phase of imminent crises 
when they are planning their operations and pre-positioning goods. In this early phase, 
there is a need to analyze, coordinate and complement agency commodity pipelines and 
asset requirements to ensure a responsive and cost-effective supply chain. Agencies 
believe that a combined perspective enables them o run optimal stock positions avoiding 
idle capacity and ensuring high turnaround of goods. The UNJLC’s involvement in the 
contingency planning helps it better address client needs and prepare for its own 
deployment in terms of building an information platform, identifying potential bottlenecks 
and staffing.  
While the Activation Protocol set the process and criteria for the UNJLC deployments, 
improvements on the exit strategy were under way. To avoid an interruption in services, 
there is a need for a set of milestones and indicators (humanitarian, political, financial, 
etc.) to guide the timing of the demobilization of a UNJLC deployment. Despite the fact 
that the UNJLC has to adapt to events and needs as they unfold, it realizes the importance 
of an appropriate hand-over period, identification of a suitable counterpart institution and 
investment in capacity building right from the beginning. A well-designed intervention 
with a workable exit strategy is of paramount importance. Agencies emphasize the need 
for a planned and communicated exit strategy in order to avoid surprises for users. It is 
important for all to know when the UNJLC is closing shop and which authority is taking 
over the provision of services still in demand. 
Stakeholder Engagement 
The UNJLC concept, having appeared spontaneously among field logisticians in the 
context of the eastern Zaire crisis, was far from a top-down initiative emanating from any 
agency headquarters. In its initial days, while it enjoyed certain credibility among 
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logisticians, it faced organizational resistance. Indeed, not many were prepared to realize 
and admit to the need for cooperation on logistics issues. Individual agencies, with their 
own mandate, tasks and priorities set about accomplishing them single-mindedly. In the 
past, even though people from different humanitarian agencies and NGOs lived and acted 
together during an emergency, they held bilateral negotiations with authorities and service 
providers. They didn’t take the time to sit together and work issues out; on the contrary, 
they were proud to have negotiated the best deal. Today, the UNJLC was there to ensure 
coordination, resolve common bottlenecks, minimize duplication of efforts and eliminate 
wasteful competition and blackmail by service operators. 
To have organizational buy-in, the head of the UNJLC, David Kaatrud, tried to dispel any 
possible misperceptions about the ambitions of WFP to overtake the logistics operations of 
the individual agencies. He carefully defined the interfaces with WFP, highlighting the 
UNJLC’s inter-agency nature and coordination function. He took every opportunity at 
inter-agency gatherings to talk about the UNJLC and its approach, inviting the participants 
to get involved and second staff to the UNJLC Core Unit as well as its deployments. To 
instill a culture of cooperation, ensure an ongoing dialogue between the logistics personnel 
of the respective agencies, identify commonalities, and provide for a forum to discuss 
global logistics issues at a technical level, he insisted on quarterly inter-agency UNJLC 
meetings. The UNJLC was careful to assume a low profile. The nature of relief business 
demands visibility. For it to be sustainable, the UNJLC’s low profile approach had to be 
balanced with adequate recognition from key stakeholders that the facility was a provider 
of value-added services. While the UNJLC got visibility with operational partners through 
its activities and website, it had no claims for media attention that went to each agency. 
The nature and magnitude of recent emergencies were such that agencies often met on the 
ground and faced the same logistics problems. Understanding among agency logisticians 
improved, given their shared jargon. Key people leading the field operations identified 
common grounds for inter-agency cooperation and pursued them vigorously. Although 
agencies still competed for resources, there was a new mind-set, more trust among them.  
The UNJLC provided an adequate response to donor quest for coordination. UNJLC 
eliminated parallel systems and pipelines and showed donors how it could save money. By 
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sharing facilities and assets and using each other’s excess capacity, agencies proved that 
they are not competing on the market for the same goods, raising costs.   
Contrary to other inter-agency coordination facilities such as UNDAC, which have 
received their mandate by the UN Secretary General, to ensure inter-agency acceptance, 
the head of UNJLC understood the need for the facility to be endorsed by the IASC. 
The UNJLC needed the buy-in of two very different sets of clients. At one end, there are 
agencies with logistics capacity and sufficient financing for their activities. These are the 
ones that do not necessarily see the need to share resources in order to economize. At the 
other end, there are those humanitarian organizations within the UN and NGO 
constellation that have limited logistics resources and competency. 
By contributing with information, staff and assets to UNJLC deployments, agencies help 
enhance the effectiveness of humanitarian logistics operations during emergencies. The 
benefits of UNJLC for those agencies with smaller logistics setups are numerous. For 
example, to ensure timely response to health-related issues, WHO assumes a coordination 
role with NGOs and health ministries worldwide. As a small mover of high value goods 
during emergencies, it tries to anticipate needs and preposition kits. To develop its brand 
and credibility as coordinators in the field of health, it needs to be seen on the emergency 
scene with its kits. However, it had limited logistics resources (e.g. only two logisticians in 
2003). Through the UNJLC it could be operational in the field. Instead of continuously 
struggling with logistics issues single-handedly, it called upon UNJLC services. For 
smaller agencies, the UNJLC had been a predictable product and had proven its value in 
action. For example in Iraq, it had supported the operations of other agencies, always 
attended to their requests. 
Collaboration between agency logisticians and the advent of the UNJLC had helped 
strengthen the profile of logistics in the respective organizations. For example WHO 
medical experts in the field were often forced to consult the UNJLC for logistics-related 
information. WHO’s involvement in complex emergencies had made many understand the 
importance of the UNJLC in areas such as clearing bottlenecks and coordinating with the 
military. 
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Apart from relevant UN agencies and the Red Cross Movement, another group that had 
benefited from the UNJLC services was the NGO community. NGOs regularly 
participated in UNJLC Task Force and logistics coordination meetings in the field. They 
are invited to UNJLC training events and, at the headquarters level, are part of the IASC 
consultative mechanism. Efficient coordination mechanisms between the NGO 
community, a typically large and diverse group, and the UNJLC deployments, typically 
small setups, however, did present some challenges. 
The need for an adequately resourced Core Unit with a conceptual and operational arm is 
well recognized. Core capability is required in between emergencies as well as at the 
outset. Critical people need to be available at the Core Unit to ensure continuity, examine 
emerging crises, drive operations and be immediately deployed on the ground. Only Core 
Unit level staff would have the required skill mix to be operational and effective on the 
ground as of day one: knowledge of the UN system and humanitarian world, coupled with 
technical and country experience. To staff the various UNJLC cells, it is then necessary to 
build and call upon a strong roster of logisticians and short-term secondments.  
The UNJLC recognizes different levels of agency participation to the facility from full-
time secondments, participation in logistics coordination and Task Force meetings at the 
field level to provision of logistics information. To create awareness around and train the 
logistician constellation on the concept paving the road to secondments, the UNJLC 
engages in systematic training sessions, hosted by different agencies, for humanitarian and 
donor organization logisticians.  
For example, the wide agency representation – UN, donors, the Red Cross Movement and 
NGOs – in the training session, held in Dubai in December 2003, was a clear sign of the 
growing understanding of the importance of logistics, the need for coordination, and the 
credibility of the UNJLC to address these issues. Appreciation went beyond the UNJLC-
related issues. While donor agency logisticians value these sessions as a means to get an 
insight into the UN system and unearth concrete collaboration opportunities, agencies with 
weaker logistics setups recognize the UNJLC’s role in enhancing internal logistics 
capability.  
Although UNJLC expect limited secondments to the facility from the NGO community 
because of their limited capacity, and none from the Red Cross Movement because of their 
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mandate and their need for an arm’s length relationship with the UN, their understanding 
of the concept and cooperation was fundamental. By the end of 2003, a total of about 100 
people representing 30 UN agencies and NGOs, as well as 10 donor organizations, had 
attended the four one-week UNJLC training sessions.  
The UNJLC could pride itself on a good record of secondments: up to nine agencies and 
standby partners (WFP, WHO, UNICEF, UNHCR, IOM, DFID, GTZ, SHA, and 
Canadem) had already seconded to the UNJLC. The level of the UNJLC secondments is 
the facility’s acid test, a demonstration of its relevance to the humanitarian community as 
no agency is so well provided with staff to afford secondments.  For most agencies, 
secondments are a means to ensure a greater and more proactive involvement in the 
development of the concept. However were agencies to fall short in providing the required 
human resources, it is WFP/UNJLC’s responsibility to bridge the gap.  
Although in order to cover the inter-agency aspect of the UNJLC it is essential to secure 
agency secondments, the quality of seconded staff is equally important. To be credible, it 
is crucial to have experienced staff in the right positions at the right time. The UNJLC 
requires trained and experienced staff with managerial as well as field experience that can 
act independently. With the right team, it can achieve more and faster. With no time to 
train staff at the outset of an emergency, the UNJLC worked toward a standby roster of top 
agency staff.  
While donors in general tend to be reluctant to fund intangible activities such as 
preparedness and coordination, operational donors that deal with logistics were among the 
first to see the merits of the UNJLC concept. For a long time, DFID had felt that the UN 
humanitarian agencies needed to improve and professionalize the way they went about 
their operations in complex emergencies. After observing how agencies tended to develop 
capabilities in parallel and duplication to each other, DFID saw a need for a logistics 
coordination platform that could provide a collective response to logistics bottlenecks. So 
when the Chief of Logistics of WFP presented the UNJLC concept to them, they did not 
hesitate to support it. 
Another critical donor that was among the first to extend its support to the UNJLC was 
USAID. USAID believed that logistics presents itself as a natural field to coordinate. As 
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such, it has provided funding to the UNJLC Core Unit as well as to the Afghan, Iraq, and 
Liberia operations. USAID commended the dynamic and able leadership of the Head of 
UNJLC and the quality and competence of the UNJLC team. According to them, the 
UNJLC has shown its capability to deliver and add value to humanitarian operations, 
regardless of the operational contexts. Its track record in logistics coordination ensured 
their continuous support. To make sure the UNJLC remains credible and not under 
resourced to provide the services it is expected to deliver, DFID also continued its support.   
With a view to broadening its donor base, the UNJLC tries to create awareness and 
increase donor understanding of the UNJLC concept. By inviting donors to the UNJLC 
training sessions and through informal and formal presentations in relevant donor capitals, 
it continuously underscores the importance of logistics and need for coordination in 
emergency contexts.   
Learning by Doing 
With few precedents in the UN system and little guidance on how to establish an inter-
agency facility within an existing operational agency, the UNJLC learnt by doing. In 2001 
it worked hard on setting out the procedures. Today it has a UNJLC Field Operations 
Manual that provides a set of guidelines and defines an operational and flexible framework 
for the UNJLC deployment. Above all, the UNJLC views each deployment as an 
opportunity to draw some lessons, folding them into the next intervention. For example, 
the less successful response to the Bhuj 2001 earthquake highlighted major strategic and 
preparedness issues. They ranged from the need to have a rapid activation process to 
ensure fast deployment to the importance of adequate standby deployment capacity 
(flyaway kits) and funds. To be taken seriously, the UNLC has to arrive quickly with 
coordination capability. Timely analysis and design of the intervention, consultation with 
relevant local authorities, as well as quick deployment are crucial.  
As an inter-agency mechanism, the UNJLC relies heavily on agency secondments for its 
staffing. Before the Afghanistan crisis, agencies were asked to volunteer staff on a part-
time basis. For the Afghan operation, a dedicated fund for secondments was set up. The 
cost-recovery mechanism put into place allowed for full secondments, augmenting overall 
human resources.   
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Secondment procedures, however, far from being harmonized across agencies, tended to 
be heavy and ill-defined. Delays in recruitment and remuneration were common. This, 
together with the lack of a proper feedback system to the mother organization on the 
performance and experience of the seconded staff, made the offer less palatable. The 
UNJLC had to resolve these administrative issues – from selection of staff, to their 
induction and after sales services to the seconding agency – before it could expect a higher 
inter-agency participation and the development of a solid roster. UNJLC was surprised to 
learn that there were no standard UN secondment procedures and related documentation. It 
had to come up with its own pro forma secondment agreements with each major agency. 
To address delays in invoicing and payments, it had dedicated HR staff working on the 
system. 
Another lesson taken to heart from the Afghan deployment was the importance of prior 
communication and marketing of the UNJLC concept and services to field offices of 
concerned agencies. Usually, there is no time to inform and agree upon things at the outset 
of an emergency. Hence, in preparation for the Iraq emergency, a UNJLC planning officer 
sensitized and briefed UN agency country teams on the UNJLC. Informing and creating 
the right expectations was crucial to ensure cooperation on the operational level, once 
humanitarian operations initiate. Agencies also recognize their own responsibility. They 
also assist in promoting and marketing the UNJLC concept within their organizations. 
The UNJLC services, such as logistics assessments, by virtue of building on WFP logistics 
expertise, at the beginning tended to be WFP-oriented. WFP often moves huge tonnage of 
limited product types (e.g., grain), while most of the other agencies deal with a wide and 
diverse set of goods, some in small volumes. Goods such as medicines require a more 
complex supply chain (e.g., cold storage) and different receiving capability at destination. 
As an inter-agency facility, the UNJLC had become responsive to the needs of its 
constituencies. To be able to address stakeholder concerns, the UNJLC logistics skills were 
widened. This was realized with the support of the concerned agencies.  As it was not 
sufficient to address only WFP’s logistics requirements, UNJLC established a relationship 
between food and NFIs, and between bulk and containerized shipments. To provide 
meaningful information to the agencies, the UNJLC started to work on a supply tracking 
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system, which would draw upon data from the individual agencies to provide a composite 
picture of relief flows in a given emergency. 
To get an independent opinion on the UNJLC’s performance and identify lessons and best 
practices, the UNJLC deployments were reviewed by a team of external consultants. 
“Given the importance of the recent deployments – Afghanistan, Iraq and Liberia – it was 
important for both its own learning as well as the institutionalization process to get 
objective feedback on user requirement from all relevant stakeholders. It is important to 
constantly evaluate and identify the key needs of the UNJLC users for the concept to 
remain demand-driven and relevant. 
Deeper and Wider Call for Common Services  
Donors are keen to see agencies achieve their respective mandates in a collaborative as 
opposed to a competitive environment. They press for common services, sharing of 
resources in a number of areas. Apart from logistics (transportation, warehousing, 
procurement, and aviation) that can be rationalized and shared within the UN, donors see 
potential in other key services including information, security, civil military coordination, 
air services, and telecommunication. 
In 2003, the concept of common services was high on IASC’s agenda that together with 
the agencies had to work on its definition, allocation, activation modalities, and reporting 
structure. As the facilitator in logistics issues of common concern and the most successful 
common service provider, the UNJLC assumed an active role in the debate and the 
process. To allow for greater flexibility in emergency response, and while aiming to 
augment the collective logistics capacity, the UNJLC views humanitarian relief in a 
modular as opposed to an integrated system whereby, within defined agency mandates, 
each agency maintains its own logistics capabilities. Bearing this in mind, the UNJLC 
work on common services aimed to look at generic but traditionally unaddressed logistics 
issues such as customs and fuel. With a view to identifying areas that can benefit from a 
coordinated approach such as reserve depots, it also looked at assets and resources with a 
global application.  
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7.4   Discussion 
In this section, we discuss the different aspects of the UNJLC, the non-operational 
humanitarian organization. We shall start by discussing the different structural components 
of the UNJLC structure. We then discuss how the services of the UNJLC contribute to the 
mitigation of failure modes and the performance of those humanitarian organizations using 
them. In section 7.4.3, we highlight the contribution of the UNJLC structure to its 
performance. To understand what ensures a successful facility, we identify the UNJLC’s 
strategic and operational building blocks. Finally we discuss the risks and opportunities 
facing the UNJLC and those humanitarian organizations calling upon its services. 
 
7.4.1     The Structure of the UNJLC 
The UNJLC structure includes a virtual web, a permanent Core Unit, UNJLC 
deployments, and UNJLC antenna offices (Figure 7.8). 
Contrary to the IFRC-NS network, which is a closed, internal one, the UNJLC virtual web 
is an open, open-ended, and a relatively stable network. Its members are organizations 
represented in the IASC, donor countries and their development institutions, CSOs, and 
private sector companies. The participation of some organizations within the NGO 
community, donor development institutions, CSOs and private sector to the UNJLC 
deployments is a result of their on-going cooperation relationship with WFP (see also 
Chapter 8). 
As depicted in Figure 7.8, contrary to the other inter-agency coordination mechanisms 
housed in OCHA, given the operational nature of the UNJLC, the facility is hosted by 
WFP, the UN’s largest logistics actor, at its headquarters in Rome, Italy. The rationale of 
placing the UNJLC under the custodianship of WFP is well anchored in technical reasons. 
WFP known for its leadership in logistics was the obvious host as it allows the UNJLC to 
draw upon the organization’s extensive logistics resource and expertise. With the largest 
and the most performing logistics setup, it has experience in managing other inter-agency 
services (See Chapter 8). Up until the establishment of the UNJLC, it regularly assisted 
UN agencies providers of small volumes of high value goods such as medicine in their 
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logistics operations. It also had prior experience in forging partnerships with other 
organizations in the area of logistics. WFP occupies an information-rich position within 
the humanitarian community in terms of knowledge about the availability and potential 
configuration of inter-agency resources. 
 
Figure 7.8 – The UNJLC Structure 
 
 
The Core Unit is staffed with a critical mass of experts seconded from humanitarian 
organizations. To address and overcome potential incompatibilities among humanitarian 
organizations, the UNJLC Core Unit has developed an operations manual and conducts 
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UNJLC Core Unit within the virtual organization allows it to drive the facility’s agenda 
and to enforce decisions regarding the life cycle of UNJLC deployments.  
Deployments activated on a needs-basis depend on a virtual web for their resources. For 
each UNJLC deployment, a focal UNJLC coordination office is established. Although it 
reports directly to the Head of the UNJLC Core Unit, the structure is integrated back into 
the UN’s country response coordination structure and the humanitarian coordinator.    
In order to cater to the needs of its constituency, the UNJLC puts logistics support as close 
to the crisis as possible through the opening and closing down temporary antenna offices, 
each headed by a lead operator and manned with seconded staff. While logistics issues 
continue to be dealt with at the focal and Core Unit level, the UNJLC antenna offices help 
agency logisticians in their planning and implementation efforts. For example, during the 
Afghanistan crisis the UNJLC antenna office in Hirat broke the local truck cartel. To 
address the sharp rise in trucking prices from and to the city, it conducted a technical study 
on the Afghan transport sector and negotiated a transport price grid on behalf of the 
humanitarian community. The initiative helped the humanitarian community save on its 
operational cost increasing its outreach. 
Designed as a dynamic and flexible facility that can anticipate, respond and adapt to 
emerging needs, the UNJLC antenna offices address the specifics of each emergency at 
key logistics nodes. With the removal of logistics bottlenecks, the need for intensified 
coordination disappears. After establishing a local logistics coordination structure, the 
UNJLC dismantles the concerned antenna office. For example, during the Afghanistan 
crisis, the UNJLC first set up a series of antenna offices in neighboring countries. As 
bottlenecks shifted from transport corridors to in-country, offices in the bordering 
countries were closed. After the fall of each major Afghan city, the UNJLC established 
new antenna offices within the country.  
As an emergency response facility, the UNJLC is deactivated soon after the emergency 
phase. To ensure a successful handover, the UNJLC tries to ensure transfer of services still 
in demand to viable logistics coordination structures. To maximize the sustainability of its 
interventions and the transfer of responsibilities to national entities, the UNJLC tries, 
within its means, to train and integrate local government personnel in its activities. 
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The UNJLC results in intra, inter and extra-organizational linkages. An example of intra-
organizational linkage created by UNJLC field offices during an emergency is provided by 
the activities of the two UNJLC offices in Uzbekistan during the Afghanistan crisis. The 
UNJLC office in the capital city of Uzbekistan, Tashkent, had a lobbying, representation 
and project management function while the UNJLC office in the border city of Termez in 
Uzbekistan was there to address emerging logistics bottlenecks. Together, they restored 
barge, rail and road transportation at the Termez crossing point and stipulated the 
modalities of humanitarian cargo in transit to Afghanistan. The UNJLC Termez resulted in 
inter and extra-organizational linkages. By coordinating and facilitating the activities of 
different humanitarian organizations through out the emergency, it created an intense 
relationship with the humanitarian community, which is an inter-organizational linkage. 
When it became the government’s focal point for the transportation of humanitarian cargo 
into Afghanistan, it assisted the authorities in their cooperation and coordination effort 
with the humanitarian community, an extra-organizational linkage.  
Another example of extra-organizational linkages is provided by the fuel cell activated 
during the 2003 Iraq crisis.  During the emergency, the services of the UNJLC fuel cell 
became of particular relevance to the US Army Corps of Engineers’ Task Force, Restore 
Iraqi Oil (RIO). RIO leveraged the UNJLC fuel cell’s experience, expertise, knowledge 
and analytical capability to meet its goal: restore the Iraqi fuel industry (see also section 
7.4.5.2).  
A much valued service of the UNJLC is in the area of information. Information generated 
by the UNJLC is not only utilized by humanitarian staff but also by information 
management specialists, desk officers and contingency planners of operational donors. For 
example, during the Afghan and Iraq crises, there were times that the only source of 
logistics-related information for donors, such as USAID and DFID, was the UNJLC. In the 
context of the Iraq emergency, when DFID received a government request on the fuel 
situation in Iraq, instead of putting someone on a desk research job and make him/her work 
around the clock, all it did was consult the UNJLC website downloading the fuel bulletins. 
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7.4.2    UNJLC Services 
The UNJLC acts as an inter- and extra-organizational logistics coordination platform. 
Throughout an emergency it organizes regular meetings with the humanitarian community 
and key stakeholders to discuss and take strategic and operational decisions. As 
summarized in Figure 7.9, the UNJLC provides a range of services to mitigate the impact 
of failure modes that result in dependencies and duplications during disaster response. The 
following paragraphs provide examples of UNJLC contribution in alleviating the impact of 
potential failure modes. 
 
Figure 7.9 – UNJLC Mitigation Services and Activities 
Activities Description/Examples 
Address supply failure 
modes 
• Joint Contingency Planning 
• Monitor agency inventory buildups 
• Address orphan issues such as fuels 
Identification and clearing 
of transport failure modes  
• Joint Contingency Planning 
• Negotiate customs tariff and exemptions 
• Streamline customs procedures  
• Open up air and surface corridors 
• Augment transport capacity at border crossing points 
• Negotiate landing rights 
• Ensure best use of assets and avoid wastage  
• Ensure Civil-Military coordination 
Identification and clearing 
of facility failure modes 
• Joint Contingency Planning 
• Negotiate, coordinate, prioritize, de-conflict the use of 
storage facilities with the military, donors and other 
agencies 
• Monitor storage capacity 
• Build a network of offices  
• Identify and negotiate access to distribution network  
Addressing communication 
& information related 
failure modes 
• Conduct technical assessments/surveys  
• Provide mapping and GIS services  
• Manage a logistics information platform  
Addressing HR failure 
mode 
• Augment logistics capacity 
• Provide technical advice 
• Streamline immigration procedures for humanitarian staff 
• Capacity building: train national counterpart institutions  
Source:  Adapted from INSEAD case study:  Samii, R. & L. N. Van Wassenhove, “UNJLC: An Operational 
and Conceptual Inter-Agency Logistics Platform” (05/2004-5213). 
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Supply Failure Modes. For emerging emergencies, the UNJLC organizes joint 
contingency planning sessions. The contingency planning exercise allows the humanitarian 
community to share their knowledge and information as well as their respective agency-
specific contingency plans with each other. The exercise helps to better quantify needs, 
identify important external and internal corridors and routes, highlight potential 
bottlenecks and need for infrastructure interventions, optimize the level of humanitarian 
inventory, and draw-up a pre-positioning strategy.  
For emerging disasters, such as the 2003 Iraq crisis, with a view to optimize the level of 
humanitarian inventory along corridors and ensure a rapid response, the UNJLC took the 
lead in contingency planning. For example, to avoid a return to the more costly air 
operations during the Afghan crisis, the UNJLC played a pivotal role in the design and 
implementation of the Afghanistan 2002-2003 winterization strategy which ensured 
maximum use of surface transportation and the pre-positioning of goods before the winter 
season. 
Parallel humanitarian supply chains may end up competing against a limited number of 
items or result in excess inventory.  During a crisis, in order to avoid supply failure modes 
related to stock-outs or excess inventory, to the extent possible, The UNJLC collects 
information on agency inventories and ensures its dissemination among relevant parties. 
Since the 2003 Iraq crisis, the UNJLC has started to address the “orphan” issue of fuels 
sourcing.  As the availability of fuels affects humanitarian operations, a combined as 
opposed to individual approach to its sourcing is deemed appropriate. The UNJLC 
addresses the need of the entire humanitarian community with a view to avoid wasteful 
competition, achieve economies of scale and consistency of supply.  
Transport Failure Modes. Lack of transport assets is a common and recurrent concern for 
humanitarian operators. Often local authorities own limited transport assets and the 
likelihood that humanitarian organizations dispose of transport assets close to the 
emergency area is also slim. Indeed, they manage or own limited transport assets given the 
implied upfront investment, the prohibitive cost of moving fleets from one disaster scene 
to another and the unpredictability regarding the timing and location of the next disaster.  
In natural disasters, lack of sufficient number of helicopters is a recurrent issue. Examples 
include the 2000 and 2001 Mozambique floods and the 2005 Pakistan earthquake. In the 
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case of the Mozambique floods, UNJLC assumed an asset management role and as such 
ensured the optimal use of transport assets among humanitarian agencies. When UNJLC 
does not have an asset management function, it liaises with the concerned military forces.  
To overcome the lack of transport assets, usually larger and financially stronger 
organizations build up and mobilize them. As was the case during the 1996 Zaire crisis, 
without interfering with an organization’s logistics systems and arrangements, the UNJLC 
ensured the use of excess transport capacity available in the system for the movement of 
relief items mobilized by smaller, less-prepared or financially endowed organizations. By 
combining and providing access to complementary and indivisible physical capacity, the 
UNJLC, after prioritizing the movement of goods and people, matches eventual aircraft 
overcapacity with outstanding transport requests, optimizing the use of assets. This service 
is of particular relevance to those small organizations that, for example, need to combine 
their resources with those of other organizations - relief items with relief items or relief 
items with transport capacity - in order to achieve their mandate. 
To ensure access to neighboring country physical infrastructure, the UNJLC negotiates the 
use of border assets with relevant authorities. For example, during the Afghanistan crisis 
when the country’s airspace was temporarily closed to humanitarian air operations, the 
UNJLC negotiated a humanitarian air corridor and pursued negotiations with combatant 
forces and local authorities on the use of key infrastructure such as airfields and landing 
spots. In terms of airlifts, it de-conflicted humanitarian operations from military 
operations. 
During the Afghanistan crisis demand for transport capacity and services outstripped 
supply. To avoid wasteful competition between agencies and in order to keep operational 
costs under control, apart from restoring overall transportation capacity through 
negotiations with port and railway authorities, the UNJLC helped break the transport cartel 
by negotiating a common and reduced transport tariffs for humanitarian traffic.  
To ensure the smooth influx and movement of relief items, humanitarian organizations, 
regardless of size and focus, have to overcome a range of administrative hurdles (customs, 
immigration, etc.). For example, during the Afghan crisis, on behalf of the humanitarian 
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community, the UNJLC negotiated with the port and customs authorities of Uzbekistan 
and Pakistan. 
To ensure the speedy and efficient implementation of infrastructure rehabilitation 
clearance projects on seriously affected, mined or deteriorated transport infrastructure 
projects, the UNJLC conducts infrastructure surveys and assessments. This is with a view 
to identify, budget and prioritize key interventions and present it to donors for funding. For 
example during the Afghanistan crisis, after identifying priority rehabilitation projects, it 
approached donors for funding. To avoid duplication of funding on the same project and 
ensure timely execution of critical ones, it matched projects with expressed donor interests. 
When execution started, it monitored the status of the projects with a view to keep logistics 
planners duly informed of the progress.  To manage the process, it organized coordination 
meetings with donors, government authorities, relevant humanitarian organizations and 
implementing partners.  
Facility Failure Modes. To overcome the shortage of storage, UNJLC negotiates the use 
of public warehousing facilities for humanitarian agencies. During the Afghanistan crisis, 
it brokered storage sharing arrangements between agencies, and de-conflicted the use of 
warehouse facilities with combatant forces. During response operations, it also forewarns 
agencies of lack of warehousing capacity across geographies. 
For country-wide emergency operations, to best serve the humanitarian community and the 
afflicted population, the UNJLC quickly builds up its physical network of offices in the 
country. It also assists implementing partners in the building up of a distribution network - 
schools, mosques, churches, etc. - through negotiations with the relevant authorities. 
Communication Failure Modes. To be able to move cargo, humanitarian logisticians 
require a range of logistics-related information. During the planning phase, they require a 
series of country specific information such as those related to the geography, climate, 
population, food habits, living conditions of the population. Demographic-related 
information needs to be combined with a range of operational and logistics related 
information such as those related to the infrastructure, duty customs and regulations of the 
concerned region.  
Logisticians seeking information on the status, availability, rates of logistics assets; 
corridor and in-country infrastructure; regional stock positions; weather forecasts and 
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contact details of agency logistics personnel regularly can consult the UNJLC website. The 
UNJLC information brokerage function replaces a series of agency-specific, stand-alone, 
competing and time-consuming information compilation and analysis initiatives.  
For large-scale emergencies, the UNJLC has become an unparalleled source of logistics-
related information for small and big organizations. It levels out the availability of 
information between organizations and accelerates its flow. To ensure that interruption in 
logistics-related infrastructure is duly factored in response plans, UNJLC provides, on 
continuous basis, up-to-date information on the status and accessibility of transport 
infrastructure. This enables logisticians to quickly develop and modify their plans and 
ensure timely delivery while minimizing planning costs. It also brings an element of 
cohesive planning as organizations worked off the same core data.  For example, during 
the Iraq 2003 crisis, the UNJLC was the only source of logistics-related information for as 
wide an audience as the logistics planners of the humanitarian community, donors, 
occupying forces and the population.  
To avoid any operational bottleneck upon arrival, the UNJLC provides information on 
viable routes, receiving capability at final destination, cargo specifications and provides 
suggestions on the most adequate transportation modes. For instance, during the 
Afghanistan crisis as long as humanitarian cargo moved through regional transit points, 
UNJLC provided information on their status and capacity. As soon as humanitarian 
activities shifted from the use of corridors to that of internal infrastructure, UNJLC 
information and analysis started to cover interior airfields and road networks.  
To improve the overall quality of logistics planning and operations and to overcome 
communication failure modes, the UNJLC conducts infrastructure surveys and sectoral 
technical assessments and flags temporary constraints. For example, during the Liberia 
crisis, the UNJLC aimed to improve the overall quality of logistics planning through 
mapping services and a series of sectoral technical assessments for fuel, customs, air, ports 
and roads. Information on transportation and fuel costs and infrastructure surveys are very 
useful for organizations that stay beyond the critical stages of an emergency.  
HR Failure Modes. Bearing in mind that humanitarian organizations typically respond to 
a number of geographically competing disasters, their logistics HR are often stretched 
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widely and thinly across geographies. Lean logistics departments, multiple and concurrent 
humanitarian response operations and important logistics requirements during large scale 
emergencies, result in an insufficient number of qualified logisticians dedicated to each 
emergencies. To overcome the HR failure mode, the UNJLC by providing logistics 
services augments the humanitarian community’s overall logistics capability and capacity. 
By mitigating the effects of failure modes, the UNJLC provides a range of value-adding 
services (Figure 7.10) that have the potential to impact the performance of the participating 
humanitarian organizations in terms of cost, timeliness, accuracy and flexibility. 
 
Figure 7.10 – UNJLC Activities and Benefits 
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For example, by leading the joint-contingency planning exercise and subsequent 
coordination meetings during disaster response, the UNJLC can ensure a cost-effective, 
timely, accurate and flexible response. At the outset of a disaster, a number of competing 
and complementary logistics scenarios emerge with respect to channels, distances, 
vehicles, routes, suppliers, etc. Decision making within and among the responding 
humanitarian organization can be time consuming as it takes place in a complex network 
that includes the affected country, its neighbors as well as the headquarters of the involved 
organizations. The UNJLC, by providing for an inter-agency discussion and decision-
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making forum, speeds up the decision-making process and avoids decisional paralysis. It 
also helps avoid conflicting decisions that may lead to the deterioration or creation of 
logistics bottlenecks.  
Similarly, humanitarian organizations need to respond to rapidly changing or unexpected 
scenarios in a fast manner. As time is of essence during emergency relief, “time 
compressing” initiatives along the supply chain are welcomed. The information brokerage 
function of the UNJLC, along with its de-bottlenecking, de-conflicting and collective 
bargaining efforts, are among the “time compressing” contributions of the facility. 
Information provided by the UNJLC helps avoid duplication of efforts and releases 
resources otherwise tied in information gathering activities. It enables logisticians to 
quickly develop their plans and ensure timely delivery. Information integration counters 
the bullwhip effect, supply distortion such as excessive item or stock buildups along 
certain corridors. For example, during the Afghanistan crisis, by monitoring stock buildups 
and the status of storage capacity, the UNJLC Hirat managed to avoid creation of a new 
bottleneck. It forewarned agencies planning to stock items in the city of the lack of storage 
capacity. The UNJLC creates knowledge at a lower cost and more speedily. It also 
optimizes its use and renders it a global public good by making it available to the entire 
humanitarian community and beyond through its website. The flow of information and 
knowledge and the creation and application of knowledge facilitated by the UNJLC allow 
individual organizations as well as the structure itself to act swiftly. 
The UNJLC de-bottlenecking, de-conflicting and collective bargaining efforts replace a 
series of agency-specific, stand-alone, competing and time-consuming negotiations and 
information compilation and analysis initiatives. For example, UNJLC’s assistance in 
opening up of the Uzbek border or the Afghanistan airspace, closed at the outset of 
hostilities, for all humanitarian air and border operations avoided parallel and time-
consuming negotiations, confusion and delays.  
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7.4.3    Contribution of the UNJLC to Relief Operations 
This section discusses how the structure of the UNJLC is key to a fast, cost-effective, 
flexible and accurate response on the part of the humanitarian community. 
Decision to activate the UNJLC occurs between 24 to 48 hours from an emergency. The 
rapid deployment of the focal UNJLC and the series of antenna offices in function of need 
ensure quick office network ramp-up and coverage.  
The UNJLC operates along the following management concept: centralized direction 
provided by the Core Unit and decentralized decision-making at the regional and antenna 
level.  More specifically, the Core Unit is responsible for the design of the UNJLC 
interventions and extends its support to the lead operator of each UNJLC deployment. 
However, for each UNJLC deployment, the lead operators manage local operations and 
provide overall guidance to staff in-charge of day-to-day decisions. It follows that the 
UNJLC regional and antenna offices are not constrained by rigid rules or prescribed 
actions. On the contrary, they rely on the creativity of their respective teams to address 
challenges and respond to new opportunities as they arise. More specifically, to ensure 
timely reaction, operational decisions are taken at the unit level. Problem flagging and 
solving is effectively incorporated in the daily decision-making and operating process of 
the UNJLC focal and antenna offices. Logistical tasks between various organizations is 
coordinated through use of cross-functional teams, limited programming of tasks and 
informal and frequent meetings between logisticians. It follows that the flat and 
decentralized structure of the UNJLC facilitates quick decision-making. 
In terms of action, when the UNJLC antenna or focal office identifies a logistics 
bottleneck, it proceeds with negotiations with the relevant entity. A case in point is during 
the Afghan crisis when the UNJLC Hirat office, without referral to higher levels, 
addressed the unexpected lack of storage facility by brokering exchange agreements 
between agencies and liaising with Coalition and government authorities for the speedy 
transfer of storage capacity for humanitarian use.  
One of the key services provided by the UNJLC is information. UNJLC is able to perform 
the information broker function effectively because of its structure: a series of UNJLC 
antenna and specialized cells. These antenna offices established strategically across a 
territory are close to a wide range of information sources and as such act, among other 
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things, as information collection nodes. The UNJLC fills the information vacuum at no 
cost for the user at a time when good information is scarce.  
More specifically, the UNJLC office network assists humanitarian organizations address 
the surge in information demand.  It helps overcome information disparity among agencies 
during the contingency planning and emergency response phases. For instance, during the 
Afghanistan crisis, to design and implement a response strategy for the forthcoming 
winter, humanitarian organizations required a range of data including an estimate of the 
target population, their distribution on the territory and status of access routes.  The 
UNJLC office network collated the required information from a wide range of sources and 
ensured its divulgation among the concerned parties. 
As knowledge and experience is spread amongst humanitarian organizations, the UNJLC 
leverages the wealth of human expertise and knowledge resources available in the virtual 
network. The UNJLC taps into knowledge available at headquarter and regional levels of 
humanitarian organizations and combines it with local knowledge and expertise of the field 
operators, UNJLC antenna offices and other stakeholders. Through the UNJLC, the 
humanitarian community can overcome knowledge asymmetries and gain access to 
knowledge assets that are tacit, not available on the market and costly or difficult to 
imitate.  
An example is the UNJLC fuels cell set up during the Iraq crisis. This small unit was built 
on the skills, initiative and flexibility of its specialists, each with their own unique 
contribution, whether it be logistics, language, technical fuels knowledge, or writing and 
analytical ability, and the talent of getting on with people under difficult circumstances. 
Basically, UNJLC had planned for one scenario in terms of fuel provision and when a 
totally different role emerged it was able to adjust in a timely fashion and perform 
effectively. The UNJLC fuels cell manned with experts drew conclusions and produced 
information bulletins on the status of fuels availability by using a combination of publicly 
available information, own observations and knowledge, and field visits.  
The UNJLC recognizes the different level of agency contribution. Members of the UNJLC 
virtual web enjoy the same rights and relationships are characterized by various degrees of 
dependence. The participation mechanism and philosophy of the UNJLC is such that, all 
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organizations, regardless of their size and level of contribution are full-fledged partners 
and can benefit from its services. It follows that through the UNJLC, agencies with small 
logistics setups and limited logistics capability can stimulate largeness by augmenting their 
logistics capacity and capability both during the planning and emergency response phase. 
By tapping into information previously accessible only to bigger organizations, they can 
make more accurate and faster decisions at no additional cost. Instead of struggling with 
logistics issues alone, they can rely on the UNJLC advice. Given their limited negotiating 
power, by joining the UNJLC they can operate more cost-effectively and flexibly in time-
sensitive emergencies. For example, they can benefit from negotiations led by the UNLJC 
in terms of de-bottlenecking and de-conflicting the use of critical logistics assets. 
The UNJLC structure and the linkages it creates are of particular value to emergency relief 
environments for three reasons. Firstly, they ensure speedy response by a temporary 
augmentation of resources (office facilities, assets, information) and capabilities (HR) at 
key geographical points. Second, they enable quick decision-making and coordinated 
action. Finally, they allow for the rapid adaptation of services to the changing and 
unexpected needs of the environment and clients.  
 
7.4.4    The UNJLC Building Blocks 
As discussed in section 3.2.1.2 of Chapter 3, the strategic alliance literature proposes a 
combination of factors as antecedents to a successful partnership. The virtual organization 
literature identifies a number of drivers as essential for the successful transition of firms 
from a stable network to a virtual web. A review of the operations of UNJLC in the 
disasters covered in section 7.2 and its institutionalization process allows us to identify the 
building blocks which have ensured the successful operationalization of the UNJLC. In the 
following two sub-sections, we discuss the contribution of a number of factors categorized 
as strategic or operational to the success of the UNJLC as a virtually organized inter-
agency facility 
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7.4.4.1   Strategic Building Blocks 
Trust. Since UNJLC’s inception, its architect and the Core Unit engaged in trust building 
activities. During the institutionalization process, the numerous socialization opportunities 
created by UNJLC deployments (secondments, coordination efforts, etc.) as well as the 
UNJLC Core Unit in its caretaker function (UNJLC training sessions and coordination 
meetings) allowed for the nurturing of personal relationships and development of trust. To 
ensure stakeholder buy-in, the UNJLC managed to dispel any doubts about the logistics 
ambitions of the UNJLC. To further consolidate trust, it invited organizations to get 
actively involved in setting the direction and agenda of the UNJLC through secondments 
to the UNJLC Core Unit and its deployments. 
Direction. The UNJLC is held together by the shared vision and values of those 
organizations committed to emergency relief that recognize the need for intensified 
logistics coordination during large-scale emergencies. The facility is configured to support 
two response models: inter-agency logistics coordination only or coordination plus asset 
management. 
Communication. Communication is as important to the UNJLC as it is to any other 
organization. The UNJLC was quick in realizing the importance of prior communication 
and marketing for its success. However, it was slow in implementing a communication 
campaign and as a result suffered during its initial deployments.  
The UNJLC communication campaigns address a select audience. They aim to raise 
awareness around the concept with key stakeholders, instill the feeling of ownership 
among web members and raise financing for UNJLC operations. They are not meant to 
gain visibility with the general public as that may overshadow the fund raising outreach of 
operational agencies. 
Before any UNJLC deployment, to create the right expectations and ensure cooperation at 
the operational level, the UNJLC staff sensitize and inform relevant parties on the UNJLC 
concept by visiting countries potentially involved and affected by the crisis. To avoid 
misunderstandings and ensure cooperation right from the outset, the UNJLC takes time to 
consult with and brief local and neighbouring country authorities, NGOs as well as the 
representatives of UN agencies on the concept and mandate of the UNJLC. 
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For example, prior to the Iraq crisis, the UNJLC toured the Middle East to apprise relevant 
parties - donors, local authorities, field and headquarter staff of the UN system in general 
and the humanitarian agencies in particular - on the UNJLC concept. Concurrently, each 
participating organization is responsible for enhancing the understanding of the UNJLC 
concept within its own organization and network of contacts.  
It is worth mentioning that unlike emerging disasters, for natural disasters the UNJLC may 
not have the time to advise relevant parties on the UNJLC concept. As such, it may fail to 
create the right expectations. This can compromise the desired level of cooperation at the 
field level at least during the early phases.  
To create awareness around and train the logistician constellation on the concept paving 
the road to secondments, the UNJLC engages in systematic training sessions for 
humanitarian and donor logisticians.  
To ensure a smooth withdrawal, the UNJLC is expected to communicate its exit strategy 
and timing to its clients advising them of the authority or structure that will continue 
providing services still in demand. The UNJLC has not always been successful in 
implementing - planning and communicating - a smooth withdrawal. For example during 
the Afghanistan crisis, it stayed beyond the emergency phase and faced some difficulties in 
ending its presence (see section 7.2.3.2). In addition, given the lack of an appropriate 
national structure able to take over services provided by the UNJLC, it had to discontinue 
some of the services still in demand. 
Leadership.  To ensure the relevance of the facility to the humanitarian community, a 
dynamic leadership was essential in developing the facility’s mission; defining its culture, 
procedures and processes;  marketing the concept among organizations committed to 
emergency relief; remaining connected and receptive to the challenges and opportunities 
facing the concept; and formalizing the lessons learnt exercise through independent 
UNJLC reviews. 
At the outset, to overcome agency skepticisms and achieve his vision, the Head of the 
UNJLC, David Kaatrud used his social contracting skills and social capital - obligation, 
trust, gratitude, liking and friendships. He concurrently institutionalized the UNJLC 
concept through IASC and ensured the participation and buy-in of key humanitarian 
organizations.  
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With no cargo of its own to move, Kaatrud highlighted the neutral nature of the UNJLC. 
He emphasized the capability of the UNJLC to task scarce resources, set priorities and 
coordinate operations in full acknowledgment and respect of individual agency logistics 
structures and systems. To market and ensure adherence to the concept, he created 
socializing and networking opportunities in form of formal and informal meetings and 
training sessions. By using his social capital and a series of tactics like institutionalizing 
the UNJLC through the IASC, he legitimized a concept that went beyond the boundaries of 
WFP and entailed the involvement of a diverse set of stakeholders.  
To broaden UNJLC’s donor base, he invited donor representatives to the UNJLC training 
sessions and made informal and formal presentations in relevant donor capitals. He 
leveraged his social capital with donor institutions and humanitarian organizations to 
mobilize human, financial and physical resources. He saw the contribution that quarterly 
inter-agency UNJLC meetings could make in terms of instilling a culture of cooperation, 
promoting trust, ensuring an ongoing dialogue between the logistics personnel of the 
respective agencies.  
To build the necessary confidence in the concept and prove its validity, he assumed a 
decisional role in the activation and design process of UNJLC deployments. He led the 
most challenging deployments including the Afghanistan and 2003 Iraq crisis. He inspired 
his logistician colleagues to identify the value added of UNJLC deployment in emergency 
response. He continuously sought for and responded to new niche sectors where the 
UNJLC could play a role, overcome a capability gap. This was with a view to augment the 
effectiveness of the whole response apparatus. For example, prompted by the UN 
Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq, he responded to the need for a combined approach to 
the sourcing of fuels during large-scale crises. 
For close to two years, on top of his responsibilities as Head of Logistics of WFP, Kaatrud 
acted as the architect, caretaker as well as the lead operator of the UNJLC. He started to 
distance himself from the concept only after its institutionalization by the IASC, handing 
over the role of the caretaker to the Head of the Core Unit. Indeed, as the concept matured 
and developed, the managerial roles became more delineated and were performed by 
people with different talents, expertise and skill sets. The new Head of the Core Unit 
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continued to nurture, strengthen and expand the UNJLC virtual web. He worked towards 
the “internalization” of the concept by all the virtual web members. He also took the lead 
in the design and formation of UNJLC operations and addressed areas for improvement.  
The dynamic and able leadership of UNJLC’s architect ensured the institutionalization of 
the UNJLC concept in a complex, multi-actor industry. Good leadership has contributed in 
building the credibility and reputation of the facility among donors, governments, military 
forces, humanitarian and development organizations. Leadership has been equally 
important in UNJLC deployments at both the focal and antenna level. 
Organizational Identification. At its inception, the UNJLC concept did not have a 
definable, distinguishable physical location or legal status. In order to be recognized as a 
distinct facility, a UNJLC logo was adopted. At the operational level, the UNJLC logo 
supported the identification of member organizations and their employees with the 
concept. At the conceptual level, it helped the market associate the UNJLC services and 
products with the facility. Currently, the Core Unit as well as each deployment use the 
logo. As the UNJLC builds its reputation, the logo helps it maintain its profile as provider 
of niche services.  
Aware of the importance of agency visibility for fund raising purposes, the UNJLC 
assumes a low profile. It does not apply its own logo on the relief items of the assisted 
organizations. This helps smaller organizations to develop their brand and credibility with 
donors, media, concerned governments and other relevant parties. As an inter-agency 
mechanism, the UNJLC Core Unit and deployments rely heavily on long and short-term 
secondments. Secondments are the second vehicle through which organizations reinforce 
their feeling of ownership and identification with the facility as well as ensure their 
proactive involvement in the development of the concept. 
The UNJLC culture is determined by the interaction of three interrelated organizational 
cultures all of which in continuous evolution. The cultures of each contributing 
organization, the Core Unit and each UNJLC deployment influence that of the UNJLC. 
The organizational culture of each UNJLC deployments is closely interrelated to that of 
the Core Unit, previous deployments and the staffing profile of each structure.    
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7.4.4.2   Operational Aspects 
Finance. In its custodian role, WFP is responsible for the mobilization of the requisite 
resources for each UNJLC deployment. The Core Unit leverages the standby agreements 
and partnerships of WFP with other organizations in order to mobilize external assets, 
services and personnel. For example, if agencies fall short in providing the required human 
resources, it is WFP/UNJLC’s responsibility to bridge the gap. The UNJLC addresses the 
shortage of expertise by recruiting external consultants or leveraging the WFP stand-by 
arrangements with a range of institutions.  
To raise funding, the UNJLC has been fighting an uphill battle. Donors are generally 
reluctant to fund intangible activities such as preparedness and coordination. The UNJLC 
had to promote the concept and built its credibility with operational donors that finance 
logistics activities. It paid regular visits to donors and briefed them on the progress and 
activities of the UNJLC. To improve their understanding of the UNJLC, it invited them to 
the UNJLC training sessions.  
Agile Workforce.  For the UNJLC to operate, the availability of a readily deployable pool 
of emergency professionals is essential. To ensure the availability of sufficient technical 
expertise at the outset of a disaster, the UNJLC has worked on three fronts. Firstly, the 
UNJLC Core Unit staff constitute a reserve capability. Secondly, the UNJLC conducts 
training sessions for agency logisticians with a view to develop a solid roster of 
logisticians enhancing its deployment capability and capacity. Lastly, realizing the 
limitation of asking web members to volunteer staff on a part-time basis, the UNJLC has a 
cost-recovery mechanism to fund full secondments augmenting overall human resources 
available.  Given the fluctuating mix of skills needed for each deployment, the UNJLC 
leverages WFP standby agreements with a number of organizations part of the virtual web: 
donor agencies, NGOs as well as the private sector. It also tries to ensure the cooperation 
of other organizations with complementary skills.  
The quality and competence of the UNJLC teams is crucial for its success. The UNJLC 
deployments build on the skills, initiative and flexibility of a small team of specialists, 
each with their own unique contribution. People seconded to the UNJLC need not only 
excel in their areas of expertise but also have other skills. These include the ability to sense 
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shifts and process new information quickly, self-manage and take decisions in real time 
without referring back to management. In terms of inter-personal relationships, they have 
to communicate effectively, interact within and across teams in a continuously evolving 
manner. They also have to work and get along with people from different cultures under 
difficult circumstances. Given the importance of domestic collaboration and input 
throughout relief operations, they also have to have the capability to quickly build 
relationships with key national players. 
Given the temporary and dynamic nature of UNJLC deployments, staff seconded to the 
focal or antenna offices is mobile and often exposed to team changes. As such, it needs to 
have the emotional skill of giving up human relationships and a given working 
environment and culture and to become quickly operational in a new one.  
The transition from organization to the UNJLC does raise adaptation problems for 
seconded staff. They have to rise to the challenge of adapting to different cultures. Without 
the physical vicinity and support of their families, co-workers and superiors, they have to 
remain motivated and focused in extreme conditions: isolation, insecure and difficult living 
conditions. They have to be able to prioritize their responsibilities and remain connected to 
shifting and evolving objectives. To monitor on the well-being of the staff and ensure 
adequate “awareness” of the activities of the different units, during a deployment, the 
UNJLC organizes regular one-day debriefing meetings.  
Business Processes. In 2001, the UNJLC started to develop a Field Operations Manual. 
The Manual is a living document, continuously enriched by lessons learnt from each 
deployment. It provides a set of guidelines and defines an operational and flexible 
framework for UNJLC deployments. For it to be effective, a growing number of inter-
agency agreements and training sessions back it up. 
For example, to react swiftly, the Activation Protocol and the availability of flyaway kits 
support the UNJLC activations. In terms of secondments, given the lack of standard short-
term secondment procedures and related documentation in the UN, the UNJLC formulated 
its own pro forma secondment agreements with each major agency. However, it needs to 
do more. For example, to ensure a higher inter-agency participation and to speed up the 
recruitment and remuneration process, seconding agencies have asked the UNJLC to 
address issues related to after-secondment services. That is, they have asked the UNJLC to 
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provide them with a feedback on the performance and experience of the seconded staff. To 
ensure quality secondments, the UNJLC needs to address issues related to staff selection 
and induction.  
Support Infrastructure. The contribution of ICT was not fundamental at the genesis of 
the UNJLC concept as the word “Centre” used during the Eastern Zaire crisis suggests. 
However, today, coordination and cooperation between geographically dispersed teams 
and the UNJLC antenna structure would be unimaginable without the use of modern ICT.   
To ensure coordination and timely exchange of information and knowledge, the UNJLC 
has assumed the information broker function. It has established a specific, cost-effective 
mechanism - the UNJLC website - to encourage inter-organizational exchanges.  
More specifically, the UNJLC consolidates invaluable information scattered amongst 
various agencies as well as use its own sources. After collecting, analyzing and processing 
information, the UNJLC issues a series of generic and thematic information bulletins 
accessible to the public at large on its website at no cost. The systematic feedback that it 
receives from site visitors helps it further develop the content of the website and ensure the 
quality and relevance of the information posted. 
The UNJLC Core Unit performs the function with the technical support of WFP. Indeed, 
WFP, the UNJLC’s host institution has invested most in the relationship and success of the 
UNJLC concept by providing the support infrastructure and systems. With the in-kind 
support of WFP in terms of finance, administration, communication and IT services, the 
UNJLC has built its support infrastructure.  
Service Design. The boundaries of the UNJLC concept in terms of mission and vision 
have evolved and have been responsive to emerging opportunities and challenges. As the 
potentials of the concept unraveled deployment after deployment, so did its application. 
Today, the UNJLC provides a wide range of options from advisory services such as 
assessment of existing inter-agency logistics coordination mechanisms for on-going 
emergency operations to surgical interventions and full-blown deployments.  
Initially, the UNJLC services such as logistics assessments by virtue of building on WFP 
logistics expertise tended to be WFP-oriented. WFP often moves huge tonnage of limited 
product types such as grain while other agencies deal with a wide and diverse set of food 
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and Non-Food Items (NFIs), some in small volumes. Goods such as medicines require a 
more complex supply chain (e.g., cold storage) and different receiving capability at 
destination, a perspective that UNJLC assessments had to cover. To address the more 
complex logistics requirements of those agencies moving small volumes of a wide and 
diverse set of food and NFIs, the UNJLC Core Unit welcomed the secondment of an expert 
from UNHCR. 
More recently, the UNJLC tries to ensure that its services and solutions are not oriented 
toward the needs of larger humanitarian organizations but that they are in line with the 
inter-agency nature of the facility. As such, the Core Unit and the deployment are typically 
staffed with a multi-organizational team of experts seconded by the UNJLC virtual web 
members. To address the concerns of its constituencies and to remain relevant to users, the 
UNJLC logistics skill set aims to support the logistics activities of a wide range of 
agencies. Indeed, the UNJLC remains valid as long as its services meet the diverse needs 
of its users. 
The UNJLC assumed its information broker function in 2001. In the context of the 
Afghanistan crisis, it developed its first emergency-specific website. Since then, for each 
emergency, the UNJLC creates a new folder on its website (www.unjlc.org) to host 
information on a wide range of crisis specific logistics-related information.  
The UNJLC outgrew its initial emergency response mandate when it started to lead the 
preparedness and joint contingency planning effort of the humanitarian community for 
complex and emerging crises. Its involvement in contingency planning started during its 
second term in Afghanistan as a means to respond to the needs of the population during the 
winter season. It showed its full potential in response to the 2003 Iraq crisis. The 
contingency planning efforts help the humanitarian community better address the needs of 
the assisted population and allow the UNJLC better prepare for its own deployment.  
More recently, in the context of complex emergencies, the UNJLC started to address 
“orphan” logistics issues not covered by any agency mandate at a technical level. For 
example, within its 2003 Iraq operation, the UNJLC activated a specialized cell to address 
the logistics “orphan issue” of fuels. As the availability of fuels affects humanitarian 
operations and the population, the UNJLC fuel cell ensures a combined as opposed to 
individual approach to its sourcing. In the 2003 Iraq and subsequent crises where a fuels 
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cell was activated, the needs of the entire humanitarian community were addressed with a 
view to achieve economies of scale, consistency of supply and logistical flexibility. 
Moreover, by addressing supply related orphan issues such as fuels, the UNJLC mitigates 
against logistics failure modes. 
To keep the facility on track - demand driven as well as relevant and responsive to user 
requirements - the UNJLC seeks independent and objective feedback on its services and 
performance from relevant stakeholders. It also tries to anticipate and quickly detect, 
analyze and understand changes. The facility has evolved in response to new demands, 
learnt from each deployment and was receptive to the concept’s potentials.  
Since the UNJLC does not interfere with the logistics operations of any organization, its 
logistics services contribute in a modular way to the logistics activities of the assisted 
organizations; assets and expertise are interlocked seamlessly in their respective systems. It 
is important to mention that because the UNJLC is aware of the importance of agency 
visibility for fund raising purposes, it assumes a low profile. It does not apply its own logo 
on the relief items of the assisted organizations. This helps smaller organizations to 
develop their brand and credibility with donors, media, concerned governments and other 
relevant parties. 
 
7.4.5    Risks and Opportunities Facing the UNJLC 
This section elaborates on the operational risks and market opportunities facing the 
UNJLC. After a general discussion, section 7.4.5.1 discusses the contribution of extra-
organizational linkages created by the UNJLC in the political and economic recovery of 
Afghanistan. Section 7.4.5.2 illustrates the potentially adverse effects of the UNJLC extra-
organizational linkages on the humanitarian space by discussing the impact of the 
unexpected collaboration with the Coalition’s Restore Iraqi Oil (RIO) during the 2003 Iraq 
conflict.  
From the organizational perspective, the UNJLC has to carefully manage its relationship 
with WFP, the host institution of the UNJLC Core Unit. While a rotating custodianship of 
the UNJLC Core Unit could have been a solution to the management and control-related 
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issues, it was not been pursued given the lack of supplementary and appropriate 
capabilities at the other humanitarian agencies. Notwithstanding its dependence on WFP 
financial, technical and administrative support, the UNJLC has endeavoured to ensure the 
neutrality and autonomy of the facility. It has also avoided competing with the logistics 
operations of those humanitarian organizations it serves.  
An increased reliance on UNJLC services such as logistics-related information by the 
humanitarian organizations and local authorities is a real threat. An undue dependency can 
translate in the need for the UNJLC to be deployed across the board, that is, in all 
emergencies, rather than selectively in large-scale emergencies where there is a concrete 
need for intensified coordination. To avoid indiscriminate deployment and with a view to 
help guard the operational independence of humanitarian organizations, the UNJLC does 
not replace the logistics operations of any organization as they continue to manage their 
own logistics activities. Moreover, it helps them in strengthening their logistics 
capabilities.  
To limit fixed cost and loss of efficiency caused by dispersed workplaces, the UNJLC 
often opts for the co-location solution. For example, existing UN or host country 
institution infrastructure house the focal UNJLC and its antenna offices.  
To avoid across-the-board activation, the UNJLC resists deployment in circumstances 
whereby the facility does have a comparative advantage but its involvement is not 
essential. For example, it argues for coordination to be internalized when an emergency 
involves the intervention of two main agencies. Likewise, when a relief operation is 
largely uni-sectoral, for instance food, it recommends the lead agency to assume the 
coordination role. During the Cote d’Ivoire crisis, for instance, where there were good 
local capabilities and only one bottleneck, the facility took on an advisory role. By 
ensuring the activation of the UNJLC only in big acute emergencies with significant 
logistics challenges, coordination for coordination sake is avoided (Kaatrud et al., 2003).  
As an emergency response facility, the UNJLC deployment network is demobilized with 
the initiation of rehabilitation activities. To ensure a successful handover, services still in 
demand are transferred to viable logistics coordination structures. In some circumstances, 
to maximize the sustainability of its interventions and ensure the transfer of responsibilities 
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and functions to national entities, the UNJLC engages in the training of local government 
personnel.  
UNJLC is subject to mission creep if, after achieving its primary objective, it is not 
dismantled. For example, past the emergency phase, the scale of the humanitarian needs in 
Afghanistan remained significant. The Afghan community, subject to too many 
disruptions, longed for continuity and resisted the dismantling of valued facilities such as 
the UNJLC.  To respond to the needs of the prolonged emergency, the UNJLC, recognized 
for its logistics expertise, continued its activities for another year. The presence of the 
UNJLC in Afghanistan beyond the normal six months weakened its ability to remain 
focused on its humanitarian mandate. By responding effectively to structural logistics gaps 
and supporting key government functions, it began to suffer from its own success.  
The UNJLC responded effectively in this highly politicized crisis. During this period, it 
moved away from its core mandate. In the absence of a properly functioning government 
structure, UNJLC engaged in capacity building activities in some areas such as snow 
removal, road repairs and river engineering. But most importantly it assisted the interim 
government in two major non-humanitarian projects as well as coordinating the country’s 
road rehabilitation effort. As it got involved in the country’s most strategic nation-building 
initiatives from the logistics perspective, an internal debate on its boundaries and mandate 
initiated. This nimble and adaptable mechanism showed that it was prone to mission creep 
to the point that the UNJLC architect, caretaker and lead operators discussed the dangers 
of a mission creep to future UNJLC operations among themselves and with key 
stakeholders. 
In the context of humanitarian relief operations, market opportunities are referred to as 
“orphan issues”. The UNJLC has had the opportunity to address “orphan” logistics issues 
not covered by any agency mandate at a technical level. For example, within its 2003 Iraq 
operation, the UNJLC activated a specialized cell to address the logistics “orphan issue” of 
fuels, which otherwise would have remained unaddressed.  
In large-scale emergencies the availability of fuels affects humanitarian operations as well 
as the afflicted population. To gear up with the challenge of a combined as opposed to 
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individual approach to its sourcing by the humanitarian community repeatedly, the UNJLC 
has taken steps towards the institutionalization of the cell within the UNJLC structure.  
Some UNJLC services may be relevant not only to its members but other stakeholders. 
Relevance of the services may go well beyond the emergency period which may call for 
their transfer to viable ex-novo structures.  
 
7.4.5.1   The UNJLC in Afghanistan 
During its Afghan deployment, the UNJLC continued to change and adapt to new 
operational obstacles as they arose. As logistics problems shifted inside the country, so did 
UNJLC activities. It also anticipated major bottlenecks, as highlighted by the winterization 
strategy.  
After the fall of the Taliban regime in early 2002, to pave the way for a democratically 
elected government and economic stability, the interim government of Afghanistan with 
foreign assistance engaged in two nation building activities: the Loya Jirga and the 
currency exchange exercise. The first initiative was to lead to the election of the new 
Afghan government. The second one aimed to collect and destroy 4,000 MT of old Afghan 
banknotes and distribute 800 million new Afghan banknotes. The currency exchange 
exercise was crucial to the stabilization of the country as it would assist Afghanistan to 
break away from the prevailing dollarized economy, build consumer confidence and pave 
the way for political unity. 
These two initiatives required considerable on-site logistics planning and execution 
capabilities. As government and institutions had “disappeared”, the only structure that 
could provide some support in this direction was the UNJLC. After carefully weighing the 
political and economic benefits of each proposed activity in terms of peaceful, secure and 
stable environment for humanitarian logistics operations, it decided to extend its support to 
these two non-humanitarian activities.  
The country’s war-shattered infrastructure and limited transportation assets posed huge 
logistical challenges. As for the currency exchange exercise, the UNJLC assisted the 
Central Bank of Afghanistan in the management of three distinct supply chains: the 
recovery and destruction of the old Afghan notes, receipt and distribution of new Afghan 
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notes and transport of observers and inspectors. The involvement of the UNJLC allowed 
for the changeover exercise to be completed within the established period of two months.  
As far as the three-stage Loya Jirga election process is concerned, it provided air, surface 
and general logistics assistance by planning and flying around candidates, delegates and 
personnel across the country. It delivered cargo such as tents and furniture to election 
centers. It got involved in the selection, organization and on-site logistics support of the 
election and gathering sites.  Once the elections were over, it organized the return of the 
participants, demobilized the election infrastructure and recovered or redistributed the 
equipment. 
During the Afghanistan crisis, the UNJLC’s coordinating role expanded to encompass the 
donor community. To help the development of a common UN strategy for the vital 
rehabilitation of Afghanistan’s road network, the UNJLC conducted a number of 
infrastructure survey projects. After assessing Afghan road conditions and traffic capacity, 
it helped the humanitarian community in submitting proposals for donor and Coalition 
funding. By organizing rehabilitation seminars, it facilitated interaction between the parties 
and helped prioritize and speed up repair interventions. 
 
Figure 7.11 – Logistics and Nation Building  
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during emergencies, risking a mission creep. By getting involved in non-humanitarian 
development activities of an economic and political nature, it almost infringed the 
humanitarian space. At the same time, it highlighted the existence of market opportunities 
in the area of logistics services past the emergency period and during the recovery phase. 
Figure 7.11 illustrates how logistics capability and resources apart from addressing a 
humanitarian crisis can assist in the economic recovery and political stabilization of a 
country. 
 
7.4.5.2   The UNJLC in Iraq 
The experience of the UNJLC during the 2003 Iraq crisis highlights the importance of 
logistics-related information in the political and economic stabilization of a country. 
During this crisis, for the first time a fuels cell was deployed within the UNJLC structure.   
The fuels cell was a nimble, neutral and informal setup staffed with few experienced 
emergency logistics operators and fuel specialists with regional and country knowledge. 
One of the key services provided by the cell was information on the availability and 
consumption of fuels in Iraq. In order to compile this information, the cell used a wide 
spectrum of information sources and interacted with a set of diverse actors. The UNJLC 
fuels cell team was able to address and predict the otherwise unexpected variations on the 
national fuels market. This thanks to its local knowledge and experience as well as 
consolidated ability in identifying logistics bottlenecks, preparing response plans for fluid 
situations and executing pre-positioning initiatives. 
 Although set up to address the particular needs of the humanitarian community and the 
population, the services of the UNJLC fuels cell became of value, resulted in a extra-
organizational linkages with the US Army Corps of Engineers’ Task Force, RIO. RIO was 
a well staffed and resourced structure with a mandate to restore Iraq’s crude output, oil 
refining capacity and fuel distribution ability to pre-conflict status. However, given its 
limited experience in addressing emergency situations in difficult settings and the inability 
to move freely on the territory, it leveraged the UNJLC fuels cell’s experience, expertise, 
knowledge and analytical capability to meet its goal. More specifically, it considered the 
information produced and provided by the cell as an input in its decision making process.  
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During the Iraq crisis, the UNJLC’s collaboration with RIO was an unexpected 
development. Once again, in the absence of any other development program or entity, the 
UNJLC went beyond its immediate mandate by assisting the interim authorities on a key 
issue affecting the political and economic stabilization of a country. By collaborating with 
an interim authority, it put under the limelight the importance of maintaining the 
humanitarian space in terms of neutrality.  
7.5   Summary 
This chapter provides background information on the UNJLC by describing its history,  
services, and structure through a number of deployments.  
The description confirms the contribution and usefulness of a logistics coordination 
platform in mitigating common and disaster-specific logistic failure modes that result in 
dependencies and duplications during disaster response. It highlights how a coordination 
platform can contribute to cost, time, accuracy and flexibility profile of a humanitarian 
organization’s disaster response operation. 
The UNJLC example provides some indication regarding the advantages and 
disadvantages of nesting the permanent structure, the secretariat of the virtual web, within 
the setup of a virtual web member. It provides some suggestions in terms of the profile of 
the most eligible organization especially in view of the latter’s expected infrastructure 
support role.  
A structural strength of the UNJLC is the possibility of quickly activating and 
demobilizing a series of temporary and interlinked offices during the project cycle. The 
function of these antenna offices is to support the activities of the humanitarian community 
as well as those who interact with it. Their advantage is that they result in a series of intra, 
inter and extra-organizational linkages. This chapter describes how the UNJLC as a virtual 
organization that activates a series of temporary, dynamic and flat focal and antenna 
structures staffed with seconded staff ensures a more effective and efficient response on 
the part of the humanitarian community during emergency response.   
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This chapter also explores the contribution of a range of strategic and operational factors to 
the successful operationalization and survival of the UNJLC in particular and the virtual 
organization in general. 
Finally, this chapter discusses the risks and opportunities facing the UNJLC. Although the 
facility has refined its mandate and operations by identifying gaps and providing useful 
services to the humanitarian community, it has resisted pressure from its members to 
engage in a wider mandate such as the review and harmonization of the humanitarian 
organizations’ supply chains. It has tried to keep its ambitions within its operational 
capabilities in order to remain a credible, reliable and manageable structure. However, in 
few occasions it got involved in non-humanitarian operations by assisting interim 
governments. Although the involvement of the UNJLC with interim forces during the 
Afghan and Iraq crises did not fireback or result in any adverse consequences for the 
facility, it has alerted the UNJLC to the potential drawbacks of such collaborations. 
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Chapter 8   WFP  
 
 
In this chapter, we present and discuss the results of our research at the World Food 
Program (WFP), the UN’s frontline humanitarian agency that addresses global hunger and 
food imbalances worldwide. The interviews were conducted from 2002 to 2004.  
The chapter is organized as follows. After an introductory note on the history, tools and 
activities of WFP, section 8.2 describes WFP’s response during a number of large scale 
disasters.  In December 2002, WFP entered into a formal partnership with TNT24 coined 
“Moving the World”. The partnership sealed through the signature of a MoU between the 
CEOs of TNT and WFP committed TNT to a five-year partnership and a yearly 
contribution of €5 million in services and cash. Section 8.3 describes the partnership from 
its inception to first year of implementation. Finally, section 8.4 discusses our findings in 
terms of disaster response at WFP and the benefits and risks of the WFP-TNT partnership. 
8.1   WFP  
World Food Programme (WFP) set up in 1963 is one of the largest providers of food to 
victims of natural and made-made disasters. In 2003, the organization moved 6.5 million 
metric tons of food by land, air and sea. On any given day of the year, it had 40 ships on 
the high seas, 20 planes in the air, and 5,000 trucks on the ground along with other 
transport means. It spent an average of €500 million yearly only on transport services. 
From an operational perspective, it operated effectively as it brought food to more than 
100 million people in more than 80 countries each year with only 7% overheads. 
Since 1995, WFP runs a specialized unit – the Augmented Logistics Intervention team for 
Emergencies (ALITE) – that provides a range of rapid emergency services to WFP field 
operations, augmenting resources available at the field level. The unit prepares logistics 
                                                 
24
  TNT is the €12 billion Dutch mail, express and logistics multinational provider that from 2002 until April 
2005 operated under the brand of TPG. Throughout this thesis, for ease of reference, we refer to the 
company as TNT. In 2002, TNT employed 161,000 people in 62 countries and served over 200 countries 
and territories by delivering global mail, express and logistics solutions through its Royal TNT Post, TNT 
Express and TNT Logistics divisions. 
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capacity assessments, deploys rapid response equipment, forges standby agreements, and 
provides guidance on civil-military cooperation. Its standby agreements with an increasing 
number of relevant governmental entities, NGOs and private sector donors complement 
WFP’s resources increasing its response capacity. WFP often establishes its own 
infrastructure – offices, warehouses and equipment for the management of its supply chain 
– in the field. In terms of response equipment, WFP mobilizes its own ICT support unit, 
the Fast Information Technology and Telecommunications Emergency Support team 
(FITTEST).WFP has a consolidated competence in logistics which is well recognized by 
the humanitarian community, donors and NGOs alike. Food, a constant need of afflicted 
populations, implies that WFP is present and mounts a significant operation in response to 
most emergencies. Compared to other humanitarian organizations, WFP usually has a 
significant in-country operational presence prior to the onset of an emergency. Given the 
fact that food makes up three-quarters or more of the relief traffic in most emergencies, 
over the years the organization has built substantial logistics capabilities. While most 
humanitarian agencies had their own logistics setup, WFP’s was the largest: 153 
logisticians, of which 30 in Rome. In addition, WFP manages various inter-agency 
services. It runs the Humanitarian Relief Depot (UNHRD) in Brindisi, Italy not only for 
itself but also OCHA, WHO, World Vision and certain Italian NGOs. It manages various 
United Nations Humanitarian Air Services (UNHAS). Before the UNJLC, organizations 
providers of small volumes of high value goods (i.e., medicine, seeds) such as WHO and 
FAO relied on WFP logistics advice and services.  
8.2   Disaster Response25 
In this section, we shall describe the role of WFP within the humanitarian community in 
the context of the 1996 Zaire, the 1999 Balkan and the 1999 East Timor crises. 
In 1996, the humanitarian community was faced by an overwhelming humanitarian crisis 
arising from the outbreak of civil war in Zaire, when over a million Rwandan refugees 
                                                 
25
  With permission from the authors this section reproduces without direct reference from the following 
INSEAD case study: Samii, R. & L. N. Van Wassenhove, “UNJLC: The Genesis of a Humanitarian Relief 
Coordination Platform”, INSEAD case study 04/2003-5093. 
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suddenly returned to their places of origin or moved deeper into the country. In early 
December 1996, the UN Multi-National Peacekeeping Force (UNMNF) arrived in 
Entebbe, Uganda. As an extension of its lead role in air logistics in this crisis, WFP, 
together with UNHCR and OCHA established an informal set-up at the Entebbe airport as 
a liaison point on logistics matters between the operational UN Agencies and the UNMNF. 
To facilitate operations, OCHA attached an expert on civil-military coordination to this 
body. As the involvement of the UNMNF in the region proved shorter than expected, the 
ad hoc set-up evolved into a coordination body dealing with a variety of humanitarian 
logistics planning and operational issues in the Great Lakes region. Staffed with 
representatives of the main UN Agencies and NGOs, it began to process information on 
and manage common logistics resources and operations for the three main UN operational 
Agencies – WFP, UNHCR and UNICEF – involved in the region.  
The massive movement and outflow of people in just a few days called for the immediate 
repositioning and re-routing of humanitarian goods by humanitarian organizations. To 
maximize the likelihood of food reaching people on the move, WFP considered all 
possible routes and entry points into the region. The identified routes had to be able to 
accommodate the move of high-volume food items. It was a tremendous challenge as the 
large mass of humanity to be assisted was moving in a remote area with little overland 
access. With few roads and no idea where people were, nor where they were heading, WFP 
had to plan its operations.  
Given the lack of infrastructure, WFP decided that the quickest way to reach the needy was 
through air deliveries to airfields near concentrations of the refugee populations. Within a 
short period the WFP team organized the arrival of a few large aircraft. It immediately 
started to fly food into the region ‘borrowing’ from its stocks available in the area for other 
operations. Within five days WFP trucks were delivering food flown in from stocks in 
neighboring countries. At the same time, WFP engaged in the time consuming alternative 
of transporting food items overland to remote areas using surface transportation (rivers and 
roads). To ensure the delivery of relief supplies to the refugees moving across Zaire, 
satellite offices were established at key logistics nodes. 
It was not long before WFP realized that only they and UNHCR had the necessary 
transport means to reach the refugees. The other UN Agencies such as UNICEF, WHO and 
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a number of NGOs (e.g. Oxfam, MSF, and World Vision) were having logistical problems. 
While other humanitarian organizations had to rely on the few, decrepit and dangerous 
roads and compete for the few local truck drivers, WFP and UNHCR, with their large and 
smaller aircraft, were moving cargo, refugees and their personnel around the region. It was 
there and then that WFP and UNHCR decided to pool and offer our excess air assets – 
cargo and passenger capacity – to each other. After obtaining donor acceptance, WFP and 
UNHCR aircraft used their excess return air capacity to move, respectively, refugees and 
food items in and out of the region.  
By mid-April 1997, WFP and UNHCR had reached an agreement. As the repatriation of 
refugees from Kisangani to Goma (Zaire) and later on to Rwanda took priority, WFP 
agreed to offer its air capacity to UNHCR by carrying refugees on its chartered aircraft 
(cargo in-refugee out arrangement). As a result during a seven-week period, over 40,000 
refugees were repatriated from Kisangani to Rwanda. Later on, when the requirements for 
cargo shipments to Kisangani increased, UNHCR aircraft (brought on line for refugee 
transportation) were used to transport WFP cargo.  
Asset sharing went beyond WFP and UNHCR. In order to survive, the refugees needed 
food (provided by WFP), medicine and medical care (e.g., to contain the outbreak of 
epidemic diseases), shelter, kitchen kits, clothing, etc. These were items typically furnished 
by other humanitarian organizations. Given the mismatch between capacity and cargo, 
intensified coordination was necessary, so that logistics assets could be pooled and 
transportation of different food and non-food items be prioritized.  
In 1998, WFP, UNICEF and UNHCR, through the WFP Nairobi regional office, pooled 
resources and coordinated their air and surface response to the Somalia floods, a small-
scale emergency on the Kenya-Somalia border area.  
In the spring of 1999 the Balkan crisis broke out, causing mass movement of refugees from 
Kosovo to Albania and Macedonia. The scale of this crisis took the international 
community by surprise but very soon a massive relief effort was underway with a large 
number of humanitarian actors flooding the region with supplies in an often uncoordinated 
manner. Throughout the crisis, a WFP staff seconded to a cell installed in the UNHCR 
premises in Geneva, coordinated ‘strategic’ air assets with NATO forces that controlled 
the region’s airspace.  
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WFP’s air operation and logistics performance during the Balkan crisis had been excellent. 
When the East Timor crisis erupted at the end of 1999, there was interest to leverage these 
capabilities, not only to respond to the food aspect of the crisis, but also to the needs of 
other agencies and NGOs. WFP prepared a proposal — well funded by the donors — for 
the provision of a wide-range, comprehensive common logistics service that included 
passenger and cargo air services and sea movements from Darwin, Australia as well as in-
country air, trucking, coastal shipping and warehouse operations. Once WFP built up this 
infrastructure and assets, it started prioritizing and scheduling the humanitarian traffic.  To 
review plans and cargo movements, WFP organized weekly meetings for the logistics 
operators of the different agencies. To guide the operations and provide feedback to 
logistics planning, WFP offices at key logistics nodes collected and provided relevant 
information to humanitarian actors. WFP provided these services to some 40 humanitarian 
organizations for a three-month period. Although it was a small operation in terms of 
tonnage and population assisted, it was a particular one as the transport infrastructure of 
the island was completely burnt or removed. 
8.3    Business-Humanitarian Partnerships 
By 2007, more than 80 governments contributed to WFP operations. In 2006, private 
sector donors accounted for 2% of the organization’s budget (WFP, 2007). The major 
private sector donors were: Citigroup, DSM (a Netherland-base global life sciences 
corporation), the Dutch Postcode Lottery, TNT, Unilever, Vodafone Group 
Foundation/UN Foundation, and Yum! Brands. WFP counts also on a number of Corporate 
Supporters among which Boston Consulting Group, Credit Suisse, SAP, and Spencer 
Stuart. In the next section, we will present our research on the WFP-TNT ‘Moving the 
World’ Partnership. Based on information available on WFP website, in section 8.3.2, we 
briefly present Citigroup’s spearheaded initiative: The Emergency Network.  
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8.3.1   WFP-TNT ‘Moving the World’ Partnership26 
In 2002, Bakker, the CEO of TNT, laid the first stones of what was later on coined as 
“Moving the World” initiative. As a global player in the business of logistics, he felt that 
TNT had the moral obligation to help alleviate the suffering of people. To realize his 
vision - social and industry leadership - a team was put together to design and implement 
TNT’s first global corporate social responsibility program.  
Traditionally, TNT had sponsored local, unrelated and relatively small-scale social 
initiatives worldwide. For its new initiative, it wanted to undertake a program in line with 
its global presence so as to facilitate a unified worldwide campaign. Only a long-term 
global alliance with one partner would ensure such global impact as well as help the 
company appreciate the particular needs and add value to the operations of the assisted 
organization. 
To achieve a new level of staff enthusiasm, TNT had to come up with an initiative that had 
the potential to engage all of its 161,000 employees in the 62 countries of operation. To 
attract the attention and approval of its customers and financial markets, the initiative had 
to produce social impact. In terms of area of focus, social and humanitarian related issues 
were identified as more compatible with the company business line, brand image and 
objectives.  
TNT assessed that through a partnership with a humanitarian organization it could build a 
more engaging relationship with its employees worldwide, create stronger bonds with its 
customers and suppliers, and enhance its reputation globally. In the long run, its 
association with humanitarian organizations in emerging markets, largely unattended by 
the company, could facilitate future entry strategies.   Finally, the partnership could make a 
social difference as it aimed to leverage the company’s comparative advantage in logistics. 
After defining its strategy, TNT conducted desk research on the main humanitarian 
organizations’ reputation, value system, neutrality and track record. It then evaluated them 
                                                 
26
   With permission from the authors this section quotes or reproduces without direct reference from the 
following INSEAD case studies: Tomasini, R. M. & L. N. Van Wassenhove, “The TNT-WFP Partnership: 
Looking for a Partner” (06/2004-5187) and Samii, R. & L. N. Van Wassenhove, “The TNT-WFP 
Partnership: Learning How to Dance” (06/2004-5194). 
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against four criteria: organizational fit, interest and attitude, organizational effectiveness 
and geographic scope.  
Organizational fit was the most important criterion. As TNT intended to bring its logistics 
knowledge and capability, logistics had to occupy a central role in the selected 
organization. The mandate of the assisted organization had to be inspiring and its vision 
compelling; something that the TNT family and customers could be proud of. To ensure 
the highest return on dollars expended, TNT looked for organizational effectiveness and 
low overhead costs. Lastly, to achieve global impact, the selected partner had to have 
global presence and operations.  
TNT identified five finalists. After several interactions, two of the finalists withdrew.  
After completing a more detailed survey, TNT narrowed down the list to the two 
organizations with the most prominent logistics operations. The process ended with a face-
to-face meeting between the TNT CEO Bakker and James Morris, the Executive Director 
of WFP, during which the commitment of the WFP management to the partnership with 
TNT was positively assessed. 
WFP was a credible and capable UN agency with which TNT was able to share its 
comparative advantage, i.e., pool of logistics knowledge, resources, employees and 
network of relations. WFP’s mandate – the fight against global hunger – was a noble cause 
to be associated with. The cause had the potential to bring cohesiveness among the 
161,000 employees and allow for the direct application of job skills. In addition, WFP was 
considered a perfect fit as it ran its operations efficiently and was the humanitarian 
organization with the largest logistics operations in terms of scope and size. Last but 
certainly no least, its Executive Director, James Morris, could understand the potential 
value of a partnership with TNT in the area of logistics and was committed to its 
successful implementation. 
To convince its Board and ensure the validity of its new CSR vision, TNT assured the 
early involvement of relevant staff. It built a case around the requirements of the 
marketplace, industry peer pressure and its comparative advantage in logistics. It leveraged 
the Netherlands’ long history of active and generous humanitarian and development 
support, which translated into expectations from TNT in its home country. It pointed to 
studies that demonstrated the extent to which global financial markets reward those 
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companies engaged in successful CSR initiatives. At the industry level, it provided 
information on its competitors’ CSR programs.  
To bring content to the partnership, TNT asked WFP to organize a mission for key TNT 
and WFP staff to the field.  The group was taken to Tanzania where WFP’s activities 
include relief assistance to refugees and development activities for Tanzanian poor. WFP 
was asked to organize the visit without any special treatment for the TNT team. The visit 
lasted three days, and TNT and WFP brainstormed throughout on the possible content of 
their cooperation. They came up with five initiatives. The School feeding support and the 
private sector fundraising were ranked among the first initiatives identified by the two 
parties. The next two initiatives - emergency response (ER) and the joint logistics supply 
chain (JLSC) - were put on the agenda as a means to leverage TNT logistics and 
transportation expertise. WFP’s top management felt that their organization’s reporting 
and budgeting practices and systems required improvement. Hence a fifth initiative on 
transparency and accountability was laid out to address the administrative needs of the 
organization. 
Back at their respective headquarters, the two organizations hammered out the details of 
the partnership in terms of budget, objectives, and plans. On September 2, 2002, during the 
Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable Development, Morris and Bakker, in the presence of 
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, signed a letter of intent that set out the broad 
objectives of their five-year partnership. The joint logistics supply chain initiative, of 
particular interest to Bakker, was intended to address the logistics needs of the UN 
humanitarian community at large. This vision, put forward by Bakker and Morris to the 
Secretary-General, received full support. 
On December 19, 2002 the WFP-TNT partnership was officially launched with the signing 
of the Memorandum of Understanding that committed TNT to a yearly contribution of € 5 
million in services and cash for the next five years. Soon after, the partnership was referred 
to as the “Moving the World” partnership. 
 
 
 
The Five Initiatives 
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Private Sector Fundraising. When TNT approached WFP, its Private Sector Fundraising 
department was yet to be established. First contact was made in January 2002, and soon 
after some initial meetings, WFP was asked to prepare a business case to convince TNT 
that they would be their best partner. At that time WFP had no clear vision or strategy for 
its corporate fundraising activities; but it was ‘hungry’ for private sector funding. 
Moreover, it was not sure how to position itself with regards to potential private sector 
donors. Although WFP is the biggest humanitarian organization, it is also amongst the 
least known among the private sector. It felt that its low brand awareness was a real 
negative, and that TNT might find it less appealing as a corporate partner. What WFP had 
underestimated was the attractiveness of its logistics capability and its role among the 
humanitarian community to TNT.  As WFP prepared for the presentation, it was able to re-
focus on this strength through feedback from TNT. 
WFP is funded almost 100% through voluntary donations from governments. On average, 
it receives about 90% of its funding from just ten governments, with the US accounting for 
half. The growing challenges of increased emergencies meant the organization needed 
increased support, while becoming less dependent on so few donors. Corporate 
contributions had been marginal and mainly in-kind in response to emergencies. Morris 
was determined to change the situation and broaden WFP’s donor base. His target was to 
raise USD 100m in private sector funding in five years.  
  One of the first projects developed under the Private Sector Fundraising initiative was a 
needs-based approach to corporation fundraising. For research and analysis, TNT brought 
in a second major corporate partner, the Boston Consulting Group (BCG).  For three 
months, from March to May 2003, four BCG consultants worked together with WFP and 
TNT staff on corporate fundraising studies for WFP. Meanwhile, a team from TNT Post in 
the Netherlands analyzed the consumer fundraising potential for WFP. It soon became 
clear that WFP would not go ahead with consumer fundraising in the Netherlands and 
Italy, as initially suggested. WFP was not yet ready for such activity and the implied up-
front investment.  
However, the findings of the corporate fundraising study highlighted the increasing interest 
of corporations to donate services and assets to humanitarian organizations as opposed to 
cash. Since WFP could not consider corporations as strong sources for cash, it had to go a 
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step further in identifying which corporations could best help WFP achieve its mandate, 
objectives and how. With the help of BCG, WFP developed questionnaires to identify 
operational and administrative needs.  The survey, conducted in the field offices and HQ, 
highlighted seven main categories of need, which were first matched with specific 
industries and then to a list of potential companies to be targeted. The results also brought 
up the issue of control and usefulness. WFP realized that just because a corporation was 
willing to offer its services to it for free, it was not obliged to accept since it should be the 
other way around. WFP should first identify its need and then bring in a partner with the 
specific skills and expertise to help it out. This approach also served to eliminate 
unnecessary competition between different corporations. 
From September 2003 onward, WFP started to approach a number of corporations. It also 
intended to leverage TNT and BCG CEO-level contacts in order to mobilize a dozen good 
corporate partners in fields relevant to its needs.  
With the addition of BCG as a second partner to WFP, the idea of a CEO Council 
developed. This Council was to provide a forum where WFP’s future corporate partners 
would exchange ideas on how to best contribute in strategic and complementary ways to 
WFP.  
Transparency & Accountability Initiative. Put on the partnership agenda by WFP 
management, the transparency and accountability initiative initially aimed only at better 
and sharper financial reporting. To add more content to the initiative, in July 2002, a 
meeting was arranged between WFP and TNT. The discussion led to the identification of 
five areas of potential collaboration:  internal audit, HR, e-procurement, results-based 
budgeting, and project closure exercises. One of the tasks under this initiative, however, 
remained the establishment of the reporting structure for the partnership. After having 
reached an agreement with TNT, WFP had to ensure its buy-in from and its transfer to 
staff across the five initiatives. 
The sub-projects that were identified had different fates. The focus of the audit project 
shifted from TNT being directly involved in the auditing exercise to training and 
development of risk assessment models. While the e-procurement project was completely 
abandoned for reasons associated with WFP’s internal restructuring process, the HR sub-
project became almost an initiative in its own right. Apart from providing HR support to 
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the partnership, the department, together with TNT, identified three areas for joint 
collaboration and experience sharing. These included recruitment, performance 
management systems, and career development. In 2003 WFP looked at TNT’s graduate 
recruitment program, visited their management assessment center and got an insight into 
their management development courses. TNT also offered WFP a number of seats on their 
management courses run by the Rotterdam School of Management. In addition a number 
of recurring instead of one-off projects was lined up for 2004. The idea of creating a 
TNT/WFP website to enable employees to share information and experiences as well as to 
network with one another was also discussed. For specific and specialized HR expertise, 
however, WFP intended to look beyond TNT, whose core competence remained logistics.  
Twelve months into the partnership, the two sub-initiatives that had created a lot of 
excitement and had produced tangible deliverables were the results-based budgeting and 
project closure exercises. The zero-based budgeting exercise started as early as January 
2003. For a couple of months, TNT trained WFP headquarters and regional office staff in 
the new tools and techniques. All this was accomplished in time for the October 2003 
Board meeting when WFP presented its budget in its new format. “WFP greatly 
appreciated TNT’s assistance in developing its thinking and helping it catch up on the new 
ideas and concepts of reporting and budgeting. As a result of the exercise, the private 
sector fundraising unit could link and put a value on each element of our private sector 
fundraising biennial strategy. As for the project closure exercise, for two months two TNT 
Italy staff with SAP expertise and financial backgrounds joined WFP headquarters in 
Rome. The project achieved great results as WFP managed to close some 75 projects more 
quickly, enabling the organization to propose alternative uses for the unspent balances. 
While the transparency and accountability initiative was less ambitious in comparison to 
the others, it had produced quick, encouraging and much needed change. Help came to the 
areas in which WFP had to get its act together in any case. With the partnership it was able 
to achieve more, better and faster. TNT was the catalyst; they were there on the job 
working with WFP. 
School Feeding Support. The School Feeding Support initiative, close to Peter Bakker’s 
heart, aimed to engage TNT staff across geographies and lines of business. It was the only 
initiative which envisaged a direct and indirect cash contribution to WFP. The indirect 
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mechanism was linked to donations mobilized by TNT employees through cause-related 
fundraising activities which would in turn be matched up to a threshold of € 500,000 by 
the corporation. Central to TNT’s internal communication campaign, the initiative through 
the 161,000 TNT employees in 62 countries aimed to feed an equal number of children per 
year. 
The second component of the School Feeding Support initiative was the volunteer program 
that aimed to create internal TNT “storytellers” to motivate internal fundraising activities 
while assisting school feeding operations in the field. 
Volunteer programs were initiated in four relatively ‘safe’ countries in Africa, Asia, and 
Latin America (Cambodia, Nicaragua, Tanzania, and The Gambia) where WFP had on-
going school feeding programs. Following a week of intensive briefings organized by 
WFP on program activities, security issues and country briefings, two groups of eight TNT 
employees (2 per country) were deployed for their assignments. At the end of their stay, 
the volunteers returned to Rome for a debriefing and reintegration session.  
Each of the pilot teams worked with WFP country staff to complete needs assessment 
surveys that helped evaluate the types of small-scale complementary activities TNT staff 
were capable of providing. The balance was between finding practical and worthwhile 
activities that motivated the volunteers without overburdening the WFP field office or 
asking them to depart from their core operations. 
The three-month volunteer experience proved to be a life-changing event for most of the 
TNT volunteers with direct impact on the corporate internal fundraising schemes. The 
volunteers are the driving force behind their business units’ fundraising efforts for WFP’s 
school feeding program. Their field experience gave them credibility with their colleagues, 
motivated them to share their experiences and helped promote the Moving the World 
campaign. 
WFP had started to measure the benefits of the initiative and explore ways to improve 
coordination and communication. Given the satisfactory results of this first year of activity 
it was already looking forward to extending the initiative to at least one more country and 
other corporations and donor institutions. 
Logistics-Related Initiatives. Interestingly enough, the most challenging point in the 
process was to figure out where TNT could help with its logistics capability. Initially TNT 
301
LEVERAGING PARTNERSHPS: LESSONS FROM HUMANITARIAN 
ORGANIZATIONS 
 
 
301
did not fully grasp the scope of WFP’s logistics activities, given the differences in context 
as well as the type of material handled. While WFP dealt primarily with bulk quantities of 
food, a perishable commodity, TNT’s logistics was geared to move smaller, non-food 
parcel items. It was not clear how they were to help as a partner in the organization’s 
emergency planning, preparedness and response efforts. 
The partners were less advanced in the two logistics initiatives than envisaged also as a 
result of the Iraq emergency. The Iraq emergency was WFP’s biggest humanitarian 
operation ever, involving 25% of it international staff.  
The partnership was a first for both WFP and TNT: WFP had never worked with the 
private sector and TNT had never engaged with a humanitarian organization. While the 
love was there, the partners had to learn to live with each other. Differences were 
particularly felt in terms of working rhythms and decision making processes. At WFP 
decisions could have political dimensions, in sharp contrast with the private sector driven 
by business rationale. The level of manager accountability was very different between the 
two organizations, leading to decisional delays. Another barrier was the language. TNT 
has a clear business language, while WFP’s is full of UN and humanitarian specific jargon 
with its own set of acronyms. This led to unnecessary misunderstandings. 
Clearly there were a number of major differences between the partners’ operational context 
and markets. WFP is logistically active in areas and countries like Iraq, war-torn and 
insecure, in which TNT is unlikely to operate. While the commercial sector is cost-
focused, WFP’s operational settings are typically very different and difficult. To get 
supplies to the most remote areas we may have to resort to a range of imaginative and 
unconventional delivery systems such as air dropping. WFP’s logistics is shaped by a 
mixture of expediency and cost-effectiveness. It is obliged to deliver life-saving food in an 
urgent manner at any cost. After the initial emergency phase and in its more routine 
operations, however, it strives to be as cost effective as possible, as each dollar saved in 
overheads and transport is in effect a dollar more for food for the beneficiaries. 
Compared to WFP, TNT was impatient to push forward with the logistics initiatives. This 
ran the risk of rushing into projects that may not have necessarily been a priority for WFP. 
For example introducing an unmanageable set of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) in 
Mozambique or translating everything into financial terms did not necessary solve or 
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address WFP’s day-to-day problems. WFP’s business is about saving lives, while TNT’s 
culture rotates around financial reporting and profit. An effort had to be made by both 
parties to see how TNT, by bringing its expertise, could help WFP save more lives.  
Twelve months into the partnership TNT and WFP shared the view that any undue 
dependency - budgetary or otherwise - on TNT should be avoided and that they should 
identify and undertake activities with distinct deliverables. During the first year the 
partners also realized that there was potential overlap between the two logistics initiatives. 
It was important to carefully review the proposed activities to ensure their attribution to the 
most appropriate initiative. To assist in the day-to-day management of these two initiatives 
and ensure proper level of interaction with TNT, WFP employed two dedicated staff.   
Joint Logistics Supply Chain (JLSC).  At the time of the partnership, WFP’s inter-agency 
logistics role was in evolution. In mid-2000, Bakker had taken his vision of WFP 
becoming the sole logistics service provider to the humanitarian community to a high level 
meeting with the UN Secretary-General and WFP’s Executive Director. Meanwhile, WFP 
logisticians and the humanitarian logistics community at large had been looking at their 
logistics activities since the mid-1990s. Given the range of activities which ‘logistics’ 
encompassed in the UN, there was no consensus that full integration was necessarily more 
cost-effective than improved co-ordination between the agencies. In their enthusiasm and 
private sector mind-set, TNT wanted quick decisions and results on this initiative without 
fully appreciating the political sensitivities at play among donor countries, recipient 
governments and humanitarian agencies. In addition, the humanitarian logistics 
community in itself quite was diverse, ranging from UN agencies such as WFP to the Red 
Cross Movement and international and national NGOs. WFP’s view was that its internal 
logistics capabilities required significant upgrading to properly execute its own mandate 
before assuming additional inter-agency responsibilities. WFP took a pragmatic approach. 
It started to improve upon select WFP logistics activities such as aviation and reserve stock 
management, building the option for the organization to assume greater inter-agency 
logistics responsibilities in these very areas in the future. Concurrently, through the 
initiative, it aimed at improved inter-agency co-ordination in critical areas such as fleet 
management. 
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As fleet management and warehousing were aspects of inter-agency logistics that were 
conceptually accessible to TNT, WFP’s logistics department gave TNT several 
presentations on its operations in the context of developing countries.27 During the first 
joint meeting, WFP got the impression that TNT was less than enthusiastic about fleet 
management, making it a closed topic. There was an initial view that fleet management 
was more of a back office type of support and hence not as visible as the more flashy airlift 
support. However, through continual discussion, TNT realized the significant impact their 
expertise could bring in terms of cost-savings by introducing greater efficiencies.  
As far as its fleets are concerned, WFP did not always know what the total consolidated 
cost of its fleets was. Although it understand their importance, KPIs are just not so relevant 
when you need expensive solutions to get the food to beneficiaries. However, if WFP 
vehicles as well as those of all humanitarian organizations ran more effectively during 
emergencies then the community would have multiplied its outreach and speed of delivery.  
One of the first projects under this initiative was the adaptation and simplification of the 
fleet management software to the requirements of developing countries. WFP spent time 
preparing and briefing the first TNT expert assigned to the project in Sierra Leone. Despite 
the long-term perspective of the partnership, TNT seconded staff on a short-term basis. 
Given the long term nature of assistance sought this high turnover raised a number of 
issues. Every new person implied that experience and understanding had been lost and that 
she/he needed to be brought up to speed to our working environment, which is quite 
different from that of business in the developed world in terms of access to modern 
technology and systems. The problem of continuity had to be addressed to ensure that 
value was created and retained by calling upon TNT resources compared to one-off 
consulting services. A TNT staff cross training solution was adapted to ensure knowledge 
sharing between the incoming and outgoing TNT personnel. 
In October 2003, TNT assisted in the organization and facilitation of the Fleet Forum 
driven by WFP, World Vision and IFRC for some 26 humanitarian UN organizations and 
NGOs. It was a breakthrough event. Until recently all agencies had been concerned about 
                                                 
27
  Each humanitarian agency had its own independent strategy for fleet and warehouse management. The 
separate and agency-specific warehouses and different types and makes of vehicles across and within given 
geographies had increased the level of complexity as well as the cost of maintenance at the agency as well as 
aggregate level. 
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their level of visibility. More recently, people working for the sector respected each others 
capabilities and country knowledge making cooperation much easier.  TNT’s role went 
beyond the event itself. By consolidating the data and information exchanged during the 
forum, it was to help put inter-agency ideas (such as the possibility of joint purchase of 
vehicles) into motion. 
The second project with inter-agency application was a TNT study on in-house vehicle 
maintenance versus outsourcing (commercial sector). TNT was to bring its experience in 
materials, spare parts, and tyre management to help agencies decide, given the country 
context (quality and cost of services provided by the market) and the number of vehicles 
involved, on the optimal business decision. To gain the necessary experience and 
understand the differences between the ways WFP ran its operations compared to the 
commercial sector, a TNT expert was fielded to Pakistan, a country in which WFP ran its 
in-house facility. 
On the warehousing side, TNT involvement was sought in the remodeling of the 
humanitarian warehouse operated by WFP in Brindisi, Italy. Members of TNT’s Italian 
business unit provided advice on optimal layout and saw these modifications through. The 
project produced practical quick wins. Improvement to the Brindisi warehouse was 
something WFP had to do in any case with external help. TNT’s involvement brought in 
necessary resources in addition to a neutral, external view. With this project WFP created 
significant and lasting benefits from the cost point of view as well as from efficiency 
perspectives. It took several more interactions before TNT’s logistics capability in the area 
of inventory tracking was taken on board by WFP in view of its increasing role as the 
logistics arm of UN humanitarian organizations for the movement of Food and Non-Food 
Items (NFIs). 
To allow for the identification of other sub-initiatives, WFP tried to help TNT connect to 
the United Nations Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC) concept. In the course of 2003, TNT 
supported the development of the UN Humanitarian Response Network (UNHRN) 
concept. UNHRN, an initiative initially driven by UNJLC, aimed towards developing a 
global, common and coherent emergency response strategy, within which various 
humanitarian agencies could set their own agenda.  
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Apart from providing technical assistance and modernizing the way WFP ran its fleets or 
managed its warehouses, TNT involvement brought leverage with other departments in the 
house. It also forced WFP to ask hard questions about its approach and operations from the 
technical as well as the administrative standpoint. It was felt that if managed with tact, an 
external force like TNT could help shake the organization and prepare it for broader and 
more sensitive issues. Given the slow pace of change in a large complex organization like 
WFP, a long-term partnership was believed to be more effective than a consultant to bring 
about change as apart from providing an objective diagnostic as a partner is usually there 
to help in the implementation of the solution.  
The partnership had been rich in terms of lessons learnt. Compared to the beginning, WFP 
had become more precise in terms of articulating its goal, work plans and the type of 
expertise and skills it required to tackle its challenges. The experience was valuable for 
future partnerships as WFP not only had a clearer understanding of its needs, but was also 
more prepared to verify whether the potential partner could adequately address them.  
The WFP logistics team concurred: after spending numerous months understanding each 
others’ requirements, the partnership was to produce substantial benefits during the 
following year as both parties were to push forward with a number of initiatives of 
significant impact.  
Emergency Response (ER). Swift delivery of Food and NFIs to emergency sites was a 
constant challenge and strain on WFP resources. Through the second logistics initiative, 
WFP intended to leverage TNT’s express and logistics capability and know-how to 
enhance its operational effectiveness. After few months of interaction, together with TNT 
WFP managed to narrow down areas in which WFP could benefit from TNT services, 
assets and expertise in order to achieve its mandate: the fight against hunger. 
The aviation training program was amongst the first. WFP had plans to professionalize its 
air operations. When TNT offered to train and certify its international cadre of air transport 
and movement officers in 2003, WFP was enthused. First TNT conducted four five-day 
assessment trainings for 27 WFP air operators. Out of those, 11 candidates from WFP air 
operations in Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan and Angola were selected to attend a full 
eleven-week course organized at TNT's air hub in Liege, Belgium. Three of the candidates 
graduated as Ramp Officers, while the remaining eight completed the full training and 
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obtained the recognized FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) Flight Dispatcher 
License. The benefit of a pool of professional and internationally certified air operators 
was considerable for WFP also in view of the prohibitive cost of such training. 
Nonetheless it led to some dependency and risk as it provided the operators with more job 
mobility and opportunities in the commercial sector. 
The second project involved TNT’s Express division and addressed the requirement to 
move small parcels of equipment to support WFP’s ICT activities during an emergency 
response, particularly in under-funded operations. Through an agreement with TNT, WFP 
ensured worldwide express delivery out of its FITTEST based in Dubai of critical ICT 
equipment to emergency locations.  
While WFP was efficient in moving food to a disaster area, due to certain budgetary 
rigidities, it was less equipped for rapidly transporting NFIs to support response teams 
deployed in the field and address logistics bottlenecks. The $500,000 emergency response 
fund established under this initiative allowed WFP to call upon TNT services during an 
emergency and offset expenditure incurred for the delivery of important NFIs at short 
notice. The account was used during the three major crises addressed by WFP in 2003: 
Southern Africa, Iraq and Liberia. In Monrovia, Liberia, the port’s forklift trucks were 
stripped and its fuel bladders looted preventing humanitarian agencies, including WFP, 
from off loading their cargo. The TNT freight services delivered forklift truck tyres and 
fuel bladders, items that enabled WFP to get its show on the road within four days. In 
normal circumstances WFP used the commercial sector through a tender process.  In 
emergency cases, however, it was extremely valuable to have an account like the TNT one 
that can come in quickly. To facilitate the use of the TNT services by WFP’s regional 
offices at the outset of emergencies, in December 2003 TNT finalized an emergency 
response catalogue listing internal assets and logistics capability throughout the world that 
could be mobilized quickly and efficiently in support of WFP’s logistics emergency 
preparedness and response requirements.  
The fourth project aimed to provide logistics assistance to WFP’s massive Southern Africa 
operations addressing the severe food shortage affecting 13 million people. To kick-off its 
collaboration WFP outsourced a functional area, its non-food supply chain from South 
Africa to Zimbabwe to TNT. The assistance consisted in the storage, handling, 
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transportation, clearance and delivery of high value small volume telecommunication and 
security related equipment from South Africa to 12 WFP implementing partners within 
different localities in Zimbabwe.  
WFP’s Johannesburg Regional Office was utterly impressed by the way TNT had managed 
the NFI supply chain in Zimbabwe. WFP’s regional interest in achieving a similar level of 
efficiency in its operations led to TNT’s involvement in a comprehensive Business Process 
Review (BPR) of WFP’s supply and demand chain in southern Africa. TNT applied 
project management skills to analyze WFP’s regional structure, business processes, MIS 
and planning procedures with a view to suggest improvements that would enhance and 
standardize operations. The BPR examined interfaces between the various functions from 
procurement, logistics, HR to finance. It also verified how the Regional office in 
Johannesburg coordinated activities among the six southern African countries involved in 
the WFP Regional Emergency Operation. As a result of this initiative, WFP managed to 
unify its data warehousing system by building the necessary interfaces between three 
different programs. WFP was then in a better position to monitor, track, and move its 
stocks and understand their quantitative as well as monetary implications. Other outputs 
included the emergency response performance indicators applicable across WFP field 
offices defined by program managers together with the logistics staff. This effort initiated 
and rolled out at a grass-root level, was expected to contribute significantly to WFP’s 
efforts to improve performance measurement through its result-based management 
initiative.  
WFP was enthusiastic about the future of the initiative which it believed would only thrive 
in the coming years. The likelihood of the emergency fund to be doubled for 2004 was 
high and so was the possibility of extending and replicating the BPR exercise in other 
WFP regional offices. Those parts of WFP operation touched by the TNT partnership had 
experienced a unique and most valuable learning opportunity: a direct in-sight on how a 
first-class company runs its business.    
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Implementation 
When WFP presented the TNT partnership to its Board, the attitude was somewhere 
between healthy skepticism and downright disbelief about why TNT wanted to work with 
WFP. The same type of feelings and doubts prevailed among WFP staff. Traditionally 
those marrying a humanitarian cause viewed their decision as a life choice. As such, not all 
WFP staff were prepared to appreciate the involvement of a profit-making entity in their 
work. As the initiatives evolved, however, WFP was moved by the devotion of TNT 
employees, and their doubts about TNT’s genuine intentions dissipated. TNT employees 
put on jobs had delivered and WFP had benefited from their expertise. In addition there 
had been a lot of emotional investment from TNT’s side in the partnership. The number 
and variety of cause-related actions undertaken by TNT employees to raise money for 
WFP’s school feeding program provided ample evidence. 
There was a noticeable difference between staff awareness and involvement at WFP and 
TNT. The TNT partnership was not as widely promoted within WFP and its many field 
offices, although this was changing rapidly. After all, TNT was only meant to be one of ten 
or so WFP corporate partners. Contrary to Bakker who engaged all of his employees 
worldwide, at WFP only relevant staff were involved.  
This was a detailed partnership and WFP grossly underestimated how much it was going to 
take to make it work. TNT had allocated a number of full time people to the partnership 
where WFP staff had to deal with the partnership on top of their normal work.  Once WFP 
took stock of the reality, it could not immediately align its resources to those of TNT as it 
had not budgeted for them.  While the two new hires joining the logistics initiatives took a 
big strain off of the logistics group, lack of resources persisted for the school feeding 
support initiative, as hundreds of TNT employees were lined up to go to the field and 
expectations were high. WFP saw the same type of constraint and pressure at TNT at the 
business unit level, where no dedicated resources had been allocated to the partnership. 
After twelve months, the partnership showed great scope for gain over the five year period. 
However, given the depth and scope of the partnership, WFP was forced to make 
substantial upfront investment in terms of staff from its own budget. WFP started to carry 
out cost exercises for each of the initiatives, taking into consideration hours/people/costs 
from headquarters and from field perspectives. An important cultural change for WFP staff 
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that had never before reported on the use of their time, the results of the exercises were to 
impact and shape WFP’s future partnerships.  
 
Future Corporate Partnerships 
WFP weighed out the pros and cons of corporate partnerships. By any measure WFP did a 
pretty good job. It brought food to 100 million people each year with only 7% overheads. 
The truth of the matter was that companies like TNT could take it to another level. The 
seeds for the partnership to grow have been planted. The future was to tell everyone more 
about its longevity and ramifications as well as TNT’s capability to motivate its 161,000 
employees to feed 161,000 children year after year, with or without Bakker’s personal 
involvement. What was sure was that the partnership’s second year budget meant to 
expand the TNT volunteer activities from the school feeding initiative to the two logistics 
initiatives, creating more opportunities for TNT staff involvement in an increasing number 
of technical assistance activities. 
Going forward, it appeared unlikely that WFP could get involved to such an extent with 
another corporation. This was WFP’s first partnership. It was anxious to learn and to make 
it work. However, it could not possibly replicate this effort with each corporation. True 
there may not be another dozen organizations that could give it the drive, commitment, 
involvement and inspiration that TNT’s CEO Peter Bakker has. But corporations had to be 
quick in partnering with WFP, given its limited absorption capacity and the diminishing 
opportunity for finding new projects as time elapsed. 
Without doubt private sector partnerships had short and long term consequences on WFP’s 
financial resources, performance and staff morale. WFP was discovering them as it went 
along. 
 
8.3.2   WFP Emergency Network 
In January 2007, Citibank and WFP announced their intention to develop the WFP 
Emergency Network, that is, a mechanism through which interested private sector 
companies can respond with cash, services and in-kind donations in advance of major 
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emergencies. The Emergency Network, which enables companies to deliver pre-planned 
contributions, is expected to augment WFP’s disaster response ahead of time.  
8.4   Discussion 
WFP is an operational humanitarian organization. In this section, we first discuss disaster 
response at WFP and then implementation risks and operational benefits of the WFP-TNT 
partnership. 
 
8.4.1   Disaster Response at WFP 
To counter supply failure modes, between the launch of an appeal and receipt of donations, 
WFP draws upon its emergency reserve accounts. It arranges for the movement of relief 
supplies and specialized equipment from its regional and national warehouses to the 
disaster site. To augment its response capability, WFP calls upon resources available in its 
network of private sector partners and standby donors.   
 To come to terms with sudden and unpredictable disasters, the evolving logistics 
challenges and the specificity of each operation and country, WFP formulates flexible 
plans that can accommodate frequent and numerous last minute changes. Where possible, 
it builds redundant capacity into its operations. For predictable disasters, WFP engages in 
scenario and contingency planning. For example, WFP has contingency plans in place to 
address severe droughts in Africa. 
With no limitation on which suppliers it can use, WFP envisages the use of different 
transportation routes, modes, and logistics service provider over a very short period. When 
an access route to a region is temporarily interrupted or insufficient, given the importance 
of timeliness, its cargo uses the next alternative transport mode or route available. To 
ensure the widest possible distribution, it leverages various distribution networks (schools, 
mosques, churches, etc.) regardless of the cost involved. 
In terms of transport mode, to reach remote areas and IDPs, WFP calls upon as many 
logistics providers as required to ensure that the combined transportation portfolio meets 
its capacity requirements. Transport modes include trucks, motorcycles, boats, and 
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helicopters as well as unconventional modes such as donkeys, elephants and airdrops. For 
example, to respond to the 1996 Zaire crisis, WFP used air transport before the more 
sustainable but time-consuming alternatives of surface transportation could be used.  In 
WFP operations, trucking often replaces airlifts after the initial emergency phase. Ocean 
transportation is used to move significant quantities of cargo (e.g. food) at low cost.  
To get operational as quickly as possible, WFP often establishes the centre of its 
operations either at the disaster site or at the closest location with the most adequate 
facilities. When transportation is unreliable, it store goods close to the point of 
consumption. For example, during the first days of the Liberia crisis, WFP worked out of a 
ship off the coast near the capital city. During the 1996 Zaire crisis, to avert the massive 
movement of people towards centralized and few food depots, WFP set up decentralized 
distribution points.  
At the outbreak of a crisis, to augment their presence, WFP relocates its headquarters and 
regional staff close or at the disaster site. For example, in response to the Afghan and Iraq 
2003 crisis, WFP first evacuated its staff relocating them, along with a good number of its 
headquarters and regional staff, to a regional office. Later, the majority of mobilized staff 
was moved into the emergency theatre. Apart from relocating, to augment its HR presence, 
WFP calls upon its network of partners. To cover outstanding needs, WFP hires “reactive” 
capacity, that is, experts and consultants and use standby assessment teams.  
To prepare initial appeals and a response plan, WFP uses a wide range of sources. To build 
estimates on human loss, the scale and scope of the damage, and number and duration of 
people requiring relief assistance, publicly available information is combined with expert 
knowledge and experience. To counter eventual communication failure modes, WFP 
mobilizes its standby ICT equipment from its regional warehouses. 
Similar to other humanitarian organizations, WFP depends on a network to stage its 
response.  The WFP disaster response network includes the media, private and public 
donors, implementing partners, recipient and bordering governments, military, and 
suppliers. Like other humanitarian organizations, WFP expects donors, suppliers and 
implementing partners to adhere to its product specifications, delivery and distribution 
requirements. As illustrated in Figure 8.1, trust, transparency, standardization and 
encapsulation regulate its relationships with long-standing donors. Trust, transparency and 
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standardization regulate its relationships with long-standing implementing partners while 
trust, standardization and encapsulation regulate its relationship with repeat suppliers.  
 
Figure 8.1 – Enablers of the WFP- Donor/Implementing Partner/Repeat Suppliers 
Partnership 
 
 
8.4.2  WFP Partnerships 
In this section we discuss the WFP-TNT partnership in detail and very briefly categorize 
the Citibank spearheaded initiative: WFP Emergency Network. 
 
8.4.2.1 WFP-TNT Partnership 
In this section, we analyze the process that led to the WFP-TNT partnership, its content, 
how the two parties managed the partnership, the difficulties they encountered and the 
actual or expected benefits for each of them.  
In general terms, TNT faced some challenges in terms of identifying a credible and 
promising humanitarian organization to partner with. Out of the five finalists, two dropped 
out and only one emerged as the obvious choice.  
To bring content to the partnership and help TNT appreciate the nature of WFP’s daily 
operations, the two partners got together immediately after the signing of the MoU. Joint 
discussions led to a detailed and complex partnership composed of five initiatives which 
resulted in a strategic partnership with one cross-cutting initiative (Figure 8.2). Two out of 
the five initiatives leveraged directly TNT’s core competencies in logistics. The JLSC was 
Trust 
Transparency 
Encapsulation 
Standardization  
Trust 
Standardization  
Transparency 
Trust 
Encapsulation 
 
 
 
 
WFP  
Donor 1 
Donor 2 
Donor n 
Repeat Suppliers 
 
Long-standing 
Implementing 
Partner 
  Standardization  
313
LEVERAGING PARTNERSHPS: LESSONS FROM HUMANITARIAN 
ORGANIZATIONS 
 
 
313
a cross-cutting initiative as specific TNT logistics resources were leveraged in the interest 
of the humanitarian community at-large. The ER initiative was a one-to-one initiative 
which aimed to enhance only WFP’s disaster response and disaster preparedness 
capabilities. One initiative leveraged TNT’s emotional capital (School Feeding) while the 
fourth leveraged its hands on experience (Transparency and Accountability). The fifth 
initiative – private sector fund raising - while initiated by TNT was soon handed over to 
another private sector partner for further development.  Each of the initiatives were driven 
by concrete objectives as far as TNT is concerned and resulted in concrete benefits to WFP 
(Figure 8.3). 
Figure 8.2 – WFP-TNT Partnership 
Multiple  
Localized Partnership 
 
Brokered Partnership 
 
 
 
 
 
Single 
Strategic Partnership 
Private Sector Funding 
School Feeding Support 
Transparency & Accountability 
ER 
 
Cross-Cutting Partnerships 
JLSC 
 
 
 Single Multiple 
 
 
Shortly after defining the scope of the partnership, the partners defined each initiative’s 
quantitative and qualitative deliverables and developed its monitoring and evaluation 
processes. This step was to ensure that the performance and impact of the partnership was 
continuously measured.  
At the time of the partnership, TNT was consolidating its operations grouped under two 
brands and three divisions. By supporting WFP’s noble mission - the “fight against 
hunger”, TNT aimed to build competitive advantage by increasing employee motivation 
and productivity, stimulating cohesiveness among its worldwide employees, and attracting 
and retaining talents.  
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Figure 8.3 – Drivers and Benefits of the WFP-TNT Partnership 
Initiatives Drivers for TNT Benefits to WFP 
Private Sector 
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n.a. • Signal other donors/broaden 
and diversify donor base 
• TNT in-kind contribution 
School Feeding 
Support 
• Moral Marketplace: Staff, 
financial markets, & 
consumers 
• Achieve Social Agenda 
• Establish Unified Global Image 
• Signal other donors/broaden 
and diversify donor base 
• TNT cash and in-kind 
contribution 
Transparency 
& 
Accountability 
• Moral Marketplace: Staff 
morale 
• Improve performance  
• Advance state of knowledge 
& practice 
JLSC • Competitive Advantage:   
Brand reputation & image 
building 
 Moral Marketplace: Staff 
morale  
• Comparative Advantage 
• Advance state of knowledge 
& practice 
• Improve operational 
effectiveness 
• Signal other donors 
ER • Competitive Advantage:  Brand   
building,  Open up new markets  
•  Moral Marketplace: Staff 
morale  
• Comparative Advantage  
• Improve disaster response 
and disaster preparedness 
• Advance state of knowledge 
& practice 
• Signal other donors 
 
The overall effort had a positive effect on employee motivation. TNT employees were 
proud of their organization and the partnership helped TNT attract new talents (Figure 
8.4). The partnership has had an impact on the moral marketplace – the company was 
ranked first in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index in 2007. TNT reports on its partnership 
with WFP in its annual reports. As a result of its efforts with WFP, TNT is recognized for 
its contribution to the humanitarian cause among its peers, the humanitarian community, 
academia, governments and media and is often invited to talk about its partnership 
experience with WFP in different fora. In conclusion, the partnership has enhanced the 
group’s brand reputation and image and has resulted in positive media exposure. 
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Figure 8.4 – The WFP-TNT Partnership: Excerpt from The Economist  
Helping others to help yourself  
When catastrophic floods hit Bangladesh last November, TNT's emergency-response team 
was ready. The logistics giant, with headquarters in Amsterdam, has 50 people on standby 
to intervene anywhere in the world at 48 hours' notice. This is part of a five-year-old 
partnership with the World Food Programme (WFP), the UN's agency that fights hunger. 
The team has attended to some two dozen emergencies, including the Asian tsunami in 
2004. "We're just faster," says Ludo Oelrich, the director of TNT's "Moving the World" 
programme. 
Emergency help is not TNT's only offering. Volunteers do stints around the world on 
secondment to WFP and staff are encouraged to raise money for the programme (they 
generated euro2.5m last year). There is knowledge transfer, too: TNT recently improved 
the school-food supply chain in Liberia, increasing WFP's efficiency by 15-20%, and plans 
to do the same in Congo. 
Balm for the soul 
Why does TNT do these things? "People feel this is a company that does more than take 
care of the bottom line," says Mr. Oelrich. "It's providing a soul to TNT." In a 2006 staff 
survey, 68% said the pro-bono activities made them prouder to work at the company. It 
also helps with recruitment: three out of four graduates who apply for jobs mention the 
WFP connection. Last year the company came top in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index. 
TNT's experience illustrates several trends in corporate philanthropy. First, collaboration is 
in, especially with NGOs. Companies try to pick partners with some relevance to their 
business. For TNT, the food programme is a good fit because hunger is in part a logistical 
problem. Standard Chartered, a bank, is working with the Bangladesh Rural Advancement 
Committee on microfinance and with other NGOs on a campaign to help 10m blind 
people. 
Source: “Feel Good Factor”, The Economist, 1/19/2008 
 
As presented in Appendix A, WFP is largely dependent on voluntary donations from some 
10 governments with the US government providing the lion’s share. The growing 
challenges of increased emergencies and food aid had encouraged WFP to look into the 
opportunity of increasing and broadening its resource base by calling upon the human, 
financial and physical resources of the private sector. Given the low brand awareness of 
WFP among the general public, at the time of the WFP-TNT partnership corporate 
contributions had been marginal and mainly in-kind in response to emergencies. WFP, 
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however, had as objective that of raising 10 percent of its total resources - cash and in-kind 
contributions - from the private sector by 2007. 
The private sector fundraising initiative was to help WFP develop a vision and strategy for 
its corporate fundraising activities. During the first year of the partnership, TNT assisted 
WFP in a corporate fundraising study which highlighted the interest of corporations in 
donating services and assets to humanitarian organizations as opposed to cash. By virtue of 
entering in a partnership with WFP, TNT had sent a signal to other donors.  
To avoid undue resource/expertise dependency on TNT, the partners worked towards the 
identification of other potential corporate partners for WFP. During the first year, TNT 
brought a new corporate partner, Boston Consulting Group, to WFP. The idea of a 
business advisory council - a global network of corporate leaders that would provide WFP 
a forum to discuss issues with global leaders, seek their advice, and learn from their 
expertise and insights without any obligation in terms of implementation - was also 
launched. 
After the first year, to ensure that partnerships with the private sector would not impact its 
traditional donor base and the humanitarian space, in 2004 WFP put forward a policy 
decision paper to its Board. The private donor fundraising policy paper approved by the 
WFP Board ensured that private contributions would not be viewed as a substitute for 
Member State funding. The paper defined the interface between the organization and 
private donors. It authorized WFP to proactively seek and accept contributions from those 
private donors whose products, services, core competencies and expertise were a strategic 
fit with its needs. The policy paper authorized WFP to publicly acknowledge the 
contribution of private donors. It also committed the organization to protect its space, 
reputation and brand image by: 
 
i) Using the framework for private donor cooperation established by the UN 
Global Compact for guidance;  
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ii) “Applying stringent selection criteria and undertake a rigorous screening 
process before accepting contributions”28; 
iii) Selecting potential private partners with care and after having conducted a 
due diligence that, among other things, assesses their commitment and 
capabilities; 
iv) Taking proper measures and ensuring that no private sector partner benefits 
commercially from its relationship with the organization; 
v) Avoiding granting exclusivity, preferential treatment to any private sector 
partner; 
vi) “Maintaining a ‘firewall’ between its private fundraising and procurement 
processes” (WFP, 2004) to ensure the decisional and managerial 
independence of the latter;  
vii) Demanding private donors to adhere to its code of conduct which calls for 
self-disclosure of information related to the exclusionary criteria; and 
viii) Regulating the use of WFP emblem and intellectual property. 
 
To avoid a large number of partnerships, WFP set about determining the optimal number 
of partners it could and would like to partner with. 
The School Feeding Program initiative helped expand WFP’s school feeding fund raising 
outreach. TNT’s involvement in WFP’s School Feeding Program aimed to feed on a yearly 
basis as many children as TNT employees worldwide. It was the only initiative that 
envisaged TNT’s direct and indirect cash contribution. The indirect mechanism was linked 
to donations mobilized by TNT employees through cause-related fundraising activities 
which would in turn be matched up to a threshold by TNT. The program also envisaged 
the participation of TNT staff in selected countries as volunteers. This was expected to 
improve employee productivity and morale. TNT’s partnership with WFP was also 
expected to improve the companies’ competitive advantage as well as enhance its position 
on the moral marketplace. The information available indicates that it has achieved these 
                                                 
28
  WFP can accept contributions only from private donors that respect human rights, apply responsible labour 
practices, have a record of socially responsible behaviour, and a positive public and/or product or service 
image (WFP, 2004). 
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objectives and that the company has even received recognition from the government of the 
Netherlands for its efforts. 
As a result of the private sector fundraising and school feeding initiatives, WFP managed 
to diversify its donor base by attracting new private and corporate donations. More 
specifically, it helped it increase the volume of in-kind, industry-specific and cash 
donations and prompting new corporate partnerships.  
Similar to the private sector fundraising, the transparency and accountability initiative did 
not leverage a TNT core competency. Nonetheless, the initiative contributed to the transfer 
of administrative and accounting practices ensuring efficient utilization of WFP financial 
resources.  It improved the status of practice and knowledge and resulted in changes in 
areas that WFP had planned improvements in. TNT added value as WFP was able to 
achieve more of its administrative objectives, better and faster. 
The JLSC and ER initiatives leveraged TNT logistics, express and transportation expertise. 
Through the JLSC, TNT was to address the common needs of the humanitarian community 
in the area of logistics. TNT expertise was leveraged in fleet management and 
warehousing; activities with an inter-agency application that could result in major cost-
savings and greater efficiencies. In terms of warehousing, WFP had planned improvements 
to the humanitarian warehouse it operated in Brindisi, Italy. TNT’s neutral diagnostic and 
technical assistance were sought in the remodeling and modernization of the warehouse.  
This resulted in long lasting benefits to the humanitarian community. 
In contrast, the ER initiative was designed to address the specific needs of WFP during and 
between emergencies. Through this initiative, TNT assisted WFP in a series of 
emergencies by utilizing its physical resources (e.g., airplanes, trucks, warehouses), human 
capital (e.g., experienced and knowledgeable managers and staff), and organizational 
capability (e.g., tracking and routing systems). Sub-projects under this initiative included 
the Emergency Response Fund for the delivery of Non-Food Items (NFIs), transport of 
critical ICT equipment from WFP’s Dubai office to emergency locations, and an aviation 
training and certification program for WFP’s international cadre of air transport and 
movement officers.  
WFP could leverage TNT resources also during emergencies in which commercial markets 
broke down or were non-existent (e.g. Liberia). This increased the speed and efficiency of 
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WFP relief operations. In response to the 2004 tsunami, TNT supplemented WFP’s efforts 
by assisting in the transportation of food and NFIs to four countries in the region. In 
Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand and India, TNT set up emergency coordination rooms, 
established food supply lines, provided transport management, temporary storage capacity 
and airport ramp handling services. By end April 2005, the in-kind support of TNT in 
terms of staff time and assets amounted to €2.3m (TNT, 2005). The cash contribution of 
TNT employees to the emergency topped €1m (TNT, 2005). 
TNT provided logistics assistance to WFP’s massive southern Africa operations by taking 
over its non-food supply chain from South Africa to Zimbabwe. To help WFP replicate 
this type of operation, TNT reviewed WFP’s supply and demand chain processes and 
assisted in improving its monitoring, tracking and costing procedures.  
The actual implementation of the WFP-TNT partnership was not problem-free. At the 
launch of the partnership, disbelief and skepticism regarding the motivations of TNT 
prevailed among the WFP board members and staff. A minority even viewed an increasing 
involvement of the private sector in humanitarian activities as a potential threat to 
“humanitarian space”. These sentiments were dispelled once the partnership started to 
produce change and the WFP staff witnessed the devotion of TNT employees to the “fight 
against hunger”. 
The WFP-TNT partnership was a detailed one and WFP had grossly underestimated the 
time and effort required to make it work. While TNT had allocated a number of full-time 
people to the partnership at the headquarters level, WFP had not. As a result, WFP staff 
had to deal with the partnership activities on top of their existing workload. This created 
additional stress for WFP staff and limited their absorptive capacity. Given the depth and 
scope of the partnership, WFP was forced to align its resources to those of TNT. However, 
this took time. Finally, WFP took on board two new hires to work on the logistics related 
initiatives some nine months after the launch of the partnership.  At the organizational 
level, discussions between the partners were overly prolonged given WFP’s temporary 
absorptive capacity limitations caused by its large-scale involvement in the 2003 Iraq 
emergency. Despite all efforts, lack of resources persisted for the school feeding support 
initiative. The same type of constraint and pressure were recorded at TNT at the business 
unit level, where no dedicated resources had been allocated to the partnership.  
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At the organizational level, partnership with the private sector and a humanitarian 
organization, respectively, was a first for WFP and TNT. Discussions were dampened 
early on because of differences in working practices, rhythms, cultures and language. For 
example, given the political dimension of the WFP’s work, decisions are not only driven 
by business rationale. Different levels of managerial accountability at WFP led to delays in 
the decision making processes. This was a source of frustration for the TNT partnership 
team accustomed to achieving targets against tight deadline. The language barrier, rooted 
in differences in jargons commonly used by each of the partners, led to additional 
misinterpretations and misunderstanding. 
Moreover, it took several months before WFP and TNT could narrow down areas within 
the two logistics related initiatives in which WFP could benefit from TNT’s logistics 
services, assets and expertise. It took time for WFP to articulate its needs and for TNT to 
fully appreciate the nature and scope of WFP’s logistics activities: movement of bulk and 
perishable commodities into underdeveloped often insecure economies, most of which 
during emergencies.  
At the early stages of the partnership and before fully appreciating the nature of WFP’s 
logistics work - a mixture of expediency and cost-effectiveness - TNT tried to introduce 
WFP to techniques and best practices widely applied in business. In response, WFP 
demonstrated reluctance in pursuing projects that were not a priority or would not 
necessarily address its day-to-day problems. TNT was initially less interested in providing 
its support to back-office type operations such as fleet management and more interested to 
get involved in visible activities such as airlifts. It was through continual discussions that 
TNT saw how assistance in back-office type activities could make a difference to the 
organization’s operating budget.  
In conclusion, WFP benefited from its partnership with TNT in a significant way in terms 
of increase in resources, visibility, networking opportunities and performance. In terms of 
resources, TNT provided WFP with cash as well specialized logistics assets and expertise. 
It helped WFP increase its visibility among the corporate world and public opinion in 
general. As a result, people outside traditional WFP circles had the opportunity to engage 
intellectually and emotionally in the “fight against hunger”. It extended its fundraising 
opportunities and corporate contacts. At the organizational level, it strengthened WFP’s 
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human capacity and sharpened its skills. Finally, it helped WFP improve its operational 
efficiency and response time during disaster response. 
TNT also benefited from the partnership. By partnering with an organization with a strong 
logistics function, it was able to apply its distinctive strength. As such, it created both 
economic and social value. While fulfilling its social obligations and raising the motivation 
of its employees, it was able to prove the resilience and soundness of its operations to the 
market by delivering goods in extreme environments in a timely fashion: potential for 
extra-benefits. As such, it can exploit its achievements (enhanced brand recognition and 
reputational assets) in its marketing efforts as well as identify new markets into which 
expand.   
 
Figure 8.5 – Risks and benefits of the WFP-TNT Partnership 
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While the partnership produced significant benefits for the two parties, it was embedded 
with risks. As a top-down initiative, the success of the partnership, its continuation and 
funding depended heavily on the interest and commitment of the TNT CEO. A change in 
CEO could have affected the faith of the program. In terms of assistance extended, some 
initiatives could have resulted in structural dependency and any disengagement could have 
compromised operational continuity. Divergence in working cultures if not recognized and 
addressed early-on could have resulted in abandonment. As far as WFP was concerned, the 
partnership viewed with suspicion could have also resulted in employee alienation and 
reduction in donor funding. Since strategic partnerships are time and labor intensive as 
well as costly, had WFP been unable to make the required investment, the partnership was 
setup to fail. Finally, throughout the life of a long-term partnership, both parties are 
exposed to an underlying risk: deteriorating reputation of their partner.  
Over a five year period, it is estimated that TNT and WFP invested respectively € 37 
million and 7.6 million in this partnership. While exposed to considerable risks, the WFP-
TNT partnership has yielded considerable benefits to both parties (Figure 8.5). Given its 
success, five years after its launch, the two parties agreed to extend their relationship as 
long as it remains beneficial to both parties. 
 
8.4.2.2   WFP Emergency Network 
As illustrated in Figure 8.6, the Citibank proposed Emergency Network can be classified 
as a localized partnership given the fact that it involves one humanitarian organization, 
WFP, and a group of private sector companies. The companies part of the network are 
expected to have different time horizons. Although all those part of the network are 
expected to commit in advance, some may turn out to be regular and long-standing donors 
while others may not be. 
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Figure 8.6 – WFP Emergency Network 
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8.5    Summary 
In this chapter we discuss and present the results of our research at WFP. Our description 
allows us to make some observations on how WFP responds to disasters how the WFP-
TNT was implemented and with what results. As far as the WFP-TNT partnership is 
concerned, it shows that business partnerships, once they avert a number of issues/risks, 
have the ability to contribute to the strategic, organizational and operational objectives of 
humanitarian organizations enhancing their disaster management capability as well as 
improve the image of the corporate partner with key stakeholders (employees, customers, 
financial market, etc.). 
 
Business/CSO 
Humanitarian Organization 
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Chapter 9   Fritz Institute  
 
 
In this chapter, we present the results of our desk research on the Fritz Institute. After an 
introductory note on the history and processes of the Institute, we describe its activities.  In 
section 9.2, we elaborate on the role and contribution of the Fritz Institute as a broker 
between humanitarian organizations and business, academia, donors and foundations. 
9.1    Fritz Institute 
The Fritz Institute was founded in 2002 by Lynn Fritz, former chairman and CEO of Fritz 
Companies, a San-Francisco-based logistics company and a Fortune 1000 global logistics 
corporation that was sold to UPS in 1999. It is a non-profit civil society organization 
(CSO) that aims to assist humanitarian organizations in the delivery of humanitarian aid. 
Its mission is to strengthen “the infrastructure of humanitarian relief organizations by 
mobilizing logistics and technology expertise and resources from the corporate and 
academic institutions” (Fritz Institute website). To “make aid effective” (ECCH, 2003), it 
identifies common challenges and inefficiencies and then leverages best practices, 
technology and resources of the private sector and academia to develops tools and support 
activities that can improve the humanitarian relief process. The process pursued by the 
Institute is illustrated in Figure 9.1. 
To achieve its mission, by end 2006, the Fritz Institute had established a multi-disciplinary 
and wide network of partner organizations. Such network included 48 NGOs, UN 
organizations and members of the Red Cross Movement; 2 government agencies; 24 
corporations; 17 academic institutions and 3 foundations for a total of 96 partners (Fritz 
Institute 2006 Annual Report).   
Initiatives. As summarized in Figure 9.2, by end 2006, the Fritz Institute ran seven 
initiatives. The first four initiatives are in the areas of logistics and supply chain, 
technology, humanitarian preparedness and impact, and capacity building. The fifth 
initiative - Corporations for Humanity - aims to broker collaboration between the private 
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sector and humanitarian organizations. The sixth initiative is the sponsoring of research in 
the area of humanitarian operations. The last and latest initiative embraced by the Fritz 
Institute is the assessment of the level of disaster preparedness of the San Francisco Bay 
Area in case of catastrophic disaster. 
 
Figure 9.1 – The Fritz Institute Process 
 
Source: Fritz Institute 2005 Annual Report 
 
More specifically, the logistics and supply chain program aims to a) transfer resources 
and best practices from the corporate world and academia to humanitarian logistics and b) 
provide training on the humanitarian logistics. This is achieved through organization of 
conferences, creation of formal certification and standardized training programs for 
humanitarian logistics, and establishment of communities of practice.  
To understand the needs of humanitarian organizations, the Fritz Institute right from its 
inception organized an annual humanitarian logistics conference. In 2005, the conference 
evolved into a full-fledged humanitarian logistics association and the Fritz Institute was 
designated as its coordinator. In 2006, the Fritz Institute launched the humanitarian 
logistics certification program. Funded by USAID, the first level of training attracted 
interest from 200 people from more than 50 organizations in 10 countries (Fritz Institute 
Annual Report, 2006). 
 
Research Operations Processes across Humanitarian Organizations 
Identify Common Challenges and Inefficiencies 
Develop Solutions with Private Sector Expertise and Resources 
Measure Improvements 
Document and Disseminate Findings 
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Figure 9.2 – Fritz Institute Initiatives 
Initiative Objective Benefit to HOs 
1. Logistics and Supply Chain 
• Humanitarian 
Logistics Association 
Advance state of 
knowledge & 
practice 
• Certification in 
Humanitarian 
Logistics  
Improve performance 
• Crossroads 
Conferences  
To ensure faster and more effective relief 
delivery:  
• Bring recognition and resources to 
humanitarian logistics 
• Improve logistics best practices 
• Professionalize the logistics function  
Advance state of 
knowledge & 
practice 
2. Technology 
Humanitarian logistics 
Software (HLS) & HELIOS 
Develop technology solutions that address 
the unique needs of humanitarian supply 
chains 
Advance state of 
knowledge & 
practice Improve 
performance 
3. Preparedness and Impact 
Humanitarian Impact 
Conferences and Surveys 
Measure the impact of disaster 
preparedness and institutionalize good 
system and structural practices to evaluate 
disaster response 
Advance state of 
knowledge & 
practice 
4. Capacity Building 
Capacity Networks 
Initiative  
Develop world-class capacity among 
African NSs to address the growing 
humanitarian need in Africa. Sponsor the 
accreditation process 
Improve performance 
5. Private-Public Partnerships 
Corporations for Humanity 
 
Leverage private-sector resources, 
technology and expertise for improvement 
in the delivery of aid  
Advance state of 
knowledge & 
practice 
Improve performance 
6. Research Centre 
Lecture series, Case studies, 
Publications, Surveys 
The research centre provides inputs 
towards the implementation of the supply 
chain, technology, capacity building and 
preparedness and impact programs  
Advance state of 
knowledge & 
practice 
7. Preparedness Initiative 
Preparedness Initiative Bay 
Area Disaster 
Assess the preparedness level of the San 
Francisco Bay Area in case of catastrophic 
disaster 
Advance state of 
knowledge & 
practice 
 
The technology initiative aims to ensure application of the state-of-the-art technology 
towards the management of humanitarian supply chains. To improve the operational 
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effectiveness and responsiveness of humanitarian organizations and bridge the IT gap, the 
Fritz Institute, in collaboration with IFRC, developed a customized Humanitarian Logistics 
Software (HLS) (see Chapter 6, section 6.3). A web-based system, the HLS aims to 
standardize and automate the relief mobilization process.  
After having developed its flagship product, the HLS, to cater to the needs of local and 
field-based small and medium-sized NGOs, the Fritz Institute developed a lighter, more 
user-friendly and cost-effective version of the software named HELIOS. Similar to HLS, 
the HELIOS helps organizations manage their emergency supply chains from mobilization 
to reporting as well as coordinate their operations with other humanitarian organizations in 
a standardized and automated fashion. HELIOS allows even the smallest organization to 
quickly ramp-up. The software is made available free of charge to any interested 
humanitarian organization. Free access to the software has the potential to ensure 
coordination of pipelines of supplies, information and financing from donation to delivery 
among many humanitarian organizations (Fritz Institute website). 
World Vision International (WVI), the largest NGO in the world, was the first organization 
to adopt HELIOS. Oxfam GB, the UK arm of the international humanitarian organization, 
after a comprehensive review of its technology needs, also chose to pilot the HELIOS in 
some of its operations.  More significantly, it started to explore whether its implementing 
partners, that is, local aid organizations that do the ‘last-mile delivery’, can benefit from 
the software.  According to the Fritz Institute, the Los Angles-based International Medical 
Corps (IMC), an NGO that has been responding to man-made and natural disasters all over 
the world for 25 years, was the latest NGO to embrace HELIOS (Fritz Institute website).  
While the HLS was fully funded by the Fritz Institute, the HELIOS received financial and 
technical support from a number of corporations.29  To ensure the continuous development 
of the software and its accessibility over time to as many humanitarian organizations as 
possible, the Fritz Institute has set up a formal HELIOS User Group. The Fritz Institute 
acts as the Secretariat of the User Group while Intel Corporation serves as its technical 
advisor. The User Group which includes WVI, Oxfam and IMC aims to provide technical 
guidance on the functionality, adoption and sustainability of the software.  
                                                 
29
  Abbott Labs, Applied Materials, Hewlett Packard, Intel Corporation, Microsoft Corporation, Levi Strauss 
and Co., and KPMG International. 
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Together with its partners, the Institute tries to measure, assess, and communicate the 
impact of humanitarian aid on beneficiaries to donors, governments and the public. This 
is achieved through the establishment of a multi-disciplinary team, that has as objective 
that of “establishing common definitions and standards for the measurement and 
communication of impact, b) create a culture of measurement within the humanitarian 
organizations, c) create coherent communications to the public about the need for and 
impact of humanitarian organizations” (Fritz Institute Annual Report, 2004). By end 2006, 
impact investigations and surveys of aid effectiveness had covered some 6,000 tsunami 
beneficiaries (Fritz Institute Annual Report, 2006). To define and measure humanitarian 
impact in a systematic way, the Fritz Institute sponsors quantitative studies and organizes 
conferences with donors, policy makers, private sector, media and beneficiary 
communities.  
In terms of capacity building, the Institute aims to build sustainable capacity within local 
NGOs and increase their absorptive capacity as recipient of aid by augmenting their 
efficiency and effectiveness as front-line implementing partners. By leveraging the 
resources, technology and expertise available in “networks” of support, the Fritz Institute 
aims to improve performance with a view to certify as many local organizations as 
“Effective Humanitarian Organizations”.  
The Capacity Network Initiative has been launched for African Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies (NSs).  The Initiative measures each NSs’ capacity with respect to 
world-class standards in three areas: governance, accountability and transparency; program 
effectiveness; and organizational sustainability. To be accredited as an “Effective 
Humanitarian Organization”, the participating NSs are subject to third-party audits. Also 
for this initiative, the Fritz Institute serves as the Secretariat and mobilizes funding to 
cover the costs related to such audits. By the end of 2006, the initiative included 18 
African NSs.  
To engage private sector participation in humanitarian operations, the Fritz Institute has 
launched a private-public initiative: The Corporations for Humanity. This initiative 
offers corporations a mechanism through which they can channel their financial, human 
and technological support to humanitarian organizations. More specifically, private sector 
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companies part of this initiative engage their core competencies to address the back-office 
challenges of humanitarian organizations as identified by the Fritz Institute. 12 Fortune 
1000 firms constitute the founding members of this initiative. By end 2006, 16 
corporations had contributed to Fritz Institute managed projects through their expertise, 
time and resources.   
To support the above-mentioned activities, the Fritz Institute sponsors research, surveys, 
publications and academic events on the topic of disaster management. 
The latest initiative embraced by the Fritz Institute is the assessment of the level of 
disaster preparedness of the San Francisco Bay Area in case of catastrophic disaster. 
Again, the Institute serves as the secretariat of this initiative and leads the development of 
preparedness standards as well as community resilience and vulnerability studies on the 
subject.  
9.2    Discussion 
The Fritz Institute occupies an important position within the humanitarian community 
given its contribution to the understanding of issues relevant to disaster management. Its 
financial, intellectual, technical and networking inputs and resources continue to advance 
the status of knowledge and practice in the humanitarian community in general and 
strengthen the logistics function of humanitarian organizations. In the following 
paragraphs we discuss more in detail the role and contribution of the San Francisco-based 
Fritz Institute to the humanitarian cause.  
In terms of partnership schemes, the Fritz Institute assumes different positions (Figure 
9.3). Its main function is that of a broker between humanitarian organizations on one side 
and the private sector, academia, foundations, and government agencies on the other side. 
As such it functions as a secretariat for 6 out of its 7 broad initiatives. However, its 
partnership with IFRC can be categorized as a strategic partnership while its engagement 
with a number of humanitarian organizations as far as its second software, HELIOS, is 
concerned can be considered as a cross-cutting one.  
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Figure 9.3 – Fritz Institute Partnership Roles 
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In its broker function, the Fritz Institute helps overcome the limited interaction between the 
humanitarian community, industry leaders, and academia (Figure 9.4). By organizing 
conferences and meetings on a regular and consistent basis, it creates networking 
opportunities for its partner organizations. Its thematic events help facilitate the exchange 
of experience and ideas on issues related to supply chain management (SCM) between 
humanitarian and commercial logisticians.  
 
Figure 9.4 – Fritz Institute: Identifying Needs and Bridging the Gaps 
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surveys and publications, it assists in raising awareness around the importance of relief 
logistics within and among humanitarian organizations as well as the donor and business 
community. On the other hand, its certification program builds human capacity and 
ensures standardized logistics training to interested humanitarian agency staff. 
Through its Corporations for Humanity initiative, the Institute channels voluntary 
corporate contributions to humanitarian organizations. At the organizational level, to help 
identify gaps, bottlenecks and redundancies in the supply chains of a specific humanitarian 
organization, on a short-term and ad hoc basis, it brings logistics veterans from the private 
sector to work closely with and suggest supply chain solutions to the select humanitarian 
organization (Thomas, 2003).  
By bringing business and academics in the field of SCM closer to the humanitarian world, 
the Fritz Institute has contributed in an unparallel way to the establishment and nurturing 
of a unique and multi-faceted virtual web of logisticians. Through its networking activities, 
it has managed to draw the attention of a wide range of players to the challenges of 
humanitarian logistics and the crucial and central role of logisticians in emergency relief 
operations. To leverage the resources available in the corporate world, it has built a roster 
of committed firms ready to intervene during disasters.  
In its broker function, the Fritz Institute creates brief networking opportunities over time 
for those organizations part of its network. The level of interdependence and closure 
between humanitarian organizations, the Institute and other parties part of the network is 
low. To develop HLS, for over 18 months, given the high level of interdependence, the 
Fritz Institute interacted and achieved closure with IFRC.  This initiative, born as a one-to-
one partnership, highlighted the advantages of tailor-made IT solutions in the management 
of humanitarian supply chains. The partnership with IFRC helped the Institute engage 
other humanitarian organizations in the development of a ‘generic’, widely applicable 
humanitarian logistics software usable by smaller organizations at the field level. For the 
development of HELIOS, the Fritz Institute needs to achieve closure and interact with 
those humanitarian organizations that have shown interest in its product over a relatively 
long period of time. Figures 9.5 and 9.6 help us visualize the level of interaction, time, 
closure and interdependence required for each Fritz Institute initiative. 
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Figure 9.5 – Level of Interaction and Duration of Relationship of Different Fritz 
Institute Partnerships  
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Figure 9.6 – Level of Interdependence and Closure of Different Fritz Institute 
Partnerships  
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As summarized in Figure 9.7, from the humanitarian organization’s point of view, the 
overall assistance provided by the Fritz Institute advances the status of knowledge and 
practice among the humanitarian community. While the Institute’s research outputs 
contribute in a meaningful way to the understanding of humanitarian operations and 
disaster management in general, they fall short in advancing knowledge and practice at the 
organizational level since findings and recommendations may not be generalizable.  Fritz 
Institute activities also signal to other donors that there are vast opportunities to assist 
humanitarian organizations in better achieving their mission. Participation in Fritz Institute 
events provides an opportunity to a participating humanitarian organization to attract other 
donors. However, since the same opportunity is provided to other participating 
organizations, there is no clear signaling but open competition on a market.  
 
 
334
CHAPTER 9 – FRTIZ INSTITUTE  
 
 
334
 
Figure 9.7 – Risks and benefits of the Fritz Institute Brokered Partnerships  
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The one-off assistance provided by the Fritz Institute through the private sector is limited 
in time and therefore unable to build disaster management capabilities or contribute to any 
structural change. It can only address specific areas with immediate benefits for the 
assisted humanitarian organizations (results on low-hanging fruits). In general, given their 
ad hoc nature and short duration, the sustainability of improvements at the assisted 
organization is questionable.  
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Given the short duration of each partnership brokered by the Fritz Institute, the limited 
effort required by the private sector partner and the receiving humanitarian organization, 
and the limited impact, the corporate partner and the humanitarian organization do not face 
any major risks.  For example, assistance is not expected to be delayed because of 
divergence in working cultures between the parties or limited absorptive capacity of the 
humanitarian organization. Ad hoc assistance is not expected to impact the donor base of 
the assisted organization in terms of decreasing, increasing or diversifying donations. It is 
not expected to result in structural dependency or loss of organizational flexibility. 
Concurrently, failure and success are expected to be short-lived and the impact of 
partnering with tainted partners, given the short duration and possibility to interrupt the 
relationship, is limited. 
As far as the private sector partner is concerned, by channeling its one-off assistance 
through the Fritz Institute, impact on its employees, the market place and reputational 
gains is diluted. Concurrently, channeling assistance through a third party limits all types 
of implementation, financial, emotional and reputational risks. Since the relationship 
between benefits and risks is not disproportionate, as long as there is some benefit, the 
effort is justified.  
As a non-profit organization dedicated to the advancement of the humanitarian 
community, the Fritz Institute does not need to appeal to the moral market place. Since its 
activities are in line with its mission, they are viewed as genuine. After five years, the Fritz 
Institute has succeeded to make itself a point of reference (first certification model, first 
accreditation model, first humanitarian software, development of preparedness standards, 
etc.) for humanitarian organizations and companies willing to contribute with their 
company-specific resources to disaster management. Recognition can be measured by its 
ability to raise funding and in-kind assistance. Initially, the Institute invested its own 
resources in the cause it set out to support. However, it accumulated effort since its 
establishment has produced an extra-benefit: access to external funding. Four years down 
the road, to feed its many programs and initiatives, it has managed to mobilize assistance 
and funding from both the private sector and donor institutions such as USAID to the tune 
of USD 2.6 m representing 90% of its total expenditures (Fritz Institute 2006 Annual 
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Report). Although by brokering assistance between humanitarian organizations and private 
sector partners and academia, the Fritz Institute has enhanced its reputation and brand 
recognition, each initiative launched increases the possibility of failure.  
Since our study of the Fritz Institute is mainly desk research, we have no evidence of the 
type of difficulties the structure encounters in managing a set of fluid and needs-driven 
programs and relationships with 90-odd partners. However, by acting as an apex institution 
and by assuming the ‘secretariat’ function, its role is relegated to that of an architect, 
catalyst and matchmaker. 
The business model pursued by the Fritz Institute, especially the brokerage function does 
have its limitations. From the managerial point of view, the management of the initiatives 
is particularly challenging because of their informal, voluntary and multi-disciplinary 
nature.  The sheer number of partners, differences in partner agendas, organizational 
cultures as well as lack of a power/authority centre and structure make it particularly 
complex. Fritz Institute as a facilitator cannot centralize decisions as it is not vested with 
the necessary power and authority. While the Institute creates new learning opportunities 
for its partners, it cannot set learning, implementation, adoption or partnership agenda. It 
has no control over expected or desired results and outcomes as it cannot allocate corporate 
resources as it deems appropriate. In other words, the parties involved have no obligation 
to implement or provide the suggested improvement, adopt or provide a technical solution, 
maintain or enter into a relationship recommended by the originator.  
9.3    Summary 
This chapter provides background information on the Fritz Institute and its activities. The 
description confirms the importance of CSOs in advancing the status of knowledge and 
practice of humanitarian organizations with a view to improve their performance. It also 
helps us differentiate between different partnership schemes in terms of benefits and risks 
for the Institute, concerned humanitarian organizations and private sector partners. 
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Chapter 10  Case Analysis 
 
In this chapter we discuss the findings of our research related to humanitarian 
organizations and their disaster response activities. We refer to the research framework 
developed in Chapter 4 with a view to demonstrate how the empirical data relates to our 
propositions and research questions (Figure 10.1). To test the necessary condition 
propositions, as indicated in Chapter 5, we follow the 7-step methodology proposed by Dul 
et al. (Dul et al., 2008). 
 
Figure 10.1 – Propositions and Research Questions 
Propositions Data 
P1:  Only a broad supplier network can ensure a speedy, 
accurate, flexible and cost-effective disaster response. 
Gujarat, Zaire, 
Hurricane Mitch  
P2:  Only virtually organized logistics coordination platform 
will lead to good services. 
 
Gujarat, 
Mozambique, 
Afghanistan, Iraq 
P3: For the parties involved, the risks and benefits of 
strategic partnerships are higher than those of brokered 
partnerships.  
IFRC, WFP, Fritz 
Institute 
P4: Only intense partnerships, that is, partnerships with long-
standing, interactive, interdependent and closely-knitted 
partners or structures, will increase a humanitarian 
organization’s stock of social capital.  
IFRC, WFP & 
UNJLC 
P5: Bonding social capital is a necessary condition for inter-
organizational coordination during disasters 
 
Gujarat, Iraq, 
Mozambique & 
Afghanistan 
P6: Bridging social capital is a necessary condition for 
successful disaster response. 
 
Gujarat, Zaire 
Afghanistan, 
Hurricane Mitch, 
Iraq, Mozambique  
Research Questions Data 
Q1:  How do humanitarian organizations manage 
dependencies and duplications emerging prior or during 
disaster response? 
IFRC, WFP & 
UNJLC 
Q2:  How do humanitarian organizations operationalize and 
ensure the success of a virtually organized logistics 
coordination platform?  
UNJLC 
Q3: What are the risks and opportunities facing humanitarian 
virtual organizations and how they are managed?  
UNJLC 
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Research Questions Data 
Q4: What type of humanitarian organizations can engage in 
strategic partnerships? 
WFP, IFRC & 
UNJLC 
Q5: What are the best practices that can help avert 
predictable risks and increase benefits of business-
humanitarian partnerships? 
WFP  
 
Q6: How is bonding social capital developed among 
humanitarian organizations? 
UNJLC, WFP & 
Fritz Institute 
Q7: How is bridging social capital developed between 
humanitarian organizations and other key stakeholders? 
IFRC, UNJLC, WFP 
& Fritz Institute 
Q8: What is the contribution of bridging social capital to 
resource/capability enhancement of operational 
humanitarian organizations? 
WFP & IFRC 
 10.1   Supplier Network 
 
In this section our aim is to validate the necessary condition proposition that relates broad 
supplier network to disaster response ability as stated below. For this proposition, we can 
only consider disaster data related to operational humanitarian organizations. 
 
P1:  Only a broad supplier network can ensure a speedy, accurate, flexible and cost-
effective disaster response. 
 
The literature indicates networks as the most apt organizational structure when an 
organization is unable to cope independently with i) the complexity and risks of a rapidly 
changing environment and ii) the skill and resource demands imposed on it in global 
markets. The literature also argues in favor of broad as opposed to integrated supply 
network for organizations that manage temporary supply chains and operate in dynamic 
environments. In this respect, broad supply networks are defined as those networks where 
switching is nor difficult or costly and where there is no restriction in terms of number of 
supply chain members.  
Humanitarian organizations operate in complex and rapidly changing environments. To 
respond to the needs of the afflicted populations they depend on the resources of numerous 
parties. Consequently, they depend on a collaborative and complex network to stage their 
response. To tap into the resources of their networks, they maintain a high number of 
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linear, forward and backward, spatio-temporal interactions and relationships with a number 
of actors. They engage in a series of activities and take into due consideration a number of 
interdependencies among different entities. During the planning and implementation 
phase, they take into account identified and emerging supply and transport failure modes.  
For predictable and emerging disasters, to save as many lives as possible, humanitarian 
organizations aim at high speed and cost-efficient operations. For unpredictable disasters, 
humanitarian organizations face an uncertain and variable demand and supply.  To save as 
many lives as possible, they aim for fast and flexible operations.  
It follows that speed is the most important success factor in disaster response. Since 
disaster response is driven by the need for timeliness, flexibility – the ability to respond to 
uncertainty and volatile demand and supply, is the second important element. 
Concurrently, accuracy – the ability to meet the quantitative and qualitative objectives of 
disaster response – is important for a successful response. Cost-effectiveness ensures that 
assistance is extended to as many people as possible and that assistance is not interrupted 
due to financial constraints. In terms of supplier network, we consider it to be broad if the 
concerned organization does not restrict itself to few repeat suppliers but calls upon a 
larger number of repeat and ad hoc suppliers.  
In terms of goods mobilized, the bulk of items in a humanitarian organization’s supply 
chain are commodity products. Hence switching is nor difficult or costly and the number 
of suppliers able to provide the goods in demand is wide. Like other international 
humanitarian organizations, IFRC and WFP manage multiple temporary supply chains in 
dynamic environments across geographies. While some humanitarian organizations like 
IFRC provide a wide range of relief products, others like WFP, whose core business is 
food and grain is its dominant product, concentrate on one or few relief items.  
To verify the validity of our proposition, we select a number of cases. Since the unit of 
analysis for this proposition is disasters, our cases relate to supply network management 
activities of two operational humanitarian organizations – IFRC and WFP, during three 
unpredictable disasters: the Gujarat earthquake, Hurricane Mitch and Zaire Crisis. The 
hypothesis for each case is that during disaster response, a speedy, accurate, flexible and 
cost-effective response cannot occur without a broad supplier network.  
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Typically, humanitarian organizations do not measure their response against predetermined 
quantitative targets. However, most of the time, they report on the outcome of their 
response. As such it is possible to have some indication of performance a posteriori. For 
example, speed can be measured in terms of number of days before response is mobilized 
and relief items delivered to the disaster site. Accuracy can be measured by taking into 
account shortages as well as the difference between goods mobilized and goods remaining 
at the end of the disaster. Flexibility can be measured by the frequency and speed in which 
alternative solutions are identified and implemented. Cost-effectiveness per se cannot be 
measured since only announcements in terms of the cost of an operation are made. 
During the Gujarat earthquake, IFRC sourced relief items from a combination of local, 
regional and international suppliers. Decisions were based on how quickly (speed) a given 
supplier could deliver products in line with the IFRC’s product specifications (accuracy). 
Since IFRC’s procurement decisions had to accommodate frequent changes over a short 
period of time, it called upon as many suppliers as required to stage its response effort 
(flexibility). Interchangeable and complementary supply chain members ensured a speedy, 
accurate and possibly cost-effective response.  
 
Figure 10.2 – Assistance Mobilized by IFRC: Gujarat Earthquake, 2001 
Date Goods Mobilized 
26 January Earthquake 
27 January Indian Red Cross supplies arrive 
29 January Arrival of Telecom and Water & Sanitation ERUs 
30 January Arrival of Hospital ERUs 
Arrival of international relief suppliers 
31 January Arrival of other ERUs and international relief supplies 
By 26 February 45 Charter planes had carried basic shelter material (255,000 
blankets, 34,000 tents & 120,000 plastic sheets) and other items 
such as kitchen sets and jerry cans 
During the first 
100 days 
300,0000 people assisted through the active participation of 35 
partners (including repeat suppliers) and ad hoc local and 
international suppliers 
End of operation Excess stock: 135 tons of high protein biscuits 
 
As summarized in Figure 10.2, within 24 hours from the disasters, the first batch of relief 
supplies provided by the Indian Red Cross arrived. The first batch of goods mobilized by 
IFRC arrived three days after the earthquake. In terms of flexibility, IFRC called upon as 
341
ORGANIZING LOGISTICS PARTNERSHPS: LESSONS FROM HUMANITARIAN 
ORGANIZATIONS 
 
 
341
many suppliers as possible to mobilize the requested 35,000 tents. In terms of accuracy, 
relief items mobilized met the required quality specifications. While excess stock was 
reported (e.g. high protein biscuits), there is no indication of major shortages. IFRC’s full 
appeal amounted to CHF 25.6 million but the cost of the operation amounted to CHF 35 
million, CHF 10 million higher. Despite a substantial difference between the appeal and 
effective expenditure, IFRC considered its response to the Gujarat earthquake as a success 
and a benchmark for future operations.  
At the time of Hurricane Mitch, IFRC had no pre-positioned supplies to kick-off its relief 
operation. Moreover, it failed to mobilize the necessary resources from its network of NSs, 
donors and suppliers. It did not call upon a broad network to ensure a swift and flexible 
response. As a result, it was criticized for its poor performance.  
In response to the Zaire 1996 crisis, WFP used a combination of international, regional and 
local resources to ensure a swift, flexible and accurate response. Over a very short period 
of time, it used different transportation routes, modes and logistics service providers 
(flexibility). Within few days, it repositioned and re-routed its food supplies to meet the 
requirement of the crisis (flexibility and accuracy). Given the lack of sufficient 
infrastructure, its plan envisaged air deliveries to airfields near the refugees. Within days, it 
chartered few large aircraft. It flew food into the region from stocks in neighboring 
countries. Within five days, trucks were delivering food flown from regional stocks. 
Concurrently, it initiated the movement of food items overland. Without limiting itself to 
any given number of suppliers, WFP easily changed its logistics plans and switched to new 
routes, modes and providers (flexibility). By using alternative routes, modes and suppliers, 
its response became more accurate and reached the refugees on the move (timeliness).  
Had it used the most economic mode of transport - surface transport, the population at risk 
would have suffered. Air deliveries, while not cost-effective per se, substituted by overland 
transport over time ensured expediency and lower operational costs.  WFP viewed its 
response to the crisis as successful.  
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Figure 10.3 – Results of Tests Related to Proposition 1 
Good Response Case Broad 
network S A F C 
Test result 
Gujarat Yes Yes Yes Yes No evidence Not rejected 
Hurricane Mitch No No No No No evidence Not rejected 
Zaire Yes Yes Yes Yes No evidence Not rejected 
 Legend:  S: Speed  A: Accuracy     F: Flexibility,    C: Cost-effective 
 
We have tested our proposition in three cases. The Figure above summarizes the outcome 
of our test cases. To respond well to the changing and unpredictable needs of a disaster, we 
have observed that in order to mobilize and transport relief items, IFRC and WFP 
construct broad and loose emergency supply network. Since the cases concern 
unpredictable disasters, our test results may not be automatically extendable to predictable 
disasters. While cost-effectiveness can be an important target for predictable disasters, it 
does not appear to be a key consideration and an important indication of a good response 
during unpredictable disasters. In view of above, we reformulate and refine our proposition 
to reflect our test results as follows: 
 
P1:  Only a broad supplier network can ensure a speedy, accurate, and flexible 
response to unpredictable disasters. 
 
The commoditized nature of most relief items makes a broad supply network possible. 
The unpredictable nature of most disasters coupled with the temporary, dynamic and 
spatially-dispersed nature of emergency supply chains make broad supply networks the 
only option for humanitarian organizations. Only a broad and loosely coupled supply 
network, driven by product/service availability, allow emergency supply chains to respond 
to  many unpredictable disasters at a given time in a timely, flexible and accurate fashion. 
As such, it is recommended that operational humanitarian organizations build systems and 
procedures that support sourcing from a broad supplier network. 
10.2   Coordination 
As seen in Chapter 3, coordination theory provides a framework for the study of 
interdependencies between different activities and actors. The theory identifies three types 
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of dependencies - fit, flow and sharing - and for each type of dependency and possibility of 
duplication it identifies a series of coordination mechanisms. In this section, we explore 
how humanitarian organizations manage their interdependencies. 
 
Q1: How do humanitarian organizations manage dependencies and duplications 
emerging prior or during disaster response? 
 
The unit of analysis for this research question is organizations. As such, we use three cases 
– IFRC, WFP and UNJLC – to explore it. To manage dependencies and duplications, the 
IFRC and WFP cases indicate that, first and foremost, operational humanitarian 
organizations engage in a series of pre-emptive agency-specific measures. The UNJLC 
case indicates that to address recurrent, common and disaster-specific dependencies and 
duplications, operational humanitarian organizations take collective action by calling upon 
the services of a non-operational organization in form of a logistics coordination platform. 
Section 10.2.1 provides examples of WFP and IFRC agency-specific measures. Section 
10.2.2 enumerates the coordination mechanisms used by UNJLC to address inter-
organizational and extra-organizational fit, flow and sharing dependencies and 
duplications.  
 
10.2.1   Agency-Specific Measures  
To pre-empt dependencies and duplications and respond to failure modes, operational 
humanitarian organizations plan for and implement a series of agency-specific mitigation 
measures (Figure 10.4).  For example, to counter supply failure modes and immediate 
dependency on donors, between the launch of an appeal and receipt of donations, IFRC 
and WFP draw upon their emergency reserve accounts to start the procurement process. 
They arrange for the movement of relief kits and specialized equipment available in their 
contingency warehouses to the disaster site. To augment their response capabilities, IFRC 
activates its NSs’ stand-by resources while WFP calls upon resources available in its 
network of private sector partners and standby donors.  To avoid arrival of unsuitable and 
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unsolicited goods, a source of supply chain disruption, IFRC has guidelines and seizes 
every opportunity to voice its preference for cash rather than in-kind donations. 
Humanitarian logisticians often have little or no advance notice of when and from/to where 
they have to move and store what type of material and in what quantities. To come to 
terms with unpredictable disasters, the evolving logistics challenges and the specificity of 
each operation and country, IFRC and WFP formulate flexible plans that can 
accommodate frequent and numerous last minute changes. Where possible, they build 
redundant capacity into their operations. 
 
Figure 10.4 – Agency Specific Mitigation Measures 
Failure Mode Mitigation Measures 
Supply • Contingency planning 
• Redundant capacity 
• Funds, inventory, suppliers, equipment, staff  
• Flexible operations 
• Supplier substitutability 
• Mix of international, regional, national suppliers 
• Guidelines for donations  
Transportation • Transportation mode substitutability  
• Alternative transportation routes 
• Logistics provider exchangeability 
• Change in destination, receiving port 
Facilities • Regional warehouses 
• Warehouses at logistics nodes 
• Establishment of temporary operational sites 
• Alternative and combined distribution networks 
HR • Standby capacity 
• Agile workforce 
Communication • Standby ICT capacity 
• Use of wide range of information sources 
 
For predictable disasters, humanitarian organizations engage in scenario and contingency 
planning. For example, IFRC has contingency plans in place to address the needs of the 
Caribbean during the hurricane season while WFP has similar plans to address severe 
droughts in Africa. 
Similar to business, IFRC and WFP envisage the use of different transportation routes, 
modes, and logistics service provider over a very short period. When an access route to a 
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region is temporarily interrupted or insufficient, humanitarian cargo uses the next 
alternative transport mode or route available. To ensure the widest possible distribution, 
they leverage various distribution networks (schools, mosques, churches, etc.). 
In terms of transport mode, to reach remote areas and IDPs, IFRC and WFP call upon a 
diversified and combined transportation portfolio. This includes trucks, motorcycles, boats, 
and helicopters as well as unconventional modes such as donkeys, elephants and airdrops. 
For example, IFRC airlifted assistance during the initial phases of the Mozambique floods. 
To respond to the 1996 Zaire crisis, WFP used air transport before the more sustainable but 
time-consuming alternatives of surface transportation could be used.  In WFP operations, 
trucking often replaces airlifts after the initial emergency phase. Ocean transportation is 
used to move significant quantities of cargo (e.g. food) at low cost.  
To get operational as quickly as possible, IFRC and WFP often establish the centre of their 
operations either at the disaster site or at the closest location with the most adequate 
facilities. When transportation is unreliable, they store goods close to the point of 
consumption. For example, during the Gujarat earthquake, IFRC established its centre of 
operation at the disaster site. During the 1996 Zaire crisis, to avert the massive movement 
of people towards centralized and few food depots, WFP set up decentralized distribution 
points.  During the first days of the Liberia crisis, WFP worked out of a ship off the coast 
near the capital city (WFP website). 
At the outbreak of a crisis, to augment their presence, IFRC and WFP relocate their 
headquarters and regional staff close or at the disaster site. For example, in response to the 
Afghan and Iraq 2003 crisis, WFP first evacuated its staff relocating them, along with a 
good number of its headquarters and regional staff, to a regional office. Later, the majority 
of mobilized staff was moved into the emergency theatre. Apart from relocating, to 
augment their HR presence, WFP calls upon its network of partners while IFRC fields its 
Field Assessment and Coordination Team (FACT) team. To cover outstanding needs, WFP 
hires “reactive” capacity, that is, experts and consultants and use standby assessment 
teams.  
To prepare their initial appeals and a response plan, WFP and IFRC use a wide range of 
sources. To build estimates on human loss, the scale and scope of the damage, and number 
and duration of people requiring relief assistance, publicly available information is 
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combined with expert knowledge and experience. For example, IFRC consults a range of 
websites to obtain historical or factual information on the region’s geography, climate, 
demographics, food habits, living conditions and customs, infrastructure, duty customs and 
regulations of the disaster area. Its relief delegates collect anecdotal information from the 
local media, population, authorities and NGOs. To counter eventual communication failure 
modes, IFRC mobilizes its telecom ERU while WFP mobilizes its standby ICT equipment 
from its regional warehouses. 
In conclusion, operational humanitarian organizations resort to a number of agency-
specific measures to pre-empt dependencies and duplications caused by failure modes that 
can emerge during disaster response.  
 
10.2.2    Coordination Mechanisms  
As discussed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, to stage its response, a humanitarian organization 
needs to coordinate its activities with other humanitarian organizations and key 
stakeholders with a view to manage fit, flow and sharing resource dependencies. As time is 
of essence during emergency response, a humanitarian organization also needs to avoid 
parallel efforts, duplications along the supply chain by combining its efforts and activities 
with other humanitarian organizations. In the next two sub-sections, we illustrate the range 
of coordination mechanisms available to address inter-organizational and extra-
organizational dependencies and duplications. 
 
10.2.2.1   Inter-Organizational Coordination Mechanisms 
As seen in Chapter 7, since the late 1990s, the humanitarian community resorts to a 
logistics coordination platform to coordinate its logistics activities. As such, in this section, 
we draw upon both the UNJLC case and agency-specific measures to enumerate the inter-
agency coordination mechanisms that allow humanitarian organizations to overcome 
dependencies and avoid duplications. We also discuss the contribution of these 
coordination mechanisms to organizational performance (Figure 10.5). 
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As seen during the Afghan crisis and the Iraq crisis, the humanitarian community resorts to 
joint contingency planning through the UNJLC to overcome sharing dependencies and 
avoid duplications. Joint contingency planning helps reduce lead times and avoid reliance 
on expensive transport options (e.g. airlifting) or last-minute sourcing. It helps in the 
development of alternative plans and ensures the mobilization of the right range of relief 
items. During joint contingency planning sessions, implementation strategies such as pre-
positioning - strategic placement of food or NFIs throughout a country/area accessible for 
distribution to recipients - act as key coordination mechanisms.  
 
Figure 10.5 – Inter-Organizational Coordination Mechanisms 
Dependency/ 
Duplication 
Coordination Mechanism Contribution to Performance 
Duplication 
Sharing 
Joint contingency planning Reduce response time 
Reduce operational costs 
Ensures accuracy 
Sharing Prioritization More accurate and timely response 
Sharing De-bottlenecking Flexibility 
Duplication Common logistics capability Limit operational cost 
Improve response time  
Flexibility 
More accurate response 
Duplication Common information 
platform 
Reduce operational costs  
Improve response time 
Flexibility  
More accurate response 
 
Relief items differ in terms of their urgency (water), life saving contribution (medicine), 
volumes required (food), complementary (kitchen kits) or simple (clothing) function, 
continuous (food) or one-of-a-time (vaccines) usage, degree of substitutability, and need 
for specialized input (medical personnel for medicines and medical care). The different 
value and characteristics of relief items together with the mismatch between available 
transport and handling capacity and the volume of cargo moving into a region call for the 
prioritization of relief item movements into the disaster theatre. As seen during the Zaire 
1996 crisis and the Mozambique floods, the humanitarian community needs not only to 
prioritize the movement of food and NFIs but also people (refugees, returnees, 
humanitarian and media operators, etc.). Prioritization – movement of food, NFIs and 
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people in accordance with humanitarian priorities – helps overcome a sharing dependency. 
Prioritization results in a more accurate response, improved response time and lower 
operational costs as indivisible asset capacity is assigned to supplies and people rather than 
used exclusively by the ‘owning’ humanitarian organization.  
As seen during the Afghan crisis, request for logistics assets (storage, transport, 
distribution, etc.) often exceeds availability. For example, storage facilities are a necessity 
whenever cargo changes from one mode of transport to another and before distribution to 
final beneficiaries. Humanitarian organizations typically have access to government-owned 
or own/rent/set-up warehousing facilities at key logistics nodes. However, this is often 
insufficient. To optimize the use of indivisible assets such as warehouses or transport 
vehicles and overcome capacity constraints, there is a need to broker exchange and sharing 
agreements between humanitarian organizations with excess capacity and those with 
limited capacity.  Debottlenecking, i.e., overcoming a temporary mismatch between asset 
capacity requirements and availability among humanitarian organizations, addresses a 
sharing dependency enhancing the level of flexibility in disaster response.  
As observed during the Afghan and Iraq crises, to cover countrywide emergencies, the 
humanitarian community has to quickly build up its physical network of offices in the 
country. Bearing in mind that a humanitarian organization typically responds to a number 
of geographically competing disasters, logistics HR are often stretched widely and thinly 
across geographies. Sharing of a common HR and office network or tapping into the 
resources of other humanitarian organizations avoids the establishment of parallel office 
network. Use of common services enhances operational flexibility, reduces operational 
costs, and improves response time and the degree of accurateness in terms of geographies 
covered. 
Throughout any crisis, access to logistics-relevant information is the biggest challenge. 
While at the outset of a crisis information is largely unavailable, throughout an operation, 
information is scattered across geographies, various stakeholders and humanitarian 
operators. Each humanitarian organization occupies a specific node in the information 
chain. Due to long-term presence, prior or on-going activities, some organizations are 
better informed than others on key logistical parameters of a region or country. Their 
network of local staff and transport operators is an unparallel source of up-to-date 
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logistics-related information. Lack of timely, reliable, and comprehensive information can 
delay response and add to the overall cost of the operation. A common information 
platform helps avoid duplication of efforts and helps reduce operational costs, improve 
response time, flexibility and ensure a more accurate response. 
We have identified two other sources of duplication – inventory management and 
procurement - currently not addressed by the humanitarian community that would 
contribute to performance (Figure 10.6). Should humanitarian organizations pursue the 
inventory optimization strategy and conduct joint procurement activities, their operations 
could be more cost-effective and accurate.  
 
Figure 10.6 – Additional Inter-Organizational Coordination Mechanisms 
Dependency/ 
Duplication 
Coordination Mechanism Contribution to Performance 
Duplication Inventory optimization More accurate response 
More cost-effective 
Duplication Joint procurement activities More cost-effective 
 
More specifically, building inventory at border crossing is a rational response to emerging 
crises. By optimizing the level of relief inventory at any one corridor, humanitarian 
organizations address a source of duplication. Inventory optimization at the humanitarian 
community level ensures an improved geographical distribution of inventory buildups, 
avoids facility failure modes associated to excessive stockpiling and wasteful duplications 
lowering operational costs and ensuring a more accurate response. 
Similarly, each humanitarian organization manages its own supply chain as most relief 
items are organization-specific and related to the mandate and focus (e.g. healthcare or 
food) of the concerned organization. Consequently, for each disaster, parallel supply 
chains may end up competing with each other against a limited number of items. For 
example, as observed during the Gujarat, Iraq and Afghan crises, they typically compete 
for transport assets, fuels, tents, etc. Coordinated or centralized procurement activities 
avoid duplication and improve the cost profile of the operation as wasteful competition is 
avoided. 
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In conclusion, humanitarian organizations by calling upon various inter-agency 
coordination mechanisms managed by a coordination platform can address emerging 
dependencies and avoid duplications. By so doing, they can improve upon their internal 
goals of cost-effectiveness, timeliness, accuracy and flexibility. 
 
10.2.2.2  Extra-Organizational Coordination Mechanisms 
In order to address dependencies and avoid duplications emerging during disaster 
response, the humanitarian community needs to coordinate segments of its supply chain 
activities with donors, local authorities, military forces and service providers.  As 
discussed in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, our research shows that humanitarian organizations 
engage in agency-specific measures and resort to a logistics coordination platform to 
ensure extra-organizational coordination. In this section, we enumerate the different 
coordination mechanisms and describe their impact on organizational performance (Figure 
10.7). 
Figure 10.7 – Extra-Organizational Coordination Mechanisms 
Actor Dependency Coordination Mechanism Contribution to 
Performance 
Donors Sharing 
Flow 
Standardization 
Partnerships 
• Standby 
agreements 
• Pre-positioned 
goods 
• Communication 
Coordinated funding 
strategy 
Improve accuracy of 
response 
Reduce operational costs 
Improve response time 
Confer flexibility 
Governments Sharing  
Fit 
Duplication 
Common negotiations 
De-conflicting 
De-bottlenecking 
Improve response time 
Improve accuracy of 
response 
Enhance flexibility 
Military Fit De-conflicting Improve response time 
Enhance flexibility 
Service 
Providers & 
Suppliers 
Duplication 
Sharing 
Collective bargaining Reduce operational costs 
Improve response time 
Ensure accuracy 
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The arrival of unsolicited, excessive and unsuitable goods disrupts the flow of relief 
operations. They exacerbate existing bottlenecks in the supply chain and delay the delivery 
of goods to the populations. They are a waste of time as limited and valuable human 
resources have to be redirected to their management. They add to the cost of the operation 
as they have to be unloaded, catalogued, and possibly returned or destroyed.  To address 
the sharing and flow dependencies related to the arrival of donor donations, humanitarian 
organizations can resort to a number of coordination mechanisms. For example, to limit 
the arrival of unsolicited goods, the humanitarian community sets standards. To improve 
upon the predictability of donor contribution, it enters into a partnership relationship and 
improves the quality of communication. Pre-positioned goods and standby agreements 
with donors improve the accuracy of donor contribution conferring a higher degree of 
flexibility to humanitarian operations. 
As noted during the Afghan crisis, to ensure continuation of relief operations, the 
humanitarian community may need to implement infrastructure rehabilitation/clearance 
projects on seriously affected, mined or deteriorated transport infrastructure. To avoid 
duplication of funding on the same projects and ensure adequate funding for critical ones, 
the humanitarian community can resort to a coordinated funding strategy vis-à-vis donors.  
As observed during the Iraq and Afghan crises, during response operations, humanitarian 
organizations need to use the infrastructure and services of both recipient and neighbouring 
countries and avoid duplicating government relief efforts. To address sharing and fit 
dependencies and avoid duplications, the humanitarian community can resort to three 
distinct coordination mechanisms: common negotiations, de-conflicting and de-
bottlenecking. Negotiations help address administrative hurdles and ensure that 
government and international community response plans complement rather than overlap 
each other. De-conflicting ensures the use of the assets by the humanitarian community 
along side the government. De-bottlenecking ensures the use of additional assets by the 
community. 
For example, as the IFRC initiative after Hurricane Mitch shows, during the contingency 
and scenario planning phase, the humanitarian community, where possible, can present and 
discuss its plans with local authorities allowing for timely feedback, early preparation and 
more accurate response. During the response phase, it can present its response plan to the 
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recipient government. To ensure the smooth influx and movement of relief items across 
boarders, it can engage in negotiations with relevant authorities. As the activities of the 
UNJLC during the Afghan crisis indicate, to de-bottleneck transport constraints, it can 
negotiate the use of inactive or non-commercial infrastructure such as airports and ports 
for humanitarian purposes. Similarly, to restore and increase storage and distribution 
capacity available to humanitarian organizations, it can negotiate with relevant local 
authorities. To ensure use of government controlled logistics assets, it can engage in de-
conflicting activities. 
Humanitarian organizations operating in military environments need to coordinate their 
response activities with military forces.  De-conflicting of activities ensures the use of 
military controlled facilities and airspace by the humanitarian community. By addressing 
this fit dependency, humanitarian organizations have the possibility to improve upon 
response time and increasing the number of options available to them. 
As observed during the Afghan and Iraq crises, humanitarian organizations can avoid 
parallel negotiations with local service providers and suppliers by engaging in common 
negotiations. Centralized negotiations ensure control over operational costs and limit the 
possibility of temporary stock-outs and delays.  
In conclusion, humanitarian organizations, directly or indirectly, by resorting to various 
coordination mechanisms with various actors can address emerging dependencies and 
avoid duplications. By so doing, they improve upon their internal goals of cost-
effectiveness, timeliness, accuracy and flexibility. 
10.3   Virtually Organized Logistics Coordination Platform 
(VOLCP) 
Since the late 1990s, the humanitarian community resorts to a non-operational 
humanitarian organization to deal with coordination issues arising during disaster 
response. In this section we analyze how humanitarian organizations operationalize and 
ensure the success of this structure, what are the risks and opportunities facing this 
structure and what is its preferred governance structure and why. To this end, we refer to 
the deployments of the UNJLC in both natural and complex disasters.  
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Q2:  How do humanitarian organizations operationalize and ensure the success of a 
virtually organized logistics coordination platform?  
 
Q3: What are the risks and opportunities facing humanitarian virtual organizations and 
how are they managed? 
 
P2:  Only virtually organized logistics coordination platform will lead to good 
performance. 
 
10.3.1  Operationalization and Success of Virtually Organized Logistics 
Coordination Platform 
In Chapter 3 by referring to the literature, we define the main features of virtual 
organizing. In Chapter 7 we argue that the UNJLC has the characteristics of a virtual 
organization. In this section, to respond to the following research question we draw on the 
UNJLC case, which allows us to discuss the structural components of a virtually organized 
logistics coordination platform as well as its building blocks.  
 
 
10.3.1.1 Structural Elements of Virtually Organized Logistics Coordination 
Platform (VOLCP) 
The virtual organizing literature has identified two structural elements of virtual 
organizing: virtual web and virtual corporation. The UNJLC case shows that during large 
scale emergencies, the virtually organized logistics coordination platform has two 
additional elements: a core unit and a series of antenna offices (Figure 10.8). In the next 
paragraphs we shall illustrate the relevance and contribution of each component to the 
operationalization and success of the platform. 
The humanitarian virtual web, an open-ended but relatively stable structure, is necessary to 
attract and include humanitarian organizations, donors, CSOs, and private sector 
Q2:  How do humanitarian organizations operationalize and ensure the success of a 
virtually organized logistics coordination platform?  
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companies. The repeated need for virtual corporations makes the virtual web a permanent 
feature of the humanitarian logistics coordination platform. Similarly, the existence of the 
virtual web calls for the establishment of a virtual web secretariat. Indeed, the 
operationalization of the virtual web best occurs through a permanent structure.  
In this respect, the core unit is the permanent structure. It is the platform through which 
virtual web members carry out their forecasting, planning and preparedness activities. The 
core unit ensures continuity in-between emergencies and quick deployment of virtual 
corporations.  Its function is to level-out potential incompatibilities among humanitarian 
organizations by educating and nurturing the web members. It acts as the caretaker of the 
facility. To be effective, it needs to be hosted by a financially and technically strong and 
credible organization recognized for its leadership in logistics and knowledgeable about 
the availability and potential configuration of inter-agency resources. 
 
Figure 10.8 – The Structure of the Virtually Organized Logistics Coordination 
Platform 
 
Universe of 
Organizations 
Hosting 
Organization 
 
 
 
 
Virtual Web 
 
 
D1 
 
D3 
 
D2 
Core 
Unit 
A1 
A2 
A3 
A1 A2 
A3 
A1 
A2 
A3 
Temporary Structures 
Reporting Line 
Secondments 
Virtual structure 
D 
A 
Focal Virtual Corporation 
Temporary Antenna Offices 
Coordination/communication 
Custodianship 
A4 
355
ORGANIZING LOGISTICS PARTNERSHPS: LESSONS FROM HUMANITARIAN 
ORGANIZATIONS 
 
 
355
For each large-scale disaster, a focal virtual corporation is established. Depending on the 
logistical challenges, the focal virtual corporation in coordination with the core unit 
evaluates the necessity to scale up and down its territorial coverage achieving flexibility 
and accuracy. Territorial coverage is achieved by the opening and closing of temporary 
antenna offices. The setting up and dismantling of antenna offices during an emergency 
ensures support to the focal virtual corporation and increases the value-adding contribution 
of the structure.  
Antenna offices augment the resources at the disposal of the participants. As they can be 
activated on a needs basis and close to the target market, they add another layer of 
flexibility to humanitarian operations. In addition, they can be considered as valid 
mitigation measures against HR, facility and communication failure modes.  
 
Figure 10.9 – Intra, Inter & Extra-Organizational Linkages of Virtual Organizations 
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faster and more accurate flow of information and improved decision making between the 
core unit and field offices (focal and antenna). The second set of linkages consists of 
exchange of information and resources between the virtual organization and the 
humanitarian community as well as a conduit for coordinated decisions among 
humanitarian organizations. The third linkage consists of those between the humanitarian 
community and those that interact with it whether government agencies, military forces or 
donors.  These links act as a coordination mechanism per se and can influence the speed, 
accuracy and cost profile of collaboration.  
 
10.3.1.2  Building Blocks of a Virtually Organized Logistics Coordination 
Platform (VOLCP) 
As seen in Chapter 3, the network and virtual organization literature propose a 
combination of factors as antecedents or drivers of inter-firm alliances and transition from 
stable network to a virtual web. The UNJLC case confirms the importance of two types of 
building blocks - strategic and operational - in the initiation, nurturing and continuation of 
the humanitarian virtual web, the core unit, the UNJLC deployments and antenna offices 
(Figure 10.10). More specifically, five strategic and five operational building blocks have 
been identified necessary for the operationalization and success of humanitarian virtual 
organizations. In the following paragraphs we explain the contribution of each to a 
successful operationalization. 
 
Figure 10.10 – Strategic & Operational Building Blocks 
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Strategic Aspects 
Trust. Trust is essential, an integrating ingredient for any collaborative initiative including 
that between humanitarian organizations and a coordination facility. It substitutes for 
formal agreements. It enables a humanitarian virtual corporation to cope with time 
pressures in complex and uncertain disasters. It facilitates information sharing between 
members and helps the structure retain its operational agility. 
Direction. To be effective, a logistics coordination platform requires a clear vision and set 
of values. The vision and values have to be communicated to and embraced by the virtual 
web members.   
Communication. The need for adequate communication is high for a humanitarian 
logistics coordination platform since the concept and structure of virtual organization may 
be a novelty for many humanitarian organizations. Dynamic and temporary non-
organizations may result alien and distant to headquarter and country office level staff. As 
a result, collaboration with the activated focal and the series of antenna offices may either 
be resisted or slow. The mandate of the facility may not be readily accepted by those 
directly affected by it especially if the new structure implies foregoing control and power 
over functions previously carried out only by the virtual web members.  Unfamiliarity, 
lack of acceptance and the wrong set of expectations can indeed undermine the potentials 
of the facility.  
To ensure awareness and ownership of the concept as well as create the right expectation 
and level of cooperation, the Core Unit needs to engage in communication and marketing 
campaigns with key stakeholders. 
Leadership. Leadership is key to the operationalization of any virtual corporation (Figure 
10.11) and the deployment of a logistics coordination platform. The caretaker has to assist 
in the mobilization of the physical and human capabilities previously developed and 
committed. The lead operator has to operationalize the vision of the virtual corporation and 
ensure the sharing of responsibilities among relevant partners. He has to communicate the 
vision and mandate of the virtual corporation to the external environment. Finally, there is 
a need to combine people, assets and activities that are not under the direct control of the 
virtual corporation, but whose performance is critical to success. 
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Figure 10.11 – Operationalization of Virtual Corporations 
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Agile Workforce. As illustrated in Chapter 2, humanitarian organizations responding to an 
emergency operate in non-routine, hard to anticipate environments. This opens a 
discussion on what characteristics and qualifications staff seconded to the emergency 
operations in general and the logistics coordination platform in particular should have.  
Staff seconded to the platform need to sense and respond to an emergency without access 
to critical information on the magnitude of the disaster, international response or the 
acceptability of international assistance. To move food and supplies to disaster areas, they 
need to be flexible, creative and quick thinkers. To get around logistics failure modes and 
bottlenecks, they need to identify every possible routing option and be ready to switch and 
change their logistics plans at short notice. They need to have the capabilities to anticipate, 
communicate, plan and collaborate effectively as well as improvise through innovative and 
creative solutions in order to meet unexpected problems as they arise.  
Experts seconded to the humanitarian logistics coordination platform have to be organized 
in teams. Teams collaborate across space, time, and organizational boundaries using a 
supporting IT system. Each team member has its own area of specialization and 
contributes to the objectives of the focal or antenna office with his/her specific skills. As 
milestones are accomplished or modified, members are disengaged, adapt their 
contribution based on new information and feedback, or assume growing responsibilities. 
Apart from learning and adapting quickly to the changes in environment, they need to be 
ready for quick deployments in new environments. Indeed, in the course of a response 
operation, they may be relocated, possibly even several times - from their headquarters, to 
regional offices and several antenna offices and back - to new environments. Given the 
temporary and dynamic nature of deployments, staff seconded to the regional or antenna 
offices needs to be mobile and self-motivated. Exposed to team changes, it needs to have 
the emotional skill of giving up human relationships and a given working environment and 
culture and to become rapidly and effectively operational in a new collaboration 
environments.  
In conclusion, the success of a humanitarian logistics coordination platform depends on a 
responsive, collaborative, empowered, skillful, flexible, mobile, devoted, self-motivated 
and connected workforce. 
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Business Processes. Reference business processes are important for the formation of the 
humanitarian logistics coordination platform and integration of new members. As such, an 
exhaustive operations manual covering processes relevant to the virtual web and each 
deployment is required. For example, the existence of a rapid activation process that 
ensures the mobilization of staff, equipment and funds among the virtual web members is 
of outmost importance as lack of personnel and funds results in late deployment and slow 
ramp-up. Absence of a set of inter-agency agreements and systems and an activation and 
exit protocol can compromise the achievement of identified mission.  
Support Infrastructure. A humanitarian logistics coordination platform becomes 
operational thanks to extensive deployment of ICT. The Core Unit performs the 
information brokerage function either directly by relying on the support of its host 
institution or by outsourcing it to the member with the best IT capability.  
Service Design. To deliver value, the humanitarian logistics coordination platform needs 
to be responsive to the diverse needs of its constituency. In this regard, the mission, vision 
and services of the humanitarian logistics coordination platform may need to evolve in 
order to remain in line with diverse needs as well as emerging opportunities and 
challenges.  
10.3.2  Virtually Organized Logistics Coordination Platform and 
Performance 
In this section our aim is to verify the validity of the necessary condition proposition that 
relates the governance structure of the logistics coordination platform to its performance as 
stated below.  
 
P2:  Only a virtually organized logistics coordination platform will lead to good 
service. 
 
The virtual organization literature describes the structural traits of this governance 
mechanism. Virtual organizations are typically geographically dispersed flat and 
decentralized structures that are activated by their members to exploit a specific 
opportunity, achieve a specific project-related (often time-bound) objective. They are 
swiftly activated, reconfigured and demobilized on a needs-basis. Their structure facilitates 
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fast decision making and decision execution. Depending on their objective, they can enable 
horizontal and vertical integration of the value chain in terms of integration of resources 
and sharing of risks and costs. More specifically, they are meant to ensure a better and 
higher use of the members’ resources; provide access to new abilities, markets and 
information at lower cost; and reduce time to market (Bremer et al., 2000).  
A humanitarian logistics coordination platform is typically entrusted with the task of 
solving dependencies and avoiding duplications among humanitarian organizations as well 
as between humanitarian organizations and other stakeholders. We argue that virtual 
organizing is the only structure that can ensure a good logistics coordination service to the 
humanitarian community.  Our argument is based on two factors summarized in Figure 
10.12. First, to ensure a good service, there is a need for the logistics coordination platform 
to be swiftly deployed, easily reconfigured and promptly demobilized in an accurate and 
cost-effective manner.  Second, good service hinges on a distinct and neutral entity with 
specific and time-bound objectives activated by its members in the position to leverage and 
combine in a speedy, flexible, accurate and cost-effective fashion the tangible and 
intangible resources (including time and space competencies and information and 
knowledge) available within the network.   
 
Figure 10.12 – Virtually Organized Logistics Coordination Platform & Good Service 
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To verify the validity of our proposition, we select a number of cases. Since the 
proposition relates to the governance structure of a logistics coordination platform and its 
services during disaster response, our case relates to the humanitarian logistics 
coordination platform: the UNJLC. More specifically we consider UNJLC deployments in 
two unpredictable and two predictable disasters: Gujarat earthquake and Mozambique 
floods, and Afghanistan and Iraq crises respectively. The hypothesis for each case is that 
during disaster response, a logistics coordination platform cannot provide good services if 
it is not virtually organized.  
As the Zaire 1996 crisis demonstrates, prior to the UNJLC, there was no mechanism 
through which the humanitarian community could be quickly represented at the disaster 
site, leverage and gain access to each others resources, overcome information and 
knowledge asymmetries, etc. As such, resource asymmetries and waste persisted 
increasing costs, delaying response, foregoing a higher level of flexibility and accuracy. 
During the Mozambique crisis, the UNJLC was deployed by the humanitarian community 
four days after the second cyclone (speedy response). It had a clear, albeit, limited 
mandate: asset management. On a daily basis, it prioritized the movement of humanitarian 
cargo and destinations (speedy and accurate response). It scheduled regional airlifts based 
on the guidelines emanating from different coordination meetings (accuracy and flexibility 
of response) and with a view to maximize the use of air assets at the disposal of the 
humanitarian community avoiding waste and delays (flexible, accurate and cost-
effectiveness use of resources).  
Since decisions were centralized with the UNJLC and made on the daily basis, no time was 
lost. As a result, humanitarian organizations, regardless of their size and structure (e.g. UN 
agency, national or international NGOs), gained access to air assets, moved their cargo and 
benefitted from the services of the UNJLC. The humanitarian community viewed the 
UNJLC’s asset management efforts and stock tracking function a success. The combined 
air operation of the disaster was among the largest ever: a total of 10,000 flights hours, 
transporting almost 30,400 passengers, and 11,623 metric tonnes of food and non-food 
items over less than two months.  
Although the UNJLC concept existed at the time of the Gujarat earthquake, it was not 
virtually organized. In response to this disaster, the UNJLC was activated late and without 
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consultation with the humanitarian community. As a result, it was not recognized as a 
legitimate logistics coordination facility by the community. Consequently, it could not 
coordinate nor provide access to the assets available within the community.  In addition, 
contrary to future deployment where the community shared the risks and costs of the 
facility, during this disaster, members did not contribute to its staffing and required 
response facilities.  Without a clear mandate and no resources, the facility which did not 
have the key characteristics of a virtual organization, was soon demobilized.  
In view of the emerging Afghan crisis, the UNJLC was deployed a fortnight after the 
September 11 events, that is, prior to the October 2001 hostilities (speedy response). 
Operations started out of WFP headquarters in Rome. By end November, UNJLC offices 
were operating out of Rome, Pakistan (Islamabad, Quetta and Peshawar), the US (Tampa, 
the Coalition headquarters), Iran (Mashad), Tajikistan (Dushanbe), Uzbekistan (Tashkent 
and Termez) as well as Afghanistan (Mazar-e-Sherif, Kabul and Hirat) constituting a 
flexible and accurate response.  
The satellite offices took decisions independently ensuring a good response. Their day-to-
day task was to identify and resolve bottlenecks affecting the humanitarian effort in their 
area of immediate responsibility through direct negotiations with relevant parties. UNJLC 
Islamabad and Rome ensured that excess aircraft capacity was efficiently used (access to 
resources). The network of offices addressed emerging local bottlenecks and disseminated 
relevant logistics-related information among agencies contributing to their decision 
making. By providing value-adding services through various coordination mechanisms 
(e.g. information brokerage function, de-conflicting, de-bottlenecking, collective 
bargaining, etc.), each satellite office and the whole network of UNJLC offices ensured 
speedy, flexible, accurate and cost-effective response, decisions, and access to resources. 
The UNJLC deployment was viewed as a huge success by the humanitarian and donor 
communities. 
Similar to the Afghan crisis, the UNJLC’s swift activation – few months before the US-led 
attack - and office configuration (Fuel cell, New York, Rome, Amman, Bagdad, Basra, 
Hilla, and Erbil) during the Iraq crisis ensured an adequate and rapid response to dynamic 
environments. The spatially and temporally dispersed virtual office network and members 
ensured a broad, extensive and cost-effective coverage. Its flat and decentralized structure 
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allowed for fast decision making and execution (speedy response). Its information 
brokerage function and resource coordination function, especially with respect to the 
availability of fuels, was valued by humanitarian organizations. The UNJLC deployment 
in response to this disaster was commended. The Figure below summarizes the outcome of 
our cases where good service is measured in terms of good response and access to tangible 
and intangible resources available in the community. 
 
Figure 10.13 – Results of our Tests Related to Proposition 2 
Case Virtually Organized 
Logistics Platform 
Good Service Test Result 
Gujarat No No Not rejected 
Mozambique Yes Yes Not rejected 
Afghanistan Yes Yes Not rejected 
Iraq Yes Yes Not rejected 
 
In the case of the Mozambique floods and the Afghan and Iraq crises, The UNJLC, as a 
virtually organized structure, was able to leverage resources available in the network in a 
timely and cost-effective fashion.   In terms of information, its quick deployment and 
constant reconfiguration together with the contribution of spatially dispersed offices and 
virtual members ensured that the structure could perform its information brokerage and 
depository function. The use of ICT and its flat structure facilitated the flow of information 
in real-time throughout the entire network quickening the pace of decisions and 
coordination among team members.  Since UNJLC services are extended indiscriminately 
to small and big organizations alike, it enabled smaller organizations such as WHO and the 
NGO community to stimulate largeness as resources (e.g. information, logistics assets, 
etc.) previously accessible to larger organizations were made available to them at no 
additional cost. 
In conclusion, prior to the UNJLC and during deployments that did not have the critical 
characteristics of virtual organizing, humanitarian organizations could not stage a response 
that addressed dependencies and avoided duplications. UNJLC’s structure enables it to 
provide a number of services and engage in functions that allow it and its members to 
respond faster, cost-effectively, accurately and flexibly to the needs of the disaster.  
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In view of above, it is recommended that UNJLCs are activated swiftly and that they are 
adequately resourced so as to improve the performance of small and large humanitarian 
organizations alike. 
 
10.3.3   Risks & Opportunities Facing the Humanitarian Virtual 
Organizations 
By drawing on the literature, in Chapter 3 we review the risks and opportunities facing 
(commercial) virtual organizations. By combining the observations of the literature with 
our own based on the UNJLC case, in this section we respond to the following question: 
 
As the framework proposed in section 10.3.2 suggests, success of the humanitarian 
logistics coordination platform depends on a number of building blocks. However, as the 
literature indicates, some aspects of virtual organizing are by themselves a source of risk 
and opportunity.  In the following paragraphs, we shall explore the relevance of these risks 
and opportunities to the humanitarian logistics coordination platform and its response 
function.  
The network literature argues that firms with excellent networking capability and a strong 
resource base in terms of amount and quality are best positioned to take the lead in the 
creation and management of networks. In the case of UNJLC, the choice of WFP as the 
host institution is a sound one given the organization’s a) strong logistics expertise, b) 
commitment to provide infrastructural support which ensures immediate operability and c) 
experience in taking the lead in the provision of other common inter-agency services.  
However, in general, the physical collocation of the various components of the structure – 
core unit and virtual corporations – has managerial and power implications. Although this 
has not been the case for WFP, the nesting of the core unit in one of the virtual web 
member’s premises may result in undue interference and influence by the host organization 
on the decisions and operations of the core unit as well as those of focal and antenna 
Q3: What are the risks and opportunities facing humanitarian virtual organizations 
and how are they managed? 
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virtual corporations. The perceived or effective interference and dominant position of the 
host institution in the decision-making process and shaping of the facility can be countered 
either by spelling out the custodian-customer and support relationship and in terms of roles 
and responsibilities or through the establishment of a neutral and autonomous facility. 
As the alliance/networks literature suggests, an increased reliance on virtual organization 
can lead to dependence and loss of control over key resources, competencies and decisions. 
We argue that a relationship continuum between members and the logistics coordination 
platform may lead to increasing levels of dependency. As far as the UNJLC is concerned, 
the facility aimed to strengthen as oppose to substitute for an organization’s logistics 
function. However, NGOs and those humanitarian organizations with limited logistics 
capability are particularly exposed to increased levels of dependency on its services. 
Humanitarian virtual organizations can also be activated in inappropriate circumstances 
and settings. In this regard, to remain a credible, reliable and manageable structure, the 
UNJLC resisted across-the-board activation (e.g. advisory role in the Cote d’Ivoire crisis) 
and tried to keep its ambitions within its operational capabilities. It refined its mandate and 
operations by identifying gaps and providing relevant and useful services to the 
humanitarian community. It resisted pressure from its members to engage in a wider 
mandate such as the review and harmonization of the humanitarian organizations’ supply 
chains. By adhering to the strategic and operational mission of the virtual organization, as 
was the case in UNJLC, the architect and caretaker of a humanitarian virtual organization 
can neutralize pressure from different quarters and ensure its selective activation.  
Focal virtual corporations are expected to be dismantled upon achievement of the set goals. 
However, this may not always occur. For example, stakeholder pressure and resistance 
may delay the closure of a virtual corporation. This may occur when closure is viewed as a 
drastic decision that disrupts and deprives the served community of continuity as was the 
case in UNJLC’s deployment during the Afghan crisis. Prolonged activations may result in 
mission creep. That occurs when after achieving its primary objective, the focal virtual 
corporation is not dismantled but asked to address new objectives that are clearly beyond 
its mandate but require the deployment of its resources. Establishment and communication 
of an exit strategy timed according to humanitarian milestones can help avoid prolonged 
interventions. 
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Dispersed workplaces – core unit, focal offices and network of antennas – do increase 
administrative costs and may result in loss of cost efficiencies. We argue that there are 
ways and means to reduce such costs. UNJLC has often opted for the co-location solution: 
hosting of the core unit, focal and antenna offices by an existing structure of a virtual web 
member.  
Dispersed teams may also result in lack of direction and motivation and weaken the loyalty 
of individuals to the team and the organization. UNJLC staff deployed in response to the 
Afghan crisis suffered from isolation and lack of regular contact with their colleagues. 
During the second phase of the Afghan crisis and the Iraq operations, UNJLC organized a 
number of meetings among the geographically dispersed teams to ensure exchange of 
experience and discussion on future activities. Indeed, regular meetings can prevent goal 
displacement and address motivational problems as individuals are regularly reminded of 
the importance of their role and contribution to the overall objective. 
Another important risk facing virtual organizations is related to the relevance of the 
services they provide. The UNJLC was very aware of this risk. To ensure its services 
remained relevant to its member, almost after each deployment, it commissioned 
independent evaluations. Thereafter, it used the findings to adjust and improve its services.  
The UNJLC case highlights the importance of timely and sufficient allocation of resources 
by its members as a means to ensure effectiveness and minimize quality variation across 
deployments. Currently, WFP, UNJLC’s host institution, has to bridge the facility’s 
resource gaps. UNJLC needs to improve on this aspect of its operations possibly through a 
Contribution Protocol that ensures a firm commitment of the virtual web members towards 
its resource requirements as it cannot rely only on the goodwill of its host institution. 
In terms of market opportunities, virtual organizations can address the need for additional 
or new services on a temporary basis. As the UNJLC case illustrates, virtual web members 
may require additional territorial coverage or a new service. The first need can be met 
through the activation of additional antenna offices. The second need can be addressed 
through the activation of a “specialized” cell as was the case of the fuel cell for the 
UNJLC.    
As far as new market opportunities for the structure and its stakeholders are concerned, the 
actual deployment of virtual corporations can assist in unearthing them. For example, as 
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the Afghan and Iraq crises demonstrate, logistics plays an instrumental role in the political 
and economic recovery and development of war shattered and disaster stricken countries.  
 
Figure 10.14 –Risks and Opportunities facing Humanitarian Virtual 
Organizations and the UNJLC Response 
 
Risks facing virtual 
organizations 
UNJLC response Recommendation 
Hosting organization of core unit 
and virtual corporations: undue 
interference and influence 
Neutral and autonomous 
facility, clear custodian-
customer relationship 
 
Undue dependency Strengthening as opposed 
to substituting for 
organizational logistics 
functions 
 
Across-the-board activation Selective activation   
Prolonged deployment - To avoid mission creep 
establish, communicate 
and adhere to an exit 
strategy expressed in 
terms of milestones 
Dispersed working-place: increase 
in admin costs 
Co-location  
Dispersed teams: goal 
displacement, prioritization, 
loyalty and motivation problems 
Regular face-to-face 
meetings 
 
Outdated, irrelevant services; lack 
of focus 
Regular evaluations and 
service design 
adjustments 
 
Under-resourced The host institution 
bridges gap  
 
Drafting and signing up 
to a Contribution 
Protocol 
Market opportunities facing 
virtual organizations 
UNJLC response Recommendation 
Need for new services on a 
temporary basis 
Activation of antenna 
offices 
Establishment of 
“specialized” cells 
 
Long-term logistics services Unable to meet this 
market need beyond 
immediate post-
emergency phase 
Establishment of a 
dedicated logistics-
provider entity 
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In the absence of adequate national logistics capabilities and assets as well as commercial 
logistics providers, a humanitarian logistics coordination platform can highlight the need 
for UNJLC-type entity until national logistics capability is established. At the same time, 
the UNJLC experience emphasizes the perils of getting involved in non-humanitarian 
logistics-intensive operations. More specifically, although humanitarian space is not 
particularly in danger during natural disaster, close collaboration with combatant, 
occupying or peacekeeping forces during complex disasters has the potential to undermine 
the humanitarian space increasing the vulnerability and safety of the humanitarian 
community. For example, collaboration with occupying forces can be in conflict with the 
humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and humanity. This could point to the 
need for the establishment of a dedicated entity that can address the logistics vacuum.   
Figure 10.14 summarizes our discussion by contrasting the risks and opportunities 
identified by the literature with the UNJLC’s response and the UNJLC’s response with our 
recommendation further developed in Chapter 11. 
We conclude this section by arguing that the outcome of our research on virtual 
organizations is extendable to other types of organizations whether for-profit or not-for-
profit, humanitarian or non-humanitarian organizations.  
10.4    Business/CSO-Humanitarian Partnerships 
In this section, we verify the validity of the following proposition and answer the research 
question related to humanitarian partnerships. 
 
P3: For the parties involved, the risks and benefits of strategic partnerships are higher 
than those of brokered partnerships.  
 
Q4: What type of humanitarian organizations can engage in strategic partnerships? 
 
Q5: What are the best practices that can help avert predictable risks and increase 
benefits of business-humanitarian partnerships? 
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10.4.1   Risks and Benefits of Strategic Compared to Brokered Partnerships 
In this section, we verify the validity of the proposition that compares strategic to brokered 
partnership from the risk-benefit profile.  
 
P3: For the parties involved, the risks and benefits of strategic partnerships are higher 
than those of brokered partnerships. 
 
We start our discussion by defining the two different partnership types and the parties 
involved in each of them. Strategic partnerships are those types of partnerships that engage 
a firm/CSO in a detailed cooperation with one humanitarian organization over a medium to 
long period of time. Parties to strategic partnerships include a corporate or CSO partner 
and a humanitarian organization. Brokered partnerships consist of partnerships where a 
nodal structure or organization matches the demand for goods and services of humanitarian 
organizations with the contribution of third parties. Three distinct groups are involved in 
this type of partnership: the brokering institution, the humanitarian organization(s), and the 
assisting partner which can be a corporation, an academic institution, the media, etc.  
As seen in Chapter 3, the literature has identified the benefits and risks of partnerships 
between for-profit and non-profit organizations, which we apply to business/CSO-
humanitarian organization partnerships. In short, the motivations of the concerned parties 
constitute the range of expected benefits. In terms of risks, the humanitarian organization 
is expected to face greater risks because while such partnerships are typically a side 
program for the corporate partner, they intervene in the core activity of a humanitarian 
organization.  
To verify the validity of our proposition, we select a number of cases. Since the unit of 
analysis for this proposition is organizations, our three cases relate to two strategic and one 
brokered partnerships between organizations. In sections 6.4.5, 8.4.2, and 9.2, we 
respectively discussed the risks and benefits of the IFRC-Fritz Institute, WFP-TNT and 
Fritz Institute-humanitarian organization partnerships. Figures 10.15 and 10.16 summarize 
the discussions.   
As illustrated in Figure 10.15, our case analysis allows us to conclude that strategic 
partnerships help improve the performance of the assisted humanitarian organizations, 
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increase their actual or potential access to additional knowledge and, in different degrees, 
contribute to signaling other donors. On the whole, they result in substantial benefits for 
the assisted humanitarian organizations.  
 
Figure 10.15 – Benefits and Risks of Strategic Partnerships 
(WFP-TNT and IFRC-Fritz Institute Partnerships) 
 
Main benefits for HOs WFP IFRC Main benefits for partners TNT FI 
Improving effectiveness 
Advance status of knowledge 
& practice 
Signal other donors 
 
H 
H 
 
H 
 
H 
H 
 
L 
 
   
Moral Market Place 
• Improve employee 
motivation & productivity  
• Fulfill the CSR expectation 
of the market 
Competitive Advantage 
• Increase in reputational 
assets 
• Enhance brand recognition 
Extra-benefits 
 
H 
 
H 
 
 
H 
 
H 
H 
 
n.a 
 
n.a 
 
 
H 
 
H 
H 
Main Risks   WFP IFRC Main risks  TNT FI 
Divergence in working  
cultures 
Absorptive capacity 
Reduced donations from 
traditional donors 
Loss of organizational 
flexibility 
Structural dependency 
Tainted partners, anti-ethical 
activities  
Overwhelming success 
Failure  
H 
 
H 
H 
 
H 
 
H 
H 
 
H 
 H 
H 
 
H 
L 
 
H 
 
H 
L 
 
H 
H  
Divergence in working cultures 
Shortage of credible & 
promising non-profits 
Accused of partnering 
exclusively for self-serving 
reasons, PR, image building or 
tax purposes 
Failure 
Deteriorating reputation  
H 
H 
 
H 
 
 
 
H 
H 
H 
 
H 
 
n.a 
 
 
 
H 
H 
 
In terms of risks, the assisted humanitarian organization needs to take a calculated risk 
when it decides to forge business/CSO partnerships. Assistance can create dependency on 
the corporate/CSO partner and result in loss of organizational flexibility (e.g. IFRC-Fritz 
Institute partnership).  Success can result in additional effort and investment by both 
parties (e.g. the IFRC-Fritz Institute and WFP-TNT partnerships).  As the WFP-TNT 
partnership shows, when the partnership is a top-down initiative, its success, continuation 
and funding depends heavily on the interest and commitment of the top management.  In 
addition, divergence in working cultures, lack of employee buy-in, negative impact on 
traditional donor funding, and lack of dedicated partnership resources can undermine 
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success. On the whole, we can conclude by stating that humanitarian organizations face 
considerable risks when they engage in strategic partnerships. 
The CSO and corporate partner benefit from strategic partnerships. Typically, they are 
recognized for their efforts by a wide range of stakeholders. They can create both 
economic and social value. For example, while the Fritz Institute fulfilled its mission and 
TNT responded to the expectation of the moral market place, both enhanced their 
competitive advantage. In addition, strategic partnerships can be a source of extra-benefits. 
For example, in the case of the Fritz Institute, the Institute has the possibility to extend the 
use of its logistics software to more organizations. For TNT, the extra-benefit consists of 
the possibility to exploit its achievements (enhanced brand recognition and reputational 
assets) in its marketing efforts as well as identify new markets into which expand.  On the 
whole, the CSO and corporate partner reap substantial benefits by devoting resources to 
strategic partnerships. In terms of risks, a CSO does not run the same risks as a corporation 
given their fundamental difference: non-profit versus for-profit organizations. 
Deteriorating reputation of the partners is a risk all parties are exposed to throughout the 
life of the partnership. However, at the aggregate level, CSO and corporate partners run 
considerable risks while they are engaged in strategic partnerships. In conclusion, parties 
involved in strategic partnerships face considerable risks and can reap considerable 
benefits.  
As far as brokered partnerships are concerned, it is worth noting that we consider the risks 
and benefits of each assistance brokered, event or activity and not the cumulative effort of 
the matchmaker or broker. Given the nature of the partnership, in the following paragraphs 
we explore its benefits and risks for three distinct groups of actors: Humanitarian 
organizations, the broker institution and the private sector partners. 
As shown in Figure 10.16, humanitarian organizations participating in brokered activities 
reap low levels of benefits. The broker’s efforts make the corporate world aware of the 
vast needs of the humanitarian organizations, which to a large extent continue to persist. 
By mobilizing resources residing in academia, foundations and the corporate world, the 
broker facilitates the advancement in the status of knowledge and practice among 
humanitarian organizations but cannot ensure long-term impact. Concurrently, the risk 
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faced by the humanitarian organization involved in brokered partnerships is minimal given 
the low level of investment required and impact expected.  
 
Figure 10.16 – Benefits and Risks of Brokered Partnerships  
(Fritz Institute Initiatives) 
 
Main benefits for HOs HOs Main benefits for partners Broker Private 
Sector 
Partners 
Improving effectiveness 
Advance status of knowledge & 
practice 
Signal other donors 
 
L 
L 
 
L 
 
Moral Market Place 
• Improve employee 
motivation and productivity  
• Fulfill the CSR expectation 
of the market 
Competitive Advantage 
• Increase in reputational 
assets 
• Enhance brand recognition 
Extra-benefits 
 
n.a. 
 
n.a. 
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H 
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Main Risks    Main risks    
Divergence in working  cultures 
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Reduced donations from 
traditional donors 
Loss of organizational flexibility 
Structural dependency 
Tainted partners, anti-ethical 
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Overwhelming success 
Failure  
L 
L 
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L 
L 
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L 
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non-profits 
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Deteriorating reputation  
 L 
L 
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As far as the broker is concerned, should the initiatives spearheaded by it be successful, it 
will gain in terms of reputational assets and brand recognition. However, it is possible that 
as it engages in more initiatives, their impact is diluted. There is also potential for extra-
benefit. The accumulated efforts of the broker can enable it to raise funds from both 
corporations and donors and gradually replace internal with external funding. Therefore, 
the broker stands to benefit from its matchmaking efforts. In terms of risks, the broker does 
not face considerable risks given the short duration and impact of each activity or event. 
As far as the private sector partner is concerned, its engagement in brokered initiative does 
not produce the same benefits or the same risks as company-specific and led initiatives. 
This is because ad hoc assistance provided by the private sector partner lacks the depth and 
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long-term financial and emotional commitment. However, as long as benefits outweigh the 
risks, companies are expected to contribute to brokered initiatives.  
Our analysis as summarized in the below figure allows us to make the following 
observations. As long as benefits outweigh the risks, there is a business case for strategic 
partnerships that imply long-term commitment and investment by both parties. 
Humanitarian organizations and private sector partners engaged in strategic and brokered 
partnerships are exposed to a level of risk that is commensurate, proportionate to the 
expected benefits. As such, efforts are expected to be rewarded with proportionate amount 
of returns. In general, business and humanitarian organizations are expected to engage in 
different types of humanitarian-business partnerships should the net benefit be higher than 
the effort. Therefore, it is recommended that both parties take time to evaluate and identify 
the potential risks and benefits associated to their partnership so as to avoid surprises. 
 
Figure 10.17 – Result of Tests Related to Proposition 3 
Case IFRC-Fritz 
Institute 
(Strategic 
Partnership) 
WFP-TNT 
(Strategic 
Partnership) 
Fritz Institute-HOs-Private 
sector 
(Brokered Partnership) 
Party HO CSO 
Partner 
HO Business 
Partner 
HO Business 
Partner 
Broker 
The risks & benefits 
of strategic 
partnerships are 
higher than those of 
brokered 
partnerships. 
Not 
rejected 
Not 
rejected 
Not 
rejected  
Not 
rejected 
Not 
rejected 
Not 
rejected 
Rejected 
 
As far as brokered partnerships are concerned, the situation is different for the brokering 
institution. The brokering institution, should it be successful in its efforts, while exposed to 
minimal levels of risk is expected to reap substantial benefits for itself. 
In view of above, we reformulate and refine our proposition to reflect the outcome of our 
test as follows: 
 
P3: For the business partner and humanitarian organization, the risks and benefits of 
strategic partnerships are higher than those of brokered partnerships. 
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10.4.2   Humanitarian Organizations and Strategic Partnerships 
As stated below, the research question in this section intends to explore whether all types 
of humanitarian organizations can engage in strategic partnerships or they need to have a 
number of characteristics before they can attract a corporate partner. 
 
Q4: What type of humanitarian organizations can engage in strategic partnerships? 
 
Since the unit of analysis for this research question is organizations, our cases relate to 
three organizations: IFRC, WFP and UNJLC. As illustrated in Appendix A, WFP is one of 
the largest humanitarian organizations in terms of annual budget. Similar to WFP, IFRC 
has global operations and office infrastructure. Both organizations rely on global funding 
and attract considerable media attention. As discussed in Chapter 8, WFP has an on-going 
strategic partnership with the global logistics company, TNT. IFRC for close to two years 
was engaged in a strategic partnership with the Fritz Institute for the development of a 
humanitarian logistics software. As for UNJLC, the facility benefits from its custodian 
relationship with WFP.  While it is not directly engaged in a strategic partnership with any 
corporation, where and when appropriate, WFP extends the services and support of its 
corporate partners to it. Corporate partners view their support through WFP to UNJLC 
going beyond the facility itself, as one benefitting the humanitarian community as a whole. 
The IFRC and WFP cases show that large humanitarian organizations attract the strategic 
interest of corporate partners and CSOs. In contrast, it seems that all types of humanitarian 
organizations can be part of and benefit from brokered partnerships. Indeed, as seen in 
Chapter 9, the Fritz Institute, in its broker function, has established a multi-disciplinary and 
wide network of partner organizations. Almost 50 humanitarian organizations part of the 
UN and NGO community with global or local operations, large and limited budgets, are 
listed among partner organizations. 
A number of reasons can explain this outcome. First, contrary to small organizations 
operating on limited budgets, large organizations seem to have the financial space to make 
the onerous up-front investments in a long-term partnership. Second, compared to smaller 
organizations, this category of organizations has the capacity to fully benefit and absorb 
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the long-term assistance provided through a strategic partner. Third, a corporate partner 
needs to have a business case (e.g. meeting its CSR objectives) before engaging in a 
strategic partnership. Only large humanitarian organizations, given the level of visibility 
they can offer, can assist the corporate partner in fulfilling the proposed business case (e.g. 
responding to the expectations of the moral market place, improving upon their 
competitive advantage, etc.). Similarly, since a corporation needs to partner with a 
humanitarian organization that is present in the same or similar markets, only larger 
humanitarian organizations can increase the probability of geographical overlap.  
In contrast, our cases do not indicate the presence of a large corporation/CSO as the 
counterpart for a strategic partnership. Indeed, while TNT is a multinational logistics 
company serving the global market, the Fritz Institute is a specialized non-profit 
organization with a global mission and aspiration, but limited budget and staffing.  
In conclusion, we have identified the size of a humanitarian organization as a critical factor 
in strategic partnerships. As such, future research can test the validity of the following 
proposition: Only large humanitarian organizations can engage in strategic partnerships, 
where large humanitarian organizations are defined as those organizations with global 
operations and office infrastructure that attract global (and hence substantial) funding and 
media attention. 
 
10.4.3    Partnership Best Practices 
In this section, by combining the frameworks provided by the non-profit-business 
partnership literature and our observation on the WFP case, we derive at some lessons 
learnt on business-humanitarian partnerships and respond to the following question: 
 
In terms of risks, through careful design and subsequent policy measures TNT and WFP 
averted some risks (Figure 10.18).  For example, TNT followed best practices during the 
design phase of the partnership by engaging its management early-on and committing itself 
to a medium term program for the right reasons. With a view to select the ‘best’ 
Q5: What are the best practices that can help avert predictable risks and increase 
benefits of business-humanitarian partnerships? 
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humanitarian organizations, during the partner search phase, TNT attached great 
importance to organizational fit. Together with WFP, it identified the partnership 
initiatives and the respective monitoring processes. To avoid structural dependency, early-
on, TNT introduced a new corporate partner to the organization to help WFP’s expand its 
private sector network.  
To minimize the impact of the partnership on its traditional donors and operations, WFP 
put forward a policy paper entitled “New Partnerships to Meet Rising Needs – Expanding 
the WFP Donor Base” for its Board approval. The approved policy ensured that private 
sector contributions were not viewed as a substitute for Member State funding, that WFP 
would not be expected to grant exclusivity to any private sector company and that the 
partnership would not be a source of profit for the private sector partner. WFP also 
committed itself to conducting a thorough due diligence on the potential partner in order to 
avoid reputational problems down the road. 
 
Figure 10.18 – WFP-TNT Partnership: Problems encountered and risks avoided 
Problems Encountered Risks Avoided 
TNT TNT 
• Divergence in working cultures 
• Difficulty in identifying logistics 
needs 
• Failure averted 
o Staff involvement early-on 
o Ensured organizational fit 
o Identified “best” partner  
• Accused of partnering exclusively for 
self-serving reasons 
o Skepticism dispelled through 
immediate implementation 
WFP WFP 
• Divergence in working cultures 
• Temporary lack of absorptive 
capacity due to surge in operations 
(Iraq crisis) and lack of dedicated 
partnership resources 
• Difficulty in articulating logistics 
needs 
 
• Structural dependency 
o New Corporate partner (BCG) 
• Reduced donations from traditional 
donors 
o Private donor fundraising policy 
• Loss of organizational flexibility 
o Avoid granting exclusivity 
• Tainted partners 
o Partner due diligence 
• Antithetical activities 
o  Ensure no commercial benefits 
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In the initial stages of implementation, the partners encountered a range of problems 
related to suspicion, differences in working culture, resource alignment, relevance of 
assistance and absorptive capacity. To dispel any suspicion and to ensure credibility 
among employees and the marketplace, TNT developed a well-motivated and long-term 
partnership and quickly proceeded with the actual implementation. The divergence in 
working cultures encouraged TNT to take time out to learn about the operations, culture, 
working style, practices, jargon, etc. of humanitarian organizations in general and WFP in 
particular. In terms of resources, while TNT had allocated dedicated resources to the 
partnership, WFP had not provisioned for additional human resources. Lack of human 
resources and a temporary absorptive capacity issue on the side of WFP were the other 
reasons for a slow take-off of the two logistics-related initiatives. In terms of relevance of 
assistance, TNT listened to WFP in the design phase of the initiatives hence all the 
initiatives reflected priority needs. However, TNT had made assumptions about WFP and 
humanitarian supply chains which were not confirmed on the ground. Concurrently, WFP 
had failed to promptly communicate its particular needs in the area of logistics. Lack of 
dedicated partnership resources and difficulties related to articulation of logistics needs, 
delayed progress on the more resource-intense logistics initiatives. However, the 
commitment and eagerness of both parties to make the partnership a success helped 
overcome all emerging issues. 
Combining the findings of the literature (section 3.3.2) and our observations on the WFP 
case, there are a number of lessons that can be drawn on how to successfully manage 
strategic partnerships. To ensure a successful strategic partnership with a non-profit 
organization in general and a humanitarian organization in specific, business needs to be 
aware of a number issues and undertake a number of measures during the design as well as 
launch and implementation phases of its partnership (Figure 10.19). 
For a strategic partnership to be effective and engaging it should be linked to the core 
competencies and values of the corporation. To have the required credibility internally and 
on the “moral marketplace”, it should envisage sustained involvement, that is, commit the 
resources of the corporation for a medium to a long-term period. 
It is important for the partnership to be well-motivated and driven by pre-identified 
objectives. This will help dispel any suspicion regarding the real motivation of business in 
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contributing to social and development projects. To ensure the desired level of credibility 
among employees and the market, the partnership has to be tailored so as to meet the 
specific needs and objectives of the assisted organization. What it should not be is i) an 
emulation of programs initiated by the competition, ii) driven primarily from the top, iii) a 
response to the latest fad or iv) implemented to appease the financial markets. 
 
Figure 10.19 – The Strategic Partnership Checklist 
Dos Don’ts 
• Design a medium to long-term CSI 
• Ensure organizational fit 
• Select ‘best’ cause-specific non-profit 
• Early organizational buy-in 
• Remain Focused: Design initiatives 
that leverage your core competencies 
and respond to identified needs of the 
non-profit 
• Confirm relevance of assistance 
offered 
• Establish deliverables and monitoring 
processes  
• Work on organizational 
‘understanding’. Take time out to 
learn about the operations, culture, 
working style, practices, jargon, etc. 
of the non-profit 
• Resource alignment. Request the non-
profit to dedicate resources to the 
partnership 
• Request the non-profit to articulate 
needs during the design and 
implementation phases 
• Gauge absorptive capacity of the non-
profit 
• To ensure credibility among your 
employees and the market, don’t 
engage in a CSI for the ‘wrong’ 
reasons 
• Don’t allow too much time to elapse 
between the launch and the actual 
implementation of the partnership 
• Don’t under-resource the partnership 
• Avoid frequent changes in the 
partnership team composition 
• Avoid creating undue 
resource/expertise dependency   
 
One of the first decisions a corporation needs to make is with respect to the scope of its 
partnership – global, regional, or national. Global initiatives are the riskiest given the fact 
that success hinges on one partner only. However, they are more effective as time and 
resources are tied up in the implementation of only one partnership. To hedge against 
potential partnership failure, a global corporation may wish to diversify its options by 
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entering into specific partnerships with non-profit organizations at the regional or national 
level. 
For a partnership to deliver its potential, business has to devote sufficient time to the 
preparation phase: partner selection, program design, collaboration structure, and reporting 
mechanisms and procedures. The corporation should try to identify and partner with the 
“best” cause-specific non-profit. In other words, an organization that is neutral, does not 
have a controversial track record, enjoys a good reputation and has effective operations. A 
“socialization” period can facilitate the selection process of the non-profit organization. In 
this respect, participation in focused practitioner networking events facilitates the partner 
search process. To be able to contribute with core competencies and be in line with the 
corporation’s values, the corporation should look for organizational fit.  
Immediate implementation is crucial as it allows the corporate partner to maintain the 
momentum created around the partnership as well as to build trust and confidence in its 
good intentions, winning over the sceptics. Once the partnership is launched, the 
corporation should devote sufficient time and effort to understand the specifics of the 
assisted organization in terms of its operations, environment, requirements and absorptive 
capacity.  
To avoid early misunderstandings and cultural clashes especially if the partnership type is 
a first, an educational period for mutual appreciation and adjustment is required. A 
learning period helps partners to appreciate differences in culture and operational 
environments and to workout a common working culture.  
The corporate partner should be sensitive to the needs of the assisted organization, 
critically consider the relevance of standard business practices to the operations of non-
profit organizations and be open to evolving goals.  The non-profit should be asked to 
articulate its needs as early on in the partnership as possible. This facilitates the design of 
initiatives that leverage the core competencies of the corporation while addressing the 
needs of the non-profit. In addition, it should assess the absorptive capacity of the non-
profit to avoid wastage of resources and repercussions on the motivation level of those 
involved in the management of the partnership on both sides. In this respect, to avoid 
partnership for partnership sake and in view of its absorptive capacity and the need to 
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nurture partnerships, the non-profit has to determine the optimal number of partners it 
could and would like to partner with. 
For a partnership to achieve its objectives, the assisted organization is expected to make a 
certain level of upfront investment or diversion of staff from regular to partnership 
activities. This investment may be onerous and not within the reach of all non-profit 
organizations. Indeed it is the absorptive capacity of each organization that will determine 
its ability, capability, appetite and opportunity to engage in time, labour or capital intensive 
partnerships.  Business should be aware of the assisted organization’s trade-offs in terms of 
increased learning/change opportunities, transfer of best practices and the required 
investment. Other considerations relate to the sustainability of change and preferences 
between external- versus internal-driven change. 
Apart from commitment at the highest level, commitment during the implementation 
phase, that is, allocation of resources in line with the partnership requirements is of 
paramount importance.  The delayed allocation of resources to the partnership by either of 
the partners results in lack of a counterpart for the day-to-day management of the 
partnership. Allocation of mobile and temporary human resources results in frequent 
changes in the partnership team composition slowing down implementation. Hence, it is 
important not to under-resource the partnership and dedicate enough human resources 
towards its management. 
Partnership with the private sector is expected to have short and long-term consequences 
on the non-profits financial resources, performance and staff morale. Consequently, the 
non-profit has to be aware of its level of engagement and reliance on corporations given 
their unstable, uncertain nature. The corporation has to avoid creating an undue resource 
and expertise dependency by the non-profit on its resources. To achieve the above, it has to 
manage its medium to long-term involvement with the non-profit by assisting in the 
identification of other suitable partners and paying particular attention to the sustainability 
of its assistance.  
In terms of power and expected partnership results, given the voluntary nature of these 
partnerships, the business partner should have a realistic view in terms of its influence over 
the assisted organization.    
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10.5    Social Capital 
We concluded Chapter 3 by suggesting that disaster response is deeply embedded in 
networks and in the structure of network relations.  We identify the ability of a 
humanitarian organization in creating and exploiting social capital as the differentiating 
factor in their performance. We argue that increasing amounts of social capital are required 
in order to coordinate actions during disaster response and gain access to disaster 
management resources and capabilities.   
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the social capital literature suggests that an interplay between 
structural (network ties), cognitive (shared codes and language, shared narratives), and 
relational (trust, norms, identification, and obligations and expectations) variables help 
reinforce the level of social capital. The literature distinguishes between individual and 
group-level social capital. Within these two levels, two types of relations are identified: 
internal and external. External ties result in bridging forms of social capital. Internal ties, 
fostered within communities, result in bonding forms of social capital (Putman, 2000).  
As illustrated below, in Chapter 4, we formulate two research questions in order to explore 
how social capital is created in the humanitarian world and one to explore the contribution 
of bridging social capital to resource/capability enhancement. We also advance one 
proposition that relates intense partnerships to increase in social capital and two 
propositions that relate social capital to an organization’s disaster management 
capabilities. In this section we try to respond to these research questions and verify 
whether the propositions can be validated.  
Q6: How is bonding social capital developed among humanitarian organizations? 
 
Q7: How is bridging social capital developed between humanitarian organizations 
and other key stakeholders? 
 
Q8: What is the contribution of bridging social capital to resource/capability 
enhancement of operational humanitarian organizations? 
 
P4: Only intense partnerships, that is, partnerships with long-standing, interactive, 
interdependent and closely-knitted partners or structures, will increase a 
humanitarian organization’s stock of social capital.  
 
P5: Bonding social capital is a necessary condition for inter-organizational 
coordination during disasters. 
 
P6: Bridging social capital is a necessary condition for disaster response. 
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10.5.1    Bonding Social Capital  
Bonding social capital is the type of social capital created within communities. As such, in 
this section, we try to answer the following research question by distinguishing between 
activities, structures and the period during which social capital is developed and 
strengthened among humanitarian organizations. 
 
As the social capital literature indicates, at the functional level, collaboration and 
communities of practice help the development of a system of obligations and expectations 
as well as trust. They also reinforce social norms and group identity. Dense and repeated 
interactions enhance the quality of exchange as parties better understand each others 
requirements, modus operandi and develop effective cooperation and coordination 
processes and routines.  
Given that logistics is human centric, we argue that both group-level and interpersonal 
relationships among logisticians contribute to the development of bonding social capital. 
At the group level, shared language and experience facilitate coordination and supply 
network management. Relational norms help create a trusting environment. Shared 
destiny, common goals together with altruism limit opportunistic behavior and ensure that 
the interest of individual humanitarian operators is consistent and aligned with that of the 
organization.  
In the next paragraphs, by drawing upon the WFP, UNJLC and the Fritz Institute cases as 
well as different partnership possibilities, we discuss how certain activities and structures 
active or activated during the supply network management, coordination and 
resource/capability enhancement efforts contribute to the strengthening of bonding social 
capital (Figure 10.20). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q6: How is bonding social capital developed among humanitarian organizations? 
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Figure 10.20 – Strengthening of Individual and Group-level Bonding Social Capital 
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First and foremost, we argue that a certain level of bonding social capital exists among 
humanitarian organizations given the prevailing common belief/value system and the 
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shared strategic vision. As far as supply network management effort is concerned, among 
other things, the WFP case is an example of an organization delivering a range of services 
- the Humanitarian Relief Depot and the UN Humanitarian Air Services - to the 
humanitarian community. In its service provider function, WFP creates bonding social 
capital between itself and a group of humanitarian organizations as these humanitarian 
organizations depend on its services and have to interact with it using a shared language. 
For example, before the UNJLC, WFP provided logistics advice and services to 
organizations providers of small volumes of high value goods (i.e., medicine, seeds) such 
as WHO and FAO. WFP leveraged its stock of bonding social capital with these 
humanitarian organizations when it came to the custodianship of UNJLC, which was an 
undisputed decision.  
The UNJLC case allows us to conclude that joint inter-organizational coordination efforts 
contribute to the creation and reinforcement of bonding social capital among humanitarian 
organizations. As mentioned in section 10.3.2, the success of the UNJLC depends on a 
number of strategic and operational building blocks. Some of the listed UNJLC building 
blocks such as trust, direction, communication, identification and business processes 
contribute to the creation and strengthening of bonding social capital among humanitarian 
organizations. Enhanced trust, a vision shared by participating humanitarian organizations, 
clear and efficient communication and common and easily recognizable identity are the 
strategic building blocks that strengthen bonding social capital. Common business 
processes is the operational building block which ensures common understanding of how 
cooperation in the area of inter-organizational coordination is to be executed at the 
organizational level during field operations. 
More specifically, without a shared language and experience, it would be difficult if not 
impossible for a diverse group of humanitarian organizations to coordinate with each 
other. The development of common jargon helps improve understanding and reaffirms the 
fact that all participating humanitarian organizations share the same objective. Common 
jargon at the functional level, such as logistics, ensures successful coordination. UNJLC 
has contributed to the development of shared language and experience especially in the 
area of inter-organizational coordination. Examples include the logistics training sessions 
and the quarterly inter-agency meetings along with the Field Operations Manual. 
386
CHAPTER 10 – CASE ANALYSIS 
 
 
386
The UNJLC has also contributed to the development of the relational dimension of social 
capital between itself and other humanitarian organizations. WFP, as an inter-agency 
service provider, enjoyed a good reputation in the area of logistics. Humanitarian 
organizations had trust in the capability of WFP and, given its custodian role, in the 
capability of the UNJLC to deliver the promised services. With each deployment and as 
the UNJLC proved itself on the ground, addressed its weaknesses (e.g. marketing and 
communication strategy, secondments, service design) and undertook independent 
evaluations, the level of confidence and trust in it increased.  
By creating and adopting a distinct logo early-on, the UNJLC ensured the identification of 
member organizations and their employees with the concept. By preparing and adhering to 
an Activation Protocol, developing a Fields Operations Manual, prioritizing the movement 
of relief items and personnel, managing the flow of information between different parties, 
ensuring asset sharing, etc. it created a system of obligations and expectations between 
humanitarian organizations as well as between the facility and its users. The Activation 
Protocol, the Field Operations Manual, and secondment agreements also contributed to the 
development of norms, another dimension of bonding social capital, necessary for a 
smooth coordination. 
As the UNJLC case demonstrates, the facility resorts to a number of tools/mechanisms to 
reinforce bonding social capital at the individual and group-level. Prior to emerging 
disasters (e.g. Iraq crisis, winterization for Afghanistan), it initiates joint contingency 
planning sessions allowing humanitarian organizations to apprise themselves of the 
response plans of each other averting and working out predictable dependencies and 
duplications and contributing to the development of a series of obligations and 
expectations. In-between disasters, it organizes quarterly inter-agency meetings allowing 
participants to interact with each other on a regular basis, developing a sense of identity 
and common jargon. It organizes UNJLC training sessions; yet another opportunity for 
networking and deriving at a common jargon. In-between disasters and during disaster 
response, it calls for agency secondments – a strong bonding mechanism - to its office 
network as well as sharing of logistics assets and information. During disasters it organizes 
intra-organizational meetings. Finally, repeated coordination efforts and sharing of 
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resources and capabilities among the same humanitarian organizations through the UNJLC 
helps not only to maintain but increase the level of bonding social capital.  
As mentioned in section 10.3.1, the UNJLC structure results in intra, inter and extra-
organizational linkages. Given the level of interaction, interdependence and closure 
between the core unit and field offices and between the virtual organization and the 
humanitarian community, that is, the first and second levels of linkages, bonding social 
capital is created and enforced at both the individual and group level. 
As far as the partnership schemes are concerned, brokered and cross-cutting partnerships 
can stimulate the reinforcement of bonding social capital between humanitarian 
organizations. This is because they provide a structure within which humanitarian 
operators can interact and socialize with each other. By creating additional networking 
opportunities, these types of partnerships help prorogate a sense of identity among 
individuals and groups. They also allow time and space for relationship and trust building, 
creation of common norms, culture, and language.  
For example, the Fritz Institute through three of its initiatives contributes to the creation of 
bonding social capital among humanitarian organizations at the individual and group-level. 
The first initiative - the Logistics and Supply Chain initiative - helps create bonding social 
capital through organization of conferences, the humanitarian logistics association, training 
programs for humanitarian logistics, and establishment of communities of practice. By 
establishing common definitions and standards (for the measurement and communication 
of impact), the Preparedness and Impact initiative contribute to the cognitive dimension of 
bonding social capital. Finally, by developing and rolling out a more user-friendly and 
cost-effective humanitarian logistics software, HELIOS, the Fritz Institute through its 
Technology initiative induces exchange of opinion and experience between humanitarian 
organizations. This contributes to the development of common norms, culture and 
language among those humanitarian organizations that choose to adopt a common 
software. 
In the framework of the WFP-TNT partnership, TNT organized a fleet forum that brought 
together 26 humanitarian organizations. The initiative currently pursued by the Danish 
fleet services company, Kjaer, provides a regular thematic networking opportunity to the 
fleet managers of the participating humanitarian organizations. The Forum has helped 
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reinforce the level of trust and common identity among practitioners as well as improve the 
overall fleet management practices and capabilities of the humanitarian community across 
geographies. 
We can conclude by saying that humanitarian organizations through a number of schemes, 
structures and activities active or activated prior, during and in-between disasters create 
and reinforce their level of bonding social capital. 
 
10.5.2   Bridging Social Capital 
Bridging social capital is the type of social capital created through external links. With 
reference to the IFRC, UNJLC, WFP, and the Fritz Institute cases as well as different 
partnership possibilities, in this section, we answer the following research question by 
discussing how certain activities and structures active or activated during the supply 
network management, coordination and resource/capability enhancement efforts contribute 
to the strengthening of bridging social capital (Figure 10.21). 
 
The IFRC and WFP cases indicate that a number of enablers – trust, transparency, 
standardization and encapsulation – can help create and strengthen bridging social capital 
between a humanitarian organization and its long-standing donors, implementing partners, 
and repeat suppliers.  
Trust is essential for any collaborative effort between humanitarian organizations and their 
long-standing donors, implementing partners and repeat suppliers. Trust is the glue that 
cements the relationship facilitating the supply network management processes.   
As far as the humanitarian organization-donor relationship is concerned, a transparent 
relationship with donors ensures accuracy: the mobilization of the right amount (money 
and goods) and mix (food, NFIs and services) of items at the right time. Similarly, 
implementing partners have to maintain a transparent relationship with the humanitarian 
organization. Trust combined with transparency ensures that information on needs and 
Q7: How is bridging social capital developed between humanitarian organizations 
and other key stakeholders? 
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activities, in continuous evolution, is used to avoid unsubscribed/oversubscribed 
initiatives, the arrival of unsolicited goods and stock-outs.  
 
Figure 10.21 – Enablers of the Goods Mobilization and Delivery Process 
 
 
To facilitate sourcing and expedite relief operations, humanitarian organizations and their 
donors and implementing partners need to rely on well-developed operational norms and a 
shared language. Process standardization (e.g. delivery to final destination, distribution 
criterion), goods standardization (e.g. quality and product specification), framework 
agreements with suppliers for key items, and code of conduct for donations are among the 
set of norms and routines developed by humanitarian organizations. Given the history of 
collaboration, long-standing donors and implementing partners are expected to be aware 
and adhere to standards and guidelines. Well-established norms and routines improve 
accuracy and help reduce search, negotiation, contracting, coordinating and monitoring 
time and cost with repeat suppliers. 
Finally, by implementing the encapsulation concept, notably, the execution of a number of 
tasks and adherence to agreed operating procedures by i) donors upon commitment,  ii) 
suppliers upon placement of orders, and iii) implementing partners upon receipt of goods, 
humanitarian organizations streamline in an effective and efficient manner the goods 
delivery process. The combination of trust, process standardization and encapsulation 
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procurement to transportation to the port of delivery to their long-standing donors. 
Similarly, trust, process standardization and encapsulation streamline the relationship 
between a humanitarian organization and its long-standing implementing partner.  
To conclude, trust, transparency, standardization and encapsulation regulate the 
humanitarian organization-long-standing donor relationship. Trust, transparency and 
standardization regulate the humanitarian organization-implementing partner relationship. 
Since humanitarian organizations do not share their plans and the flow of donations with 
their repeat suppliers, the humanitarian organization-supplier relationship is regulated by 
trust, standardization and encapsulation. These relationships, a source of bridging social 
capital, have the potential to improve the supply network management ability of a 
humanitarian organization.  
Extra-organizational coordination efforts also result in the creation and reinforcement of 
bridging social capital. As the IFRC and UNJLC case studies indicate, prior to a disaster, 
an operational or non-operational humanitarian organization by communicating its or the 
community’s plans to key stakeholders – donors, recipient and neighboring governments – 
and seeking feedback can build and strengthen the level of bridging social capital. In-
between disasters, it can engage donors through visits to capital cities and by inviting key 
stakeholders including the military to its planning and training sessions. Throughout a 
disaster, to debottleneck and de-conflict use of key logistics assets and ensure adequate 
funding, it can organize coordination and information meetings with key stakeholders 
(donors, military forces, etc.). 
A virtually organized humanitarian logistics coordination platform through its extra-
organizational linkages (see section 10.3.1) contributes to the creation of bridging social 
capital between humanitarian organizations and key stakeholders. We argue that even if a 
party does not use all the links created by the structure, the general connectivity between 
humanitarian community and key stakeholders is a potential source of bridging social 
capital. However, we argue that the contribution of this set of linkages to the creation of 
bridging social capital maybe directly related to decisions concerning the life-time of the 
structure, the number of offices, the timing of activation and demobilization and the level 
of interconnectivity. 
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Brokered and strategic partnerships, that is, initiatives aimed at introducing external 
partners to a humanitarian organization, are also a source of bridging social capital. They 
enable a humanitarian organization to build structured relationships with a new group of 
actors – business and CSOs – and through them with other corporations and actors such as 
academia. Examples are provided in Figure 10.22. Indeed, apart from contributing directly, 
these partnerships can heighten the profile of and further the cause of humanitarian 
organizations with new set of actors. These new partners, by organizing networking 
sessions, apart from lowering a humanitarian organization’s networking and partnership 
transaction costs, help expand and diversify their network of contacts. 
 
Figure 10.22 – Building and Strengthening of Bridging Social Capital 
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The above discussions allow us to derive at the following conclusion. Bonding or bridging 
social capital developed in one context – prior, during or in-between disasters – or during 
one activity – supply network management, coordination or resource/capability enhance – 
is appropriable, convertible in other contexts and activities.  
 
10.5.2   Partnerships and Social Capital 
In this section our aim is to validate the necessary condition proposition that relates intense 
partnerships to social capital as stated below: 
 
P4: Only intense partnerships, that is, partnerships with long-standing, interactive, 
interdependent and closely-knitted partners or structures, will increase a 
humanitarian organization’s stock of social capital.  
 
As indicated in the proposition, intense partnerships are defined as those partnerships with 
long-standing, interactive, interdependent and closely-knitted partners or structures. To 
measure the contribution of different network ties to the development and hence increase 
of social capital, we propose to qualify relationships along Nahapiet & Ghoshal’s 
(Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998) four criteria: time, interaction, interdependence and closure.  
To verify the validity of our proposition, we select a number of cases. Since the unit of 
analysis for this proposition is organizations, our cases related to both operational and non-
operational humanitarian organizations namely: IFRC, WFP, and UNJLC. The hypothesis 
for each case is that a humanitarian organization’s stock of social capital does not increase 
in the absence of intense partnerships. In other words, non-intense partnerships do not 
contribute to the creation of social capital.  
Research at IFRC allows us to confirm that in response to each disaster, to mobilize relief 
items and stage its response, the Federation depends on the collaboration and contribution 
of its response network. The IFRC disaster response network includes the media, donating 
and receiving NSs, recipient and bordering governments, military, donors and suppliers.  
Since IFRC responds mainly to natural disasters, news on a disaster is what often activates 
its emergency supply chains. However, the result of our research does not indicate any 
intense relationship with any particular news agency, whether local or international. On the 
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contrary, relationship with the media appears to be short with low levels of interaction and 
in absence of closure or interdependence. 
Similar to other humanitarian organizations, IFRC can stage its assistance only after the 
recipient country welcomes “acts of solidarity”. Often the recipient NS plays a crucial role 
in ensuring a rapid announcement from the government. For example during the Gujarat 
earthquake, the Indian Red Cross convinced the government to ‘open up its doors’. 
Thereafter, it negotiated the use of local assets with the local government and obtained 
necessary administrative clearances. Therefore, typically, there are high levels of 
interaction between IFRC and the recipient government especially immediately after a 
disaster and there is high level of closure and interdependence throughout disaster 
response.  
IFRC and the NSs often use military assets to stage their response. For example, during the 
Gujarat earthquake, the Federation used the Bhuj military airport to receive relief items. 
During the 2000 Mozambique floods, before the arrival of civil assets, humanitarian 
organizations including the IFRC used the fleet of the South African National Defense 
Force to stage the first wave of relief operations. Therefore, the relationship is 
characterized more by dependence than interdependence with high levels of interaction and 
closure over the short period of time that coincides with disaster response. 
Emergencies that occur close to a border or those that involve more than one country, such 
as the destructive Hurricane Mitch, render humanitarian organizations dependent on 
neighboring country infrastructure. IFRC and its network of NSs often rely on neighboring 
country physical assets and as such need to liaise with different government authorities to 
ensure a rapid response. Similar to the relationship with military forces, there is low level 
of interdependence but IFRC maintains high levels of interaction and closure with 
neighboring country authorities over a short period.  
IFRC depends on two sets of donor groups to fuel its emergency supply chain: its 
worldwide network of NSs and the donor community composed of institutional and ad hoc 
donors. The NS network is a closed and stable one that springs into actions as required. 
IFRC choreographs the operations of a selected group of donor and receiving NSs - 
participating NSs - in response to each disaster. The Federation also receives donations 
from other public (e.g. ECHO) or private organizations as well as individuals. The 
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contribution of this second source is more unpredictable and unreliable. It follows that 
IFRC entertains two different types of relationships with its donors. Relationship with 
long-standing NS donors is characterized by closure, interdependence and high levels of 
interaction over a long period while the opposite is valid for ad hoc donors.  
IFRC manages a decentralized but coordinated procurement process. At one end, it 
releases inventory from its regional warehouses, mobilizes standby resources from its 
network of NSs and raises ad hoc donations from the international community. At the 
other end, it uses funds mobilized for a disaster to procure from local and international 
suppliers. Similar to its donor base, IFRC maintains two types of relationship with its 
suppliers. Relationship with repeat suppliers is characterized by closure, interdependence 
and high levels of interaction over a long period while the opposite is valid for ad hoc 
suppliers.  
Given its organizational structure, IFRC does not depend on the NGO community for the 
“last mile” delivery as much as the other humanitarian organizations. Instead, it uses its NS 
office network, assets of the recipient/donating NS and its pool of relief delegates to 
distribute relief operations. As a result, the recipient NS becomes IFRC’s implementing 
arm.  As such, similar to its network of donor NS, the IFRC maintains intense relationships 
with its recipient NS network.  
The afflicted population assisted by IFRC is at the receiving end. The IFRC relief supply 
chain confirms the silent role of the beneficiaries in the goods mobilization process. The 
NSs and the IFRC relief delegates are the forces that activate the goods mobilization 
process.  
Similar to any other humanitarian organization, to resolve structural and temporary 
logistical failures, IFRC needs to coordinate its activities throughout a disaster with other 
humanitarian organizations. For example during the Mozambique 2000 floods, since for 
weeks airlifts were the only way to move relief items, it moved its cargo by going through 
the airlift services of the UNJLC. It also exchanged information on its stock and the 
situation on the ground with other organizations directly and through UNJLC. Therefore, 
the IFRC maintains an intense relationship with the logistics coordination platform when 
and if it is deployed. 
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IFRC was engaged in a one-to-one intense partnership with the Fritz Institute for the 
development of a humanitarian logistics software. However, that is not the only interface 
IFRC has with the Institute. Similar to other major humanitarian organizations, IFRC 
maintains a long term relationship with the Institute and participates in and benefits from 
activities and initiatives meant for the community as a whole. IFRC participates on a case-
to-case basis to short-term Fritz Institute events and activities where the level of 
interaction, closure and interdependence with other parties involved is low. Finally, IFRC 
participates in the fleet forum initiative currently run by Kjaer.  
Figures 10.23 and 10.24 help us visualize and qualify the range of relationships maintained 
by IFRC with different actors part of its network. As discussed in section 10.5.2, IFRC 
builds social capital not only with long-standing donors, its network of NSs repeat 
suppliers and Fritz Institute but also with receiving and neighboring governments, military 
forces, as well as promoters and participants of cross-cutting and brokered partnerships. As 
such the IFRC case rejects proposition 4. 
As far as WFP is concerned, its disaster response network comprises the media, donors, 
implementing partners, governments, military forces, and suppliers. WFP is also engaged 
in a one-to-one strategic partnership with TNT. WFP, as the host and custodian of the 
UNJLC as well as a user of its services, maintains intense relationship with the facility 
prior, during and in-between disasters. In addition, similar to other major humanitarian 
organizations, WFP maintains a long-term relationship with the Fritz Institute. It also 
participates in and benefits from its activities and initiatives meant for the community as a 
whole. As such, it participates on a case-to-case basis to these short-term events and 
activities where the level of interaction, closure and interdependence is low. Similar to 
IFRC, WFP participates in the fleet forum initiative currently run by Kjaer. Finally, it 
maintains relationship with the Citigroup emergency network initiative which involves 
some 20 private sector companies.   
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Figure 10.23 – IFRC: Interaction & Duration of Relationships with Network 
Actors/Partners 
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Figure 10.24 – IFRC: Interdependence and Closure with Network Actors/Partners 
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Figures 10.25 and 10.26 help us visualize and qualify the range of relationship maintained 
by WFP with different actors part of its network. Similar to IFRC, WFP builds social 
capital not only with long-standing donors, its repeat implementing partners, repeat 
suppliers, and TNT but also with receiving and neighboring governments, military forces, 
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as well as promoters and participants of cross-cutting and brokered partnerships. As such 
the WFP case also rejects our proposition. 
 
Figure 10.25 – WFP: Interaction & Duration of Relationships with Network 
Actors/Partners 
 
 
 
Military 
Recipient Government 
Neighboring Governments 
 
Donors 
Repeat Implementing Partners 
Repeat Suppliers 
Humanitarian Organizations 
TNT 
Kjaer 
UNJLC 
High 
 
 
 
 
 
Interaction 
 
 
                  
   
Low 
Media 
Ad hoc Suppliers 
Ad hoc Donors 
WFP Emergency Network 
Fritz Institute Initiatives 
 
 
 
Fritz Institute  
               Short                                             Long 
Time 
 
Figure 10.26 – WFP: Interdependence and Closure with Network Actors/Partner 
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Similarly, the UNJLC in fulfilling its mandate interacts with a range of actors. Since 
humanitarian organizations are its primary clients, it maintains intense relationship with 
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them as well as with its donors. Throughout its deployment, it maintains high levels of 
interaction, closure and interdependence with recipient governments. Its relationship with 
military forces, neighboring countries and ad hoc suppliers of critical items is 
characterized by high levels of interaction over a short period of time combined with high 
closure with low levels of interdependence.  
Figures 10.27 and 10.28 help us visualize and qualify the range of relationship maintained 
by UNJLC. UNJLC builds social capital not only with other humanitarian organizations 
and its donors, but also receiving and neighboring governments, military forces and ad hoc 
suppliers of critical services/products. As such the UNJLC case also rejects our 
proposition. 
 
Figure 10.27 – UNJLC: Interaction & Duration of Relationships with Network 
Actors/Partners 
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Figure 10.28 – UNJLC: Interdependence and Closure with Network Actors/Partners 
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The results of our tests are presented in Figure 10.29. Such results allow us to conclude the 
following: Humanitarian organizations build social capital not only with those actors 
appearing in the top quadrants of the interaction/time and closure/interdependence 
matrixes but also other actors.  
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Figure 10.29 – Results of Tests Related to Proposition 4 
Case Intense 
Partnerships 
Social Capital Test result 
IFRC No Yes Rejected 
WFP No Yes Rejected 
UNJLC No Yes Rejected 
 
Our results show that the simultaneous presence of the four factors – interaction, time, 
closure and interdependence – is not a necessary condition for the development of social 
capital. What is sufficient for social capital to develop within and among humanitarian 
organizations and other parties is the presence of at least two of the factors. In view of the 
above, we reformulate and refine our proposition as follows: 
 
P4: A humanitarian organization’s stock of social capital increases should it meet at 
least two of the following four relationship criteria – long-term relationship, high 
interaction, closure or interdependence – with the concerned entity. 
 
10.5.3  Social Capital and Disaster Management Capability 
In this section, we try to validate the remaining two necessary condition propositions 
relating social capital to inter-organizational coordination and disaster response and to 
respond to the research question that aims to explore the contribution of bridging social 
capital to organizational resource/capability enhancement capabilities.  
We start by verifying the first proposition that relates bonding social capital to inter-
organizational coordination as stated below: 
 
P5: Bonding social capital is a necessary condition for inter-organizational 
coordination during disasters. 
 
As stated earlier on, bonding social capital is social capital created within communities 
which in our case consists of humanitarian organizations. Inter-organizational coordination 
ensures coordination between the activities of humanitarian organizations in the UN 
system, NGO and international organization community prior and during disasters. For 
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inter-organizational coordination to be successful, we argue that there has to be structural 
connections, common cognitive experiences and strong relationships, i.e., bonding social 
capital among the concerned humanitarian organizations. 
As discussed in section 10.5.1, a certain level of bonding social capital exists among 
humanitarian organizations. Moreover, major humanitarian organizations find themselves 
on the same disaster scenes time and again. As such, their staff interact with each other, 
become aware of each others activities, and exchange information and assets. Since the 
advent of the UNJLC in late 1990s, organizational ties have been more structured, frequent 
and maintained interruptedly over longer periods of time.  
The unit of analysis for this proposition is disasters.  Since the domain of our research is 
large disaster and the humanitarian community has deployed UNJLCs to deal with 
logistics coordination during the period covered by our research (2002-2005), our cases 
embedded in UNJLC relate to its deployment in four disasters namely, the Mozambique 
floods, the Gujarat earthquake, and the Afghanistan and Iraq crises. The hypothesis for 
each case is that during disasters, inter-organizational coordination through a logistics 
coordination platform cannot be successful without bonding social capital. 
In the case of the Mozambique floods, during the first wave of floods, it was OCHA’s 
UNDAC that set up the Cell for Logistics Coordination, with the mandate to coordinate 
assessment and relief activities. When the second wave of floods hit the country, no single 
organization was prepared for its abruptness and magnitude. Again on the initiative of 
UNDAC, local authorities requested that the Cell be converted into a UNJLC. The 
UNJLC, hosted in the building of the National Institute for Disaster Management (INGC), 
had the required legitimacy to direct air operations. Upon its activation, it was accepted by 
the military as the body in charge of prioritizing, tasking, and scheduling air assets. WFP 
designated an ex-pilot and several-time OCHA consultant as head of the centre.  
At the onset, there was little understanding of the concept and mandate of the UNJLC 
among the humanitarian community and military actors. The concept gained credibility 
through the daily updates at the coordination meetings chaired by the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs which were attended by humanitarian organizations and the media. These meetings 
became a forum where UNJLC reiterated that it was there to support the humanitarian 
community with the commonly available logistics assets. But it still failed to ensure the 
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participation of other humanitarian organizations through secondment of their experienced 
staff. 
In this operation, the UNJLC coordinated only ‘regional’ airlifts. To ensure the smooth 
influx and movement of relief items, with the support of OCHA, INGC and the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, it dealt with a series of administrative issues (e.g. facilitation measures 
such as exemption from landing and navigation fees, immigration procedures, customs 
clearance, etc.). 
This case shows the importance of the strong relationship between OCHA and WFP, the 
custodian of the UNJLC prior to the disaster. Indeed, OCHA by supporting the 
transformation of the Cell into a UNJLC showed its confidence in the capability of the 
facility and WFP in coordinating the use of assets. In return, WFP/UNJLC appointed a 
several-time OCHA consultant to lead the initiative. At the onset, the level of 
understanding between UNJLC and other humanitarian organizations was little. However, 
no time was lost in building confidence and trust through daily meetings. In conclusion, 
without bonding social capital between OCHA and WFP, the UNJLC would not have been 
established. Similarly, without growing levels of bonding social capital between UNJLC 
and client humanitarian organizations, the UNJLC would not have been able to prioritize 
humanitarian cargo, coordinate the use of air assets, and transport 30,400 passengers and 
11,623 metric tonnes of relief items. 
In the case of the Gujarat earthquake, the UNJLC was deployed without consultation with 
the humanitarian community. Moreover, few people among the UN agencies were aware 
of the concept. UNJLC staff arrived at the disaster site without knowing what type of 
assistance was required by the humanitarian community. With no relationship between the 
UNJLC and those it was meant to serve, the need for the facility was questioned. Without 
establishing connections to or serving the humanitarian community, the UNJLC was 
demobilized just four weeks after its deployment. 
In contrast, in view of the Afghan crisis, the UNJLC was deployed after a consultation 
process among humanitarian organizations. Its mandate was clear: coordination of UN’s 
logistics effort.  During this crisis, the facility could rely on the office network of the 
Humanitarian Information Centre (an OCHA facility) and the administrative support and 
fundraising mechanisms of WFP. Prior to its deployment, the UNJLC had started work on 
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its Field Operations Manual and conducted training sessions for humanitarian logisticians. 
To attract and ensure agency secondments, UNJLC established dedicated funds to cover 
the costs of full-time secondments. It then communicated the opportunity for secondments 
to the relevant organizations. As a result, at the height of the operations, the UNJLC 
offices had attracted 30 seconded staff from six different humanitarian organizations. 
These secondments further contributed to the creation and reinforcement of bonding social 
capital.  
To discuss logistics issues, task scarce resource and set priorities, UNJLC organized 
regular inter-agency meetings. By gaining the respect of agency staff as a neutral facility 
and building bonding social capital, UNJLC managed to obtain timely and accurate 
information from each agency in terms of their assets, requirements and activities. This 
allowed it to forewarn and forearm agencies of emerging bottlenecks such as shortage in 
storage capacity or deteriorating road conditions and to negotiate with local authorities and 
service providers on issues of common concern to the community.  
Among other things, the UNJLC provided tailored logistics support (e.g. UNICEF’s Back-
to School Campaign) to select humanitarian organizations. More significantly, as early as 
June, it focused the attention of the humanitarian community on the upcoming winter 
through a winterization strategy workshop. The workshop, which paved the way for a 
joint-contingency plan, was attended by 25 representatives of the five major humanitarian 
organizations, donors and NGOs.  The coordination efforts of the UNJLC were substantial 
and deemed as highly successful. Just in terms of air cargo, UNJLC ended up coordinating 
flights into the Afghan region for 28 organizations for a total of 2,772 MT of humanitarian 
cargo. 
In preparation of the Iraq crisis, the UNJLC set off on a social bonding and expectation 
management mission: a UNJLC planning officer traveled to countries potentially involved 
and affected by the crisis to learn about their needs and sensitize and brief UN agency 
country teams on the services it could offer. The issue of fuels was identified as a potential 
bottleneck to humanitarian operations. In order to achieve economies of scale and 
negotiating power in the purchasing, transport, storage and distribution of fuels, the 
UNJLC had to highlight the merits of common sourcing to humanitarian organizations.  
With a view to convey the message, get support and formalize the concept of joint fuel 
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supplies, the UNJLC sat down with each agency to discuss the proposal and determine 
their fuels needs. Thereafter, the UN Office for Project Services was identified as the 
supply fuel agent for the community. Again, in this case, inter-organizational coordination 
on the issue of fuels would not have been possible if UNJLC had not taken out enough 
time to understand the specifics of the emergency with the humanitarian operators, 
establish a dialogue with each organization, and identify and appoint a supply agent. 
As summarized in Figure 10.30, our cases show that without efforts directed to the 
reinforcement of bonding social capital among humanitarian organizations, it is difficult 
for inter-organizational coordination through a logistics coordination platform to be 
successful. As a result, it is recommended that humanitarian organizations directly and 
through the UNJLC devote time and effort to build and strengthen the level of social 
capital among them in-between and during disasters. 
 
Figure 10.30 – Results of Tests Related to Proposition 5 
Case Bonding Social 
Capital 
Inter-Organizational 
coordination 
Test result 
Mozambique Yes Yes Not rejected 
Gujarat No No Not rejected 
Afghanistan Yes Yes Not rejected 
Iraq Yes Yes Not rejected 
 
In the next paragraphs, we verify whether we can validate the proposition that relates 
bridging social capital to successful disaster response as stated below: 
 
P6: Bridging social capital is a necessary condition for successful disaster 
response. 
 
As mentioned earlier on, bridging social capital is social capital created through external 
links. As argued in Chapter 2, a humanitarian organization depends on the contribution of 
seven forces to stage a successful response. We assert that to mobilize and distribute 
goods, humanitarian organizations depend on the media, recipient country(s), military, 
neighboring countries, donors, suppliers and implementing partners who are usually part of 
the NGO community. As depicted in our conceptual framework, coordination is a subset of 
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supply network management. We assert that to manage dependencies and avoid 
duplications arising from failure modes, humanitarian organizations need to coordinate 
their activities not only with other humanitarian organizations but also with key 
stakeholders. Therefore, to mobilize and distribute goods from supply networks as well as 
coordinate the use of logistics assets with key stakeholders, humanitarian organizations 
need to leverage their bridging social capital in order to ensure a cost-effective, speedy, 
accurate and flexible response. 
To verify the validity of our proposition, we select a number of cases. Since the unit of 
analysis for this proposition is disaster response, our cases relate to the disaster response 
activities of IFRC and WFP namely, the Gujarat earthquake, Hurricane Mitch and Zaire 
crisis but also UNJLC’s coordination efforts during the Mozambique floods, Gujarat 
earthquake, and Afghanistan and Iraq crises. This is justified by the fact that our research 
shows that since late 1990s, operational humanitarian organizations engage in inter- and 
extra-organizational coordination through the UNJLC (non-operational humanitarian 
organization). The hypothesis for each case is that disaster response, of which coordination 
is a subset, cannot be successful without bridging social capital. 
IFRC’s response during the Gujarat earthquake demonstrates that to mobilize relief items 
and stage a successful response, the organization depended on the collaboration and 
contribution of its response network. As depicted in Figure 10.2, IFRC’s donating NSs 
dispatched a range of Emergency Response Units (ERUs) to the disaster site within 3 to 5 
days from the disaster (speed and accuracy). To mobilize goods, IFRC leveraged not only 
its relationship with its donating NSs, but also those with its repeat suppliers (speed, 
accuracy and cost-effective). Indeed, within five days, international relief supplies arrived 
on the disaster scene. On the other hand, the Indian Red Cross leveraged its relationship 
with the Indian government. It was instrumental in obtaining the endorsement of the Indian 
government for international help soon after the disaster (speed) and thereafter the 
collaboration of the Indian military forces in terms of use of military assets and staff by 
IFRC. As the tents example shows, the on-going dialogue with local authorities ensured an 
accurate and flexible response. More specifically, initially the Indian government 
expressed its contrariness to setting up of tent camps. It changed its mind several times to 
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settle on the total figure of 35,000 tents. Bearing in mind the prevailing supply constraint, 
IFRC contributed to the supply request. 
In contrast, lack of understanding on the needs of the populations and quick activation of 
contacts with governments affected by Hurricane Mitch resulted in poor response on the 
part of IFRC. Lack of standby agreements with repeat suppliers and understanding with 
donating NSs prevented a speedy dispatch of goods and ERUs.  
WFP’s response during the Zaire crisis demonstrates how an organization building upon its 
existing logistics network can quickly mobilize the required air and ground logistics 
resources (speed, flexibility, accuracy, cost-effectiveness). WFP’s bridging social capital 
with traditional and long-standing donors ensured the diversion of relief stocks in the 
region to the disaster and the use of slack WFP logistics resources by other humanitarian 
organizations. Indeed, WFP managed to obtain donor agreement on these two issues on a 
timely basis contributing to the speed, flexibility, accuracy, cost-effectiveness of its 
response. 
In terms of coordination, the UNJLC activities during the four selected crises show that to 
manage dependencies and avoid duplications, the humanitarian community depends on the 
collaboration and contribution of local authorities, military forces, donors and suppliers. 
With the exception of the Gujarat earthquake where the facility was not recognized by the 
local authorities, by centralizing coordination with the UNJLC, the humanitarian 
community ensured that bridging social capital created with recipient (e.g. Mozambique 
authorities in case of Mozambique floods), interim (interim authorities during the Iraq 
crisis) and bordering governments (Uzbek authorities during the Afghanistan crisis; 
Jordan, Iran, etc. during the Iraq crisis) as well as with national and foreign military forces 
(South African military forces during Mozambique floods, Coalition forces during 
Afghanistan crisis) was used to coordinate, that is, de-conflict and de-bottleneck, in a 
timely, flexible and accurate fashion humanitarian operations with others in the interest of 
all.  
In addition, during the Afghan crisis, the UNJLC coordinated road rehabilitation projects 
with the donors and military forces. After having completed an infrastructure survey 
projects, the UNJLC approached donors and military forces interested in rehabilitation 
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works (roads, hospitals, schools, etc.) with a view to avoid duplication of funding on 
project and ensuring the most urgent repair interventions.  
 
Figure 10.31– Results of Tests Related to Proposition 6 
Case Bridging Social Capital Successful Disaster 
Response 
Test Result 
Gujarat (IFRC) Yes Yes Not rejected 
Hurricane Mitch No No Not rejected 
Zaire Yes Yes Not rejected 
Gujarat (UNJLC) No No Not rejected 
Mozambique Yes Yes Not rejected 
Afghanistan Yes Yes Not rejected 
Iraq Yes Yes Not rejected 
 
As indicated in Figure 10.31, we can conclude by stating that to ensure a successful 
response, that is, overcome resource gaps at the organizational and to resolve dependencies 
and avoid duplications at the community level during disasters, operational and non-
operational humanitarian organizations should take time to build and reinforce their level 
of bridging social capital with key stakeholders. 
In the remaining paragraphs, we explore the contribution of bridging social capital to 
organizational resource/capability enhancement as stated below: 
 
Q8: What is the contribution of bridging social capital to resource/capability 
enhancement of operational humanitarian organizations? 
 
Since the unit of analysis for this research question is organization, our cases relate to two 
operational humanitarian organizations: WFP and IFRC.  
The WFP case shows that with the contribution of an external corporate partner, the 
organization made a sustainable quantum leap in its operations and business processes. 
Examples include the remodeling of the Brindisi warehouse, the results-based budgeting 
and project closure exercises, fleet management, aviation training program, and the 
comprehensive Business Process Review (BPR). The external partner, a source of bridging 
capital, contributed with its specific core competency. As such, it was well positioned to 
help WFP identify and overcome its persistent HR, operational and business processes 
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weaknesses over a relatively short period of time. In this specific case, the improvements 
have been sustainable since the TNT, the corporate partner, committed to a long-term 
partnership had the necessary time horizon to implement them. In addition, the interest of 
TNT was aligned with that of WFP, the assisted organization, in terms of achieving 
measurable results according to schedule. 
On a smaller scale, the IFRC case demonstrates that external expertise was required for the 
development of a humanitarian logistics software. While IFRC was fully aware of the need 
to automate its supply chain activities, none of its internal resources (NSs, traditional 
donors, etc.) were able to overcome this gap. IFRC had the choice to commission the 
development of the software on commercial basis to an external firm. However, the Fritz 
Institute, a source of bridging social capital, was able to enhance its capability through the 
development of a tailor-made software, free of charge and within the shortest delay. 
While without an external partnership, WFP and IFRC respectively would not have found 
the specialized and additional resources to make that quantum leap in their internal 
operations (Figure 10.33), the duration of the partnership and the aligned interest of the 
partners in ensuring success have been important variables for the sustainability of the 
proposed improvements.  It appears that to enhance organizational resources and 
capabilities, humanitarian organizations need to build long-term relationships with parties 
committed to the humanitarian cause with core competencies that match their 
requirements. Future research could test the validity of the following propositions: Long-
term bridging social capital is a necessary condition for resource/capability enhancement 
of operational humanitarian organizations. 
10.6    Summary 
In Chapter 3 we developed our conceptual framework which is based on the integration of 
network, coordination, resource-based view, social capital and corporate social 
responsibility theories. In Chapter 4, we developed our research framework which consists 
of a number of research questions and propositions. In this Chapter, using the empirical 
data developed in Chapters 6 to 9, we tested the propositions and responded to the research 
questions. In this section, we summarize our findings. 
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As far as supply network management is concerned, we distinguished between 
unpredictable and predictable disasters. Our cases show that a speedy, accurate, and 
flexible response to unpredictable disasters depends on if a humanitarian organization 
resorts to broad supplier networks or not as only a broad supplier network can ensure good 
performance. As such, it is recommended that they put in place systems and procedures 
that support the construction of broad supplier networks. Our cases did not allow us to 
extend our results to predictable disasters and to link broad supplier network to cost-
effectiveness.  
To pre-empt dependencies and duplications arising during disaster response, humanitarian 
organizations can engage in a number of agency-specific measures. Similarly, by engaging 
in a number of inter-organizational and extra-organizational coordination mechanisms 
directly or through a logistics coordination platform, our cases show that humanitarian 
organizations can avert and manage dependencies and avoid duplications. 
As far as the governance structure of the logistics coordination platform is concerned, our 
results show that a virtually organized structure can lead to the provision of good services. 
As such, it is recommended that humanitarian organizations opt for this organizational 
structure when deploying a coordination platform. In terms of structural components, the 
virtually organized logistics coordination platform requires four distinct elements: Virtual 
Web, Core Unit, focal virtual organization and a series of antenna offices.  Success 
depends on a number of strategic and operational building blocks. In line with the relevant 
literature, our cases highlight the fact that there are a number of risks inherent to virtual 
organizing which need to be addressed and market opportunities that members can 
capitalize upon. 
As far as business/CSO partnerships are concerned, we derive at two conclusions. First 
that the risk-benefit profile of brokered partnerships is different for the three parties 
involved. More specifically, while the risk-benefit profile is low for the business partner 
and the assisted humanitarian organization, the broker organization can reap substantial 
benefits while facing low levels of risk. Second, the risk-benefit profile of brokered 
partnerships for the business partner and the concerned humanitarian organization is lower 
than that of strategic ones.  Our cases tend to indicate that a certain type of humanitarian 
organizations, that is larger organizations, attract strategic partnerships. We also observe 
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that business and humanitarian organizations can minimize the risks of their partnership 
and increase its benefits by adhering to some best practices.  
A certain level of bonding social capital exists among humanitarian organizations. 
However, humanitarian organizations can strengthen the level of their bonding social 
capital with other humanitarian organizations by engaging in a number of activities and 
structures prior, in-between and during disasters. Our cases allow us to identify ways in 
which humanitarian organizations currently develop their bonding and bridging social 
capital in-between and during disasters. As far as bridging social capital is concerned, our 
cases show how through trust, transparency, standardization and encapsulation 
humanitarian organizations create and reinforce it with their long-standing donors, 
implementing partners and repeat suppliers.  
Our test results show that humanitarian organizations do not build and reinforce their stock 
of social capital only with partners with whom they have intense relationships but also 
with other parties as long as a combination of two of these factors – high interaction, long-
relationship, closure, interdependence – is satisfied. Enhanced trust, a set of social and 
operational norms, and a system of obligations and expectations between humanitarian 
organizations increase their ability to engage in inter-organizational coordination through a 
logistics coordination platform.  More specifically, our cases show that bonding social 
capital built in-between and during disaster response is necessary for a successful inter-
organizational coordination. Similarly, given the need to bridge resource and capability 
gaps and coordinate, operational and non-operational humanitarian organizations require to 
build bridging capital both during disaster response and in-between disasters to ensure 
successful operations.  We can conclude by stating that the performance of any type of 
humanitarian organization depends on the structure, health and multiplicity of its 
partnerships which results in a combination of bridging and bonding social capital. 
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Chapter 11 Key Findings, Contributions and Future 
Research  
 
This thesis provides a first overview on how humanitarian organizations, the relief arm of 
the international community, respond to the growing challenge of emergency response.  It 
accomplishes the investigation task by drawing and building upon four streams of 
literature – network theory, coordination theory, the resource-based view of the firm and 
social capital theory – as well as the case study methodology.  
The case study approach is chosen because experiments, archival and historic research as 
well as surveys fail to provide the necessary insights to the complex subject of disaster 
management. Yin (Yin, 2003) argues that the type of research questions, extent of control 
a researcher has over actual behavioral events and the contemporary versus the historical 
nature of the phenomena under study determine the investigator’s empirical approach. In 
our case, the case study approach is justified as our research questions are mainly 
exploratory, it is possible to document humanitarian operations in ‘real-life’, and because 
partnerships are a contemporary phenomenon in the humanitarian sector.  
To contribute to an under-researched branch of the supply chain literature, humanitarian 
supply chains, this thesis set out to explore two main research questions. 
 
1.  What factors contribute to the performance of humanitarian organizations during 
disaster response? 
 
2.  How do humanitarian organizations manage their disaster response activities? 
 
To build an initial understanding of the disaster management capabilities of humanitarian 
organizations, this thesis develops a framework that helps explain the contribution of 
partnerships to performance during disaster response.  It first explores the contribution and 
impact of well-designed and implemented partnerships on humanitarian operations. 
Thereafter, it identifies supply network management and coordination as key disaster 
response capabilities, a continuous need for resource and capability enhancement as a 
requirement and social capital as the differentiating factor in organizational performance. 
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This closing chapter is organized as follows. Section 11.1 summarizes our findings related 
to the first main research question while section 11.2 to the second one. Section 11.3 takes 
stock of the contribution of this thesis to the virtual organizing literature, which is an 
unexpected outcome of this study. Lessons emerging from this research for business and 
humanitarian organizations are reviewed in sections 11.4 and 11.5 respectively. To set the 
stage for future research on the topic, the closing section sketches the limitations of this 
research and highlights future research areas.  
11.1 Factors Contributing to Performance during Disaster 
Response 
In this section, we summarize the findings of our research in terms of factors that 
contribute to the performance of humanitarian organizations during disaster response. 
Performance is defined in terms of cost-effective, timely, flexible and accurate response 
and operation accountability. 
To master disaster management, that is, ensure the arrival of the right goods, at the right 
time and place, humanitarian organizations have to excel in disaster preparedness and 
response. To tackle preparedness and response challenges related to their supply chains, 
this thesis advances that humanitarian organizations engage in a range of partnership 
arrangements. 
In terms of response, in order to bridge their resource and capability gap, humanitarian 
organizations need to call upon the contribution and resources of their response network. 
Seven actors compose a humanitarian response network. These actors are the media, 
donors, receiving government(s), military, neighboring governments, suppliers and 
implementing partners. For each disaster, a humanitarian organization needs to construct 
and manage a temporary supply network. The ability of a humanitarian organization to 
access and leverage the resources and capabilities within its supply network defines its 
performance in terms of its cost-effectiveness, timeliness, accuracy and flexibility.  
It follows that the response capability of a humanitarian organization depends on the 
response capability and willingness of each of these forces. As mentioned in section 2.7.1, 
the supplier network is the only node of the supply network over which a humanitarian 
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organization can exercise direct power. We have observed that during unpredictable 
disasters, in order to mobilize and transport relief items, humanitarian organizations need 
to construct broad and loose emergency supply networks. This is explained by the fact that 
a broad network of multiple and geographically dispersed, interchangeable and 
complementary suppliers renders the emergency supply chain more resilient to supply, 
transport and communication failure modes ensuring timeliness, flexibility and accuracy.  
In Chapter 2 we argue that to respond to unpredictable and predictable disasters, 
humanitarian organizations need to pursue and excel in two distinct supply chain 
strategies. For predictable disasters, they should construct and manage efficient supply 
chains while for unpredictable ones they need to setup agile supply chains that are 
responsive to demand and hedged against any supply shortage. Good performance implies 
existence of capabilities and systems that allow for the parallel and simultaneous 
implementation of these strategies. 
Contrary to commercial supply chains that are designed for repetitious, routine operations, 
humanitarian organizations are increasingly engaged in mounting and managing non-
routine supply chains in response to large-scale, sudden and complex disasters. In addition, 
given the geographies they operate in and the impact of disasters, they often face a range of 
significant structural to temporary logistics failure modes. These failure modes create a 
series of inter- and extra-organizational dependencies and lend themselves to duplication 
of efforts and activities by the concerned actors. In Chapter 2, we argue that the increasing 
number of unpredictable and competing large scale disasters - often in fragmented, less 
developed countries of the world with limited or depilated infrastructure - coupled with 
insufficient resources at the disposal of each organization has increased the need for 
coordination.  
To deal satisfactorily with logistics dependencies and in order to avoid duplications, 
humanitarian organizations have opted for a distinct and independent partnership scheme: 
a logistics coordination platform. The platform allows for coordinated inter-agency actions 
and provides an adequate interface with other key stakeholders. Our research indicates that 
to provide a good service, this neutral non-operational facility needs to have the 
organizational characteristics of a virtual organization. This is because virtual organizing is 
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the only organizational structure that can provide a good service, that is, ensure a speedy, 
flexible, accurate and cost effective response and access to resources available within the 
community during time sensitive environments.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, humanitarian organizations suffer from a generalized 
underinvestment in preparedness capability and need to improve upon their response 
function.  To achieve a quantum leap and address their weaknesses, they need to tap into 
specialized and additional resources. To this end, they need to go beyond the generic and 
tied resources offered to them by their traditional donors. In this regard, select resources 
within business and CSOs are relevant. As a result, business/CSO-humanitarian 
partnerships are the third type of partnership arrangement sought by humanitarian 
organizations. 
Although business and CSO partnerships cannot substitute for good internal operations, 
they can complement and enhance internal operations, provide an impetus for 
improvement and expand the humanitarian virtual web. We argue that such partnerships, if 
carefully implemented, contribute both to disaster preparedness and response capabilities. 
They can assist individual humanitarian organizations achieve faster and more accurate 
results for less cost to society.   
Our research suggests that disaster response is deeply embedded in networks and in the 
structure of network relations.  We identify social capital as the driver behind the 
participation of different actors during disasters. We equally identify the ability of 
humanitarian organizations to build and exploit it as the differentiating factor in their 
performance. We conclude that in order to increase its social capital, a humanitarian 
organization needs to fulfill at least two of the following relationship criteria - long-term 
relationship, high interaction, closure or interdependence - with the concerned entity. 
Our research highlights the importance of both bonding and bridging social capital to 
disaster management. More specifically, it shows that without efforts directed to the 
reinforcement of bonding social capital among humanitarian organizations, it is difficult 
for inter-organizational coordination to be successful. As a result, it is recommended that 
humanitarian organizations, directly and through their logistics coordination platform, 
devote time and effort to build and strengthen the level of social capital among them in-
between and during disasters.  
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Similarly, our research shows that without efforts directed to the creation and 
reinforcement of bridging social capital, it would be difficult for humanitarian 
organizations to overcome their resource and capability gaps at the organizational level 
and to resolve dependencies and avoid duplications at the community level. As far as the 
latter is concerned, we argue that humanitarian organizations need to build long-term 
relationships with parties committed to the humanitarian cause with core competencies that 
match their requirements.  
11.2    Management of Disaster Response Activities 
In this section we summarize the findings of our research in terms of how humanitarian 
organizations manage their disaster response activities. We summarize how humanitarian 
organizations manage dependencies and avoid duplications, how they operationalize the 
logistics coordination platform, and how to best manage the risks and opportunities 
associated to it. Then we summarize the concepts, activities and structures that contribute 
to the creation and reinforcement of bonding and bridging social capital. 
To manage eventual dependencies and avoid duplications, first and foremost, operational 
humanitarian organizations engage in a series of pre-emptive agency-specific measures. To 
address recurrent, common and disaster-specific dependencies and duplications, 
operational humanitarian organizations take collective action by calling upon the services 
of a non-operational organization in form of a logistics coordination platform.  The 
logistics coordination platform engages in a range of inter and extra-organizational 
coordination mechanisms contributing to the accuracy, flexibility, response time and 
operational costs of disaster response. Inter-organizational coordination mechanisms 
include joint contingency planning, prioritization, debottlenecking, common logistics 
capability and information brokerage, joint procurement and inventory management 
activities. Extra-organizational coordination mechanisms include standardization, 
partnerships, coordinated funding strategy, common negotiations, de-conflicting, and de-
bottlenecking. 
Our research shows that a successful logistics coordination platform needs to have four 
distinct elements: virtual web, virtual corporation, core unit and a series of antenna offices. 
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The virtual web and core unit are the permanent features of the structure. Virtual 
corporations and antenna offices are activated and deactivated in response to each and 
every large-scale disaster. The humanitarian virtual web is necessary to attract and include 
humanitarian organizations, donors, CSOs, and private sector companies. A focal virtual 
corporation is established for each large-scale disaster. Territorial coverage is achieved by 
the opening and closing of temporary antenna offices augmenting the resources at the 
disposal of the participants. It is worth noting that the deployment of virtual corporations 
may help unearth the structural or temporary logistics needs of a country, which need to be 
addressed by a separate entity(s). 
The humanitarian community has decided to nest the logistics coordination platform in 
WFP: an organization with strong logistics expertise, committed to provide infrastructural 
support, and experienced provider of inter-agency services. To avoid a dependent relation 
between the platform and the assisted humanitarian organizations or loss of control over 
logistics resources, the platform complements rather than substitutes an organization’s 
logistics function. To remain a credible, reliable and manageable structure, it resists 
across-the-board activation and tries to keep its ambitions within its operational 
capabilities. It has realized the importance of timely dismantling of focal virtual 
corporations to avoid mission creep. To avoid an increase in administrative cost and loss of 
cost-efficiencies due to dispersed workplaces, it has often opted for the co-location 
solution with an existing structure of a virtual web member.  
To avoid lack of direction and motivation among its staff, during deployments, the 
platform organizes a number of meetings among the geographically dispersed teams. To 
ensure that its services remain relevant to its member, almost after each deployment, it 
commissions independent evaluations and uses results and findings to adjust and improve 
services.  
Timely and sufficient allocation of resources by members ensures effectiveness and 
minimizes quality variation across deployments. Typically WFP, UNJLC’s host institution, 
bridges the facility’s resource gaps. UNJLC needs to improve upon this aspect possibly by 
obtaining a firm commitment of its virtual web members towards its resource 
requirements. 
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Our view of organizational performance is a socially-driven one. We see disaster response 
deeply embedded in networks and in the structure of network relations. Therefore, it is 
important to explore and explain how humanitarian organizations develop and manage 
bonding and bridging social capital.  
First and foremost, we conclude that a certain level of bonding social capital exists among 
humanitarian organizations given the prevailing common belief/value system and the 
shared strategic vision. Those humanitarian organizations engaged in the delivery of 
services to other humanitarian organizations create bonding social capital. Inter-
organizational coordination also results in the reinforcement of social bonding capital 
through enhanced trust, shared vision, communication, common identity, and common 
business processes. Activities and arrangements that contribute to its reinforcement include 
joint contingency planning sessions, inter-agency meetings, training sessions, agency 
secondments, etc. 
As far as business/CSO-humanitarian partnership schemes are concerned, brokered and 
cross-cutting partnerships stimulate the reinforcement of bonding social capital between 
humanitarian organizations by creating additional networking opportunities, providing 
training, developing a common IT platform or standards, etc. 
We conclude that a number of enablers – trust, transparency, standardization and 
encapsulation – help create and strengthen bridging social capital between a humanitarian 
organization and its long-standing donors, implementing partners, and repeat suppliers. 
Extra-organizational coordination efforts result in the creation and reinforcement of 
bridging social capital. Prior dialogue as well as networking, planning, training and 
coordination activities with key stakeholders – donors, recipient and neighboring 
governments – help build and strengthen the level of bridging social capital.  Brokered and 
strategic partnerships are also a source of bridging social capital. They enable a 
humanitarian organization to build structured relationships with new groups of actors.  
11.3   Virtual Organizing 
One of the unintended contributions of this research has been to the virtual organizing 
literature. To respond rapidly to logistics failure modes, humanitarian organizations have 
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considered a specific governance structure - a virtual resource base - for their logistics 
operations. The humanitarian community’s experience provides empirical evidence for the 
emergence and management of logistics virtual organizations and contributes to the virtual 
organizing literature in several ways.  
 
Figure 11.1 – Structural Components of UNJLC 
UNJLC Structural Components Virtual Organization Literature 
Virtual Web Virtual Web 
Core Unit -  
UNJLC deployments Virtual Corporations 
UNJLC Antenna Offices -  
 
In terms of structure, the UNJLC example highlights two structural aspects of virtual 
organizing not explicitly covered by the literature: the Core Unit and the Antenna Offices 
(Figure 11.1). The first element consists of the need for a small permanent virtual web 
secretariat, which in effect results in physicality. The UNJLC example shows that it is 
through the Core Unit that the caretaker operationalizes the virtual web and the UNJLC 
deployments; addresses incompatibilities; carries out forecasting, planning and 
preparedness activities; and ensures continuity.  
A structural strength of the virtual organization concept not explicitly emphasized by the 
literature is the possibility of quickly activating and demobilizing a series of temporary and 
interlinked offices during the project cycle. The function of these antenna offices is to 
support the activities of the virtual corporation and its stakeholders. Their advantage is that 
they allow for the rapid adaptation of services to the changing and unexpected needs of the 
environment and clients. They also result in intra, inter and extra-organizational linkages. 
These linkages are of particular value to emergency relief environments. They ensure 
speedy response in time sensitive environments by a temporary augmentation of resources 
at key geographical points. They create value not just for their direct users but also for the 
community. Moreover, even if a given organization or stakeholder does not use all the 
links created by the antenna offices, it values the general connectivity between 
organizations guaranteed by the structure.  
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UNJLC provides some indication regarding the advantages and disadvantages of nesting 
the Core Unit within the setup of a virtual web member. Advantages include the immediate 
operability. Disadvantages include the perceived or effective interference and dominant 
position of the host institution in the decision-making process and direction of the facility. 
In terms of the profile of the most eligible organization, our research underscores the 
importance of nesting the core unit in a financially and technically strong and credible 
organization recognized for its competence.  The core unit would benefit from residing in 
an organization that occupies an information-rich position within the community in terms 
of knowledge about inter-organizational resources. The hosting organization’s prior 
experience in forging partnerships with other organizations and managing inter-firm 
services are additional assets. Finally, our research underlines the usefulness of a logo in 
the organizational identification process. 
Our research elaborates on the comparative advantages of virtual organizing in overcoming 
the specific challenges of emergency environments. Virtual organizations facilitate the 
rapid activation of temporary, dynamic, and flat coordination structures staffed with virtual 
teams. These organizational features are of particular relevance in time sensitive 
environments that depend on the resources of a host of small and large organizations.  
In Chapter 10 we propose a framework that distinguishes between the strategic and 
operational building blocks necessary for the operationalization of virtual organizations. 
We argue that for the virtual organizing concept to realize its potential, trust needs to 
prevail among the virtual web member and the concept should have a clearly defined 
mission. For cooperation to take place, virtual web members have to set the direction. In 
this regard, the quality of communication and leadership is fundamental. To ensure the 
achievement of the set objective, the caretaker and lead operators have to overcome 
identification problems associated to virtual organizing. They have to rise to the challenge 
of creating an organizational identity and facilitating a bonding process for the virtual 
corporation to which the seconded staff can sign up to and identify with.  
At the operational level, we argue that under resourced virtual corporations are not able to 
realize their objectives and would suffer from lack of credibility. To remain a value-adding 
partnership, the services of virtual corporations need to be demand-driven.  
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Comprehensive reference business processes and the provision of a reliable support 
infrastructure such as IT services by a virtual web member ensure operational 
effectiveness. 
We also review the drawbacks to virtual organizing. These range from difficulties arising 
from lack of authority and control over the virtual web members and their resources, 
incompatibility between cooperating members, and shortcoming in the strategic and 
operational building blocks. Our research also points to the very advantages of virtual 
organizing – flat organizations, temporary and dispersed units – as the source of potential 
drawbacks. It discusses challenges related to the novelty and the very nature of the concept 
- dynamic and temporary non-organizations, in terms of stakeholder buy-in. Undue 
dependency, misapplication, and mission creep are the other risks facing the concept and 
its members.   
In terms of new market opportunities, the activation of virtual corporations can help in 
their identification. We argue that whenever services provided by the virtual corporation 
are sought by third parties, to capitalize on the market opportunity, the virtual web 
members should seriously consider the setting up of a separate entity.  
11.4  Lessons for Business 
In this section we summarize the relevance of our research to business. We first discuss the 
different partnership possibilities and how business can best engage with humanitarian 
organizations. Our discussion goes beyond humanitarian organizations since it can be 
extended to other non-profit organizations. We also summarize under which circumstances 
business can apply the solution adopted by the humanitarian community to deal with 
failure modes during disasters. More specifically section 11.4.2 verifies the relevance of 
the humanitarian logistics coordination platform to business while section 11.4.3 discusses 
what business can learn from UNJLC’s institutionalization process.  
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11.4.1  Business-Humanitarian Partnerships 
This research provides several takeaways on business-humanitarian partnerships. After 
having identified four different partnership possibilities, it highlights their different risk-to-
benefit profile. For example, the risk and benefits of strategic partnerships are found to be 
higher than brokered ones for the humanitarian organization and business partner. Given 
the different risk-to-benefit profile, we recommend that the parties involved take time to 
identify and evaluate them so as to avoid surprises. However, it should be noted that as 
long as benefits outweigh the risks, there is a business case for each partnership scheme.   
As far as strategic partnerships are concerned, to guide the two parties in their partnership 
path, we propose a checklist. Emphasis is place on well-motivated partnerships that are 
driven by pre-identified objectives and linked to the core competencies and values of the 
business partner. To achieve the desired level of credibility, we stress that it is important 
that partnerships commit corporate resources for a medium to a long-term period. The 
importance of partnering with the “best” humanitarian organization and devoting enough 
time to the preparation phase is also highlighted.  
Immediate implementation is considered crucial as it helps build trust and confidence. A 
learning and educational period helps build mutual appreciation and understanding. To 
ensure the delivery of valued services, emphasis is placed on the need for the humanitarian 
organization to articulate its requirement and assess its own absorptive capacity as early on 
in the partnership as possible. The partners should also ensure the adequate and timely 
allocation of dedicated resources to the partnership. Finally, the partners should 
consciously avoid an undue resource and expertise dependency by the humanitarian 
organization on the resources of the corporate and CSO partners. 
In conclusion, early management engagement, commitment to medium term collaboration, 
organizational fit, an adequate socialization period, clear program objectives and 
deliverables ensure that the program starts off on the right foot. Subsequent policy 
measures meant to minimize the impact of the partnership on traditional donors, ensure the 
participation of other corporate partners and build firewalls between CSR activities and 
commercial relationships help avert predictable partnership pitfalls. Working out 
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differences in working culture, ensuring resource alignment and relevance of assistance 
ensure smooth partnership implementation. 
As far as brokered partnerships are concerned, our research highlights the limitations of a 
decentralized, voluntary network where short-term one-to-one relationships prevail. 
Indeed, in such partnerships, the broker cannot centralize decisions as it is not vested with 
the necessary power and authority. Other challenges facing the brokering institution could 
include lack of focus and control over expected or desired results. As far as the private 
sector partner is concerned, its engagement in brokered initiative does not produce the 
same benefits or the same risks as company-specific and led initiatives.  
 
11.4.2  Commercial Supply Chains and Logistics Coordination platform 
As already mentioned in Chapter 3, firms need to overcome failure modes under a variety 
of situations. For example, firms sourcing from developing countries may face a set of 
structural and temporary country-specific barriers in the areas of purchasing, 
transportation, warehousing, and technology and inventory control. As a result, they need 
to plan and be prepared to overcome a range of predictable logistics failure modes.   
Business is equally exposed to natural and man-made disasters and hence subject to 
damage and destruction. Surveys among US businesses confirm that companies have plans 
against recurrent, low-impact risks. However, few have plans and are capable to respond to 
high-impact, low-likelihood risks (Rice & Caniato, 2003a). In this regard, we argue that 
should firms shift their focus from risks to failure modes, their preparedness efforts will be 
simplified. Contingency plans as well as the need for flexibility and redundancy would be 
conceived for a limited number of dependencies that emerge because of failure modes as 
opposed to a wide range of high - and low-likelihood and impact risks.  
Finally, as the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US demonstrated, government response, policies 
and regulations on the availability and reliability of public infrastructure and systems can 
severely affect the performance of commercial supply chains. It also highlighted that 
business is not necessarily consulted on security-related decisions that affect its operations. 
Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, there is growing consensus on the importance of private-
public partnerships in form of cooperation and coordination. Indeed, the US government’s 
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decision to close US airspace and enforce security measures at borders immediately after 
the attacks disrupted the supply chains of many businesses. It brought to the forefront and 
put into perspective the importance of government response and the dependency of 
industry on government infrastructure like customs, ICT, transportation and energy (Rice 
& Caniato, 2003a). In addition, in the aftermath of the attacks, a series of policy measures 
and programs were initiated. These measures and policies that aim to build security and 
ensure the smooth flow of materials transiting the US are expected to have a permanent 
impact on the supply chains of global companies.  
Against this background, Rice & Caniato (Rice & Caniato, 2003b) recommend a 
significant increase in business, government and public sector collaboration. More 
specifically, they advance the need for companies to forge new relationships, partnerships 
with those government agencies that are involved in rendering supply networks secure and 
resilient. In their view, those companies that can only respond to government regulations 
and actions are not protected from major supply chain disruptions. Only proactive firms 
that make security and resilience part of their company culture and are involved in the 
decision making process - can anticipate and have prior knowledge of government 
response - are protected. They recommend “industry leaders to have a voice in planning 
emergency response and at the point of emergency response” (Rice & Caniato, 2003a). 
However, they admit that “it is not clear how industry could and should be represented in 
emergency response” (Rice & Caniato, 2003a). 
The literature indicates that logistics alliances in business are driven by the logic of cost, 
risk and waste reduction; quality maximization; improved time to market and better access 
to resources (Gentry & Vellenga, 1996; Bowersox & Daugherty, 1995). They are not 
necessarily pursued as a business continuity strategy, a strategy to address dependencies or 
mitigate specific logistics-related bottlenecks and failure modes. This is not a surprise 
given the fact that commercial supply chains are designed for repetitious and routine 
actions that through standardization and other techniques work towards the minimization, 
if not elimination, of operational disruptions.  Evidence of structured cooperation is even 
scarcer between business and key stakeholders such as government authorities.  
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Figure 11.2 –Mitigation Measures Pursued by Business & Humanitarian 
Organizations   
Mitigation Measures Failure Mode 
Commercial Operations Humanitarian Organizations 
Supply • Contingency planning 
• Redundant capacity 
• Inventory, suppliers, 
production capacity 
• Flexible operations 
• Supplier substitutability 
• Design changes 
• Direct sales model 
• Contingency planning 
• Redundant capacity 
• Funds, inventory, suppliers, 
equipment, staff  
• Flexible operations 
• Supplier substitutability 
• Mix of international, regional, 
national suppliers 
• Guidelines for donations  
UNJLC 
Facilities • Recovery centers 
• Global, dispersed 
operations 
• Redundant/standby 
production facilities 
• Regional warehouses 
• Warehouses at logistics nodes 
• Temporary operational sites 
• Various distribution networks 
UNJLC 
Transportation • Transportation mode 
substitutability  
• Alternative 
transportation routes 
• Logistics provider 
exchangeability 
• Transportation mode 
substitutability  
• Alternative transportation routes 
• Logistics provider 
exchangeability 
• Change in destination, receiving 
port 
UNJLC 
Communication • Business continuity 
plans 
• Standby ICT capacity 
• Use of wide range of information 
sources 
UNJLC 
HR • Temporary staff • Standby capacity 
• Agile workforce 
UNJLC 
 
To verify whether the solutions adopted by humanitarian organizations can be relevant to 
business, we first compare the range of mitigation measures applied by commercial firms 
with those pursued by humanitarian organizations. Figure 11.2 allows us to draw two 
conclusions. First, humanitarian organizations manage disruptions to their emergency 
response supply chain similarly to how firms deal with unpredictable one-off events 
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affecting their supply chains. Second, humanitarian organizations resort to a logistics 
coordination platform, the UNJLC, to manage dependencies and avoid duplications that 
emerge during disaster response. Humanitarian organizations outsource logistics 
coordination to UNJLC when they lack the resources and expertise to deal satisfactorily 
with a wide range of failure modes single-handedly in a cost effective, speedy, flexible and 
accurate manner.  
The humanitarian experience during emergency relief operations demonstrates that a 
distinct coordination structure can, among other things, help avoid duplication of efforts 
among humanitarian organizations and provide for a negotiation mechanism that can help 
mitigate or reverse disruptive decisions and actions taken by other stakeholders including 
governments. An adaptive and responsive strategy, it can effectively address dependencies 
with other key stakeholders and mitigate bottlenecks affecting operations under a wide 
range of exceptional situations on a continual basis, repeatedly.  
We argue that a similar coordination mechanism can assist firms to i) overcome logistics-
related infrastructure gaps, ii) contrast temporary logistics failure modes caused by natural 
and man-made disasters and iii) engage in a constructive dialogue with government 
agencies in control of public goods. For example, firms sourcing from developing 
countries or operating in disaster-stricken areas may face a set of structural or temporary 
country-specific logistics-related barriers. An inter-firm coordination platform allows for 
common action in response to common logistics barriers. Through a coordination 
structure, business can achieve inter-firm coordination (joint contingency planning and 
implementation, prioritize movement of goods, aim at the optimal use of limited or 
disabled logistics infrastructure and assets, ensure geographical coverage and avert 
operational bottlenecks, etc.). Indeed, an institutionalized emergency response 
coordination platform established by industry leaders can facilitate the articulation of a 
common strategy and action plan by firms. 
Apart from achieving inter-firm coordination, an institutionalized emergency response 
coordination platform established by industry leaders can provide for the much-needed 
interface and coordination with government authorities regulating or in control of public 
infrastructure. Industry depends on government infrastructure like customs, ICT, 
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transportation, and energy. While the humanitarian community has always maintained 
relationships with government agencies, in the commercial world, firms need to strengthen 
their relationships with government agencies that have the responsibility for making their 
supply network secure and resilient. A coordination structure can be an effective response 
mechanism to eventual disruptive government actions.  
Similarly, a logistics coordination platform is indicated for those one-off supply chain 
initiatives with permanent impact on the global supply that require the coordinated and 
active participation of industries, governments and local authorities. An example is the safe 
and secure trade lanes initiative led by the US government that aims to introduce new 
security measures in the maritime transportation. The initiative involves the active 
cooperation of transport, retail and manufacturing industries as well as port and 
government authorities of many countries for its implementation. The initiative is novel 
and can have unexpected outcomes. In addition, it cannot fall back on prior experience for 
its implementation. As such, a coordination platform, manned with the representatives of 
the involved parties, set up for the duration of the project can ensure coordination, an all-
inclusive and holistic stakeholder approach and adequate response to unpredictable 
developments. 
Humanitarian organizations have considered a virtual resource base for their logistics 
coordination platform given its contribution to time-sensitive and resource scarce 
environments that involve a large number of actors. Its implication for business is that, 
apart from facilitating the exploitation of specific business opportunities, virtual organizing 
can be a winning strategy for commercial supply chain management during disasters. More 
specifically, it can be a winning strategy in two scenarios. First, it is a winning strategy 
during large scale, exceptional events such as disasters that depend on the contribution and 
participation of a host of small and big organizations in the manufacturing, retail, transport 
and service industries. It is argued that when delivery infrastructure is affected, virtual 
organizing is effective in providing a fast, flexible, cost-effective and accurate response 
and access to critical resources. Second, when the objective of the network members is 
time sensitive and information and knowledge at the disposal of the actors is dispersed, 
incomplete or scarce.   
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In terms of organizational structure, the structure adopted by the UNJLC deployments - a 
series of temporary, dynamic, small antenna offices and specialized cells - is replicable by 
business. The core-focal-antenna results in valuable intra, inter and extra-organizational 
linkages and as such adds further agility to the virtual corporation concept, a feature of 
potential interest to business. To adequately address issues related to the management and 
an eventual vacuum in terms of infrastructural support of the virtual organization, guidance 
is provided to business in terms of nesting of the caretaker function in a strong institution.  
It is however worth noting that there are contexts that are beyond the response capabilities 
of coordination structures. In the context of humanitarian operations, there are certain 
natural disasters, such as the 2004 tsunami, that given their scale, unpredictable and 
devastating nature are beyond the response capability of any humanitarian organization, set 
of humanitarian organizations or a coordination platform. In these cases, should the 
necessary planning data and information be readily available, success depends on the 
availability of an unworkable level of redundant or standby capacity and assets.  
 
11.4.3  Institutionalization Process of Logistics Coordination Platform: 
Lessons Learnt 
In establishing a logistics coordination platform similar to the UNJLC, business may face 
similar problems to those faced by the UNJLC architect. First, it is important to recognize 
the different capabilities and potential contribution of each member firm. Then there is a 
need to work on the organizational buy-in of the facility as most firms may not be prepared 
to realize and admit to the need for cooperation on logistics issues.  More precisely, the 
concept may need the buy-in of two very different sets of members: firms with and those 
without logistics capability and sufficient financing. The challenge is to secure the active 
participation and contribution of those larger firms that do not necessarily see the need and 
merits of sharing resources. To overcome resistance, the platform should make sure it does 
not overshadow firm visibility and brand identity.  
The virtual organization literature recommends a sequential implementation of tasks - 
preparation and initiation of the virtual web; maintaining and improving the virtual web 
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collaboration; and the initiation and operation of virtual corporations  - by the caretaker for 
the institutionalization of the virtual organization (Franke, 1999).  
In UNJLC, instead of the caretaker, the architect carried out most of the institutionalization 
and deployment tasks. Moreover, the order of the tasks was often reversed and at times 
overlapped. For example, the architect through a consultative process delivered a vision of 
the concept to the IASC long after the deployment of UNJLCs.  
The UNJLC case study demonstrates that should the virtual web members share a common 
vision and set of values, operational incompatibilities including differences in supply chain 
design at the organizational level can be overcome by the efforts of the different 
managerial figures and sound business processes collated in an operations manual.  
In commercial virtual organizations, firm pre-qualification criteria aims to ensure that each 
participating firm contributes to the initiative with its specialized resources. While the 
avoidance of free riders is relevant in profit making contexts, in the humanitarian context, 
the noble mission of the participating organization rather than its specialized resources is 
the qualifying parameter.  
In terms of business processes, UNJLC deployments interrupted the “preparatory phase” 
several times. To improve the partnering process and the efficiency of UNJLC 
deployments, the UNJLC did not have reference guidelines. It used the recommendations 
and findings of the independent reviews, conducted after each UNJLC deployment, to 
prepare, update and refine its administrative procedures and its work on the facility’s Field 
Operations Manual. More precisely, with little guidance and few precedents in the UN 
system on how to establish an inter-agency facility within an existing operational agency, 
the UNJLC learnt by doing and addressed a range of administrative issues as they 
emerged.  
The overlapping of managerial figures and the reversed order of tasks delayed the 
institutionalization of the UNJLC concept as a permanent response structure of the 
humanitarian community. The concept was reinforced through a trial and error process, 
which is a costly approach. Unsuccessful deployments as well as slow ramp-ups could 
have been avoided if dedicated resources were allocated towards the development of the 
UNJLC concept right from the outset.  
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Business is expected to adhere to a sequential implementation of tasks related to the 
establishment of virtual organizations. Contrary to humanitarian organizations that may 
launch an initiative before securing the necessary funding from the donor community, 
firms usually obtain approval, secure funding and develop business plans before venturing 
in any new initiative. 
The literature recommends a marketing strategy to compensate for lack of physicality of 
the virtual corporations. The UNJLC case elaborates on the need for marketing by 
distinguishing between the need for communication and organizational identification. 
Communication aims to create awareness and ownership around the concept as well as set 
the right set of expectations and ensure cooperation. Organizational identification activities 
aim to support the bonding process between the concept and the member organizations and 
the team members of the virtual corporation.  
In this regard, compared to humanitarian organizations, business is typically better 
equipped to address communication and marketing related activities. Firms with their sales 
and marketing department are expected to be more experienced in developing and 
implementing communication campaigns. The other major difference between 
humanitarian organizations and business is in the area of finance. Humanitarian 
organizations depend mainly on donors for funding. Compared to business, they still have 
limited control over their financial resources and as a result may end up managing grossly 
under-resourced operations. 
In Chapter 10, we propose and discuss a framework for the operationalization of virtual 
organizations. The framework identifies five strategic and five operational building blocks. 
We advance that this framework is equally relevant to business in the operationalization of 
virtual organizations.  
The network literature emphasizes the importance of agile workforce in turbulent 
environment. The UNJLC case study brings to the forefront the need for an agile 
workforce in the activation of virtual corporations. It also provides a definition for an agile 
workforce which is a responsive, collaborative, empowered, skillful, flexible, mobile, 
devoted, self-motivated and connected workforce. To ensure success of the virtual resource 
base, business should be able to depend on an agile workforce. To facilitate the 
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contribution of virtual corporation team members to the success of the operation, the 
virtual corporation and its spin-offs should be flat organizations in which the decision-
making responsibility of each employee is high and decisions are decentralized at the unit 
level.  
The literature points to ICT as the key enabler of virtual organizing. The UNJLC case 
study advances a more inclusive view by emphasizing the importance of support 
infrastructure which goes beyond IT to include finance and administrative support.  
Finally, the UNJLC case study confirms that to remain relevant and responsive to the 
needs of its membership, particular attention should be given to the design and evolution 
of the facility’s services.  
In section 10.2.2, we discuss the range of inter and extra-organizational coordination 
mechanisms the UNJLC adopts to address dependencies and avoid duplications. We argue 
that both these and the additional coordination mechanisms of joint procurement and 
inventory optimization can be adopted by business in view of catastrophic disasters such as 
terrorist attacks. 
In sections 7.4.5 and 10.3.3, we argue that the services of a virtual corporation may be of 
value to third parties. In this regard, we propose that prompted by new market 
opportunities, business should be prepared to capitalize on opportunities presenting 
commercial value. It should plan for an eventual transfer of services still in demand to 
existing or newly created commercial setups.  
11.5   Lessons for Humanitarian Organizations 
In this section we shall review the impact of the UNJLC on the humanitarian community, 
discuss the role of IT in humanitarian supply chain management and the background for 
and impact of business-humanitarian partnerships for humanitarian organizations. 
 
11.5.1 UNJLC and the Humanitarian Community 
Williamson (Williamson, 1985) argues that parties engaging in frequent, recurring 
transactions are more predisposed to adopt more specialized and complex governance 
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structures. This certainly has been the case for humanitarian operations during relief 
emergencies. While network arrangements among humanitarian organizations were 
virtually unheard of a decade ago, today, the humanitarian community can rely on a 
number of coordination tools and services. Given the recurrent need for intensified inter-
agency coordination, to address logistics failure modes the humanitarian community has 
been receptive to the establishment of a specialized structure in the form of the UNJLC.  
Collaboration between agency logisticians and the advent of the UNJLC has underscored 
the central role of logistics in emergency relief and the need for coordination. It has also 
strengthened the profile of logistics and logisticians within the humanitarian network. At 
the organizational level, agencies with weaker logistics setups have recognized the 
UNJLC’s contribution in enhancing their internal logistics capability.  Participation to 
UNJLC activities has also produced an indirect benefit. The increased intensity and 
frequency of formal and informal networking opportunities and socio-technical meetings 
and interaction have contributed to an increase in the “absorptive capacity” and knowledge 
base of the UNJLC web members. 
Big and small humanitarian organizations part of the UN, international organization or 
NGO community contribute to and benefit from the UNJLC. As the UNJLC case shows, 
they value the coordination efforts of the UNJLC especially for those back-office activities 
that do not interfere with or compromise their visibility and hence fund raising capability 
with the donor community.  
Logistics presents itself as a natural field for coordination in emergency response. The 
humanitarian community, however, has already identified other services within the 
humanitarian supply chain - air services, warehousing, procurement, vehicle maintenance, 
information, security, civil military coordination and telecommunication - that can be 
shared and rationalized (Samii & Van Wassenhove, 2004a). As the most successful 
common service provider, the UNJLC is foreseen to assume an active role in this debate. 
In addition, a series of initiatives that would benefit from a common approach such as the 
harmonization of the humanitarian community’s supply chains systems and processes 
could see the UNJLC in the driving seat. 
434
CHAPTER 11 – KEY FINDINGS, CONTRIBUTIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 
 
434
The demonstration effect of the UNJLC has been fundamental in bringing to the forefront 
new partnering opportunities within the sector. Although the catalytic and multiplier effect 
of the UNJLC on the humanitarian sector has yet to be realized, this inter-agency 
coordination platform has helped shape new attitudes. It has made organizations more 
receptive to the potentials of coordination and collaboration.  An example is the 2003 Fleet 
Forum that aimed to identify and put into motion inter-agency collaboration ideas such as 
the possibility of joint vehicle purchase and maintenance currently pursued by the Danish 
company, Kjaer. Organized with the assistance of TNT by WFP, World Vision and IFRC, 
it was attended by some 26 humanitarian organizations and NGOs; a level of attendance 
and participation unimaginable just few years ago.   
It is not excluded that in the context of UN reforms, certain functions of the UN 
humanitarian value chains, such as logistics, currently managed at the organizational level 
and coordinated through various mechanisms are integrated, centralized, regrouped and 
streamlined so as to be executed by one or few organizations.  
In section 11.5.1.1, we explore how the humanitarian community can capitalize on the 
opportunities unearth by the UNJLC during disaster response. In section 11.5.1.2, we 
highlight the need for a Contribution Protocol to ensure that the facility is always 
adequately resourced.  
 
11.5.1.1  Capitalizing on Opportunities 
As we saw in section 7.4.5 of Chapter 7, the UNJLC may provide a series of services that 
have market value for external parties. The UNJLC’s support to combatant forces or 
authorities has highlighted the need to protect the humanitarian space especially in conflict 
situations. The humanitarian community needs to retain its neutrality and avoid taking 
sides in politically sensitive and charged emergencies. As such, it has to manage its 
collaboration with combatant, peacekeeping or occupying forces - at times a necessity to 
better assist the afflicted populations - with care. A set of guidelines regulate the use of 
Military and Civil Defense Assets (MCDA). To avoid putting at risk the effective or 
perceived independence of humanitarian operations and to safeguard the humanitarian 
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space in general, we argue that guidelines need to be regularly updated and extended to 
define or limit new forms of collaboration and coordination.  
In the absence of commercial logistics providers and adequate government logistics 
capabilities and assets, our discussion on the UNJLC illustrates the importance of logistics 
services and support in the political and economic stabilization of conflict, war-torn 
countries. While it highlights that there is a market for UNJLC services, it also emphasizes 
the fact that seconding such market needs can lead to mission creep. The UNJLC can be 
subject to mission creep if it does not farm out its services to an existing organization or 
group of organizations.  
To avoid a prolonged presence and at the same time in order to ensure the provision of key 
UNJLC services past the emergency phase, we argue that there might be scope for the 
establishment of a dedicated structure. This structure would have the mandate to assist 
governments and donors on issues related to logistics during emergencies and their 
immediate aftermath. The structure, with no affiliation with humanitarian organizations, 
could still be part of the UN’s nation building effort. Initially, it can be included in the 
mandate of a UN or international peacekeeping force effort before the roll-out of a UN 
recovery and reconstruction program. The structure could be funded by the donor 
community and staffed with short-term experts from the private, development or NGO 
sector. Once security is established, the gap in logistics services could be filled by the 
domestic private sector, should capabilities be locally available, or outsourced to a foreign 
company. In all events, the humanitarian community could use the networking 
opportunities provided by the virtual web to discuss alternatives to the UNJLC and decide, 
on a case-to-case basis, the best way forward. 
 
11.5.1.2  Consolidating the Facility 
The success of UNJLC deployments and their capability and credibility continues to 
largely depend on the quick mobilization of equipment, the extent and quality of 
secondments and availability of emergency funds. Given these limitations, the UNJLC 
tends to respond more effectively to emerging as opposed to natural disasters. The UNJLC 
is not always in a position to react swiftly, with credibility and at an appropriate scale to 
436
CHAPTER 11 – KEY FINDINGS, CONTRIBUTIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 
 
436
unpredictable disasters. This is because capability is determined by voluntary secondments 
of logisticians, the collaboration of the recipient country and the response of the donor 
community. In terms of staffing, given the very limited number of logistics staff at the 
agency level, most agencies cannot afford secondments to the UNJLC during large-scale 
emergencies.  
To coordinate the activities of humanitarian organizations during sudden large scale 
disasters, the UNJLC needs to go a step further. To ensure timely and adequate response, it 
has to increase the level and availability of its stand-by resources. This can be done by 
keeping redundant capacity and resources at the UNJLC Core Unit level. The facility can 
also enter into a formal agreement – Contribution Protocol – that commits donors and 
humanitarian organizations to a quick ramp-up of the UNJLC deployments in line with the 
requirements of the emergency. The requirements of the emergency could be determined 
on objective grounds. For instance, contributions could be linked to a number of demand 
and supply parameters such as number of people affected and recipient government’s 
response capability.  
For emerging emergencies, the UNJLC gets involved in the contingency planning phase of 
operational agencies. As such, it has the luxury of time to understand its own and its users’ 
requirements, design its intervention and plan the secondments. It can consult with, inform 
and sensitize local authorities and counterpart institutions on the concept, agree on the 
course of action, raise funds for its operations and ensure cooperation on the operational 
level. This preparatory work ensures that the UNJLC services are not redundant and that 
they do not duplicate the work of capable national agency(s). 
In terms of implementing an exit strategy, the UNJLC, a short term facility has come to the 
conclusion that prolonged deployments make their execution difficult as demobilization is 
faced with increasing resistance. To ensure a well planned and communicated exit strategy, 
the UNJLC needs to define clear milestones as well as a range of humanitarian and 
political indicators. In order to avoid surprises and interruption in key services, it has to 
mobilize enough resources for the implementation of an appropriate hand-over to a pre-
identified entity for services still in demand.  
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11.5.2   Role of IT in Humanitarian Supply Chain Management 
What has emerged from our research is that compared to business, the humanitarian 
community does not leverage the power of information technology to estimate demand and 
hedge against supply risks and failure modes.  
To avoid supply shortages, humanitarian organizations share their supply chain resources. 
For example, they share their logistics assets with each other, “borrow” from, divert stocks 
from on-going to new emergencies and call upon a mix of national, regional and 
international suppliers and donors. However, no entity has a comprehensive overview of 
the response of the humanitarian community to a disaster.  This has prevented the 
possibility for inventory optimization during disaster response. Likewise, none of the 
interviewed organizations collects and analyzes, in a systematic way, historic information 
on its supplier base production and delivery capacity in terms of pricing, quality and 
volume. Lack of aggregate and historic information is one of the reasons that have 
prevented humanitarian organizations to engage in joint procurement activities. One of the 
justifications provided by the interviewees for the absence of aggregate data was a generic 
deficiency in adequate information systems and lack of inter-operability between the IT 
systems of different humanitarian organizations.  
An obvious conclusion is that there is scope for improving the effectiveness of 
humanitarian supply chains. For example, humanitarian organizations can improve the 
response capability of their supply chains by collecting and analyzing operational data and 
by drawing lessons from their own errors and successes. They can also improve their 
performance by adopting adequate or investing in and making a more extensive use of 
common or inter-linked IT systems such as the one provided by the Fritz Institute. As the 
Fritz Institute case demonstrates, availability of an inter-linked IT system may be a 
necessary condition for improved supply chain performance but not a sufficient one. 
Indeed as long as the culture of humanitarian organizations does not include a systematic 
measurement of performance, the full potential of an IT system will not be captured.  
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11.5.3  Business–Humanitarian Partnerships 
Our research highlights the short and long-term impact of strategic partnerships on 
humanitarian organization’s financial resources, performance and staff morale. It alerts 
humanitarian organizations to protect their reputation and brand image and to be aware of 
their level of engagement and reliance on corporations given their unstable, uncertain 
nature. To make sure that private contributions are not viewed as a substitute for traditional 
funding, it is recommended that humanitarian organizations seek the approval of their 
donors. After obtaining such approval, humanitarian organizations should proactively seek 
and accept contributions from those private donors whose products, services, core 
competencies and expertise are a strategic fit with their needs.  
Another aspect of business/CSO-humanitarian partnerships covered by our research is that 
not all humanitarian organizations may be able to benefit from strategic partnerships. What 
will determine their possibility of engaging in such partnerships is their level of absorptive 
capacity and their ability to come up with the upfront investment required for the 
successful implementation of such partnerships. 
It is worth noting that contrary to the UNJLC which emerged from a concrete need at the 
field operations level during disaster response by the humanitarian community itself, the 
possibility of business-humanitarian partnerships was something humanitarian 
organizations had not foreseen or contemplated on. For example, both WFP and IFRC 
were ‘surprised’ when they were approached by TNT and the Fritz Institute respectively. 
In other words, the humanitarian community has tapped into the in-kind contribution of 
government agencies and NGOs, but it still stands to capture the in-kind resources 
available with the private sector in a systematic way.  Indeed, most of the fund raising 
efforts of the humanitarian organizations are geared to cash donations from government 
sources. It is only after experiencing the potential of business contributions that 
humanitarian organizations have set up their private sector funding units, developed their 
strategies and established targets.  
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11.6   Limitations and Future Areas for Research 
To respond to the identified research questions, this research describes the context in 
which humanitarian organizations operate. It unearths the set of supply chain and 
organizational strategies humanitarian organizations need to adopt to respond effectively 
and efficiently to the needs of disaster-stricken populations. Finally, it discusses when, to 
what extend and under what conditions the organizational solutions and practices of 
humanitarian organizations can be applied to improve the resilience of commercial supply 
chains.  
Each partnership scheme addresses a specific need and can be directly linked to the range 
of challenges facing the sector identified in Chapter 2 (Figure 11.3). Temporary supply 
networks intend to facilitate the goods mobilization and distribution process. The logistics 
coordination platform activated during large-scale multi-sectoral emergencies seeks to help 
the humanitarian community overcome logistics dependencies and avoid duplications 
arising from common and recurrent disaster specific failure mode. Finally, bearing in mind 
their absorptive capacity, humanitarian organizations may seek partnerships with business 
and CSO in order to improve their disaster management capability. Our cases allowed us 
to verify how humanitarian organizations operationalize each partnership type.  
 
Figure 11.3 – Contribution of Partnership Schemes to Key Challenges 
Challenge Partnership Scheme 
• Ensure accurate, timely and predictable 
funding 
• Ensure speedy, accurate, flexible and 
cost-effective response operations 
• Manage logistics dependencies and 
avoid duplications 
• Address need for a rapid 
professionalization of the sector and of 
the logistics function  
• Increase investments in disaster 
preparedness 
• Address underinvestment in 
infrastructure 
• Broaden the donor base: 
Business/CSO partnerships 
• Temporary Supply Network & 
Logistics Coordination Platform 
• Logistics Coordination Platform  
 
• Business/CSO partnerships 
 
 
• Business/CSO partnerships 
 
• Business/CSO partnerships 
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The scope of this research is limited. First, this study provides an overview of the 
humanitarian supply chains only during emergency relief operations. However, many 
humanitarian organizations are involved in development operations. Indeed, development 
and prevention activities often constitute the bulk of a humanitarian organization’s 
activities and tie up a larger portion of their financial and human resources.  
By focusing mainly on partnerships, this thesis does not map the state of humanitarian 
preparedness in terms of existing capacity and systems.  Likewise, it does not explore the 
impact of politics, insecurity, health hazards, cultural sensibilities and technologically 
appropriateness on the response capability of humanitarian organizations. 
Similarly, by taking an overall view, the thesis does not provide any detailed information 
on the capability gap of individual organizations. It does not propose a blueprint, an 
organizational enhancement work-plan with a related timeline with a view to level out the 
existing differences between the preparedness and response ability of individual 
organizations. Also, it does not explore the opinion of key actors, such as beneficiary 
governments and end beneficiaries, on the preparedness and response performance and 
capability of humanitarian organizations. 
This thesis does not explore the impact of humanitarian supply chains on economic 
development targets such as crowding out of domestic suppliers and/or creating domestic 
markets dependent on serving it.  
The thesis is written mainly from the perspective of humanitarian organizations part of the 
UN and Red Cross Movement. The perspective of humanitarian organizations part of the 
NGO community is not adequately incorporated. Lastly, this thesis discusses only one of 
the existing coordination mechanisms, the UNJLC, without attempting a critical analysis 
of the other coordination tools and mechanisms.  
As stated throughout this thesis, humanitarian organizations are differentially endowed 
with capabilities and resources and depend on the active contribution and cooperation of a 
range of players to stage their response. Because of the non-hierarchical, collaborative and 
voluntary nature of the humanitarian supply network, uncertainty prevails around the 
when, if, and level of such cooperation. In this research, we advance that social capital can 
help mitigate the uncertainties related to the if and level of cooperation and contribution. 
We argue that a humanitarian organization’s social capital is the intangible resource that 
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allows it to gain access and leverage the resources and capabilities available within its 
supply network. It follows that since humanitarian organizations dispose of different levels 
of social capital, their ability to access and leverage resources and capabilities within their 
supply network differs.  
However, despite a humanitarian organization’s social capital, its performance can still 
vary substantially from emergency to emergency. This is because it lacks control over key 
nodes of its emergency supply chain. Therefore, in addition to a humanitarian 
organization’s social capital, there are some exogenous, external factors beyond the control 
and influence of a humanitarian organization that influence supply chain performance. 
Although the elimination of supply network contribution variability is beyond 
humanitarian organizations, the topic is worth investigating.  
All things being equal in terms of disaster management capability of a humanitarian 
organization, it appears that the performance of each and every network actor in terms of 
accuracy and speed of response matters.  More specifically, the speed and accuracy in 
which the media cover a disaster, donors provide funds, the recipient government asks for 
international assistance, suppliers deliver goods to the disaster site, the implementing 
partners distribute relief items and recipient country, neighboring country(s) and military 
cooperate may determine the effectiveness of emergency operations. It follows that the 
capability, capacity and willingness of each actor to contribute to a disaster can impact the 
performance of a humanitarian organization. 
It is worth noting that the actors part of the humanitarian supply chain do not operate in a 
vacuum or in isolation from each other. Therefore, the combined support and performance 
of the actors can matter. For example, once a sovereign country invites international 
solidarity, the combined speed, duration and level of media coverage as well as donor 
community, recipient country, neighboring country(s) and the military contribution and 
collaboration define the reach and scope of the humanitarian community’s operations. 
Similarly, the goods mobilization effort depends largely on the response capability of 
donors and suppliers. The amount of donor pledges and the speed in which donors honor 
their pledges are the propelling forces, the fuel of an accurate and timely activation of the 
supplier network and ultimately response. However, the speed in which relief items are 
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mobilized and distributed does not only depend on donor funding but may also depend on 
the response capacities and capabilities of supplier and implementing partners.  
As independent entities, the actors composing the humanitarian supply network each have 
their own mission, vision, objectives and priorities. Their willingness to contribute to a 
disaster may not necessarily be in function of the size and gravity of the disaster.   For 
example, media coverage varies from emergency to emergency. “Creeping” crises such as 
famine or health emergencies tend to obtain less airtime than highly visible natural 
disasters such as hurricanes and earthquakes. Indeed, the geography, origin of populations 
afflicted and timing of a disaster rather than the sheer size and urgency of an emergency 
seem to influence and drive the intensity and duration of media coverage. Similarly, the 
level and speed of donor support varies from emergency to emergency. Often donor 
support is not positively correlated to the magnitude or gravity of a disaster but by political 
and budgetary considerations (Samii & Van Wassenhove, 2006). As a result, compared to 
natural disasters, “creeping” crises often remain under-subscribed.  
In addition, there may be a correlation between the actions of the various actors. If so, each 
node in the supply chain can directly and indirectly affect the performance of other 
members. The intensity and accuracy of support and response of some actors may 
accelerate or delay, increase or decrease the response of other actors. For example, national 
and international media coverage and pressure may directly or indirectly influence the 
speed and accuracy of response of donors, military forces, the recipient country and other 
governments. Extensive media coverage can attract donor and public attention and drive 
the funding potential of an emergency. Media coverage and pressure may also affect the 
level of government or military contribution and collaboration. Donor pressure can 
accelerate or delay recipient government request for assistance.   
In conclusion, similar to commercial supply chain, the performance of each network actor, 
in isolation and in combination with other actors, affects the performance of the 
humanitarian emergency supply chain. What appears to be different in humanitarian 
supply networks is that supply of relief items is not necessarily driven by demand, but 
other factors. As such, not only the concerned humanitarian organization or the 
beneficiaries have the power to shape supply but all the other actors in the supply network 
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can positively and negatively affect the flow of goods, services, people and information by 
exercising pressure on others.   
The impact of the humanitarian response network on emergency response and the study of 
interdependencies between actors, activities, and resources call for an in-depth survey. For 
example, it would be interesting to explore the positive or negative correlation between the 
actions of the various forces in terms of level, duration, timing and quality of support. 
Similarly, it would be interesting to verify whether the speed and duration of support is in 
function of objective parameters such as size and level of urgency or subjective parameters 
such as the nature, timing and location of a disaster. It is equally important to study the 
motivational parameters of each partner. A survey among the actors and a large number of 
humanitarian organizations is a more indicated investigation and validation methodology 
than the case study methodology and as such is left for future research.   
In terms of future research areas, it would be of interest to conduct in-depth research on the 
first component of disaster management, namely disaster preparedness. It would also be 
important to identify the pros and cons of coordination versus integration, centralization of 
common functions such as logistics among humanitarian organizations. The impact of 
group size and diversity on coordination and cooperation is also worthy of study. As 
humanitarian partnerships are here to stay, research on how to improve their impact, 
especially those with business, is worth exploring. In addition, as far as business/CSO-
humanitarian partnerships are concerned, issues such as sustainability of assistance are 
key. 
Academia does not have a monopoly over knowledge creation but it has a comparative 
advantage. As a member of the CSO community, we argue that it has a social obligation to 
expand its research and educational agenda with a view to cover the needs of the 
humanitarian community. By applying and channeling some of its resources and attention 
to the humanitarian cause, it can advance the state of knowledge and practice in disaster 
management. Through research and its divulgation, academia can intervene at the four 
levels. It can i) help create awareness around the challenges of the humanitarian 
community, furthering its cause, ii) develop knowledge and teaching material, iii) design 
and conduct tailored training courses, and iv) become a source of talents for the sector. 
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Appendix A – Overview of Humanitarian Organizations  
 
 
This Appendix aims to introduce the reader to the structures and concepts relevant to the 
humanitarian community. Section A.1 defines the concept of “humanitarian space”. This is 
followed by a brief description of the humanitarian constellation in terms of major 
humanitarian actors, structures and their sources of funding. 
A.1   “The Humanitarian Space” 
Humanitarian organizations operate in accordance with the principles of humanity, 
neutrality and impartiality. Humanity ensures that human dignity is restored and suffering 
relieved wherever founded. Neutrality demands for relief to be provided to the needy 
without bias or affiliation to one party or the other. Impartiality implies that assistance is 
extended without discrimination and proportionally to the most urgent needs and segments 
of the population.  The principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality are the building 
blocks of “the humanitarian space” (Figure A.1). 
 
Figure A.1 – Humanitarian Space 
 
 
The founder of the Red Cross Movement, Henri Dunant, was also the father of the 
humanitarian space concept (ECHO, 2003). The driving force behind the first Geneva 
Convention, he worked towards the indiscriminate treatment of victims of war by ensuring 
Neutrality Impartiality 
Humanity 
Humanitarian Space 
Source: Tomasini & Van Wassenhove, 2004b 
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an inviolable space for medical personnel that operated under an identifiable symbol: the 
Red Cross or Red Crescent emblem. The Geneva Convention, apart from protecting 
humanitarian operations from attack, aims to clear humanitarian space from interference 
and exploitation by combating forces.   
To ensure the prompt and effective delivery of relief to victims of conflicts, combatant 
forces are expected to respect humanitarian space. There are times, however, when 
authorities refuse humanitarian organizations access to the victims. During intense 
fighting, humanitarian organizations themselves abandon the emergency scene as a 
security measure. 
While combatant forces need to grant humanitarian operators full and secure access to the 
distressed, to safeguard their space, humanitarian organizations are responsible to 
distinguish themselves from fighting forces. Although humanitarian space is protected by 
international law, humanitarian organizations are its guardian and defender. They also have 
an important role in reinforcing the concept in unfriendly, hostile and uninformed 
environments. This is typically achieved by providing relief repeatedly and continuously in 
line with humanitarian principles to those in need regardless of identity and location 
(Kellenberger, 2003).  
Humanitarian assistance is complex in conflict situations. While the neutral and impartial 
humanitarian action is irreplaceable, humanitarian organizations recognize the role 
governments and military play in assisting and protecting vulnerable people during times 
of war (Kellenberger, 2003). Their reconstruction role in post-conflict situations is equally 
acknowledged. This overlap begs for a clear distinction between humanitarian and military 
activities, lack of which can undermine the effectiveness of humanitarian aid and put at 
risk the security of humanitarian staff.  
To address the need for cooperation with the military and more specifically the use of 
Military and Civil Defense Assets (MCDAs), the humanitarian community has a set of 
guidelines. These guidelines are particularly relevant during conflicts and post-conflict 
situations. They underline the importance of separating humanitarian aid from policy and 
military interests. Concurrently, they recognize the role the military and UN peacekeeping 
forces can play in restoring security for humanitarian operations. 
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A.2   The Humanitarian Constellation 
The humanitarian sector is a fragmented and crowded one with a predominant oligopolistic 
structure both on the demand and supply side (Binder & Witte, 2007). On the demand side, 
it is composed of few major relief agencies in the UN and International Organization 
community, a small number of large Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) and a large 
number of small NGOs. While for each major disaster, new NGOs are created, 
governments are involved as either donors or recipients.  
 
A.2.1   Humanitarian Organizations 
Humanitarian crises leave the affected populations in need of food, medicine, and shelter. 
To respond to the staggering needs of the afflicted populations, over decades, the 
international community has created a number of organizations; UN programs/funds, 
entities and specialized agencies; and NGOs. The following paragraphs will provide a brief 
overview of the typologies of humanitarian organizations. 
International Organizations. The oldest international humanitarian organization is the 
International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC). Established in 1863, ICRC’s mission is to 
protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide 
assistance. ICRC is one of the three independent bodies that compose the International Red 
Cross and Crescent Movement. The other two bodies are the National Societies (NSs) and 
the IFRC. 
NSs, approved by ICRC, are independent bodies that act as auxiliaries to their respective 
governments. Almost 60% of their funding comes from their respective governments and 
the remaining 40% from income-generating activities and private donations. Their services 
include disaster relief, health and social programs and assistance to people affected by war. 
By the end of 2006 there were 185 NSs; almost one in every country in the world.   
The IFRC was established in Paris in 1919. Its founding members were the British, French, 
Italian, Japanese and American NSs. Today the NSs cover 50% of IFRC’s operational 
budget. IFRC, as the representative of its NSs, directs and coordinates international 
assistance of the Red Cross Movement to victims of disaster, refugees and in health 
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emergencies. It provides support to its NSs by launching international appeals, mobilizing 
goods and personnel, and coordinating the relief operation of the network.  
Apart from the ICRC and IFRC, there are a number of other humanitarian organizations 
with international status. The most prominent one is the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM), the leading international organization working with migrants and 
governments to provide humane responses to migration issues. 
The UN Family. There are four major operational organizations within the UN that focus 
on the different needs and aspects of disasters and humanitarian crises. To protect the most 
defenseless segment of the population, i.e. children, UNICEF, established as early as 1946 
as a special fund of the UN, helps meet the basic needs of children, protecting their rights 
and expanding their opportunities. To safeguard the rights and well-being of another 
category of vulnerable people, i.e. refugees, in 1950 the UN establishes the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). As the leading and coordinating institution on 
refugee matters, UNHCR has the mandate to resolve refugee problems worldwide. To 
address global hunger and food imbalances worldwide, in 1963 the UN sets up the World 
Food Programme (WFP). Given the importance of health and the regular occurrence of 
health emergencies, in 1948, the World Health Organization (WHO) is established. WHO, 
a specialized agency within the UN family, is the frontline agency during all health 
emergencies such as HIV/AIDS as well as outbreak of diseases in their aftermath. 
To strengthen and coordinate its response to both natural disasters and complex 
emergencies that involve refugees, Internally Displace Peoples (IDPs) and combatant 
forces, in 1991, the UN establishes the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA).  Based in Geneva and New York, OCHA is a non-operational 
organization which is headed by the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC). The ERC 
reports on humanitarian affairs directly to the UN Secretary-General (SG). 
OCHA provides a number of common services to the humanitarian community. It is the 
secretariat for the following four coordination mechanisms and tools: the Consolidated 
Appeal Process (CAP), the Central Emergency Relief Fund (CERF), the United Nations 
Disaster Assessment Coordination teams (UNDAC), the Humanitarian Information Centre 
(HIC), and the Military and Civil Defense Unit (MCDU) (Figure A.2). 
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Figure A.2 – Humanitarian Coordination Mechanisms 
Coordination Mechanism Objective Housed  
CERF Stand-by disaster response funds OCHA 
CAP Funds mobilization OCHA 
UNDAC Disaster needs assessment OCHA 
HIC Information OCHA 
MCDU Civil military coordination OCHA 
UNJLC Humanitarian logistics WFP 
 
The Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) is a stand-by $500 million fund set up for 
rapid response and under-funded emergencies. It complements funds raised through the 
CAP. Through the CAP, OCHA, on behalf of the humanitarian organizations and the 
recipient government(s), leads and coordinates the mobilization of resources from the 
international community of donors. To prepare a consolidated appeal, it fields UNDAC 
teams. UNDAC, a standby resource deployed upon the request of the disaster-stricken 
country, conducts a rapid needs assessment exercise with a view to estimate the cost of a 
collective relief operation. As humanitarian response depends as much on timely 
information as it does on assets, to ensure availability of information throughout a crisis, it 
activates the HIC. Depending on the nature of the disaster and the need for military and 
civil defense assets, OCHA’s MCDU sets policies for Civil Military Coordination 
(CMCoord) services. 
In terms of logistics capability, humanitarian organizations have unequal strengths. There 
are agencies with good logistics capabilities and sufficient financing for their activities and 
those with limited logistics resources, competency and a relatively small pool of core 
logistics staff.  This together with the complexity of more recent humanitarian crises has 
led to the unbundling of logistics from generic coordination and the institutionalization, in 
2002, of the UN Joint Logistics Center (UNJLC). The UNJLC, an inter-agency logistics 
coordination platform hosted by WFP, aims to complement and coordinate the logistics 
capabilities of cooperating humanitarian organizations during large-scale disasters. 
The NGO Community. The humanitarian and development NGO community is a very 
large and diverse group in terms of size, visibility, area of focus, religious affiliation, 
country of origin, etc. Oxfam, CARE, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and World Vision 
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are among the most renowned ones. Oxfam (the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief) is a 
development, relief and campaigning organization dedicated to finding lasting solutions to 
poverty and suffering around the world. CARE (the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief 
Everywhere) is dedicated to fight global poverty. MSF is an independent humanitarian 
medical aid agency that provides medical aid wherever needed and raises awareness of the 
plight of people assisted. World Vision is a Christian relief and development organization 
working for the well being of all people, with particular emphasis on children. 
Given the number and diversity of the NGO community, the sector is represented by three 
consortia notably, InterAction, International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) and 
the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR). InterAction is a 160-member 
US-based international development and humanitarian NGO coalition that aims to promote 
human dignity and development in 165 countries around the world. It members include 
CARE, Mercy Corps, Save the Children, Refugees International, World Vision and the US 
subsidiaries of NGOs like Oxfam and MSF (Doctors of the World). The ICVA, a Geneva-
based organization founded in 1962, is a global network of more than 70 human rights, 
humanitarian and development NGOs. Its members include organizations such as CARE, 
CARITAS, ICRC, IFRC, InterAction, MSF, Norwegian Refugee Council, Oxfam UK, 
Salvation Army and World Vision International. The SCHR is an alliance for voluntary 
action of CARE International, Caritas International, ICRC, IFRC, International Save the 
Children Alliance, the Lutheran World Federation, MSF International, Oxfam 
International, and World Council of Churches. 
 
A.2.2   Policy Making Organ of the Humanitarian Community 
Soon after the creation of OCHA, the humanitarian community establishes its policy 
making organ, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). IASC, chaired by the 
Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), has as full members the executive heads of eight 
UN organizations. The standing invitees include the executive heads of three other UN 
organs, three international organizations and the three NGO consortia. Apart from OCHA, 
UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP and WHO, the other UN entities part of IASC are: the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Population Fund 
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(UNFPA), the Office of the United Nations for Human Rights (OHCHR), the World Bank, 
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the Office of the Special Representative 
to the Secretary General on Internally Displaced People (IDP). The three NGO consortia 
representing up to 200 NGOs are InterAction, ICVA and SCHR. The three international 
organizations are IFRC, ICRC and IOM. As represented in Figure A.3, the full members of 
IASC are in bold. 
 
Figure A.3 – IASC’s Full Members and Standing Invitees 
 
 
At the field level, the ERC on behalf of the UN Secretary-General (SG) and after 
consultation with the IASC designates a Humanitarian Coordinator (HC).  The HC who is 
also the in-country head of a designated lead agency (typically the UNDP representative) 
is responsible for coordinating the operational and strategic activities of the UN 
organizations throughout a humanitarian emergency. 
The ERC, in consultation with the IASC, provides the overall guidance for a particular 
complex emergency including parameters for the use of Military and Civil Defense Assets 
(MCDAs) and resources in support of UN humanitarian activities. To protect humanitarian 
space and to ensure a clear distinction between humanitarian and military operations, the 
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use of MCDAs for humanitarian purposes is regulated by a six-point guideline that 
emphasizes its temporary, extraordinary and limited nature (OCHA, 2003). The HC is the 
authority that initiates the request for the use of military and civil defense resources in the 
field within the parameters set by the ERC. S/he initiates the process only upon the request 
and consent of the affected country.  
OCHA’s MCDU, activated by the ERC upon the recommendation/decision of the IASC, 
ensures the most efficient use of MCDAs by the humanitarian organizations. The MCDU 
serves as the UN focal point for governments, international organizations and military and 
civil defense establishments. As such, it facilitates the relationship between the 
humanitarian and military components of a relief operation.  
 
Figure A.4 – Relationship between IASC, Non-Operational and Operational Entities 
 
 
To address logistics-related issues in large scale and complex emergencies, the IASC has 
the prerogative to activate the UNJLC. While the IASC is the organ that decides on its 
deployment, the HC is responsible for overseeing its operations through supervision of its 
Chief. If a UNJLC is activated, MCDU coordinates with and supports those logistics 
initiatives and services of the UNJLC that depend on MCDAs. Likewise, MCDU assists 
HIC and UNJLC in obtaining relevant information from the military (Figure A.4). 
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A.2.3   Donors 
On the supply side, the donor community is composed of governments and their 
institutions, citizens and corporations. The IFRC estimates global humanitarian assistance 
to total at least US$ 10 billion a year (IFRC, 2004). Figures complied by OCHA on the 
basis of information provided by donors and appealing organizations offer an indication on 
the origin of humanitarian contributions (Figure A.5). Figure A.6 shows the sectoral 
distribution of the 2007 contribution as complied by OCHA. 
 
Figure A.5 – Global Humanitarian Contributions, 2007 
Donor % of Total 
13 European Countries * 38.7 
US 24.4 
European Institutions 14.9 
Allocations of un-earmarked funds by the UN 4.0 
Canada 3.6 
Japan 2.8 
Saudi Arabia 2.8 
Private 2.0 
Others 6.8 
Total 100.0 
* UK, Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, France, Finland, Ireland, Spain, Belgium 
and Italy.        Source: http://www.reliefweb.int.fts (July 2008) 
 
Figure A.6 – Global Humanitarian Contributions 2007: Totals per Sector 
Sector % of Total 
Multi-sector 27.7 
Food 27.4 
Sector not yet specified 9.0 
Health 9.0 
Coordination and support services 7.0 
Agriculture 5.3 
Family Shelter and Non Food Items (NFIs) 3.5 
Economic recovery 3.1 
Water and Sanitation 2.8 
Other 5.2 
Total 100.0 
  Source: http://www.reliefweb.int.fts (July 2008) 
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In 2007, bilateral and multilateral European aid accounted for more than 53% of such 
contributions. Among inter-governmental organizations, the EU, through the European 
Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), is the largest single donor. ECHO’s mandate is 
to provide emergency assistance and relief to the victims of natural disasters or armed 
conflict outside the EU. USAID and DFID are the bilateral institutions through which the 
US and UK channel most of their funding to humanitarian organizations.  
The amount of resources raised by each organization determines the size and scope of their 
operations. Figure A.7 provides an overview of the resources mobilized by a sample of 
organizations in the UN, international and NGO community. 
 
Figure A.7 – Funds Raised by Select Humanitarian Organizations, 2007/2006 
Organizations Resources 
(in millions of US$) 
UNICEF 2,768  
WFP 2,705  
World Vision International 2,220  
UNHCR 1,268 
IFRC 412 
 Source: 2007 Annual Reports of respective organizations. 2006 Annual Report of UNICEF & IFRC 
 
As far as the source of contributions is concerned, in 2007, the US accounted for almost 
half of WFP’s budgetary resources. Moreover, 69% of its total funds originated from just 
10 governments. Similarly, the top 10 government donors accounted for 70% of the 
contributions received by UNHCR, with the US accounting for almost 30% of it. The 
situation is slightly more balanced at UNICEF. In 2006, the organization depended on 10 
countries for 48% of its resources. Figure A.8 provides an overview of WFP, UNHCR and 
UNICEF top 10 donors.  
In 2007, private sector contributions to UNHCR represented a very small fraction of total 
resources mobilized (USD 34.1 million). Those to WFP were around 2% while NGO and 
private sector contribution accounted for 31% of resources mobilized by UNICEF (2006). 
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Figure A.8 – WFP, UNHCR and UNICEF Top 10 Donors 
WFP's Top 10 Government Donors, 2007
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Source: UNHCR & WFP 2007 Annual Reports, UNICEF 2006 Annual Report 
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Appendix B - Acronyms of Organizations and Facilities 
 
ASOC Aviation Support Operations Centre operated by UNOPS. 
DAB Da Afghanistan Bank. 
Canadem Canadem is a roster of Canadians skilled in human rights, peace building, 
democratisation, administration-logistics, security, reconstruction, etc. It 
serves as a civilian stand-by mechanism for the UN and other 
international agencies conducting field operations.  
CARE Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere is dedicated to 
fighting global poverty. 
CJCMOTF Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force was set up as a 
coordinating body between UN Agencies, ISAF and NGOs 
CHLC Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Centres were the civil affairs arm of the 
Coalition. 
DFID Department for International Development is the UK government 
department responsible for promoting development and the reduction of 
poverty. 
DPKO Department of Peace-Keeping Operations, UN. 
ECHO European Community Humanitarian Aid Office’s mandate is to provide 
emergency assistance and relief to the victims of natural disasters or 
armed conflict outside the European Union. 
FAO Established in 1945, the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization has the 
mandate to raise levels of nutrition and standards of living, improve 
agricultural productivity, and better the condition of rural populations. 
GTZ The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) is an 
international cooperation enterprise for sustainable development with 
worldwide operations. In acute emergencies, such as natural disasters, it 
implements emergency aid and refugee programs. 
IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee is composed of UN humanitarian 
agencies and representatives of 200-250 humanitarian NGOs. 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization aims to ensure the safe and 
orderly growth of international civil aviation throughout the world. 
ICRC Established in 1863, the International Committee of Red Cross’s mission 
is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence 
and to provide them with assistance. 
IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent’s mission is to 
improve the lives of vulnerable people by mobilising the power of 
humanity. It focuses on four core areas: promoting humanitarian values, 
disaster response, disaster preparedness, and health and community care. 
INGC National Institute for Disaster Management of Mozambique. Set up in 
1999, this oversight institution attached to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Cooperation, Mozambique, has the mandate to manage, 
develop mitigation policy, prepare for and coordinate disasters. 
458
APPENDIX B – ACRONYMS OF ORGANIZATIONS AND FACILITIES 
 
 
 
458
IOM International Organization for Migration is the leading international 
organisation working with migrants and governments to provide humane 
responses to migration challenges. 
ISAF The establishment of the UN International Security Assistance Force was 
part of the Bonn Agreement (December 5, 2001) in support of the 
Afghan Interim Government. ISAF was mandated to assist in 
maintaining security for Kabul and its surrounding areas until the 
constitution and functioning of a new Afghan security and armed forces.  
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency extends technical assistance for 
national development and human resources development as a part of 
Japan’s Official Development Assistance programmes. 
MPW The Afghan Ministry of Public Works. 
 
MRRD The Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development. 
 
MSF Médecins Sans Frontières is an independent humanitarian medical aid 
agency committed to two objectives: providing medical aid wherever 
needed and raising awareness of the plight of people assisted. 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization signed in 1949 created an alliance of 
12 countries committed to each other’s defence. By 1999 it had 19 
member countries. Together with non-member countries and other 
international organisations it is involved in peacekeeping and crisis 
management tasks. 
NS IFRC’s National Societies 
OCHA United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
mobilizes and coordinates the efforts of the international community to 
meet the needs of those exposed to human suffering in disasters and 
emergencies. OCHA is a Geneva-based, non-operational UN agency that 
reports to the UN Secretary General. It coordinates the launch of a 
consolidated emergency appeal among the donor community, liaises 
between local governments and humanitarian agencies and provides a 
number of common services to the humanitarian community. The major 
ones include setting policies for Civil Military Coordination (CMCoord) 
services, the United Nations Disaster Assessment Coordination team 
(UNDAC) and the Humanitarian Information Center (HIC).  
OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance of USAID. 
Oxfam Oxford Committee for Famine Relief is a development, relief, and 
campaigning organisation dedicated to finding lasting solutions to 
poverty and suffering around the world. 
SHA Swiss Humanitarian Aid is an instrument of the Humanitarian Aid of the 
Swiss Confederation for direct activities and in support of international 
organisations through secondment. 
SIDA The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency is the 
Swedish government agency for bilateral international development 
cooperation. 
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UNAMA In late March 2002, UN New York established and funded the United 
Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA) as a means to 
assist the interim government. As a result all UN activities had to be 
coordinated through UNAMA. Consequently, the UNJLC technically 
became part of one of UNAMA’s pillars, the one dealing with 
humanitarian issues.  
UNDAC The UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance’s (OCHA) 
Disaster Assessment Coordination team (UNDAC) is a rapid response 
tool (members arrive quickly and stay no longer than two weeks) 
deployed for “sudden onset of natural disaster”. Its mandate consists of 
the preparation of a consolidated appeal for the emergency on behalf of 
the government and UN humanitarian organisations (Inter-Agency) for 
donor funding.  
UNDP United Nations Development Programme is the UN's principal provider 
of development advice, advocacy and grant support. It has six priority 
practice areas: Democratic governance, poverty reduction, crisis 
prevention and recovery, energy and environment, IT and 
communications, and HIV/AIDS. 
UNFPA The United Nations Populations Fund is dedicated to improving access to 
and the quality of reproductive health care, upon request of developing 
countries. 
UNHAS The UN Humanitarian Air Service was operated by WFP. 
UNHCR Established in 1950, the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees is dedicated to leading and coordinating international action to 
safeguard the rights and well being of refugees worldwide. 
UNICEF Established in 1946, the United Nations Childrens' Fund advocates the 
protection of children's rights, helps them meet their basic needs and 
expands their opportunities to reach their full potential. 
UNMNF UN mandated Multi-National Peacekeeping (Military) Force deployed 
for the Eastern Zaire emergency. 
UNOPS The United Nations Office of Project Services is an arm of the United 
Nations that provides project-management services in every field where 
the UN has a mandate. 
USAID United States Agency for International Development is an independent 
government agency that conducts foreign assistance and humanitarian aid 
to advance the political and economic interests of the United States. 
WFP Set up in 1963, World Food Programme is the United Nations' frontline 
agency in the fight against global hunger.  
WHO Established in 1948, World Health Organization is the UN Agency 
dedicated to attaining the highest levels of health for all people. 
World Vision A Christian relief and development organisation working for the well 
being of all people, especially children. 
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Appendix C - Functions Interviews at each Site 
 
 
Chapter 6 - IFRC 
• Head of Logistics and Resource Mobilization department 
• Head of the Resource Mobilization Unit 
• Head of Fleet Logistics Unit 
• FACT officer 
• Field Logistics Officer 
• Operations Manager 
• India Desk Officer 
 
Chapter 7 - UNJLC 
• Head of UNJLC 
• Head of UNJLC Core Unit 
• Iraq Operations Coordinator 
• Head of UNJLC Mozambique 
• Regional Coordination for the Afghan UNJLC  
• Head of UNJLC Kabul 
• UNJLC Field Coordinator 
• Members of the Fuel team 
• Head of Fuel Planning Unit 
• UNJLC liaison person in NY  
Donors 
• NGO/International Organization Coordinator of ODFA, USAID 
• Director of the Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department, DFID 
Other Humanitarian Organizations 
• Chief of the Office for Coordination of Normative Operational and Decentralized 
Activities, FAO 
• Logistics Officer, IFRC 
• Deputy Chief, Military, Civil Defence and Logistics Section, OCHA 
• Emergency Officer, OCHA 
• Director, Supply Management Service, UNHCR 
• Head Field Logistics Support Unit, UNHCR 
• UNHCR Officer seconded to UNJLC Core Unit 
• Head of Operations Unit, IOM 
• Deputy Head of Logistics Division, ICRC 
• Emergency and Field Logistics Officer, UNICEF 
• UNICEF Officer seconded to the UNJLC Core Unit 
• Technical Officer, WHO 
External Organizations 
• Members of the independent evaluation team 
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Chapter 8 - WFP 
 
WFP 
• Chief of Staff 
• Deputy Executive Director 
• Director, Office of Budget 
• Budget Officer 
• Director, Transport & Logistics 
• Chief of Logistics 
• Head of Emergency Response Unit (ALITE) 
• Emergency Officer, ALITE 
• Program Officer, Surface Transport Services 
• Chief Logistics Officer 
• Logistics Officer 
• Head of International Staff Management and Recruitment Unit 
• Donor Relations Officer 
• Managers of the School Feeding Program 
TNT 
• Director of the TNT Moving the World Programme, TNT 
• Logistics Initiative Sponsor, TNT 
• Fund Raising Initiative Sponsor, INT 
• School Feeding Initiative, Corporate Communication Sponsor, TNT 
• Emergency Response Initiative Sponsor, TNT 
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SUMMARY IN ENGLISH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The supply chain management literature, although extensive, has focused almost 
exclusively on commercial operations. Little research has been conducted on humanitarian 
supply chains. An understanding of humanitarian supply chains is important given the 
increasing number of disasters and their impact on the livelihood of millions of people 
each year. By drawing and building upon four streams of literature – network theory, 
coordination theory, the resource-based view of the firm and social capital theory – as well 
as the case study methodology, this thesis aims to fill this gap.  
To master disaster management and ensure the arrival of the right goods as fast as possible 
to the disaster areas, humanitarian organizations have to excel in disaster preparedness and 
response. To tackle preparedness and response challenges related to their supply chains, 
this thesis advances that humanitarian organizations rely on a range of partnership 
arrangements.  
In terms of response, in order to bridge their resource and capability gap, humanitarian 
organizations call upon the contribution and resources of their response network. Seven 
actors compose a humanitarian response network. These actors are the media, donors, 
receiving government(s), military, neighboring governments, suppliers and implementing 
partners.  
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Humanitarian organizations respond to an increasing number of unpredictable and 
competing large scale disasters often in less developed countries of the world where the 
infrastructure is limited, depilated or destroyed. To pre-empt a range of potential failure 
modes, humanitarian organizations first resort to a series of agency-specific measures. To 
deal with a range of common and recurrent disaster-specific logistics dependencies and in 
order to avoid duplications, the humanitarian community resorts to a logistics coordination 
platform. To improve the performance of operational humanitarian organizations, through 
a number of coordination mechanisms, the logistics coordination platform ensures inter- 
and extra-organizational coordination.  
The third type of partnership sought by humanitarian organizations with impact on disaster 
management is that with civil society organizations (CSOs) and the private sector. CSOs 
and business can contribute with their resources during disaster response. Moreover, 
humanitarian organizations have limited resources to invest in the strengthening of their 
organizations. Business and CSOs with their specialized resources can enhance the 
resources and capabilities of humanitarian organizations.   
This thesis identifies four different business/CSO-humanitarian partnership possibilities: 
strategic, cross-cutting, localized and brokered. It then highlights their different risk-to-
benefit profile. Strategic partnerships have short and long-term impact on a humanitarian 
organization’s financial resources, performance and staff morale. There is a need for 
humanitarian organizations engaged in these types of partnerships to protect their 
reputation and brand image and be aware of their level of engagement and reliance on 
corporations given their unstable, uncertain nature. To make sure that private contributions 
are not viewed as a substitute for traditional funding, it is recommended that humanitarian 
organizations seek the approval of their donors.  This research also underscores that not all 
humanitarian organizations can benefit from strategic partnerships. What will determine 
their possibility of engaging in such partnerships is their level of absorptive capacity and 
their ability to come up with the upfront investment required for the successful 
implementation of such partnerships. 
To guide business and humanitarian organizations interested in strategic partnerships, this 
thesis proposes a partnership checklist. Among other things, it argues in favor of well-
motivated partnerships driven by pre-identified objectives and linked to the core 
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competencies and values of the corporation. It stresses the importance of pursuing a 
medium to a long-term partnership without loosing sight of its implementation 
implications. 
Our research suggests that disaster response is deeply embedded in networks and in the 
structure of network relations.  We identify both forms of social capital, bonding and 
bridging, as drivers behind the participation of different actors to humanitarian disasters. 
We argue that bonding social capital among humanitarian organizations contributes to 
successful inter-organizational coordination. Bridging social capital helps enhance 
resources and capabilities at the organizational level and resolve dependencies and avoid 
duplications at the community level. Since we identify the ability of humanitarian 
organizations to build and exploit social capital as the differentiating factor in their 
performance, we derive two recommendations. First, humanitarian organizations, directly 
and through their logistics coordination platform, should devote time and effort to build 
and strengthen the level of social capital among them in-between and during disasters. 
Second, in order to enhance their resource and capabilities, humanitarian organizations 
should build long-term relationships with parties committed to the humanitarian cause in 
possession of core competencies that match their requirements. 
The thesis holds some lessons for humanitarian organizations. By differentiating between 
unpredictable and predictable disasters, it argues that humanitarian organizations should 
pursue and excel in two distinct strategies: efficient and agile supply chains. More 
specifically, for predictable disasters humanitarian organizations should manage efficient 
supply chains. For unpredictable disasters, humanitarian supply chains need to be agile, 
that is, responsive to demand and hedged against any supply shortages. It also argues that 
humanitarian organizations can improve their supply chain management capabilities by 
learning from the errors and successes of business, adopting adequate supply chain 
solutions and making a more extensive use of IT. 
This thesis argues that humanitarian organizations manage global, multiple, temporary and 
dynamic supply chains. In terms of supply chain strategies, we have observed that during 
unpredictable disasters, in order to mobilize and transport relief items, humanitarian 
organizations need to construct broad and loose emergency supply networks. This is 
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explained by the fact that a broad network of multiple and geographically dispersed, 
interchangeable and complementary suppliers renders the emergency supply chain more 
resilient to failure modes impacting performance. 
Humanitarian organizations mount and manage non-routine supply chains while 
commercial supply chains are designed for repetitious, routine operations. It follows that 
business calls upon supply chain mitigation measures in extraordinary circumstances. In 
light of the above, it is argued that structured cooperation between firms as well as those 
between firms and key stakeholders such as government authorities can assist business 
overcome infrastructural deficiencies and emergencies. More specifically, they can assist 
firms i) overcome an infrastructure gap, ii) contrast temporary logistics failure modes 
caused by natural and man-made disasters and iii) engage in a constructive dialogue with 
government agencies in control of public goods.  
Indeed, apart from achieving inter-firm coordination, an institutionalized emergency 
response coordination platform established by industry leaders can be an effective 
response mechanism to eventual disruptive government actions. It can also be useful for 
those one-off supply chain initiatives with permanent impact on the global supply chains 
that require the coordinated and active participation of industries, governments and local 
authorities for their design and implementation. 
Our investigation on how humanitarian organizations operationalize their logistics 
coordination platform - the UNJLC - has led to new observations on virtual organizing.  
Indeed, the humanitarian community’s experience has provided empirical evidence for the 
emergence and management of logistics virtual organizations.   
In terms of application of the virtual organizing concept, the experience of the 
humanitarian community demonstrates that virtual organizing can be a winning strategy 
for commercial supply chain management during disasters.  Apart from facilitating the 
exploitation of specific business opportunities, a virtually organized coordination structure 
can help address the challenges of large scale, exceptional events.  It is argued that virtual 
organizing is effective in time sensitive environments that depend on the contribution of 
numerous organizations and government authorities since they enable a good response and 
access to resources available in the community. 
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In terms of design feature, the humanitarian experience highlights the need for a small 
permanent structure in a virtual organization. It discusses the advantages and 
disadvantages of nesting this structure within the setup of a virtual web member. In terms 
of the profile of the most eligible organization, it underscores the importance of nesting the 
permanent structure in a financially and technically strong and credible organization 
capable of addressing issues related to the management and support infrastructure vacuum. 
The analysis of the UNJLC deployments highlights the possibility of quickly activating 
and demobilizing a series of temporary and interlinked antenna offices during the project 
cycle. Such offices allow for the provision of services close to the market as well as 
adaptation of said services to the changing and unexpected needs of the environment and 
clients. In other words, they would increase the potentials of the virtual organization to 
achieve its primary objective and would be valid mitigation measures against supply chain 
failures.  
This thesis advances that for the virtual organizing concept to realize its potential, trust 
needs to prevail among its member and the concept should have a clearly defined mission. 
For cooperation to take place, the members have to set the direction. In this regard, the 
quality of communication and leadership is fundamental. To ensure the achievement of the 
set objective, identification problems associated to virtual organizing have to be overcome.  
At the operational level, it stresses the importance of timely allocation of the right quality 
and quantity of resources, the delivery of demand-driven services, the existence of 
comprehensive reference business processes and a reliable support infrastructure such as 
IT services. 
In terms of drawbacks, the very advantages of virtual organizing – flat organizations, 
temporary and dispersed units – are identified as the source of potential drawbacks.  The 
challenges and opportunities facing the implementation of virtual organizing are also 
discussed. Challenges are mainly related to the novelty and the very nature of the concept - 
dynamic and temporary non-organizations. Decisions regarding the physical location of 
the various components of the virtual organization result in a series of managerial and 
control-related consequences. Lack of resources, undue dependence, irrelevant services, 
misapplication, and mission creep are the other major risks facing the success of concept. 
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Logistics capabilities developed by virtual corporations can result in new market 
opportunities or, if pursued, in temporary mission creep. The humanitarian experience 
highlights the need to plan for an eventual transfer of services provided by the virtual 
corporation still in demand to existing setups. It argues that there is scope for the 
establishment of a dedicated structure that can assist governments and donors on a 
temporary basis during emergencies and their immediate aftermath. It is recommended for 
the structure to be part of the UN’s effort in the recovery phase and as such be funded by 
the donor community.  
In conclusion, this thesis argues that complex and large scale emergencies, time pressure, 
demand and supply uncertainty, resources and capability gaps, logistics failure modes, and 
the need to include smaller humanitarian organizations are positively related to the 
formation of humanitarian partnerships. It advances that well-designed and implemented 
partnerships boost the operations of individual humanitarian organizations on two fronts: 
disaster response and disaster preparedness. In terms of disaster response, partnerships 
allow humanitarian organizations to be more flexible and provide relief items to affected 
populations in faster, more accurately, and cost-effectively. As for disaster preparedness, 
they enable them to better meet the strategic, operational and organizational challenges of 
the future. 
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De supply chain management literatuur is zeer uitgebreid, maar richt zich bijna exclusief 
op commerciële operaties. Weinig onderzoek is gedaan naar humanitaire supply chains. 
Een begrip van humanitaire supply chains is belangrijk, gezien het toenemende aantal 
rampen en noodsituaties en hun impact op de leefomstandigheden van miljoenen mensen 
elk jaar. Gebruikmakend en bouwend op vier stromen van literatuur – netwerk theorie, 
coördinatie theorie, resource-based view of the firm, en social capital theorie – naast case 
study methodologie, richt deze dissertatie zich op het vullen van deze leemte. 
Om rampmanagement te beheersen en om te garanderen dat goederen zo snel mogelijk 
aankomen in het noodgebied, moeten humanitaire organisaties excelleren in het voorbereid 
zijn (preparedness) en het nemen van actie (respons). Deze dissertatie betoogt dat 
humanitaire organisaties steunen op een variëteit van partnerschappen om de hindernissen 
met betrekking tot preparedness en response het hoofd te bieden. 
Om de ruimte tussen benodigde en voorhanden middelen en capaciteiten te overbruggen 
doen humanitaire organisaties een beroep op hun respons netwerk. Een respons netwerk 
bestaat uit zeven actoren: de media, donoren, ontvangende overheden, het leger, 
aangrenzende overheden, toeleveranciers en uitvoerende partners.  
Humanitaire organisaties moeten actie ondernemen voor een groeiend aantal 
onvoorspelbare en onderling concurrerende rampen van grote omvang, vaak in minder 
ontwikkelde landen waar de infrastructuur beperkt of verwoest is. Om mogelijke manieren 
van falen (faalmodi) te voorkomen verlaten humanitaire organisaties zich eerst op een 
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aantal instellingspecifieke maatregelen. De humanitaire gemeenschap leunt op een 
logistiek coördinatie platform, zodat kan worden omgegaan met een aantal veel 
voorkomende, ramp specifieke logistieke afhankelijkheden en duplicaties kunnen worden 
vermeden. Om de prestaties van humanitaire organisaties te verbeteren garandeert het 
logistiek coördinatie platform inter- en extraorganisatorische coördinatie door middel van 
een aantal coördinatie mechanismen. 
Een derde type partnerschap dat wordt aangegaan door humanitaire organisaties is die 
tussen civil society organizations (CSOs) en de private sector. CSOs en commerciële 
bedrijven kunnen met hun middelen bijdragen aan rampbestrijding. Bovendien kunnen ze 
de middelen en capaciteiten van humanitaire organisaties verbeteren. 
Deze dissertatie identificeert vier verschillende commerciële/CSO-humanitaire 
partnerschapsmogelijkheden: strategisch, cross-cutting, localized en brokered. Vervolgens 
worden de bijbehorende risk-to-benefit profielen belicht. Strategische partnerschappen 
hebben een korte en lange termijn impact op de financiële middelen, performance en 
werkmoraal van humanitaire organisaties. Het is daarom belangrijk voor deze organisaties 
om hun reputatie en imago te beschermen en zich ervan bewust te zijn hoe intensief het 
samenwerkingsverband en de afhankelijkheidsrelatie is, gegeven hun onstabiele en 
onzekere natuur. Om zeker te zijn dat private bijdragen geen substituut zijn voor 
traditionele fondsgelden is het aan te raden om goedkeuring te vragen aan donoren. Het 
onderzoek geeft ook aan dat niet alle humanitaire organisties kunnen profiteren van een 
strategisch partnerschap. Belangrijke determinanten hierin zijn het absorptief vermogen en 
het vermogen om investeringen vooraf te doen die noodzakelijk zijn voor succesvolle 
implementatie van dergelijke partnerschappen. 
Om bedrijven en humanitaire organisaties die geïnteresseerd zijn in een strategisch 
partnerschap te begeleiden wordt in deze dissertatie een checklist geboden. Het verdient 
aanbeveling om te streven naar een goed gemotiveerd partnerschap, gedreven door 
vantevoren bepaalde doelstellingen die verbonden zijn met de waarden en 
kerncompetenties van de betrokken organisaties. Benadrukt wordt het belang om de 
implicaties voor implementatie hierbij niet uit het oog te verliezen. 
Het onderzoek suggereeert dat rampbestrijding diep in netwerken en de structuur van 
netwerk relaties is geworteld. Geïdentificeerd worden beide vormen van sociaal kapitaal, 
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bonding en bridging, als drijfveren achter de participatie van verschillende actoren bij 
humanitaire rampen. Beargumenteerd wordt dat bonding van sociaal kapitaal tussen 
humanitaire organisaties bijdraagt aan succesvolle inter-organisatorische coördinatie. 
Bridging van sociaal kapitaal draagt bij aan het verbeteren van beschikbare middelen en 
capaciteiten op organisatorisch niveau, het oplossen van wederzijdse afhankelijkheden en 
het vermijden van duplicaties op gemeenschapsniveau. Aangezien we de bekwaamheid 
van humanitaire organisaties om sociaal kapitaal te ontwikkelen en te gebruiken 
identificeren als een factor die het verschil kan maken als het gaat om prestaties, komen we 
tot twee aanbevelingen. Ten eerste zouden humanitaire organisaties tijd en moeite moeten 
besteden aan het opbouwen en versterken van onderling sociaal kapitaal, zowel direct als 
via het coördinatie platform, zowel tijdens als tussen noodsituaties. Ten tweede, om hun 
middelen en capaciteiten te verbeteren, zouden humanitaire organisaties lange termijn 
relaties moeten opbouwen met partijen die gecommitteerd zijn aan de humanitaire zaak en 
die in het bezit zijn van kerncompetenties die aansluiten bij hun behoefte. 
Deze dissertatie herbergt enige lessen voor humanitaire organisaties. Onderscheid makend 
tussen voorspelbare en onvoorspelbare noodsituaties, zouden humanitaire organisaties 
twee verschillende strategieën moeten nastreven. Voor voorspelbare noodsituaties moeten 
humanitaire organisaties efficiente supply chains managen. Voor onvoorspelbare 
noodsituaties moeten supply chains behendig (‘agile’) zijn, wat betekent dat snel kan 
worden gereageerd op vraag en dat men beschermd is tegen toeleveringstekorten. 
Humanitaire organisaties kunnen hun supply chain management capaciteiten verbeteren 
aan de hand van de fouten en successen van het bedrijfsleven door het adopteren van 
adequate supply chain oplossingen en door extensiever gebruik van IT.  
We beargumenteren dat humanitaire organisaties globale, meervoudige, tijdelijke en 
dynamische supply chains managen. In termen van supply chain strategieën hebben we 
gezien dat gedurende onvoorspelbare rampen humanitaire organisaties brede en losse 
noodhulp supply chains moeten opbouwen om hulpgoederen te mobiliseren en te 
transporteren. Dit kan worden verklaard doordat een breed netwerk van meerdere en 
geografisch verspreide, uitwisselbare en complementaire toeleveranciers de noodhulp 
supply chains meer weerbaar maken tegen faalmodi die de prestatie beïnvloeden.  
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Humanitaire organisaties organiseren en besturen non-routine supply chains, terwijl 
commerciële supply chains zijn ontworpen voor repetitieve routine activiteiten. Het volgt 
dat het bedrijfsleven vraagt om maatregelen om de supply chain te verbeteren in 
buitengewone omstandigheden. In dit licht bepleiten we dat gestructureerde samenwerking 
tussen zowel bedrijven onderling als ook tussen bedrijven en andere belangengroepen, 
zoals overheden, bedrijven kunnen helpen om 1) hiaten in infrastructuur te overbruggen en 
ii) een constructieve dialoog aan te gaan met overheidsinstanties die publieke goederen 
beheren. 
Sterker nog, los van het behalen van coördinatie tussen bedrijven, een geïnstitutionaliseerd 
coördinatie platvorm voor hulpactie gevestigd door industrieleiders kan een effectief 
responsmechanisme zijn tegen mogelijke ontwrichtende overheidsacties. Het kan ook 
bruikbaar zijn in eenmalige supply chain initiatieven met een blijvende impact op globale 
supply chains, welke een gecoördineerde en actieve participatie van industrieën, overheden 
en locale autoriteiten nodig hebben voor hun ontwerp en implementatie.  
Ons onderzoek naar de manier waarop humanitaire organisaties hun logistieke coördinatie 
platform – het UNJLC - operationaliseren heeft geleid tot nieuwe observaties met 
betrekking tot virtuele organisaties. De ervaringen van de humanitaire gemeenschap bieden 
empirisch bewijsmateriaal voor de opkomst van virtuele logistieke organisaties en hun 
management. 
De ervaringen van de humanitaire gemeenschap laten zien dat virtueel organiseren een 
winnende strategie kan zijn voor commerciële supply chains gedurende een ramp. Naast 
het faciliteren van de exploitatie van specifieke business opportunities kan een virtueel 
georganiseerde coördinatie structuur helpen om de uitdagingen van uitzonderlijke 
gebeurtenissen van grote schaal aan te pakken. Beargumenteerd wordt dat virtueel 
organiseren effectief is in tijdsgevoelige omgevingen die afhankelijk zijn van de bijdrage 
van vele organisaties en overheidsinstanties, omdat ze een goede respons mogelijk maken 
en toegang tot middelen die beschikbaar zijn in de gemeenschap.  
In termen van ontwerp benadrukken de humanitaire ervaringen de behoefte aan een kleine 
permanente structuur in een virtuele organisatie. We bespreken de voor- en nadelen van 
het inbedden van deze structuur in een van de virtuele leden. Het is belangrijk dat dit lid 
een financieel en technisch sterke en geloofwaardige organisatie is die de capaciteit heeft 
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om kwesties gerelateerd aan het vacuüm in de management- en 
ondersteuningsinfrastructuur aan te pakken. 
Een analyse van de activiteiten van het UNJLC geeft aan dat het mogelijk is om snel een 
serie van tijdelijke antenne-kantoren op te zetten en weer ongedaan te maken gedurende de 
project cyclus. Zulke kantoren maken het mogelijk om diensten dicht bij de markt aan te 
bieden en ook die diensten indien nodig aan te passen aan veranderende of onverwachte 
behoeften van de omgeving en klanten. In andere woorden, zij zouden het potentieel 
vergroten van de virtuele organisatie om haar primaire doelstelling te behalen en zij 
zouden valide hulpmaatregelen bieden tegen het falen van de supply chain. 
Om het potentieel van het virtuele organisatie concept volledig te benutten stelt deze 
dissertatie dat er voldoende vertrouwen moet zijn tussen haar leden en dat het concept een 
duidelijk gedefinieerde missie moet hebben. Om samenwerking te bewerkstelligen moeten 
de leden samen de richting aangeven. In dit licht is kwaliteit van communicatie en 
leiderschap van essentieel belang. Om de gestelde doelstelling te bewerkstelligen dienen 
de identificatie problemen die worden geassocieerd mat virtueel organiseren te worden 
opgelost. 
Op operationeel niveau is het belangrijk om de middelen op tijd en in de juiste hoeveelheid 
en kwaliteit te distribueren, om vraaggestuurde diensten af te leveren, en om een brede 
referentielijst met bedrijfsprocesses en een betrouwbare ondersteuningsinfrasstructuur te 
hebben. 
Juist de voordelen van virtuele corporaties – platte organisaties, tijdelijke en verspreide 
eenheden – worden geïdentificeerd als bron van potentiële schaduwzijden. De uitdagingen 
en kansen die de implementatie van virtuele organisaties met zich meebrengen worden ook 
besproken. Uitdagingen zijn voornamelijk gerelateerd aan de nieuwigheid van het concept 
en haar natuur zelf – dynamische en tijdelijke non-organisaties. Beslissingen met 
betrekking tot de fysieke locatie van de verschillende componenten van de virtuele 
organisatie resulteren in een aantal bestuurlijke en beheersmatige consequenties. Een 
gebrek aan middelen, ongepaste afhankelijkheid, irrelevante diensten, verkeerde toepassing 
en ongewenste uitbreiding van het project buiten de originele doestelling (‘mission creep’) 
zijn de andere risicos die het succes van het concept bedreigen. 
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Logistieke capaciteiten ontwikkeld door virtuele corporaties kunnen resulteren in nieuwe 
markt kansen of, indien gewenst, in tijdelijke mission creep. De humanitaire ervaringen 
benadrukken de behoefte om vooruit te plannen met betrekking tot een uiteindelijke 
verplaatsing van diensten die worden aangeboden door de virtuele corporatie en nog steeds 
worden gevraagd door bestaande structuren. Er is gelegenheid voor het opzetten van een 
toegeweide structuur die overheden en donoren tijdelijk kan assisteren gedurende rampen 
en hun directe gevolgen. Het wordt aanbevolen dat die structuur onderdeel is van de VN 
inspanningen in de herstellingsfase en als zodanig wordt gefinancierd door de 
donorgemeenschap.  
Concluderend kunnen we zeggen dat complexe en grootschalige noodsituaties, tijdsdruk, 
onzekerheid in vraag en aanbod, tekorten in middelen en capaciteiten, logistieke faalmodi 
en de behoefte aan kleinere humanitaire organisaties positief zijn gecorreleerd met de 
opzet van humanitaire partnerschappen. We stellen dat goed ontworpen en 
geïmplementeerde partnerschappen de activiteiten van humanitaire organisaties op twee 
vlakken versterken: respons en preparedness. In termen van respons zorgen 
partnerschappen ervoor dat humanitaire organisaties meer flexibel zijn en hulpgoederen 
sneller, nauwkeuriger en meer kostenefficiënt kunnen aanbieden. Met betrekking tot 
preparedness stellen ze humanitaire organisaties in staat om de strategische, operationele 
en organisatorische uitdagingen van de toekomst het hoofd te bieden. 
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Far leva su partenariati logistici. Lezioni dalle organizzazioni 
umanitarie.  
 
Questa tesi affronta un argomento non ancora sufficientemente esplorato: organizzazioni 
umanitarie e loro catene di fornitura. Le organizzazioni umanitarie rispondono alle 
esigenze primarie delle popolazioni soggette a tragiche catastrofi umane e naturali. Visto il 
contesto difficile nel quale operano le organizzazioni umanitarie, questa tesi in primo 
luogo analizza i fattori che contribuiscono all’efficienza e all’efficacia della loro 
assistenza, per identificare successivamente le strategie e le strutture organizzative che 
devono adottare per rispondere alla crescente sfida di un’efficace assistenza a più persone 
con minori risorse. Nella tesi si argomenta che le organizzazioni umanitarie per eccellere 
nella preparazione e risposta ad un disastro, inter alia, devono stabilire almeno tre forme di 
partenariato - reti provvisorie di fornitura, una piattaforma per la coordinazione logistica, e 
una serie di partenariati con settore privato e societá civile – costruendo e rafforzando allo 
stesso tempo un certo numero di competenze. La risorsa intangible che abilmente utilizzata 
aumenta l'occasione e le capacitá di una organizzazione umanitaria di agire meglio é il suo 
capitale sociale con i partners coinvolti in questi partenariati. In termini di lezioni per il 
settore privato, questa tesi verifica l'attinenza ed i benefici di strutture di partenariato 
umanitarie per le catene di fornitura di tipo commerciale in specifici scenari. In piú, oltre 
ad indicare lezioni per le stesse organizzazioni umanitarie, questa tesi contribuisce alla 
letteratura relativa alle organizzazioni virtuali e fornisce evidenza empirica per la creazione 
e la gestione di organizzazioni virtuali logistiche.  
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